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I’ve been fortunate that the difficult and sometimes lonely process of graduate school has 
been made less so for me thanks to the colleagues, mentors, friends, and family who have helped 
me along the way. This dissertation is a testament to them.  
I learned to be a scholar at Johns Hopkins University, under the guidance of an incredible 
set of teachers, mentors, and friends. Melanie Shell-Weiss taught me historical empathy and the 
value of publically engaged scholarship. She modeled thoughtful pedagogy and compassionate 
mentorship, gently guiding me through the maze of undergraduate education and early adulthood. 
Elizabeth Rodini was a constant collaborator and friend who helped me understand the broad 
reach of humanities scholarship and the creative possibilities of our work. Jessica Stern taught 
me skills of historical analysis that I still think of every day and that I have passed on to my own 
students. She planted the idea of graduate school in my mind and her effusive enthusiasm about 
my ambitions was uplifting. By some stroke of luck, Nathan Connolly and I crossed paths in my 
last year at Hopkins, a fortuitous meeting that is largely responsible for the arc of my career. 
Nathan’s kind, thoughtful, and challenging mentorship fostered an intellectual curiosity that has 
sustained me through these past seven years. More than anything, though, I am grateful to 
Nathan for sending me to Michigan.  
I’ve received impeccable mentoring at the University of Michigan and have benefited 
from a committee of intellectual rock stars who are also keenly invested in my growth and 
success. Matt Lassiter has been a model dissertation chair. He fostered this project from its 
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earliest moments and always encouraged me to think outside the typical boundaries of our field. 
His thoughtful engagement with every historical project he encounters has helped me to think 
creatively about my own work and pushed me to better understand the broad scope of historical 
inquiry. He has also helped me to become a thoughtful teacher, a caring mentor, and a 
responsible colleague, through instruction and by always modeling those roles himself. Matthew 
Countryman guided me through my first semester of graduate school and encouraged me to 
pursue the questions that came to animate my dissertation. He has been an unfailingly kind 
mentor as I plan my career and consider the many options before me, always helping me to find 
the right fit. Heather Ann Thompson’s enthusiasm for this project invigorated me in moments 
when I felt lost and unsure of the way forward. Her ability to see the forest for the trees has 
helped me to take ownership of my research and refine my arguments. Her boundless energy and 
incredible ability to find time for her many students as well as her own invaluable scholarship is 
an inspirational model. Martha Jones always encouraged me to think with perspectives that did 
not come naturally to me, bettering this dissertation by no small amount. Her model of 
responsible public scholarship makes me aspire to reach broader audiences thoughtfully and 
empathetically. Bill Novak has always asked me the most confounding of questions that pushed 
me to make my arguments all the more precise and inventive. His infectious love of doing 
history is always invigorating and makes the work exciting. 
The Department of History at the University of Michigan has been an ideal home for the 
past seven years. Kathleen King, Diana Denney, Kimberly Smith, and Lorna Altstetter answered 
my questions as I learned to navigate the University and helped me with all the nuts and bolts 
along the way. I’ve benefited from the instruction and guidance of many faculty members 
beyond those on my dissertation committee; they have served as my teachers, my collaborators, 
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and my colleagues. I am grateful to Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof, Stephen Berrey, Marty Pernick, 
Fran Blouin, Rebecca Scott, Paulina Alberto, Howard Brick, Kathleen Canning, Will Glover, 
Mary Kelly, Michael Witgen, and Gina Morantz-Sanchez. Leslie Pincus, Sueann Caulfield, and 
Doug Northrup read early drafts of dissertation chapters in the dissertation-writing seminar, 
which was critical in keeping me on track through the writing process and helping me learn how 
to write a dissertation in the first place. Greg Parker and Michelle McClellan provided 
collegiality and collaboration through multiple public history projects in my final years at 
Michigan, which fostered my creativity and helped me expand my historical repertoire. Brandi 
Hughes gave me incredible counsel and support in the job skills seminar, commenting on draft 
materials and lending a compassionate ear through the difficult process of finding my next step.  
Beyond the Department of History, Michigan has offered me so many opportunities to 
grow and discover the career that I want. Paula Wishart provided space and resources for me to 
begin my critical exploration of the career options before me. She and the other facilitators of the 
What Now Seminar gave me a set of skills and the language I needed to understand how I might 
fit into the world beyond graduate school. I am grateful to Laura Schram and the Center for 
Research on Learning and Teaching for their work on the Preparing Future Faculty Seminar. The 
pedagogical skills and professional knowledge that I gained in that program helped me to 
navigate the process of academic job applications and made my materials much stronger.  
In my final year of graduate school, I became involved in the contract campaign for the 
UM Graduate Employee’s Organization. While it seemed like an unlikely task to take on as I 
finished my dissertation, bargaining that contract gave me a renewed sense of purpose. I am 
grateful to the GEO bargaining team—Cass Adair, Chris Campbell, Persephone Hernandez-Vogt, 
Angie Perone, and Sam Shuman—for showing me the power of collaboration and solidarity. The 
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contract we negotiated and this dissertation are my two proudest accomplishments at the 
University of Michigan. John Ware, Rachel Miller, Dominic Barbato, and Denise Bailey 
provided invaluable support for our work and I am in awe of their ongoing efforts to secure fair 
and equal working conditions for all the graduate students who labor at UM. I’m also grateful to 
GEO and the many organizers who came before me for securing our contract and particularly our 
health insurance. Those benefits enabled me to receive years of treatment at the UM 
Psychological Clinic, without which I could never have finished this dissertation. In particular, 
Emily Bilek helped me to become a happier, more balanced, more skilled person; I’m incredibly 
proud of the growth I have accomplished with her help. 
 My work has been generously funded by the University of Michigan Department of 
History, the Eisenberg Institute for Historical Studies, the Rackham Graduate School, the 
University of Michigan Law School Race, Law, and History Program, the Illinois Historical 
Society, and the University of Virginia Miller Center of Public Affairs. Brian Balogh and the 
Miller Center provided not only fellowship support, but also incredible mentoring and 
professional opportunities in my final years of dissertation writing. It was through the Miller 
Center that I met Kelly Lytle Hernandez, who read multiple dissertation chapters in varying 
states of completion. Her incisive comments improved the project immensely and pushed me to 
see the broad implications of my research for our contemporary moment. I was also fortunate to 
be a part of a brilliant cohort of Miller Center Fellows—Lizzie Ingelson, Sarah Robey, Ben 
Holtzman, Boris Heersink, Jon Free, Sarah Coleman, Noel Anderson, Shannon Nix, and Sara 
Seo—who provided invaluable commentary on my work as well as friendship and collegiality 
through our year together. Nikki Hemmer became a friend during my visits to Charlottesville and 
provided thoughtful feedback on my work as well as important advice about my career path.  
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 My friends and colleagues have made doing history rewarding and exciting. I am 
fortunate to be part of the far-flung network of Michigan alumni who have given me important 
advice and guidance. I’m grateful to Andrew Highsmith, Lily Geismer, Clay Howard, and Dale 
Winling. I’ve known Ashley Johnson and Peter Pihos since I first started venturing outside of 
Michigan to share my work, and they have been unfailingly supportive colleagues and friends. 
Michigan itself has lived up to its reputation as a supportive and collegial place to do graduate 
work and I am a better scholar for it. I am grateful to so many people at Michigan—Liz Harmon, 
Nicole Greer Golda, Cyrus O’Brien, Adriana Chira, Joe Ciadella, Austin McCoy, Alexander 
Stephens, Steve Arionus, Patrick Parker, Emily Merchant, Anthony Ross, Chelsea Del Rio, Josh 
Mound, Laura Ferguson, Robyn D’Avignon, Garrett Felber, Tatiana M. F. Cruz, Scott De Orio, 
Walker Elliott, Emma Nolan-Thomas, Hunter Harris, Leslie Hempson, Yanay Israeli, Hafsa 
Kanjwal, Brittany Magueri, Emma Park, Emily Price, and Jon Farr, among them.  
Marie Stango’s friendship has brought me countless hours of happy memories along with 
invaluable support in every personal or professional dilemma I could imagine. Katie Rosenblatt 
has been a constant collaborator and helped me broaden my horizons in all parts of my life. Ronit 
Stahl has always provided me with compassionate counsel and helped me through every 
milestone along the way. ToniAnn Trevino has become a close friend and collaborator, and I am 
so proud to see her flourish as a scholar. Jacqueline Larios is among the most loyal friends I have 
ever had; her candor and honesty is invaluable to me. Brady G’Sell and Aaron Seamen gave me 
a home away from home during some of the most difficult parts of the process, always with a 
cup of tea and two shoulders to cry on. Laura Burton Weigold came to Ann Arbor just when I 
needed her them most, and I will always treasure the year that we spent here together.  
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 I had the good fortune to arrive at the University of Michigan alongside a group of 
incredible scholars whom I am fortunate and humbled now to call my closest friends. I am 
grateful for so many things that I gained at Michigan, but mostly I am grateful for them. Tapsi 
Mathur’s friendship has sustained me through the most difficult of trials and made my happy 
times all the more joyous. Knowing that I can ask anything of her brings me comfort and 
strength. She is my person and I cannot imagine my time at Michigan or my life without her. 
Sophie Hunt and I became fast friends in our first weeks in Ann Arbor and she is one of my most 
trusted confidants. She is always ready to help me sort out any problem that arises with a 
thoughtfulness that is unmatched. Kate Silbert is a beacon of compassion who has helped me 
work through the most difficult of intellectual puzzles. Her steadfast kindness encourages me to 
think outside myself and strive to understand those around me more fully. Matt Woodbury is 
among the most generous friends I have ever had and always dependable for an adventure and a 
good time. His deep well of knowledge and eager curiosity make his friendship unfailingly fun 
and rewarding.  
Dan Wilcox came into my life as this project reached its final year and he is largely 
responsible for sustaining me through it. His enthusiasm invigorated me as I made the final most 
difficult push to finish the dissertation and to decide my next steps. He has attentively listened to 
more worries than I can count, always with a compassion that brought me comfort even in the 
most challenging times. I value his empathy, his insatiable lust for life, and his ability to bring 
out the best in me. Together we have small joys and great happinesses and I am lucky to call him 
my partner.  
 My family has seen me through all the challenges of graduate school and the years before. 
They have shared in my accomplishments and have made my failures easier to bear. Drew 
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Krinitsky is all that one could want in a brother and a friend. His passion for all that he does and 
his commitment to equality and justice make me proud every day. It brings me such happiness to 
see my relationship with Neil Krinitsky renewed as this project comes to an end. I am so grateful 
to him for bringing Katie and Olivia into my life and making our family all the more complete. 
John Krinitsky has never made a secret of his admiration for my scholarship, and perhaps even 
more so, my labor activism. He is always my sounding board and ever reliable to help me solve 
any problem, no matter how small or how great. I so appreciate his ability to express his love and 
his pride, and knowing that I am worthy of both sustains me. Wendy Krinitsky has been my 
ultimate champion. She is a lifelong learner who inspires me to interrogate the world around me 
and to strive to make it better and more just. She has never wavered in her support of my goals, 
my values, and my aspirations. She taught me to be a scholar and a feminist and to always rise to 
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“The Politics of Crime Control: Race, Policing, and Reform in Twentieth-Century 
Chicago” is a political history of urban policing that examines the integral role of crime control 
in the governance of modern American cities. It does so through a case study of policing and 
reform in Chicago from the interwar decades through the post-World War II years, a period that 
saw massive changes including African American migration, immigration, industrialization, and 
labor unrest. Crime control served as the central political proxy through which city leaders, 
reformers, and law enforcement officers attempted to achieve urban order, and in so doing, 
constructed modern social and racial hierarchies. These officials and reformers contributed to the 
construction of the coercive state, a state apparatus that prioritized social order as the primary 
mode through which to express state legitimacy and exercise state power. In the context of early-
twentieth-century Chicago, coercive state strategies worked in tandem with Progressive 
reformers and anti-crime activists to establish and reinforce spatial boundaries and to reify and 
redefine social hierarchies. Local police discretion represented the primary coercive state tool for 
addressing urban disorder, as well as one of the most intransigent and opaque modes of state 
power, especially in the service of defining and reinforcing racial hierarchy. The immediate, 
discretionary interactions between police and city residents served as one of the primary sites of 
racial formation in these decades, and elicited investigation, critique, and proposals for reform 
from myriad urban communities, other state institutions, and municipal reform organizations. 
Policing, therefore, represented the very intersection of coercive state power, municipal politics, 








On October 1, 1926, an African American woman who lived on Chicago’s South Side sat 
down to write a strongly worded letter to Mayor William E. Dever, which she wrote “in honour 
of Chicago.”1 She was likely among the thousands of African Americans who had migrated to 
Chicago during the previous ten years, the wave of black urban migration known as the first 
Great Migration. The woman lamented the conditions of her neighborhood, advising the mayor 
that the narrow strip of land between State Street and Federal Street and bound by 31st Street and 
39th Street was home to a disgraceful wave of law breaking. The South Side resident—who chose 
to identify herself only as “a hardworking woman”—described the daily harassment she faced as 
she returned home from work or other errands, only to be pursued by white men who roamed the 
streets, soliciting the black women they encountered. The letter arrived at the mayor’s office 
during the years of federal Prohibition, in the midst of several ongoing crime control campaigns 
that the reformist mayor had mounted in order to drive liquor and crime from the city.2 The 
hardworking woman’s neighborhood was located in the middle of the racially segregated South 
Side Black Belt and her letter indicated one of the foremost problems that many African 
American city residents faced—police directed illicit establishments and illegal activity into 
                                                
1 Letter from Anonymous to William E. Dever, October 1, 1926, Box 4, Folder 29: Dever, William E. –Mayoralty 
Papers, Police Department, 1926-1927, William E. Dever Papers, Chicago History Museum [hereinafter Dever 
Papers]. 
2 After assuming office in 1923, Dever directed police to shutter illegal saloons and dance halls, particularly those 
that catered to integrated clientele; months later he directed police to drive all alcohol from the city as well. “Mayor 
Backs Chief in Order to Mop Up Vice,” Chicago Journal, April 18, 1923, Volume 5: Career to 1923, William E. 
Dever Scrapbooks, Chicago History Museum [hereinafter Dever Scrapbooks]; “Law and Order Dever's Motto,” 
Chicago Journal, May 5, 1923, Volume 18: Mayoralty Campaign, 1923, Dever Scrapbooks; “6 Black and Tan Cafes 
Divested of Licenses,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 8, 1923, Volume 18: Mayoralty Campaign, 1923, Dever 
Scrapbooks. 
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black neighborhoods and failed to equally enforce the law thereafter. The woman wrote 
desperately that if the mayor would not exercise his executive power to direct police to enforce 
the law equally throughout the city “All hope is lost.”3 She had complained about the 
proliferation of illicit establishments and lawbreakers in her neighborhood before, “but it seems 
that the Police stand in with them.”4 This African American woman, who lived among the most 
criminalized and inequitably policed neighborhoods in early-twentieth-century Chicago, leveled 
an incisive critique of law enforcement officials themselves, drawing attention to the ways that 
police discretion and corruption had encouraged and endorsed law breaking on the black South 
Side.  
The hardworking woman’s letter indicated the intersection of several processes of law 
enforcement and racialization in Chicago over the course of the early twentieth century. Her 
lamentation over the dismal condition of her neighborhood and the fact that police stood by 
while illegal activity flourished there demonstrated two of the most intractable forms of racial 
discrimination that African American Chicagoans faced at the hands of law enforcement officers. 
Since pressure from Progressive reformers and business owners had resulted in the closing of the 
city’s downtown vice districts in the second decade of the twentieth century, police had actively 
encouraged illegal activity to move south into the predominantly black neighborhoods of the 
South Side.5 Police discretion to draw this spatial association between illegality and black urban 
space reinforced popular discourses of inherent black criminality that had circulated in Chicago 
                                                
3 Letter from Anonymous to William E. Dever, October 1, 1926, Box 4, Folder 29: Dever, William E. –Mayoralty 
Papers, Police Department, 1926-1927, Dever Papers. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Vice Commission of Chicago, The Social Evil in Chicago: Study of Existing Conditions with Recommendations by 
the Vice Commission of Chicago (Chicago: Vice Commission of Chicago, 1911), 38; Chicago Commission on Race 
Relations, The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and A Race Riot (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1922), 344. 
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and around the country since the beginning of the twentieth century.6 Many of the corrupt police 
that the woman observed likely benefited financially from their relationships with illicit 
enterprises, discouraging them from halting illegal activity in the neighborhood. This exercise of 
police discretion and corruption further underscored urban inequality, suggesting that the black 
residents of her neighborhood were undeserving of fair law enforcement. The woman’s self-
moniker—“hardworking”—also drew to mind a particular strain of black crime politics that had 
emerged in Chicago over the course of the Great Migration, one that intersected with the politics 
of respectability and drew contrasts between lawful African Americans and lawbreakers. By 
identifying as “hardworking,” the letter writer situated herself as a part of respectable black 
Chicago who earned her living through honest means, in direct contrast to the women employed 
in the vice trades who also populated her neighborhood.  
The problems that the hardworking woman faced in 1926 were the same ones that piqued 
the interests of a range of reformers in Chicago during the first four decades of the twentieth 
century—the proliferation of vice, the illegal sale of alcohol and operation of saloons, criminal 
syndicate activity and street crime, and discriminatory discretionary policing. The city’s myriad 
reformers offered a range of solutions to the problems she confronted, each drawing on their own 
methods of urban improvement. The Vice Commission of Chicago, the Progressive municipal 
agency tasked with investigating and eradicating vice in the second decade of the twentieth 
century, would have suggested that low wages had ushered women in to the vice trades and that 
poor police discipline had resulted in the encouragement of those immoral establishments and 
their proliferation in black neighborhoods. The Progressive reformers and intellectuals in that 
organization would have recommended the complete elimination of vice establishments and 
                                                
6 “Voice of the People: The Southern Negro in the North,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 9, 1917; “Chicago Blames 
Idle Negroes for Crimes,” Detroit Free Press, March 24, 1919; Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of 
Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 5. 
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strict law enforcement by police as the best solution.7 The Chicago Commission on Race 
Relations, an interracial group of reformers and urban sociologists assembled after the 1919 
Chicago Race Riot, would have noted the structural factors that limited the woman’s residential 
and employment opportunities and recommended the improvement of economic opportunities 
for African Americans in order to reduce illegal activity on the black South Side.8 In contrast, the 
anti-crime activists of the Chicago Crime Commission, a group of conservative businessmen 
concerned with urban lawfulness, might have recommended an increase in the number of police 
patrolmen detailed to the neighborhood as well as the close surveillance of the illicit 
establishments located there.9 The Juvenile Protection Association, a group of women social 
workers who advocated for the improvement of juvenile justice, would have delegated a number 
of their own officers to the neighborhood to inspect the conditions and make recommendations 
for improved social services in order to prevent further law breaking.10 These multiple possible 
solutions to the hardworking woman’s dilemma demonstrated the potential for the problems of 
urban crime control to prompt diverse recommendations for the implementation of urban order, 
some in tension with one another and variously encouraging state expansion, surveillance, and 
policy changes in the early twentieth century.  
 “The Politics of Crime Control: Race, Policing, and Reform in Twentieth-Century 
Chicago” explores the questions, themes, and possibilities for reform raised by this hardworking 
woman’s letter and reflected in the visions of these several reform organizations—questions of 
police discretion, state power, urban space, and race making in the modern United States. It 
                                                
7 Vice Commission of Chicago, The Social Evil in Chicago, 25. 
8 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago, 640-651. 
9 Henry Barrett Chamberlin, “The Chicago Crime Commission—How the Business Men of Chicago Are Fighting 
Crime,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 11 (May 1920); Edwin Sims, “Fighting Crime in Chicago: The 
Crime Commission,” Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 11 (May 1920-1921). 
10 “Annual Report of the Juvenile Protection Association,” 1915-1916, Supplement 1, Box 1-SI, Folder 4: Annual 
Reports; 1907-1939, Juvenile Protection Association Records, University of Illinois at Chicago Special Collections 
[hereinafter JPA Records]. 
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reveals the integral role of crime policy in the governance of modern American cities through a 
case study of policing and reform in Chicago from the early twentieth century through the post-
World War II years. The dissertation spans one of the most significant periods of urban growth 
in the United States; the myriad urban changes in the first half of the twentieth century 
underlined the relationship between law enforcement and the imposition of urban order in a 
rapidly changing and diversifying metropolis. The chronological scope of the project captures 
two massive migrations of African Americans to Chicago, waves of European and Mexican 
immigration, and the eventual curtailment of that immigration. It was also a period of significant 
industrialization as well as expansion and municipalization of city services and infrastructure. 
These intersecting urban changes precipitated urgent responses from municipal officials and 
reformers alike, as they considered how crime and social deviance would affect the growing city 
and the building of an ordered metropolis. The endpoint of the dissertation—the years following 
WWII—captures critical changes to the relationship among racial categories, criminalization, 
and policing in the early twentieth century. By the post-WWII years, a second massive migration 
of African Americans had arrived in Chicago, European immigration had been restricted by 
federal legislation, and Prohibition was practically a distant memory. These shifts focused 
attention on the problem of black crime, in contrast to the intersecting crime control campaigns 
of the interwar years that had variously turned attention to criminality among the foreign born, 
ethnic immigrant gangs, and newly arrived African Americans. White racial violence also 
resurged again in the post-WWII years as it had in the years following the First World War, with 
similar endorsement by the law enforcement authorities, demonstrating ongoing state investment 
in the defense of the urban color line.11 
                                                
11 My dissertation builds on the work of urban historians of Chicago who have traced the intersection of migration, 
immigration, industrialization, and capitalism in the growth of that metropolis from the late nineteenth century 
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The dissertation is concerned with what I call “crime control politics”—a purposely 
expansive term that I have coined and deploy to signal the broad constellation of actors, 
institutions, state policies, and reforms concerned with urban crime and deviance and the 
achievement of lawfulness and urban order. Throughout the early twentieth century, crime 
served as the central political proxy and public discourse through which urban leaders, reformers, 
and law enforcement officers defined urban disorder and attempted to impose their own visions 
of improvement and reform. The broad boundaries of “crime control politics” capture not only 
concern regarding official law breaking, but also a range of deviant behaviors and actions that 
were criminalized by law enforcement officials and reformers, although not necessarily by the 
letter of the law. The dissertation primarily traces three types of crime control problems raised 
among early-twentieth-century Chicagoans: vice and moral turpitude, street crime and official 
law breaking, and state corruption and violence. Various historical actors prioritized these 
problems according to the conditions of their own neighborhoods, their political and reformist 
                                                                                                                                                       
through the twentieth. For representative examples of that extensive historical literature, see Jeffrey S. Adler, First 
in Violence, Deepest in Dirt: Homicide in Chicago, 1875-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); 
Gabriela F. Arredondo, Mexican Chicago: Race, Identity, and Nation, 1916-1939 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2008); Robin F. Bachin, Building the South Side: Urban Space and Civic Culture in Chicago, 1890-1919 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Davarian Baldwin, Chicago’s New Negroes: Modernity, the Great 
Migration, and Black Urban Life (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Andrew W. Cohen, The 
Racketeer’s Progress: Chicago and the Struggle for the Modern Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004); Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1991); Andrew J. Diamond, Mean Streets: Chicago Youths and the Everyday Struggle for Empowerment in 
the Multiracial City, 1908-1969 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Maureen A. Flanagan, Seeing with 
their Hearts: Chicago Women and the Vision of the Good City, 1871-1933 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002); Margaret Garb, City of American Dreams: A History of Homeownership and Housing Reform in Chicago, 
1870-1919 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); James R. Grossman, Land of Hope: Chicago, Black 
Southerners, and the Great Migration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Thomas A. Guglielmo, White 
on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); 
Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); Jeffrey Helgeson, Crucibles of Black Empowerment: Chicago’s Neighborhood Politics 
from the New Deal to Harold Washington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014); Elaine Lewinnek, The 
Working Man’s Reward: Chicago’s Early Suburbs and the Roots of American Sprawl (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014); John T. McGreevy, Parish Boundaries: The Catholic Encounter with Race in the 
Twentieth-Century Urban North (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Thomas L. Philpott, The Slum and 
the Ghetto: Neighborhood Deterioration and Middle-Class Reform, Chicago, 1880-1930 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 978); Allan H. Spear, Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1967). 
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goals, and their racial and social contexts. Among Progressive reform organizations and many 
neighborhoods residents, vice and moral depravity served as the foremost challenge to urban 
improvement and middle-class notions of moral order. Groups such as the Vice Commission of 
Chicago and the Chicago Urban League sought to rid the city of vice establishments that law 
enforcement officials largely encouraged or ignored. Good government reformers and 
businessmen viewed official laxity and corruption as one of the city’s leading crime problems, as 
they threatened state legitimacy and discouraged industrial growth. Those actors saw criminal 
syndicate activity and street crime as corresponding problems, as connections to criminal gangs 
spurred official corruption and discouraged rigorous law enforcement. Almost all city residents 
viewed street crime as a foremost problem in Chicago, as they experienced law breaking in their 
neighborhoods that often went unaddressed by law enforcement officers who chose to 
underpolice certain neighborhoods due to their racial, ethnic, or class dimensions. Finally, 
policed communities themselves also experienced the ubiquitous problem of illegal police 
brutality and state violence, seeking legal remedies to that endemic problem throughout the early 
twentieth century. All of these actors turned to law enforcement and criminal justice in some 
capacity to solve the problems of crime and disorder that they identified, demonstrating the 
centrality of law enforcement to urban development and governance in this period.  
I self-consciously avoid the term “law and order politics” as a label for the many varieties 
of anti-crime policies and reformist sentiments in the dissertation due to the political 
connotations that the term invokes—that of a conservative turn to punitive politics and strict law 
enforcement often associated with the last few decades of the twentieth century. Admittedly, 
some of the actors in the dissertation did prescribe to ideologies of strict, punitive law 
enforcement; when that comparison is appropriate, I deploy the language of law and order. But 
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the broad swathe of actors concerned with controlling crime and disorder in early-twentieth-
century Chicago spanned the political ideological spectrum. While some did invoke the kind of 
rhetoric and politics that modern American historians have come to associate with punitive law 
and order, others drew on Progressive reform traditions to imagine modes of curtailing crime that 
accounted for various urban social conditions such as poverty, unemployment, and housing 
discrimination. As the organizing framework for the dissertation, “crime control politics” 
provides for a broad consideration of the historical actors with a vested interest in urban 
lawfulness and order, rather than a narrow focus on actors who might obviously be associated 
with law enforcement, concerned with statutory crime, or calling for punitive measures. It also 
encompasses those who critiqued law enforcement itself, such as municipal government 
reformers and racial justice advocates who saw police as foremost lawbreakers due to their 
widespread connections to organized crime and their illegal uses of violence. The dissertation 
puts these actors into the same framework in order to understand the range of strategies pursued 
in order to control crime in its many forms and to understand how those strategies and policies 
interacted and influenced one another. 
My capacious concept of crime control politics and close attention to the local scale have 
shaped my understanding of the American state in the early twentieth century. Scholarship on the 
American carceral state after World War II has meticulously documented its rise, the massive 
expansion of mass incarceration, and the punitive turn in American law enforcement policy.12 
                                                
12 For a sampling of recent historical scholarship on the rise of the American carceral state, the expansion of mass 
incarceration, and the bipartisan investment in punitive politics, see Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: New Press, 2010); Robert T. Chase, “We Are Not Slaves: 
Rethinking the Rise of Carceral States through the Lens of the Prisoners' Rights Movement,” Journal of American 
History Vol. 102, No. 1 (June 2015): 73-86; Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and 
Opposition in Globalizing California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Marie Gottschalk, The 
Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in 
America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016); Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, Getting Tough: Welfare and 
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Embarking on this project, I had expected to discover the gradual building or origin point of the 
modern carceral state in the same punitive mode that historians of the late twentieth century have 
catalogued. Questions posed by those scholars provided a critical starting point for my 
examination of early-twentieth-century law enforcement and provided the basis for a broader set 
of questions about the relationship among law enforcement, urban development, and municipal 
governance that eventually came to animate the dissertation.13 What I found in early-twentieth-
century Chicago was a range of reformers and municipal leaders far more concerned with 
imposing urban order, defining social hierarchy, and defending the urban color line than with 
punitive law enforcement or massive criminal justice state building. Certainly, attempts to 
achieve urban order through policing and crime control resulted in many instances of state 
scrutiny, surveillance, and punishment of Chicagoans. Those processes did not result from a 
dominant punitive law enforcement ethos, however, but rather from a conception of governance 
that foregrounded crime control as crucial to modern social order and state legitimacy.14 
Therefore, the label “carceral state” and its current historiographical associations with a massive 
criminal justice apparatus came to feel increasingly anachronistic as I spent time with these 
                                                                                                                                                       
Imprisonment in 1970s America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Marc Mauer, Race to Incarcerate 
(New York: New Press, 1999); Naomi Murakawa, The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Donna J. Murch, “Crack in Los Angeles: Crisis, Militarization, and Black 
Response to the Late Twentieth-Century War on Drugs,” Journal of American History, Vol. 102, No. 1 (June 2015): 
162-173; Jonathan Simon, Governing through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy 
and Created a Culture of Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Heather Ann Thompson, “Why Mass 
Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History,” Journal of 
American History Vol. 97, No. 3 (December 2010): 703-734; Heather Ann Thompson, Blood in the Water: The 
Attica Prison Uprising of 1971 and Its Legacy (New York: Pantheon Books, 2016). 
13 Similar questions about the politics of law enforcement and crime control as an engine of state capacity motivate 
Lisa McGirr’s recent work on Prohibition, although she adopts a national and federal framework for her study. Lisa 
McGirr, The War on Alcohol: Prohibition and the Rise of the American State (New York: W.W. Norton, 2016). 
14 My archival findings were particularly in tension with historical literature that has emphasized late-twentieth-
century conservative backlash as the primary causative factor in the development of American law enforcement and 
crime control policy. Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997); Michael Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of 
Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Christian Parenti, Lockdown America: 
Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis (New York: Verso, 1999); Vesla M. Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the 
Development of Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American Political Development Vol. 21, No. 2 (November 
2007), 230-265; Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America (New York: Russell Sage, 2006). 
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early-twentieth-century sources, encouraging a conception of the state that could capture its 
wider range of functions. 
The concept that best captures this pursuit of order and its relationship to the politics of 
crime control is one that I call the “coercive state,” a framework that encompasses both carceral 
state institutions as well as non-state actors with an interest in the institution of reform and the 
imposition of social order. A coercive state is one that prioritizes social order and the 
maintenance of social hierarchy as the primary mode through which to express state legitimacy 
and exercise state power, while also relying on public-private partnerships to provide social 
services and surveillance and to augment state capacities to compel lawfulness and adherence to 
respectable norms of behavior. In the context of early-twentieth-century Chicago, coercive state 
structures utilized reform movements to establish and reinforce spatial boundaries and to reify 
and redefine social hierarchies as they were unsettled due to influxes of African American 
migration, immigration, industrialization, and labor unrest. The coercive state encompasses the 
carceral state’s expansion and contraction over time while also including non-state actors in 
initiating, pursuing, and enacting state projects of social control. Critically, the non-state actors 
and non-carceral state institutions that participate in coercive state projects tend to view law 
enforcement strategies and agencies as the most efficacious way to institute their visions of 
reform and urban order. The coercive state is then both a set of interlocking institutions and 
policies as well as a mode of governance and reform. It is not chronologically bounded but rather 
defined by its public-private collaborations in pursuit of social order through the means of law 
enforcement. The coercive state may be located and identified in other eras of American history 
beyond the boundaries of this dissertation, in moments when a variety of historical actors with a 
shared interest in order and reform turned toward law enforcement to achieve their ends.  
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In my close analysis of the role of the coercive state in organizing American society and 
constructing modern social hierarchies, I join the growing literature of American political history, 
drawing attention to the manifestations of state power evident in the routine interactions between 
police and city residents, thereby demonstrating the critical role that policing must play in 
understandings of diffuse, infrastructural state power.15 My concept of the coercive state 
particularly draws on the historical literature of Progressivism, especially in its attention to the 
Janus-faced pursuit of both social reform and social control. Historians of Progressivism have 
catalogued a broad range of policies deployed in the service of middle-class normative standards 
of order and behavior in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including settlement 
work, urban planning, vice eradication, public health reform, labor protectionism, and socialized 
jurisprudence.16 I demonstrate the centrality of law enforcement to historical actors engaged in 
projects of both social control and social reform and deploy “coercive state” as a concept that can 
                                                
15 I am particularly influenced by a range of political historians who have located diffuse state power among actors 
such as welfare workers, federal lawyers, marriage clerks, immigration officers, public health officials, and border 
patrol officers. My work indicates the utility of urban historical methodologies to political historians who seek to 
answer question about where, how, and when the modern American state grew in capacity over the course of the 
twentieth century by demonstrating how issues of urban order fostered efforts to expand state surveillance over 
everyday life. Margot Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Risa Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2010); Kelly Lytle Hernández, Migra!: A History of the US Border Patrol (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010); Peggy Pascoe, What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of 
Race in Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens 
and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); William J. Novak, “The Myth of 
the “Weak” American State,” The American Historical Review, 113 (3), 752-772; Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: 
Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Michael 
Willrich, Pox: An American Story (New York: Penguin, 2011). 
16 For examples of historians of Progressivism who locate both its coercive and reformist impulses, see Paul Boyer, 
Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); Miroslava 
Chávez-Garcia, States of Delinquency: Race and Science in the Making of California’s Juvenile Justice System 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Mark Connelly, The Response to Prostitution in the Progressive 
Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Flanagan, Seeing With their Hearts; Estelle B. 
Freedman, Their Sisters’ Keepers: Women’s Prison Reform in America, 1830-1930 (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1981); Anne Meis Knupfer, Reform and Resistance: Gender, Delinquency, and America’s First 
Juvenile Court (New York: Routledge, 2001); Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the 
Progressive Movement in American, 1870-1920 (New York: Free Press, 2003); Natalia Molina, Fit to Be Citizens?: 
Public Health and Race in Los Angeles, 1879-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Daniel T. 
Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1998); Shah, Contagious Divides; Michael Willrich, City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era 
Chicago (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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hold both of those impulses together, rather than assuming an inherent tension between 
progressive and punitive ends. Critically, the coercive state can tolerate certain varieties of urban 
disorder while quashing others, a calculus informed by the local racial, spatial, and political 
contexts. For instance, state officials regularly tolerated and endorsed white popular violence 
during the early twentieth century, while simultaneously disproportionately arresting African 
Americans, as well as European and Mexican immigrants. The coercive state is then a 
historically specific embodiment of state power, informed by local contexts and power holders. 
Police themselves were a critical component of the coercive state in early-twentieth-
century Chicago, and policing—the most immediate and routine site of contact between city 
residents and the state—serves as the primary narrative engine of the dissertation as well as a 
lens onto the processes of state coercion, racialization, reform, and critique. Progressive 
reformers, business elites, city executives, federal officials, and racial justice advocates all 
adopted crime control as a lens through which to define urban disorder and viewed police as a 
critical component of resolving it, whether as agents of order or as objects of reform themselves. 
Scholars of urban policing have noted the historical tension between policing and efforts for 
reform, drawing attention to recurrent attempts to control police behavior and reform police 
department policy.17 These reform efforts, however, have been routinely stymied by police 
reluctance to resign police power and autonomous discretion or have been transformed by local 
political circumstances resulting in the expansion of punitive law enforcement policies. I expand 
on this scholarship, drawing on its attention to the tension between policing and reform and 
                                                
17 For recent historical scholarship on the relationship between policing and reform, see the April 2017 special 
section of the Journal of Urban History. Chris Agee, “Crisis and Redemption: The History of American Police 
Reform since World War II,” Journal of Urban History (April 18, 2017): 1-9. 
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extending that attention to an examination of early-twentieth-century urban development.18 It 
was also the immediate, discretionary interactions between police and city residents that served 
as one of the primary sites of racial formation in these decades and elicited investigation, critique, 
and proposals for reform from myriad urban communities, other state institutions, and urban 
reform organizations.19 Policing, therefore, represented the very intersection of coercive state 
power, municipal politics, racialization, and efforts for reform.  
Police represented the primary state apparatus for addressing urban disorder in early-
twentieth-century Chicago, as well as one of the most intransigent and opaque tools of state 
                                                
18 While the historical scholarship of urban policing and reform has grown in recent years, much of that work has 
focused on the second half of the twentieth century. Chris Agree, The Streets of San Francisco: Policing and the 
Creation of a Cosmopolitan Liberal Politics, 1950-1972 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014); Andrew S. 
Baer, “From Law and Order to Torture: Race and Policing in De-Industrial Chicago,” (Phd diss., Northwestern 
University, 2016); Martha Biondi, To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Max Felker-Kantor, “Policing the Crisis: Law Enforcement, Race, 
and the Shaping of the Carceral State in late-Twentieth Century Los Angeles,” (PhD diss., University of Southern 
California, 2014); Risa Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power, Constitutional Change, and the Making of the 
1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Leonard Moore, Black Rage in New Orleans: Police Brutality 
and African American Activism from World War II to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 
2010); Murch, “Crack in Los Angeles;” Micol Seigel, “Objects of Police History,” Journal of American History Vol. 
102, No. 1 (June 2015): 152-161; Sara Seo, “The Fourth Amendment, Cars, and Freedom in Twentieth-Century 
America,” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2016); Timothy Stewart-Winter, Queer Clout: Chicago and the Rise of 
Gay Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). Recent exceptions to this scholarly focus on the 
late twentieth century include Adler, First in Violence, Deepest in Dirt; Simon Balto, “‘The Law Has a Bad Opinion 
of Me’: Policing and Politics in Twentieth-Century Black Chicago,” (Phd diss., University of Wisconsin, 2015); 
Jennifer Fronc, New York Undercover: Private Surveillance in the Progressive Era (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009); Kali Gross, Colored Amazons: Crime, Violence, and Black Women in the City of Brotherly Love, 
1880-1910 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Marilynn Johnson, Street Justice: A History of Police Violence 
in New York City (Boston: Beacon Books, 2003); Shannon King, Whose Harlem is This, Anyway?: Community 
Politics and Grassroots Activism during the New Negro Era (New York: New York University Press, 2015); Sam 
Mitrani, The Rise of the Chicago Police Department: Class and Conflict, 1850-1894 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2013); Gillian O’Brien, Blood Runs Green: The Murder that Transfixed Gilded Age Chicago (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2015). 
19 Historical scholarship on the carceral state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has largely focused 
on penal institutions while I draw attention to the immediate contact between citizens and the coercive state through 
daily encounters with the police. Douglass A. Blackmon, Slavery By Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black 
People in America From the Civil War to World War II (New York: Doubleday, 2008); Mary Ellen Curtin, Black 
Prisoners and Their World, Alabama, 1865-1900 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000); Talitha 
LeFlouria, Chained in Silence: Black Women and Convict Labor in the New South (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2015); Alex Lichtenstein, Twice the Work of Free Labor: The Political Economy of Convict Labor in 
the New South (London: Verso, 1996); Rebecca M. McLennan, The Crisis of Imprisonment: Protest, Politics, and 
the Making of the American Penal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); David M. Oshinsky, 
Worse Than Slavery: Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice (New York: Free Press, 1996); David 
Rothmans, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic (New York: Transaction, 
1971). 
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power. All the historical actors and agencies who participated in coercive state projects engaged 
with police in some capacity, sometimes as collaborators and sometimes as critics of police. 
These actors all encountered the problem of police discretion, whether as a problem of official 
laxity, racial discrimination, or state violence.20 In turn, they offered a variety of solutions to 
these problems—as reformers would have to the problems posed by the hardworking woman 
writing to Mayor Dever in 1926—ranging from equalized law enforcement, to increased state 
surveillance, to structural and economic improvements. Official discretion is embedded in the 
very structure of American law enforcement itself and nearly inseparable from state officials’ 
ability to make decisions about when, where, and how to enforce the law.21 However, this 
functional feature of law enforcement also became the site where assumptions about race and 
social hierarchy could be enacted by officers of the state, as they chose whom to arrest, which 
neighborhoods would receive surveillance, where to direct vice and other illegal activity, and 
when to exert violence.22 These decisions were always historically contingent and informed by 
the social and political context of the city and the nation, as popularly circulating discourses 
about the link between blackness and criminality or proclivities to crime among the foreign born 
found expression in police tendencies to arrest African Americans and immigrants at 
                                                
20 My close attention to police discretion is particularly influenced by the work of William Novak and his critique of 
a weak/strong dichotomy for understanding the development of the American state. Novak encourages scholars to 
adopt the concept of infrastructural power to understand the vast reach of the state and its penetration into nearly 
every aspect of American civil society; police discretion is a critical component of infrastructural power. Novak, 
“The Myth of the “Weak” American State,” 763. 
21 Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1980). 
22 This analytic point is influenced by the work of critical race theorists who have indicated the role of race in 
American law and the ways that legal developments have worked to secure the structures of white supremacy and 
white privilege over time. These scholars draw particular attention to the active role that law has played in producing 
meaning for racial categories, arguing that law does not simply reflect a preexisting power structure, but that law 
itself produces and gives meaning to social and racial hierarchies. I draw on this contribution to show how policing 
has also been generative of racial knowledge and has played active role in the definition of racial hierarchies. 
Derrick Bell, “Racial Realism,” Connecticut Law Review 24 (1992): 363-379; Cheryl Harris, “Whiteness as 
Property,” Harvard Law Review, 106 (June 1993): 1707-1791; Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 6 
(July 1991): 1241-1299. 
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disproportionate rates. Chicago’s own particular racial history, including the massive growth of 
its African American population in the years after WWI and the construction of urban racial 
boundaries, also shaped the deployment of police discretion, as officers decided how to enforce 
the law based on the racial meaning of the spaces that they patrolled. Violence, the worst excess 
of police discretion, wove throughout nearly every daily interaction with police, serving as the 
foundation of state authority rather than an aberration from typical police conduct. Police 
brutality was so ubiquitous as to practically amount to department policy, and few Chicagoans 
could escape illegal police violence regardless of race, gender, or status. 
The coercive state played a direct role in the redefinition of racial categories in the early 
twentieth century through the exercise of police discretion and other discretionary law 
enforcement practices. Police discretion allowed racial knowledge to suffuse daily interactions 
between police officers and Chicago residents and allowed that same racial knowledge to 
become embedded in campaigns to control crime. This understanding of policing as a state 
technology of race making draws on the work of scholars who have found similar race making 
functions among other officers of the state such as judges, immigration officials, marriage clerks, 
border patrol officers, and public health officers.23 Racial knowledge informed the decisions of 
these state agents as they enforced regulations and enacted public policies, just as police drew on 
racial knowledge to inform their decisions about how to enforce the law. One of the foremost 
police race making technologies was the act of arrest; the choice to arrest one person and not to 
                                                
23 For scholars who have adopted similar approaches to the relationship among race, bureaucracy, and state 
knowledge, see Chávez-Garcia, States of Delinquency; Ariela Gross, What Blood Won’t Tell: A History of Race on 
Trial in America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Ian Haney López, White By Law: The Legal 
Construction of Race (New York: New York University Press, 2006); Daniel Martinez HoSang, Racial 
Propositions: Ballot Initiatives and the Making of Postwar California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2010); Lytle Hernández, Migra!; Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness; Pascoe, What Comes Naturally; 
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American West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Ngai, Impossible Subjects; Theodore M. Porter, 
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arrest another demonstrated the immediacy of police discretion. This form of discretion also 
operated at the level of neighborhoods, as police administrators decided where to direct 
enforcement efforts thereby criminalizing some neighborhoods and decriminalizing others.24  
Racial knowledge shaped successive crime control campaigns in Chicago throughout the 
early twentieth century, as officers deployed their understandings of racial difference to guide 
concerted efforts to control crime in the city. Progressive reformers’ campaigns to control vice 
and other deviant activity in the first two decades of the twentieth century resulted in calls for the 
total suppression of vice, such as the Vice Commission of Chicago’s 1911 recommendation 
“Constant and persistent repression of prostitution…absolute annihilation the ultimate ideal.”25 
In practice, however, those recommendations resulted in the eradication of vice only from certain 
white neighborhoods, as police encouraged illicit establishments to relocate to African American 
neighborhoods by the second decade of the twentieth century.26 Later crime control campaigns 
targeted racially integrated public spaces and ethnic immigrant social establishments, marking 
racial integration and foreign-born communities as necessarily criminal. Police also used 
discretionary tactics to demonstrate their own state authority and crime fighting vigor in the face 
of criticism from reformers; repeated mass police raids in African American neighborhoods and 
among immigrant communities in the interwar decades worked to criminalize those communities 
and dramatize police power. 
Policing represented a critical site of racial formation in early-twentieth-century Chicago 
and demonstrated the instability of racial categories throughout this period and the complexity of 
those categories beyond a simple racial binary. Annual reports from the Chicago Police 
                                                
24 This attention to the work of police at the neighborhood level is influenced by Heather Ann Thompson’s concept 
of “the criminalization of urban space.” Thompson, “Why Mass Incarceration Matters,” 706. 
25 Vice Commission of Chicago, The Social Evil in Chicago, 25. 
26 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago, 344. 
 17 
Department displayed a remarkable degree of transparency, documenting arrests and charges 
according to racial and ethnic categories as well as by gender. This record of early-twentieth-
century police data served as an archive of discretion and race making, indexing not those who 
were most likely to break the law, but rather those who were most likely to be arrested. Police 
consistently arrested African Americans at disproportionate rates beginning in the early twentieth 
century; this overrepresentation of black arrests forged a statistical linkage between blackness 
and criminality through the operation of police discretion.27 Similarly, certain immigrant groups 
in Chicago were consistently overrepresented among arrests and targeted in crime control 
campaigns for violations of the federal ban on alcohol and immigration regulations. Germans, 
Poles, and Italians were frequently overrepresented among liquor violations, while Mexicans, 
Greeks, Italians, and Chinese were detained at disproportionate rates in so-called deportation 
raids. Police discretion to make arrests, therefore, represented the site at which officers of the 
state could reinforce the association of certain racial categories with law breaking in the interwar 
decades.  
Critically, however, the history of racialized policing in early-twentieth-century Chicago 
was not one of a strict binary between blackness and whiteness but instead represented a moment 
in time when the state puzzled over the meaning of those categories and the boundaries among 
them. Scholars of whiteness and immigration have shown the role of structures including labor 
unions, welfare programs, community institutions, and cultural consumption in incorporating 
ethnic immigrant communities into white racial categories.28 Law enforcement also represented a 
                                                
27 U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
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site where the boundaries of whiteness could be expanded or contracted, as Chicago police 
carefully chose whom to arrest and whom to leave undisturbed. While some white crimes and 
deviant behaviors were decriminalized and endorsed by the police, others were not, and the 
decision regarding whom to arrest and when largely hinged on a range of factors including the 
relationship of the policed community to the category of whiteness, the urban geography of the 
crime, and the relative threat that any given crime or deviance posed to the legitimacy of the 
coercive state itself. For instance, police routinely ignored white racial violence and failed to 
make arrests in white street crimes against black victims. This form of illegal white violence 
served to bolster the urban color line, one of the most critical coercive state projects in this 
period. Other white and immigrant crimes, however, were stringently policed such as criminal 
syndicate violence, the sale of illegal alcohol, and violations of federal immigration restrictions. 
The warrantless arrest of members of Chicago’s immigrant communities stretched in the 1930s, 
contradicting arguments that whites and ethnic immigrants had been decriminalized or viewed as 
a rehabilitatable population at least a decade earlier.29 Instead, local police continued to target 
recent European immigrants as well as Mexican immigrants in order to demonstrate their own 
authority and contradict claims of official laxity. While black crime gradually became a foremost 
priority among city leaders and reformers by the post-WWII years, the uneven decriminalization 
of whiteness in the decades before demonstrated that these racial categories did not become 
redefined in an even exchange, but rather through contingent processes that depended on the 
local politics of crime control.  
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Foremost among the actors who populate the dissertation are the policed themselves, 
especially the city’s growing African American population and its immigrant communities, who 
engaged in their own variety of crime control politics and coercive state projects through the 
pursuit of equalized policing in their neighborhoods and the curtailment of illegal state violence. 
As masses of African Americans left Southern rural areas for urban centers following WWI, 
Chicago’s black population more than doubled between 1910 and 1920, and doubled again by 
1930.30 The proportion of black Chicagoans comprising the total city population grew apace as 
well; by 1920, that proportion had grown to four percent, and by 1930 it had increased yet again 
to 6.9 percent. Most of those new black Chicagoans found homes in the South Side Black Belt, a 
narrow strip of racially segregated land roughly bounded by 31st Street to the north and 63rd Street 
to the south, Wentworth Avenue to the west and Cottage Grove Avenue to the east.31 It was here 
that many new black migrants found some of the only landlords willing to rent to African 
Americans, usually at highly inflated rates. As a result, by 1920 more than 85 percent of black 
city residents lived in neighborhoods that were at least 50 percent African American, most of 
them concentrated on the black South Side.32 
The African American population of Chicago was a diverse one in the early twentieth 
century, made up of black elites, leaders of racial improvement organizations, Old Settlers, and 
new Southern migrants. Among the masses of African Americans who comprised the 8.2 percent 
of Chicago’s total population by 1940 were many thousands of migrants who had arrived in the 
years after each World War. The infusion of new black Southern migrants fostered intraracial 
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divides along axes of class and status, as long-time black Chicago residents came to be known as 
“Old Settlers” as opposed to their newer Southern neighbors, most of whom were almost 
uniformly working class or impoverished.33 In contrast, the leaders of racial improvement 
organizations were generally among the black intellectual, economic, and religious elite of 
Chicago, and many of them had links to national organizations and black intellectual institutions 
around the country. Scholars of black migration have demonstrated how those massive 
movements of African Americans to the urban South and North transformed urban racial 
landscapes, intraracial divisions, and black politics and rights claims.34 The politics of crime 
control shaped claims for black rights as well, as black Chicagoans attempted to secure fair law 
enforcement and end police discrimination.  
Resistance to discriminatory policing among African Americans demonstrated the 
potential for crime control politics to be oriented toward state institutions themselves and to be 
generative of claims to equal rights. Among some African American Chicagoans—particularly 
among political, economic, and intellectual black elites—discriminatory law enforcement 
clarified a black law and order politics that intersected with the politics of respectability, as some 
equated black lawfulness and moral upstanding with black rights to fair law enforcement. The 
politics of respectability wove throughout black public life during the Great Migration, a political 
discourse that assumed black racial success hinged on the improvement of the black working 
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class and the black poor.35 The long entwinement between the politics of respectability and black 
calls for stringent law enforcement provide deep historical context for the relationship between 
black politics and American law enforcement. Black demands for policing during and after the 
Great Migration were consistent with demands for equal access to other state services, 
employment opportunities, and housing options. The history of black crime politics demonstrates 
that demands for fair and equal law enforcement have been an enduring feature of urban black 
life since the early twentieth century, contradicting recent analyses that suggest that African 
American demands for fair policing were directly motivated by punitive carceral politics and 
directly resulted in the massive growth of punitive law enforcement institutions and policies.36 
Other critiques of discriminatory policing along the black political spectrum in early-twentieth-
century Chicago drew attention to the violations of civil liberties that suffused interactions with 
police, which indicated the potential for law enforcement to encourage multiple strains of 
critique at times in tension with one another. State violence itself was particularly generative of 
critiques; the Chicago branch of the NAACP mounted a concerted campaign against police 
brutality in the interwar years but consistently framed police violence as a racialized civil rights 
violation, precluding critiques that reached across boundaries of ethnicity or class. Legal and 
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political campaigns to end police violence provided models for ongoing efforts to curtail state 
violence into the twentieth century, however, and highlighted the role of law enforcement in the 
long history of American civil rights movements.37  
Immigrant communities in early-twentieth-century Chicago displayed a similar degree of 
diversity along the axes of ethnicity and class. Chicago had seen an influx of immigration since 
the middle of the nineteenth century, beginning with waves of Irish immigration and followed by 
successive immigrations of Germans, Poles, and Italians, among others, as well as growing 
numbers of Mexican immigrants in the early twentieth century. Historical scholarship on 
immigration to Chicago has noted the role of immigrant communities in the city’s burgeoning 
industrial workforce, labor movement, and political machine.38 The proportion of foreign-born 
Chicago residents fell by 1920 and continued to fall in the face of federal immigration 
restrictions during that decade, but the number of first and second-generation immigrants in the 
city remained significant during the interwar decades. The declining number of foreign-born 
whites, however, obscured the growing population of Latino/a immigrants in Chicago during the 
twentieth century, a population often undercounted by the United States Census.39 Recently, 
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scholars have turned attention to Latino/a immigration to Chicago, tracing the gradual 
immigration of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans to Chicago before World War II and the more rapid 
growth of those communities in the post-war decades.40 This scholarship has demonstrated the 
multiracial character of Chicago, a city often characterized by a black/white divide, but one that 
has historically been populated by many communities of color and processes of racialization that 
cannot be captured by a dual divide.41  
Similarly to the criminalization of African Americans in early-twentieth-century Chicago, 
business elites, anti-crime reformers, and some city executives labeled new immigrants as one of 
Chicago’s foremost crime problems, and police targeted those neighborhoods for raids and 
arrests particularly following rashes of criminal syndicate violence. This targeting of certain 
immigrant neighborhoods for criminalization also intersected with national immigration politics, 
reflecting nativism, immigration restrictionism, and deportation policies directed towards 
Mexicans. Parallel discriminatory policing tactics in African American and immigrant 
communities produced similar processes of criminalization in these marginalized neighborhoods, 
but those parallels diverged over time as some European immigrants became increasingly 
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racialized as white and the connection between European immigrants and criminal syndicalism 
diminished with the repeal of Prohibition in 1933.42 The outsized criminalization of some 
immigrants, however, continued into the 1930s as recent arrivals and members of their 
communities remained targets for arrests for street crimes and violations of federal immigration 
regulations. The continued targeting of certain immigrants for arrest demonstrated the uneven 
decriminalization of new arrivals to Chicago and indicated the role of local political and social 
circumstances in those processes of decriminalization, as older immigrants who had achieved 
political power in Chicago mostly escaped undue scrutiny. New urban spatial arrangements 
through the interwar decades and into the post-World War II years also influenced the 
criminalization of differently racialized communities, as many European immigrants found 
themselves able to integrate into predominantly white neighborhoods and eventually able to 
leave the city limits altogether, while African Americans and Mexicans became increasingly 
racially segregated over time.43 
The politics of crime control also attracted urgent attention from a range of social 
reformers and criminal justice reformers in Chicago throughout the early twentieth century, 
reformers who spanned the ideological and methodological spectrum from Progressive uplift 
organizations and women’s reform groups to conservative anti-crime businessmen and 
criminologists. Progressive reform organizations and settlement houses had turned their sights on 
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problems of crime and urban disorder since the late nineteenth century, offering social services 
such as job training, domestic training, and housing assistance, in the interest of steering 
working-class and immigrant Chicagoans into productive labor rather than illegal enterprises. 
Chicago’s reform landscape was crowded by such organizations by the early twentieth century, 
such as Jane Addams’ Hull House, the Chicago Commons Settlement, the Juvenile Protection 
Association, and the Immigrants’ Protective League. All of these organizations had been founded 
and operated by white Protestant elite women in the early twentieth century, many of them 
trained as social workers or sociologists. Some of those same reformers participated in municipal 
investigatory commissions, another dominant form of urban reform in the early twentieth century. 
Committees such as the Vice Commission of Chicago and the Chicago Commission on Race 
Relations performed exhaustive investigations of urban conditions, each producing lengthy 
reports on their findings accompanied by recommendations for improved urban conditions. The 
members of those commissions drew from among Progressive reformers as well as urban 
sociologists trained at the University of Chicago. In the interwar decades, a new variety of 
criminal justice reform also emerged among Chicago businessmen, who drew critical attention to 
law enforcement inefficiency and formed the Chicago Crime Commission in order to improve 
state operations. Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the persistent role of business and 
capitalist development in American political culture, and my attention to the role of anti-crime 
businessmen in the reform landscape of Chicago suggests that histories of capitalism must 
consider the relationship between business and law enforcement as well.44 This masculine 
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variety of urban reform stood in contrast to many Progressive organizations, although it did 
borrow from Progressive methodologies of urban investigation and knowledge accumulation.  
Chicago reformers drew their agendas, evidence, and recommendations from local needs 
and circumstances, but many of those organizations also served as national models of urban 
improvement. Although Hull House was not the first settlement house in the United States, it 
became the most well-known by the early twentieth century and its publications served to 
instruct settlement work throughout the country.45 Similarly, the Vice Commission of Chicago, 
along with New York City’s Committee of Fourteen, was among the first municipal 
commissions to conduct a comprehensive study of urban vice conditions in the United States.46 
Its final publication, The Social Evil in Chicago, provided meticulous detail regarding local 
conditions as well as recommendations for vice eradication that could be imported to a variety of 
urban contexts. The same was true of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, whose final 
publication, The Negro in Chicago, was widely read among urban sociologists and leaders of 
organizations such as the National Urban League.47 Institutions such as the Municipal Court of 
Chicago also served as national leaders in early-twentieth-century criminal justice reform, 
drawing the attention of prominent jurists who viewed the local court as a model for socialized 
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legal practice.48 Interwar Chicago anti-crime activists literally fostered the national crime 
commission movement, traveling to urban centers through the country to instruct local activists 
in the formation of their own anti-crime organizations.49 The range of interpretations of crime 
causation among these many Chicago reform organizations—from social and structural 
interpretations of law breaking, to individual explanations, to environmental causes—and the 
shifts in those interpretations over time also served as a bellwether for crime politics throughout 
the country. Progressive organizations in the early twentieth century and into the interwar 
decades tended to interpret law breaking and deviance as functions of social circumstances and 
recommended economic and environmental improvement as a solution. Anti-crime activists, by 
contrast, largely interpreted crime as an individual choice to violate the law, divorcing law 
breaking from the social and economic contexts that had been the focus of many Progressive 
reform organizations in the city.50 As a result of their national influence and their signification of 
national trends, Chicago reformers served as a critical index to changes in crime control politics 
in the early-twentieth-century United States.  
Federal officers of the state also played a role in the local politics of crime control, 
particularly with regard to the federal ban on alcohol and federal restrictions on immigration. In 
chapters that treat each of those topics, federal officers from the Bureau of Prohibition and the 
Bureau of Immigration play active roles in shaping urban law enforcement, pursuing campaigns 
to enforce federal statutes. These federal officers interacted with and collaborated with local law 
enforcement officials, particularly police, in pursuit of their own crime control campaigns. Other 
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efforts to intervene in urban crime control came in the form of federal investigations and 
recommendations for the improvement of law enforcement, particularly from the National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, a federally convened committee of 
criminologists and other reformers who sought to improve state efficiency. The many reports 
produced by this committee provided a wealth of information about the condition of law 
enforcement in many cities throughout the country, although its lack of enforcement power 
resulted in few changes to current practice. Scholars of early federal policing efforts have noted 
the relationship between federal criminal law and the gradual building of the federal state, but 
my work reorients that focus to the local scale to show how federal law enforcement shaped local 
crime control priorities and how efforts to impose urban order drew on the capacity of the federal 
state in the early twentieth century.51 
Police themselves populate every chapter of the dissertation, as principal agents of the 
coercive state. The opacity of Police Department records poses an archival problem for those 
interested in the internal composition of the department, but occasional profiles of Chicago 
police officers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries revealed that the department 
was staffed predominantly by first and second-generation European immigrants, particularly 
Irish and Germans.52 Scholars of early-twentieth-century urban policing have show how police 
often acted as agents of political machines or criminal syndicates rather than officers of law 
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enforcement or defenders of the rule of law.53 Patrolmen were often responsible for policing the 
very neighborhoods from whence they came, and many also had personal and financial 
relationships with criminal gangs. Police officials—district commanders, sergeants, and the 
department superintendent—held authority to direct police policy and to discipline their officers, 
often shielding them from discipline in instances of illegal violence or other misconduct. Other 
state officers with the discretion to direct crime control efforts also worked in tandem with police, 
particularly members of the State’s Attorney’s Office, the Chicago City Council, the Civil 
Service Commission, and the Chicago Mayor’s Office. During the early twentieth century, the 
Chicago Republican and Democratic political machines vied for control of the mayor’s office, 
trading control of the office until 1933, when the election of Anton Cermak initiated the 
beginning of sole Democratic power over the mayor’s office. Chicago mayors often used crime 
control campaigns for political purposes, deploying law and order rhetoric to appease certain 
voters or tolerating illegal activity to satisfy others.  
 “The Politics of Crime Control” is a political history of urban policing from the early 
twentieth century through the years immediately following WWII, utilizing the methodological 
boundaries of an urban historical case study. Chicago exemplified the range of urban changes 
that animate the central questions of the dissertation; over the course of the early twentieth 
century, it saw massive African American migration, immigration, industrialization and labor 
organization, multiple movements for reform, and ongoing efforts for crime control. Chicago 
was a city with a reputation for notorious criminality but also one that drew sustained attention 
from criminal justice reformers and intellectuals concerned with race relations, urban 
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development, and crime. As a result, the urban archive of Chicago is an exceptionally rich site 
through which to study the historical relationship among race, crime, and policing.54 The 
dissertation draws on this capacious archive, including municipal, state, and federal government 
records, investigatory commission reports and research records, news reports, historical 
sociology and criminology, the records of civic reform organizations, and the records of social 
reform and racial improvement organizations. While it takes account of broader political shifts in 
the early twentieth century, the dissertation maintains a close narrative focus on the city of 
Chicago, drawing on the methodological models of urban historians who have traced changes in 
national political culture and political economy through a local urban case study.55 The urban 
historical focus on locality served as the best methodological approach to answer my questions 
about how routine interactions between the law enforcement officers and city residents shaped 
the arc of crime control campaigns and the relationship between criminality and racial categories 
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over the early twentieth century. Policing is necessarily local, and it was in those immediate, 
daily interactions that most Chicagoans experienced the authority of the coercive state to impose 
order on the diversifying city. 
The history of Chicago itself, however, was not exceptional but rather demonstrated keen 
similarities to coercive state projects in other American cities during the early twentieth century. 
Most major American urban centers experienced similar social, political, and economic 
disruptions in this period, through waves of African American migration, immigration, and 
industrialization, and demonstrated similar investment in marshaling the coercive state to resolve 
those disruptions. Concerns regarding urban disorder prompted debate among urban leaders and 
reformers regarding the best way to restore order and often resulted in the increased policing of 
supposedly criminal, deviant, or indigent populations. Other urban contexts demonstrated a 
similar investment in the restoration of order in the early twentieth century, but did not always 
deploy crime as the primary discourse of urban disorder. In Chicago, crime dominated the public 
and political discourse, as most urban leaders and reformers coded urban problems as ones of 
crime and deviance due to the city’s long history of criminal syndicalism and prevalence of street 
crime. As a result, the coercive state model found in early-twentieth-century Chicago prioritized 
police as foremost agents of restoring order, at times in need of reform themselves. City leaders 
and reformers in other urban centers sometimes prioritized the work of other state actors such as 
public health officials, housing authorities, or social workers, demonstrating how the 
achievement of urban order through coercive state projects was ultimately contingent on local 
political circumstances and social conditions.  
Similarly to Chicago, cities with robust vice economies such as New York City saw 
reform movements and Progressive vice commissions investigate and attempt to eradicate 
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immoral activity in the early twentieth century, utilizing the methods of urban investigation 
deployed by the Vice Commission of Chicago and the Chicago Commission on Race Relations. 
The effects of vice reform in New York resulted in similar associations between deviance and 
black urban space, as police tended to resolve the problem of vice districts by ushering illicit 
establishments into black and working-class neighborhoods.56 Western cities that saw influxes of 
Chinese and Latino/a immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries deployed a 
range of state strategies to surveil and restrict those growing populations, such as residential 
segregation and strict public health regulations. The public discourse surrounding Chinese 
immigration in cities like San Francisco resembled that concerning African Americans and 
certain immigrants in Chicago, as some city leaders and reformers anticipated that those new 
populations would bring criminality and deviance to the city. Some Western cities differed in the 
primary state agencies utilized to discipline new immigrant communities, as public health 
officers and social workers—in addition to police officers—surveilled Chinese and Latino/as.57 
Other Northern urban centers like Detroit saw surges of African American migration in the early 
twentieth century and deployed similar techniques of black segregation and discriminatory 
policing among black neighborhoods. These discriminatory processes resulted in a similar 
development of black crime politics rooted in respectability, akin to the strain of black law and 
order politics that developed in early-twentieth-century Chicago.58 The elaboration of black 
crime control politics in the urban North suggested that the Great Migration was a critical 
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component in the process of developing that form of black political discourse in the context of 
growing black urban populations and the discriminatory policing they received. 
The dissertation moves from the turn of the twentieth century through the interwar 
decades and ends in the years following WWII, tracing successive waves of black migration, 
European and Mexican immigration, post-war demobilization, and crime control campaigns. 
Each of its seven chronologically and thematically structured chapters examines a set of actors 
engaged in a problem of crime control or urban disorder and considers the critiques and reforms 
generated as a result. Together, they demonstrate points of consensus and tension regarding the 
relationship among lawfulness, urban order, and racial politics across a wide scope of historical 
actors, including city officials, police officers, municipal reformers, black migrants, immigrants, 
labor organizers, and business elites. Chapter 1, “Police Discretion and Racial Geographies in 
Migration-Era Chicago,” sets the stage for the conflicts surrounding crime control, urban order, 
and police discretion in the decades to come. It examines the rapidly changing social landscape 
of the city during the first period of massive African American migration and considers how 
police discretion shaped the decriminalization of white racial violence, the defense of racial 
neighborhood boundaries, and the association between crime and black urban space.  
The next two chapters turn attention to the years immediately following World War I, as 
the city saw increasing racial violence and some city leaders anticipated a post-war crime wave. 
Chapter 2, “Crime and Vicious Environment: The 1919 Chicago Race Riot and Black Crime 
Politics After WWI,” narrates this notorious incident of massive racial violence with particular 
attention to the causal role of police in initiating and perpetuating the conflict. It also considers 
the post-riot investigation of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, which leveled 
pioneering critiques of police discrimination and uncovered significant tensions among law 
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enforcement institutions with regard to race and criminality. Chapter 3, “The Cost of Crime: 
Business, Anti-Crime Activism, and Police State Building in Interwar Chicago,” turns attention 
to the crime commission movement and efforts among urban businessmen to impose lawfulness 
on the city. It traces the points of resonance and departure between this anti-crime initiative and 
Progressive reformers in Chicago, demonstrating a shared investment in urban order among 
those movements but contrasting methods of improving state efficiency.  
The following two chapters examine crime control campaigns that emerged from 
Chicago’s post-WWI reform efforts and the consequences of those campaigns for urban 
inequality and racialization. Chapter 4, “Beer Wars and Black and Tans: Policing the Color Line 
During Prohibition,” traces efforts to control crime in the Prohibition-era city and the effects of 
law and order politics during that decade. It finds that the rhetoric of law and order provided 
political cover for the disparate policing of racially marginalized communities, including the 
harassment of interracial couples, raids of integrated public spaces, and massive arrests in 
African American neighborhoods. Chapter 5, “Crime and the Foreign Born: Deportation Drives 
in the Depression Years,” examines the consequences of similar policing among Chicago’s 
immigrant neighborhoods as local officers refuted accusations of corruption and inefficiency 
through repeated raids and mass arrests for supposed immigration violations. These raids 
intersected with national anti-immigrant politics and represented a similar if distinct form of 
racialization through policing.  
Violence—ranging from white popular violence and violent crime to state violence and 
state complicity in many forms of violence—runs throughout every chapter of the dissertation, 
but the penultimate chapter takes violence as its focus. Chapter 6, “Lawlessness in Law 
Enforcement: Police Violence and the Chicago NAACP Campaign Against Brutality,” traces the 
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scope of police violence in interwar Chicago, showing that brutality was so endemic among 
police-citizen interactions it was tantamount to official policy. The chapter considers the Chicago 
branch of the NAACP’s concerted legal campaign against police violence in the 1930s as well as 
its political and strategic limitations as a method to critique this most egregious use of police 
discretion. The final chapter turns attention to the years following World War II, mirroring the 
first chapter’s focus on the consequences of post-war politics and massive migration. Chapter 7, 
“War, Migration, and the Law Enforcement Landscape of Mid-Century Chicago,” concludes the 
dissertation by returning to the themes of migration, white racial violence, and police discretion. 
It demonstrates points of continuity in the criminalization of black urban space and the 
decriminalization of white racial violence along with keen differences in the urban legal and 
social landscape after the repeal of Prohibition and the intensified migration of African 










POLICE DISCRETION AND RACIAL GEOGRAPHIES IN MIGRATION-ERA CHICAGO 
 
On June 16, 1919, a bomb exploded in the basement of the home of William B. Austin. 
The Austin home was located on Bellevue Avenue near Lake Shore Drive, nestled among the 
ornate mansions of Chicago’s tony Near North Side neighborhood. Austin was a white attorney 
who had recently rented a property on Grand Boulevard to Gertrude Harrison and her children, 
an African American family. The rental property was located near the concentration of black 
Chicagoans on the city’s South Side, although the home was on a block with no other black 
residents. The integration of the block promoted violent threats to the Harrison home after the 
family took up residence there in March 1919. After receiving a warning that white neighbors 
planned to bomb her house, Mrs. Harrison notified the Forty-Eighth Street police station, where 
an officer informed her that this was likely “idle talk.”1 These warnings turned out to be anything 
but idle, however, when bombs exploded at Mrs. Harrison’s home on the following two nights. 
Despite prior notifications and clear evidence indicating the apartment from which the second 
bomb had been thrown, “police failed to question either the persons living in the apartment or 




                                                



















FIGURE 1.1: “LAKE SHORE DRIVE DISTRICT’S TASTE OF BOMB WARFARE,” 19193 
Following the two attacks on Mrs. Harrison’s Grand Boulevard house, William Austin 
received an anonymous phone call, promising more violence if he refused to evict the Harrison 
family. According to Austin, the caller asked, “Are you going to evict those two tenants,” to 
which he responded, “I own the property and I can do what I choose with it. The tenants are 
highly respectable.”4 Just the day after, Austin placed an advertisement in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune, seeking information regarding the ongoing attacks: “I will give $500 reward for 
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4 “Lake Shore Home Blasted in Negro War,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 17, 1919. 
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evidence leading to the arrest and conviction of the criminals who bombed my house at 4807 
Grand-blvd in May; also $100 for the identification of the man who threatened me over the 
phone.”5 Several months after the incident, the real estate periodical Property Owners’ Journal 
claimed that Austin had “violat[ed] a gentleman’s obligation to his community in selling a home 
to a Negro.”6 It was apparently the violation of this unspoken agreement that prompted the attack 
on Austin’s home in June, as a part of the ongoing defense of the color line in early-twentieth-
century Chicago.  
In the days after the Austin home bombing, Chicago Defender contributor Nahum Daniel 
Brascher lamented the frequency of these racially motivated attacks, telling readers “These 
exhibitions have increased rather than diminished until it has been regarded as a rather dull week 
if the home…of some one or more of our group is not bombed in some mysterious manner.”7 
Brascher referred to the years-long campaign of racial violence in Chicago that had begun in 
earnest in 1917. As the black population of the city grew in the years following World War I, 
housing became increasingly scarce in the narrow South Side Black Belt, and those with the 
means to do so began to seek accommodations elsewhere in the city. Those attempts at 
desegregation elicited violent retaliation, as white homeowners associations repeatedly bombed 
black homes and the homes of those who would rent to black residents, with practically no 
response by police, many of whom lived among those homeowners associations and likely 
actively collaborated with them.8 Although police always claimed ignorance of the perpetrators 
of these attacks, local news outlets and later investigations into the violence declared that white 
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neighborhood associations—particularly those in the South Side Kenwood and Hyde Park 
neighborhoods—had orchestrated the ongoing campaign of violence.9  
Although most home bombings in early-twentieth-century Chicago received little if any 
concerted police response, upon first notice of the explosion at the Austin home on June 16th, a 
group of police officers from the Chicago Avenue station rushed to the scene. The first accounts 
of the crime reported that the bomb had exploded at the home of wealthy businessman and 
Rockefeller son-in-law Harold F. McCormick. The McCormick residence was just a block away 
from Austin’s house on Bellevue Avenue, and the first witnesses assumed that the industrialist 
McCormick had been victim of an attack by labor unionists. Those initial false reports prompted 
a rapid response from city police, as “the vast machinery of the Chicago Police Department was 
started into action to round up what were considered perpetrators of a bolshevik or I.W.W. 
outrage.”10 However, when police arrived on the scene and learned that the bombing was not an 
attack on McCormick’s home by a group of International Workers of the World operatives or 
other labor radicals but rather a racially motivated attack on a landlord who had rented to a black 
tenant “They expressed intense relief when they learned of the real motive underlying the 
attack.”11 The officers quickly dispersed from the scene, as this racially motivated attack on 
black upward mobility and residential integration failed to merit the urgency that a supposed 
attack on one of the city’s most prominent owners of capital had elicited. Despite the quick 
retreat of officers from the scene, Lieutenant Flanigan of the Chicago Avenue police station later 
assured the Austin family that a full investigation would be made, informing them “We expect to 
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have a tangible clew [sic] shortly.”12 These reassurances proved hollow, however, as no arrests 
were made in the attack on Austin’s home, nor in the series of attacks on the house he had rented 
to Mrs. Harrison and her family. 
The attack on the Austin home in June of 1919, and the racially motivated bombings that 
led up to and followed the incident, captured the victimization of blackness and the power and 
consequences of police discretion in early-twentieth-century Chicago. Despite widely circulating 
knowledge that white homeowners’ associations had coordinated and perpetrated the ongoing 
attacks on the growing black population of Chicago, police rarely if ever made an arrest in these 
instances of white racial violence. Fifty-eight home bombings took place between July 1917 and 
March 1921; the majority of the attacks occurred within a few blocks of the black South Side, as 
white Chicagoans attempted to harden the boundaries of the growing black district.13 Instead of 
investigating these criminal acts, police repeatedly decriminalized white racial violence through 
the exercise of official discretion; among those 58 attacks, police made a mere two arrests. One 
of the men arrested was later released on a $500 bond, while the other was held for police 
surveillance for two days and then released.14 Neither was ever convicted of a crime. Black 
leaders and aldermen repeatedly appealed to the mayor and superintendent of the Chicago Police 
Department, asking them to thoroughly investigate and halt the bombings.15 When city law 
enforcement officials refused to do so, the Chicago Commission on Race Relations later 
observed that “the Negro population grew to trust less and less in the interest of the community 
and public agencies of protection.”16 Police failure to make arrests in the bombing of black 
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homes and their failure to investigate widely held knowledge about the perpetrators of the attacks 
resulted in the implicit endorsement of the violent defense of the urban color line.  
The culmination—although not the conclusion—of this concerted campaign of white 
racial violence occurred just a month after the bombing of the Austin residence, when the city 
was gripped by eight days of racial violence in an event that came to be known as the 1919 
Chicago Race Riot.17 The incident that touched off the riot was not a home bombing, but it was 
another instance of the violation and subsequent violent defense of the color line, in which police 
allowed and encouraged white racial violence first at a Chicago lakefront beach and then 
throughout the city. The accidental integration of one of the city’s beaches incited a group of 
white onlookers to attack and kill a young black swimmer. When black witnesses demanded than 
an observing policeman arrest the guilty parties, he refused; the ensuing confrontation between 
black beachgoers and the officer escalated and became violent, engulfing the city in a violent riot 
that eventually required the arrival of the state militia in order to quell the chaos. 
Police officers in early-twentieth-century Chicago—the arm of the coercive state in the 
city streets—decided when and where to enforce the law, resulting in the uneven application of 
law, the decriminalization of some communities, and the disproportionate criminalization of 
others. Police deployed discretion in a variety of ways that resulted in the further enforcement of 
the urban color line and the association of blackness and criminality.18 As the black population of 
Chicago grew over the first few decades of the twentieth century, African Americans became 
increasingly overrepresented among arrests while public debates about crime in the city also 
marked African Americans—particularly new Southern migrants—as a particular source of law 
breaking. Police and other official discretion also played a critical role in the construction of 
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criminal geographies and illegal markets in the city, particularly with regard to the sale of vice 
and other supposedly immoral conduct. As reformers demanded the closure of the city’s 
notorious vice districts in the first decades of the twentieth century, police encouraged those 
enterprises to move into the predominantly African American Black Belt. Through daily 
interactions with the police, Chicagoans encountered the state and navigated the power of state 
actors to leverage their authority to enact and enforce racial boundaries. These processes 
reflected the particular urban landscape and social politics of Chicago, including the shifting 
racial geography of the city over the course of the Great Migration and the relationship between 
white ethnic crime syndicates and the city’s police force.  
In early-twentieth-century Chicago, policing and the deployment of police discretion was 
a critical site of racial formation.19 The locally contingent decisions of police officers made 
meaning for racial categories, making black Chicagoans the objects of violence and 
discriminatory law enforcement while decriminalizing white racial aggression by failing to make 
arrests. Police encouragement of illegal enterprises and underpolicing in black neighborhoods, 
disproportionate black arrests, and inflated statistics on black crime all contributed to the 
growing association of blackness and criminality and the decriminalization of white racial 
violence. A number of intersecting structures worked in concert during the first half of the 
twentieth century to erect racial boundaries in Chicago—racially restrictive real estate practices, 
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employment discrimination, and urban politics among them.20 Police discretion and its role in 
crime control policy represented another critical component of urban racial politics, especially 
insofar as police drew upon the authority of the state to enforce racial boundaries and define the 
meaning of legality on the city streets. The diffusion of law enforcement authority and the near 
total power of police discretion meant that the construction of racialized categories of criminality 
occurred through dispersed law enforcement institutions informed by local knowledge and 
politics. Local state institutions, reform and racial justice organizations, and individual citizens 
forged this site of racial formation as they navigated the exigencies of stopping crime and 
securing fair law enforcement.  
 
POLICE DISCRETION AND THE MAKING OF A WIDE OPEN TOWN 
It was 2:30 in the morning on October 31, 1910, but one of the saloons on Chicago’s 
Wabash Avenue was still crowded and noisy. Two out-of-towners sat at the bar, accompanied by 
two prostitutes. The men stood out in the busy saloon; they appeared to be farmers visiting the 
city and looking for a thrill. But their night of amusement was cut short when they argued with 
the waiter about the price of their drinks and were ejected from the establishment. Angry at this 
injustice, the farmers found two policemen patrolling nearby and brought the officers back to the 
Wabash saloon. The officers spoke to the waiter for a moment, but then turned to the farmers and 
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instructed them to “beat it or they would be arrested.”21 Surprised, the farmers hesitated, but 
finally left when one of the officers threatened to strike them with his club. Satisfied, the 
policemen covered their badges with their hands as they walked through the saloon; they walked 
to a back closet, where they exchanged their uniforms for casual clothing. They sat down in the 
still-bustling establishment, next to the same prostitutes with whom the farmers had been 
drinking. The waiter declined to charge the officers for their drinks, and they proceeded to enjoy 
a pleasurable late night. The city investigator who witnessed the scene recognized the officers as 
the patrolmen who had been assigned to police the district that night.22 That investigator was a 
member of the Vice Commission of Chicago, a municipal organization charged with examining 
vice activity in the city; his description of the scene was later included in the commission’s 
comprehensive report, The Social Evil in Chicago.  
Chicago had held a reputation as a “wide open town” since the late nineteenth century, 
meaning that police, including both patrolmen and police officials, deployed their official 
discretion to encourage and profit from two notorious vice districts as well as several smaller 
areas of illicit activity throughout the city.23 Illinois state legislators never legalized enterprises 
including prostitution, gambling, and unlicensed liquor sales, but Chicago proprietors of these 
operations knew well that a relationship with a police district captain would allow them to 
operate without much interference thanks to the power of police to use their discretion to allow 
vice to operate uninterrupted. In fact, it was so well known that the Chicago Police Department 
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protected and profited from vice establishments in designated areas of the city that some framed 
the practice as official policy.24 City aldermen also played a crucial role in the system of 
protecting vice districts, as they often promised support to the mayor’s office in exchange for 
power over police appointments in their wards.25  
Police discretion shaped the geography of Chicago’s vice economy as patrolmen 
concentrated vice operations in two distinct districts until the second decade of the twentieth 
century. The commercialization of vice in Chicago began in the late nineteenth century when the 
city’s most prominent vice district, known as the Levee, grew in size and notoriety. Bounded by 
Van Buren Street to the north and Twelfth Street to the south and stretching between Clark Street 
to the west and State Street to the east, the Levee abutted Chicago’s central business district.26 
Brothels and saloons occupied the Levee, but it was also a working-class neighborhood and 
provided a home for successive waves of migrants to Chicago, including Irish and German 
immigrants and African Americans.27 Police officers exercised individual discretion with regard 
to which houses of prostitution or other vice establishments operated in the Levee, and patrolmen 
would often partake in illicit entertainment themselves. A 1904 investigation of policing 
maintained that officers thought nothing of abandoning their posts in the Levee to enjoy a drink 
in a saloon—much as the officers at the Wabash Avenue tavern had done in 1910—and would 
even allow soliciting that took place openly in the streets.28 
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During the first few years of the twentieth century, real estate near Chicago’s central 
business district became increasingly desirable to railroad companies and manufacturers as they 
looked for low rents and close access to the downtown shopping district.29 In order to encourage 
the construction of new railroad lines and the growth of industry, Mayor Carter Harrison directed 
police officers to shut down the Levee in 1904. That year, the Police Superintendent’s annual 
report to the Chicago City Council maintained, “There remains but an insignificant remnant soon 
to disappear, where once flourished scenes of lewdness impossible to imagine at present.”30 
Following the mayor’s instructions, police closed the Levee but exercised their discretion to 
move illicit establishments south; most relocated to a new vice district between Eighteenth Street 
to the north and Twenty-Second Street to the south, and between Clark Street to the west and 
Wabash Avenue to the east.31 Known as the Twenty-Second Street Levee, police protected this 
new vice district for the next seven years until that real estate similarly became desirable to the 
city’s growing railroad industry. 
Progressive critics of the Police Department’s role in the vice trade highlighted the undue 
authority that police discretion placed in the hands of patrolmen themselves, arguing that it 
undermined the power of the state legislature and compromised the rule of law in the city. In 
1905, Chicago Mayor Edward F. Dunne proposed to formalize the boundaries of vice districts in 
Chicago, a plan that would have effectively removed the power to decide the boundaries of the 
vice economy from police patrolmen themselves.32 Dunne’s plan met with vocal opposition from 
a variety of actors invested in the coercive state and its project to impose middle-class moral 
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standards, including Protestant ministers, women’s reform organizations, urban property owners, 
and State’s Attorney John J. Healy. Ministers and women reformers insisted that only the 
complete eradication of vice could protect the morality of the city, while a number of property 
owners criticized the negative impact that vice districts would have on their nearby property 
values.33 State’s Attorney Healy, however, critiqued Dunne’s proposal based on the implications 
it would have for the authority of the state. While Healy acknowledged that the total eradication 
of vice was likely impossible, he insisted that Chicago Police officers should enforce the law to 
the best of their ability and end the local toleration of vice, as “It in the first place shows a 
weakness on the part of the authorities to legalize vice in any form.”34 Healy’s critique of vice 
toleration highlighted how the discretionary decisions of various state agencies could come into 
conflict with one another especially as they demonstrated tensions in the interpretation of the 
proper enforcement of the law.  
This range of critiques took on institutional form with the establishment of the Vice 
Commission of Chicago (VCC) in 1910, an investigatory group formed by Mayor Fred A. Busse 
following urgent demonstrations by anti-vice reformers.35 The work of the Vice Commission 
culminated in April 1911 with the publication of its exhaustive report, The Social Evil in 
Chicago.36 The VCC unanimously recommended the complete eradication of vice from Chicago, 
repudiating Mayor Dunne’s vice districting plan of 1905 and emphasizing the need to preserve 
the rule of law. The VCC drew attention to the undue power of police officers to legalize illicit 
activity at their own discretion “In place of enforcing the law the police have been allowed to 
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adopt arbitrary rules and uncertain regulations of their own…We have, then, a combined 
administrative and legislative power in the hands of a department of the local government.”37 
The VCC identified the conflation of legislative and executive power that police discretion 
produced and emphasized the inviolability of Illinois criminal law above all else “It must not be 
forgotten that the law cannot be made subservient to any rules and regulations by any group of 
officials, whether they believe the law wise or unwise, effective in operation or futile in 
execution.”38 The report clarified that it was not necessarily individual officers who were to 
blame for this problem but the structure of law enforcement itself that had allowed police to 
accept graft payments in exchange for the toleration of vice. Here the VCC indicated that the 
problem of police discretion manifested not only through individual police misconduct but also 
through department policy and institutional structure, as patrolmen followed the directives of 
their superior officers.39 
The investigation of the Vice Commission of Chicago occurred just a year after the 
United States Congress passed the Mann Act, better known as the White-Slave Traffic Act, a 
federal law that prohibited the transporting of women over state lines for “immoral purposes.”40 
The national concern over so-called white slavery racialized the problem of urban prostitution, 
framing it as a particular threat to white womanhood. Despite this racial narrowing of the vice 
problem among national lawmakers and Progressive reformers, The Social Evil in Chicago did 
include evidence regarding the conditions of vice in black neighborhoods and indicated that 
when police relocated vice establishments they tended to direct them toward black 
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neighborhoods.41 In fact, that association of black urban space and vice had happened with the 
relocation of the Levee in 1904, as investigators found, “The situation along State Street from 
16th Street is an illustration” of the worst vice conditions, directing attention to a predominantly 
black neighborhood.42 
Despite the unequivocal recommendation of the Vice Commission of Chicago that vice 
be completely eliminated from the city, police discretion to protect vice persisted and officers 
continued to direct those establishments into close proximity to black residential neighborhoods. 
After the VCC disbanded in 1911, the private Committee of Fifteen took on the role of vice 
investigation in Chicago and continued the VCC’s campaign of total vice elimination in 
Chicago.43 Under pressure from anti-vice crusaders, Mayor Carter Harrison ordered the closing 
of the city’s most famous brothel in October of 1911, a club located in the Twenty-Second Street 
Levee.44 The work of anti-vice reformers was joined by economic pressures by the second 
decade of the twentieth century, as real estate values near the Twenty-Second Street Levee rose 
as railroad companies sought control of the property in order to link the Illinois Central line with 
the Western Indiana and Pennsylvania lines. In October 1912, State’s Attorney John Wayman 
issued 135 warrants for the arrest of brothel and resort owners in the district and worked with 
members of the Police Department’s Moral Squad to close a total of 518 establishments.45 In 
addition to the use of arrest warrants, the Committee of Fifteen also occasionally published the 
names of real estate owners and landlords who rented their properties to brothels and gambling 
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houses in order to shame property-holders into evicting those establishments.46 Thanks to this 
combination of factors, by 1915, the Twenty-Second Street Levee was gone.47 
In the midst of this campaign against vice in Chicago, a number of black Chicagoans 
remained skeptical that vice and illegal activity could be eliminated from the city. Instead, they 
predicted, police would use their discretion to encourage vice establishments to move south, into 
the city’s Black Belt, as they had done for decades earlier. A few days after Wayman issued his 
wave of indictments in October 1912, editors at the Chicago Defender voiced concern that the 
campaign to clear Chicago’s central business district would mean the “invasion of residence 
districts” on the South Side of the city where most black Chicagoans lived.48 The Defender 
suggested that residents of the Black Belt might wake up to find that prostitutes had replaced 
their neighbors, “the bulk of them will be found here and there in respectable neighborhoods on 
the south side.”49 The Defender insisted that the invasion of vice would violate the respectability 
of black neighborhoods, suggesting that it was black respectability that was deserving of equal 
law enforcement. A week later, Revered Roberts of the Bethel A.M.E. Church told his 
congregation that the city’s new policy of vice suppression was not the work of reform, but the 
work of “devilment.”50 The popular pastor addressed a large congregation that morning and 
reiterated the Defender’s assertion that police discretion to relocate vice threatened the 
respectability of the South Side “The incoming of the undesirables from any neighborhood is a 
menace to ever respectable family.”51 
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FIGURE 1.2: “HOUSES OF PROSTITUTION,” 191852 
These critiques of racialized discretionary policing were prescient, as the number of vice 
establishments in the Black Belt steadily increased in the years following the state’s attorney’s 
anti-vice campaign. The number of houses of prostitution south of Thirty-Ninth Street, in the 
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heart of the Black Belt, quintupled over the course of the 1910s as police ushered vice 
establishments and other illegal activity south.53 The Vice Commission of Chicago had 
foreshadowed the racialization of the city’s vice geography in its 1911 report, citing testimony 
from a former police commissioner, “A former Chief of Police gave out a semi-official statement 
to the effect that so long as this degenerate group of persons confined their residence to districts 
west of Wabash avenue and east of Wentworth avenue they would not be apprehended. This part 
of the city is the largest residence section of colored families.”54 The statement offered a rare 
instance of a state official who explicitly connected police discretion with the association of 
blackness and criminality. While some city officials and reformers lamented the intractability of 
vice, here the police official openly admitted the active role of the state in constructing the vice 
economy through discretion and the direct linkages between black urban space and deviance 
forged through that process.  
The ensuing years further demonstrated the ongoing association of vice, crime, and 
blackness through the active role of police in relocating vice establishments to African American 
neighborhoods. An investigation by the Juvenile Protection Association in 1913 drew attention 
to the fact that white proprietors of vice were only very rarely arrested in black neighborhoods 
and that the presence of those white offenders actually encouraged black Chicagoans to break the 
law, as the white criminal “naturally influences the colored men with whom he associates.”55 In 
its 1922 report, The Negro in Chicago, the Chicago Commission on Race Relations (CCRR) 
traced the movement of vice establishments into the Black Belt over the previous ten years. 
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While the number of vice establishments in the former Twenty-Second Street Levee had 
decreased, the number of resorts and houses of prostitution had increased steadily further south 
in the city. The CCRR estimated that the number of houses of prostitution between Thirty-First 
and Thirty-Ninth Streets had increased slightly from 62 to 84 between 1916 and 1918.56 But a 
more dramatic increase had occurred between Thirty-Ninth and Fifty-Fifth Streets, in the center 
of the Black Belt, where the number of houses of prostitution had increased from 11 to 54. 
Although there were still fewer total houses of prostitution in this area of the city compared to 
those closer to the former vice district, this dramatic rate of increase suggested that it had been 
targeted as a new locale for the city’s vice economy.  
 
BLACK CHICAGO IN THE AGE OF MIGRATION 
The racial geography of Chicago transformed over the course of the early twentieth 
century as well, as the Great Migration of African Americans to the urban North, the 
immigration of Europeans, and the immigration of Mexicans during and after WWI created an 
increasingly racially diverse city.57 The city’s black population more than doubled between 1910 
and 1920, and doubled again by 1930. The rate of black demographic change was most dramatic 
at the end of the 1910s; between 1916 and 1919 Chicago’s black population grew by 86 
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percent.58 The proportion of black city residents also increased accordingly in those decades; in 
1910, African Americans comprised just two percent of the total Chicago population.59 By 1920, 
that proportion had grown to four percent, and by 1930 it had increased yet again to 6.9 
percent.60  




WHITE BLACK FOREIGN-BORN WHITE 
ALL 
OTHER MEXICAN 
1890 1,099,850 1,084,998 
(98.6%) 
14,271 
(1.3%) 450,666 (41.0%) 
581 
(0.1% ) -- 
1900 1,698,575 1,667,140 (98.1%) 
30,150 
(1.8%) 585,420 (34.5%) 
1,285 
(0.1%) -- 
1910 2,185,283 2,139,057 (97.9%) 
44,103 
(2.0%) 781,217 (35.7%) 
2,123 
(0.1%) -- 
1920 2,701,705 2,589,169 (95.8%) 
109,458 





1930 3,376,438 3,117,731 (92.3%) 
233,903 





1940 3,396,808 3,114,554 (91.7%) 
277,731 






 The vast majority of that black population growth came from Southern states; in 1910, 
66.2 percent of non-white Illinois residents had been born outside the state and by 1920 that 
number had reached 75.3 percent, with fully 60.3 percent having been born in the South.62 This 
growing African American population also skewed relatively young; the largest age 
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demographic of Southern migrants arriving in Chicago in that decade were between 25 and 34 
years old with a significant number of migrants in the 20 to 24 year old age demographic as 
well.63 These patterns of migration and demographic change meant that by the end of the second 
decade of the twentieth century, most black Chicagoans were young, recent migrants from 
Southern states. Most of those new black residents lived in the narrow South Side Black Belt, 
confined by a racialized real estate market and white racial hostility. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, two thirds of the city’s black population lived in neighborhoods that were less 
than 50 percent African American. By the early 1920s, however, that number had shifted 
significantly, as 87 percent of black Chicagoans came to live in predominantly African American 
neighborhoods, a proportion that grew to over 90 percent a decade later.64 Despite the 
comparatively smaller number of Mexicans in Chicago in these decades, the rate of increase of 
Mexicans in the city vastly exceeded that of African Americans. In 1920, the Mexican 
population of Chicago numbered merely 1,141, but by 1930 that number had increased 
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FIGURE 1.3: CHICAGO BLACK POPULATION DENSITY, 192066 
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FIGURE 1.4: CHICAGO BLACK POPULATION DENSITY, 193067 
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The rapid growth of the city’s African American population in the years during and after 
WWI fueled public debates regarding Southern black migration as well as the perception that 
these new city residents were innately more criminal than white Chicagoans.68 The city’s major 
white newspapers and other news outlets around the country regularly ridiculed growing migrant 
populations, labeling them a threat to the moral and sanitary well-being of the city. A 1917 
article from the Chicago Daily Tribune characterized black Southern migrants as unreliable, lazy 
workers, quoting a stockyards foreman who claimed that Southern migrants “work three or four 
days when they first arrive, draw their pay and quit point blank…These same men, however, are 
content to sleep and live in foul smelling rooms.”69 The same article went on to claim that black 
Southern migrants had “almost no standard of morals,” failing to acknowledge how the 
segregated real estate market of Chicago contributed to poor living conditions on the black South 
Side. Other articles published by white newspapers suggested that Southern migrants simply 
could not adjust to life in the North since the Southern states were their natural homes. These 
accounts advised that black migrants would better thrive under the control of white Southerners; 
one typical article claimed “Give him a home in the south…where he is understood and can 
understand, and let him have a master, and you have given him the ideal home.”70 Articles like 
these drew regional distinctions between North and South, simultaneously critiquing Southern 
race relations while justifying Northern practices of racial segregation as necessary responses to 
black pathology. 
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In addition to the circulation of ideas about black criminality and pathology among major 
news outlets, city officials also criticized the conduct of black Southern migrants and blamed 
them for crime in the city. In March of 1919, Chicago Chief of Police John Garrity announced 
that the recent return of soldiers following the end of World War I had resulted in increased 
criminality among black Chicagoans after many were fired from the city’s packing industries in 
order to vacate jobs for returning white soldiers.71 Garrity singled out black Chicagoans in his 
announcement, racializing the city’s perceived crime problem even while linking criminality to 
unemployment. Mayor William Hale Thompson affirmed Garrity’s assessment of the source of 
Chicago’s crime problem, prompting Ida Wells-Barnett and the Negro Fellowship League (NFL) 
to counter the accusation with a critique of the Chicago Police Department itself. Wells-Barnett 
had founded the NFL in 1908 as a political discussion group and community uplift organization 
that provided resources for new Southern migrants.72 The NFL contended that Garrity and 
Thompson blamed black Chicagoans for crime in an attempt to excuse poor policing itself “It is 
bad enough that we are being discharged from work and made idle through no fault of our own 
without being held responsible for all the crime in Chicago in an attempt to excuse Big Bill’s 
inefficient police force.”73 The Negro Fellowship League’s rebuttal to Garrity’s claim regarding 
black criminality drew attention to the decriminalization of certain white crimes particularly in 
its claim that black Chicagoans had been unfairly accused of “all the crime in Chicago.” 
Furthermore, the critique identified the active role of the Police Department in not only 
disseminating discourses regarding innate black criminality but also in the construction of that 
discourse itself, through its disproportionate arrests of black city residents. 
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The public debate regarding Southern black migrant criminality also permeated black 
public discourse, demonstrating how accusations of Southern migrant criminality could animate 
and exacerbate black divisions along the lines of class and status. Longer-settled elite black 
residents—“Old Settlers”—tended to sentimentalize race relations in the city before the Great 
Migration, laying blame on new migrants for racial tensions and conflicts in the city, particularly 
after migration quickened after 1916.74 Black elite and Old Settler attitudes toward new Southern 
migrants largely concentrated on inculcating new city residents to middle-class standards of 
respectability—the social and cultural standards of middle-class decorum that many of the city’s 
black elites viewed as crucial to racial advancement writ large.75 According to many elite black 
Chicagoans, the perception of Southern migrant criminality posed a threat to middle-class black 
status, especially as residential options for black city residents became increasingly 
circumscribed. This spatial amalgamation of blackness in Chicago obscured class and cultural 
differences within the community, making migrant and working-class black criminality a 
pressing concern among black elites who viewed this spatial proximity to assumedly criminal 
Southern migrants to be a threat to their own status and political power. The discourse of 
respectability and uplift, however, obscured the degree to which white racism itself had 
delimited migrants’ abilities to access adequate housing, employment, and education, thereby 
restricting their access to the terms of middle-class respectability.76 
Assumptions that the conduct of black migrants would reflect poorly on black Chicago as 
a whole prompted some Old Settlers to issue warnings and instructions to new city residents in 
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order to improve their behavior. For instance, one editorial in the pages of the Chicago Defender 
in 1917 provided a “Word to ‘Newcomers,’” instructing new arrivals to the city in the standards 
of decorum. The writer directed Southern migrants on the proper Northern standards of dress “In 
the north a man is usually judged by the clothes he wears, how clean they are…it is different 
here in the north. In the south they don’t care how they dress, here they make it a practice to look 
as well in the week as they do on Sunday.”77 Even black elites who expressed optimism about 
the adjustment of Southern migrants emphasized the need for those new city residents to 
accommodate to a respectable way of life. In a 1917 interview, Dr. George C. Hall, a prominent 
African American physician, recommended the rapid adjustment of Southern migrants “The 
colored man from the South does not need to be in the North very long before he learns…that he 
must be industrious and thrifty if he wants to get along.”78 Hall went on to insist that instruction 
from black elites was a critical component of that process “The new arrivals rapidly adjust 
themselves to their changed surroundings if they are reached by the proper people and get the 
right tip.”79 Hall’s comments indicated both the widespread belief among black elites that 
Southern migrants were in need of adjustment and improvement once arriving in Chicago and 
the sense that the responsibility for aiding in that adjustment lay among elites themselves. 
This sense of responsibility and urgency to improve the respectability of black Southern 
migrants took on organizational form with the founding of the Chicago Urban League (CUL) in 
1916, a new branch of the National Urban League on Urban Conditions Among Negroes. The 
establishment of the CUL began as a project supported by black and white Chicago elites—
physician George C. Hall, Chicago Defender editor Robert S. Abbott, philanthropist Julius 
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Rosenwald, University of Chicago sociologist Robert E. Park, and Wabash Avenue Y.M.C.A. 
executive secretary Alexander L. Jackson among them.80 In collaboration with national 
organizers Eugene Knuckle Jones and T. Arnold Hill, the group defined its mission as the 
“adjustment or assimilation” of Southern migrants.81 The project of Southern improvement 
infused the work of the early CUL; among the programs it established in its first year was the 
Southern Improvement Association, a group for recent migrants “in order to furnish the medium 
for a discussion of their difficulties and suggestions of things, of which they should not be 
ignorant, if they are to be desirable citizens.”82 Other work of the CUL focused on providing new 
migrants with the contrivances of middle-class respectable life, such as single-family housing 
and industrial work. In pursuit of this goal, the CUL largely acted as a social service agency in its 
first decades of existence, akin to the work performed among the city’s many settlement 
houses.83  
Along with the Chicago Urban League, the Chicago branch of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) also served as a key organizational response 
to the problems of black Chicago in the early years of the Great Migration. First established as a 
vigilance committee of Progressive elites influenced by the National Negro Committee in 1910, 
the organization became a branch of the national NAACP in 1913.84 One the first local 
organizations of the national NAACP, the Chicago branch set forth in its founding constitution 
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that among its activities would be “Efforts to lessen racial discrimination and to secure full civic, 
political and legal rights to colored citizens and others.”85 The early Chicago NAACP shied 
away from strident activism, however, and struggled to grow its membership in its first decade of 
existence. In 1922, national director of branches Robert Bagnall lamented to NAACP executive 
secretary James Weldon Johnson, “The branch has no proper records and is fast becoming 
dormant.”86 In an effort to revive the struggling branch, Johnson recruited Chicago Republican 
reformer Harold Ickes to act as president of the branch, instructing the new officer that “the 
masses of the colored people have not been reached by our association in Chicago, and only be 
reaching them, can the Chicago branch be brought to the position it should occupy.”87  
After a year and half in his new position, Ickes seemed no more satisfied with the state of 
the branch than NAACP leaders had been in 1922, reflecting to Bagnall “The feeling had been 
growing in me that probably one difficulty with our local branch was that we were too ‘high 
brow.’”88 Ickes went on to say that the visible white leadership of the organization likely 
hampered its prestige among the growing black population of Chicago, imploring Bagnall to see 
black leaders elected to the board of the organization and to other prominent leadership 
positions.89 Within a year, the leadership had indeed changed as Dr. Carl Roberts, a surgeon and 
the first African American to act as president of the Chicago branch, assumed the office.90 But 
according to the national director of branches, the change in leadership did little to change the 
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image of the Chicago NAACP among most of the city’s black residents, as it “has so long been 
regarded as an organisation dominated by whites and a few colored individuals that it will take 
some time to educate public opinion to the realisation that it is an organisation of the people.”91 
In part, Bagnall attributed this perception to the Chicago branch’s commitment to an older model 
of interracial committee organizing rather than transitioning to mass organizing as other branches 
around the country had by the mid-1920s.  
The challenges faced by the Chicago NAACP reflected the stratified class politics of 
early-twentieth-century black Chicago, divisions that had been fostered by the politics of 
respectability pursued by black elites and other organizations such as the Chicago Urban League. 
Class divisions divided black Chicago along the lines of wealth and profession as well as 
respectability and refinement.92 Just as the CUL did in the same years, the Chicago NAACP 
assumed an educational and uplift mission among new black Chicago residents. For instance, the 
Educational Committee of the Chicago branch circulated pamphlets in the early 1920s to 
acclimate new migrants to the city and instruct them regarding proper conduct and behavior. 
Along with information about city governance and the social agencies with resources for the 
newly-arrived, the pamphlets described “Some Things a Citizen Should Do,” among them, 
“Obey the Law,” “Conduct one’s self in a peaceful, considerate and gentlemanly manner in 
public and in private,” and “Dress neatly, not “loud,” and not in gaudy array.”93 The Chicago 
Defender, the most read black newspaper in Chicago by the interwar decades, echoed those 
educational pamphlets with its own advice columns in the 1920s, with catalogs of “Don’ts” for 
new migrants—“Don’t let you property run down,” “Don’t sit around in the yard,” “Don’t talk so 
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loud, we’re not all deaf,” “Don’t make yourself a public nuisance,” “Don’t spend your time 
hanging around saloon doors,” “Don’t be seen in the streets with loose aprons,” “Don’t drink 
moonshine,” “Don’t forget to bathe,” “Don’t play hookey from school.”94 As a result, most of 
black Chicago found itself awash in educational advice and instruction by the second decade of 
the twentieth century, most of which framed black inequity as a product of Southern migrant 
conduct itself. 
While many of the Defender’s advice columns aligned with the politics of respectability 
pursued by the Chicago Urban League and the Chicago NAACP, this African American 
newspaper also provided a space for the voices and critiques waged by migrants and other black 
city residents themselves. The Defender pursued a campaign against discriminatory policing in 
the years during and after WWI, and it also provided a record of the persistent conflicts between 
black Chicagoans and patrolmen engaged in daily processes of policing. In February 1914, the 
Chicago Defender began to publish its Legal Helps column, in which it publicly responded to 
inquiries that had been sent to the newspaper’s Legal Department.95 Editors of the Defender 
conceived of its Legal Helps column as a form of public legal aid, designed to those who could 
not afford legal advice. Although most questions submitted to the Defender’s Legal Department 
concerned commercial transactions and domestic life, the paper also regularly published 
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questions about police conduct and discrimination.96 These columns provided a glimpse into the 
Defender’s politics of law enforcement, as the editors of the paper regularly offered to aid 
aggrieved citizens in their cases against city officials and used the column to offer critiques of 
discriminatory law enforcement. Reflecting the Defender’s broader investment in the politics of 
respectability, however, those critiques of law enforcement were themselves premised on black 
respectability. Writers for the Legal Helps column and other Defender articles argued that 
African Americans in Chicago deserved equal law enforcement because they were respectable, 
law-abiding citizens.  
The letters to the Defender’s Legal Helps column offered rare insight into the lived 
experiences of policing in early-twentieth-century Chicago. A few weeks after the establishment 
of the column, one letter writer described a recent interaction with a Chicago Police officer in the 
Black Belt “I was standing at the corner of South State and 31st Streets with several other friends, 
when a policeman told me to move on, or he would arrest me.”97 The letter writer inquired 
whether such a demand was indeed within the authority of the police officer, which the authors 
of the Legal Helps column affirmed, citing the Chicago Code of 1911. According to this section 
of the municipal code, which applied to so-called loungers and loafers, “No person shall obstruct 
or encumber any street corner or other public place…after being requested to move on by any 
police officer; any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be fined not less 
than five dollars nor more than fifty dollars for each offense.”98 This section, however, only 
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empowered police to fine those who refused to move from street corners, not to arrest them, as 
the letter writer indicated he had been threatened. The code itself provided a considerable degree 
of discretion for police who wished to control access to public space in Chicago, providing them 
with the power to decide who would be allowed to traverse city streets and when. Discretion, 
then, was not a power seized by individual discriminatory police, but one provided for and 
embedded in law itself. The letter suggested that even with this considerable degree of official 
discretion, Chicago patrolmen still exceeded their legal authority in policing city streets, using 
arrests or threats of arrest to criminalize black Chicagoans for simply occupying public space.  
A letter from November of 1914 similarly indicated the power of police discretion to 
allow for arbitrary arrest practices, as the letter writer asked, “Has a policeman or other officer 
the right to arrest a citizen without a warrant?”99 The Defender assured the querier that arrests on 
suspicion were illegal in most circumstances, citing the section of the Chicago Code of 1911 that 
specified that a police officer could make a warrantless arrest in a case in which they had 
witnessed the commission of a crime or had reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was 
about to be committed. Here again the municipal code provided for wide discretion “They shall 
have the power to arrest all persons in the city found in the act of violating any law or ordinance 
or aiding and abetting in any such violation, and shall arrest any person found under 
circumstances which would warrant a reasonable man in believing that such a person had 
committed or is about to commit a crime.”100 Barring such reasonable suspicion, the Defender 
maintained that a warrantless arrest would be illegal. But legal or not, the letter writer’s query 
indicated that black Chicagoans often found themselves subject to arbitrary and warrantless 
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arrests in which police exercised their wide discretion and asserted their authority to make such 
detentions.  
While these examples demonstrated the power of police discretion on the city streets, 
other letters to the Defender’s Legal Helps column indicated the persistent pattern of racial 
discrimination and violence in the city’s jails. A letter published in August 1914 described one 
man’s futile attempts to secure his right to counsel “I was arrested and locked in the police 
station on Monday night at about 8 p.m. and demanded of the jailer that I be permitted to consult 
an attorney at once, by the jailer refused to allow me to do so until Thursday morning.”101 The 
Defender advised that the man had indeed been deprived of his civil liberties and instructed that 
the offending officers should have paid him $100 in compensation.102 A column from November 
1914 also indicated habitual brutality experienced by black arrestees in city jails. The authors of 
the Legal Helps column advised the letter writer to take his complaint to jail authorities and went 
on to recommend such action more widely “The same answer applies to the many complaints as 
to race discrimination practiced in the jail against colored prisoners.”103 This reference to the 
“many complaints” received by the Defender’s Legal Department suggested that the brutal 
treatment of black arrestees by police was typical and that most black Chicagoans could expect 
violent treatment if they found themselves in one of the city’s jails.  
The Defender’s Legal Helps column repeatedly advised readers to seek legal remedies for 
police discrimination, demonstrating the local formation of a litigious critique of racially 
discriminatory law enforcement. In its response to the August 1914 letter regarding rights to 
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counsel, the Defender advocated that the letter writer seek legal representation immediately in 
order to secure his due financial redress from the offending officers.104 Subsequent columns 
advocated litigation further, arguing that legal action against police and city officials would 
eventually eliminate the problem of racially discriminatory law enforcement. The Legal Helps 
column recommended that all who were subjected to a warrantless arrest should initiate a lawsuit 
“Persons who have been arrested without warrant on suspicion and then turned loose after a few 
days’ investigation should sue everyone connected with such arrest, would put a stop to this 
nefarious practice.”105 In addition to securing individual compensation for police discrimination, 
the Defender suggested that such lawsuits would eventually end discriminatory practices more 
widely, an argument that it advanced again in a September 1915 column concerning illegal 
police searches “When a few sterling worth citizens appeal such cases and then sue the officers 
then the nefarious practice will cease.”106 The Defender’s advocacy of litigation as the most 
effective critique of discriminatory law enforcement foreshadowed later strategies of racial 
justice that would emerge in Chicago, such as police brutality cases pursued by the Chicago 
branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in the 1930s.107  
While the advocacy of legal remedies for discriminatory law enforcement dominated the 
advice dispensed by the Defender’s Legal Helps column in the second decade of the twentieth 
century, one unusual column in October 1914 provoked a more forceful appraisal of street 
policing in Chicago, demonstrating the potential for law enforcement to embolden black political 
critique. In this case, the letter writer complained about the inequitable treatment that black 
Chicagoans received at city police stations “A number of persons and tax payers have 
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complained that certain police officers at the stations refuse to give civil answers to persons 
having business at the stations and treat them with overbearing arrogance and lock them up if 
they do no obey the tyrannical whims and officious caprices of these police officers.”108 As in 
other letters to the Legal Helps column, the power of police discretion suffused the complaint, 
but was labeled by the letter writer as “whims” and “caprices,” descriptions that largely framed 
these actions as individual prerogatives and minimized the degree to which such discretion drew 
on the authority of law. The Defender advised that the names and badge numbers of offending 
officers should be submitted to the Chief of Police but went on to argue that this racially 
discriminatory conduct was fundamentally at odds with the democratic ideals that supposedly 
governed the city. Here, the authors of the column made an explicit critique of racially 
discriminatory police discretion “The police of Chicago who assume too much authority and 
play the role of petty tyrant…they must be made to know that the police do not make the laws 
and that they have no right and business to treat tax payers as though they were outlaws and 
hardened criminals.”109  
This critique of tyrannical policing alluded to the necessity of limits on the police 
discretion allowed by the municipal code of Chicago, suggesting that the extensive problem of 
police discrimination and violence could not be solved through individual complaints but would 
require broader legal or administrative change. In a marked departure from its typical measured 
advocacy of litigation, the Defender called for a broader critique of police practices “The time in 
Chicago has arrived for the citizen to rise up and put the arrogant and self-conceited police 
officer intoxicated with a little authority in his proper place. They should be made to devote their 
time in detecting some of the many law breakers and highwaymen who are making life so 
                                                




unsafe…instead of showing their authority upon some unoffending tax payer who comes to one 
of the stations to transact business.”110 The column suggested the insidious nature of official 
discretion—that the very police power provided by law could “intoxicate” an officer and cause 
him to overstep his authority. It also highlighted how police discretion could work to 
decriminalize the actions of some while inflicting illegal violence or arrests on others. In 
suggesting that police might do better to “devote their time in detecting some of the many law 
breakers” in the city, the Defender alluded to police failure to evenly enforce criminal laws, as 
they had in their failure to apprehend the many perpetrators of racial violence in the bombing 
campaign against black homes just a few years later. 
 
THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT IN THE MIGRATION YEARS 
In contrast to the rapid growth of the non-white population of Chicago in the early 
twentieth century, the city’s Police Department remained overwhelmingly staffed by white or 
European ethnic men.111 For Irish and German immigrants in the nineteenth century, the newly 
consolidated Police Department had represented a chief source of employment for new arrivals 
to the city, as Department leadership found it advantageous to employment Irish and German 
patrolmen in order to control the city’s growing immigrant working class communities.112 By the 
late nineteenth century, the force was nearly 50 percent Irish or of Irish parentage.113 The next-
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largest ethnic group represented in the Chicago Police Department in that period was German or 
of German parentage, making up approximately ten percent of the force. Overall, foreign-born 
officers comprised over half of the CPD by the turn of the twentieth century, a notable figure in a 
city that was only about 35 percent foreign-born in 1900; the overrepresentation of foreign-born 
officers indicated that the CPD offered an important source of employment for newly arrived 
immigrants to Chicago.114 Among some ethnic groups, this correlated with a drop in arrests; Irish 
immigrants had been overrepresented among arrests in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
but that rate declined as the number of Irish patrolmen employed by the CPD rose.115 
While immigrant groups including Irish and Germans found themselves integrated into 
the ranks of the Police Department by the turn of the twentieth century, African American 
incorporation into the Police Department arrived at a markedly slower rate. Before the turn of the 
twentieth century, black police officers numbered approximately 25 among a total force of nearly 
2,500 men; that number fell even lower in the first decade of the twentieth century, after the 
institution of civil service requirements that eliminated many black applicants.116 The number of 
black police officers saw a steady rise during the years of the first Great Migration, however, due 
to the growth of the department as well as agitation for the increased hiring of African American 
applicants. Campaigns against the arbitrary and discriminatory conduct of white officers, often 
waged in the pages of the Chicago Defender, produced demands for the hiring of black police 
officers. The campaign for black police hiring in Chicago represented the intersection of multiple 
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strains of black politics during the Great Migration. Some agitated for increased black police 
hiring in order to reduce anti-black police conduct, while others made a case for black police on 
the premise that it would solidify black middle class respectability. In the mid-1910s, one West 
Side resident cited police discrimination as the primary rationale for the urgency black hiring, 
telling an interviewer “The police were bothering our people so badly that we got together and 
asked to have some colored police sent out.”117 Among black elites, however, employment as 
police officers offered not only an improvement of services, but also “the prestige which colored 
officers would bring to the race.”118  
In the second decade of the twentieth century, black news outlets including the Defender 
and the Chicago Whip encouraged their readers to withhold their votes from the Republican 
Mayor William Hale Thompson if the Police Department failed to hire more black officers.119 
Thompson had solidified his electoral victories by courting black votes in Chicago, and the 
number of black police officers did begin to rise during his mayoral administration. When 
Thompson first assumed office in 1915, black officers comprised just 1.8 percent of the police 
force, a number that was relatively commensurate with the overall black population of the city, 
which numbered two percent in 1910.120 The campaign for black officers succeeded in growing 
that number during Thompson’s first administration; in 1922, the number of black police officers 
in Chicago had grown to 116 and by 1930 that number had climbed to 137.121 However, despite 
this steady climb in the number of black police officers, African American police continued to 
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comprise only about two percent of the total police force over this entire period, despite the fact 
that the black population of Chicago had grown to 6.9 percent by 1930.122 Despite an increase in 
the actual number of black police officers, black Chicagoans actually became increasingly 
underrepresented in the Chicago Police Department during the interwar decades. 
Early-twentieth-century annual reports from the Chicago Police Department displayed a 
remarkable degree of official transparency The Department reported total arrests according to 
nativity beginning in 1899 and specified felony and misdemeanor arrests, charges, and 
convictions according to racial and ethnic group beginning in 1913. The CPD continued to report 
those totals until 1932.123 Rather than offering an objective measure of urban crime, these annual 
reports represented an archive of police discretion, indicating whom and for what offenses police 
made arrests in the early twentieth century. Contemporary sociologists used this data with 
caution, noting unanswered questions about the methods of its collection but also acknowledging 
that the arrest data in the CPD annual reports was the only source of such information 
available.124 Consequently, the arrest and conviction statistics of the Chicago Police Department 
could not be used to make definitive conclusions about the state of crime in the city, but they did 
represent a crucial discursive script in the politics of crime control and demonstrated how police 
administrators and city officials thought along a broad racial spectrum in these decades. These 
were the statistics referenced by municipal policy makers, reported in city newspapers, and 
consulted by urban reformers in their efforts to curtail crime and improve the efficiency of law 
enforcement. As such, despite the challenges this data presents for the historical interpretation of 
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urban crime conditions, it served as the discursive terrain upon which many historical actors 
constructed their own ideas about criminal responsibility and the relationship among criminality, 
race, ethnicity, and gender.125 
TABLE 1.2: NATIVITY OF PERSONS ARRESTED, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT ANNUAL 
REPORTS, 1899-1931126 
 
NATIVITY YEARS LISTED 
Americans 1899-1931 










English  1899-1931 
French 1899-1931 
Germans 1899-1931 









Mexicans 1902; 1928-1931 
Norwegians  1899-1931 
Polanders 1899-1931 
Portuguese 1902 
Romanians  1916-1931 
Russians 1899-1931 
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Other Nativities 1899-1931 
 
Arrests and charges represented a critical site for the forging of a connection between 
blackness and criminality through the exercise of official police discretion. Police had arrested 
black Chicagoans in disproportionate numbers since the early twentieth century; although the 
rate of black arrests per 100,000 city residents remained below that of “American” arrests, the 
proportion of total black arrests was consistently outsized compared to the proportion of black 
city residents. In 1900, when the black population of Chicago made up 1.78 percent of the total 
city population, the number of black arrests made up 7.83 percent of total arrests.127 By 1910, the 
black population of the city had risen only slightly to 2.02 percent, but the proportion of black 
arrests remained disproportionately high at 7.09 percent.128 Ten years later, in 1920, the black 
population of the city had grown to 4.05 percent of total city residents, and the proportion of 
black arrests had risen significantly to 11.3 percent of the total number of arrests by the Chicago 
Police Department that year.129 The proportion of black arrests in the city saw its biggest jump 
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between 1920 and 1930; in 1930, Chicago’s black population made up 6.9 percent of the total 
city population, but black arrests represented 25.34 percent of total arrests.130 
The total number of black arrests in Chicago was even more dramatically imbalanced 
when disaggregated by gender, as black women found themselves arrested at even higher rates 
than the total black population or black men in those decades. Like the total number of black 
arrests, the total proportion of black women arrested remained consistently higher than the 
proportion of black women in the city but became even more markedly disproportionate by the 
1930s. In 1904, black women accounted for 11.95 percent of total women arrested, although they 
comprised approximately 1.7 percent of the total female population of the city.131 In 1910, the 
proportion of black women in the city had grown slightly to 2.0 percent, but the number of black 
women arrested that year still made up 11.06 percent of all women arrested.132 A decade later, 
the population of black women in Chicago had increased to 4.0 percent of the total population of 
women in the city, but the total number of black women arrested comprised 15.54 percent of 
women arrested that year.133 And similarly to the proportion of total black arrests, the proportion 
of black women arrested saw its highest jump between 1920 and 1930. In a year when black 
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women made up 6.9 percent of the population of women in the city, black women made up 50.08 
percent of women arrested in the city that year.134  


















1900 70, 438 5,512 7.83% 1,698,575 30, 150 1.78% 
1910 76,628 5,434 7.09% 2,185,283 44,103 2.02% 
1920 87,197 9,856 11.3% 2,701,705 109,458 4.05% 
1930 183,434 46,487 25.34% 3,376,438 233,903 6.9% 
 
 
Most black Chicagoans found themselves arrested most often for offenses that were also 
common among other populations in the city. In 1920, burglary, larceny, and robbery accounted 
for most black felony charges, mirroring the most common offenses cited by the police 
department for the population of Chicago as a whole. However, black arrestees were similarly 
overrepresented for these offenses as they were in total arrests for that year.136 The influx of 
migrants increased the proportion of working-class black city residents, who crammed into the 
crowded neighborhoods of the black South Side and often struggled to find employment in the 
city’s factories and manufacturing districts. Considering the economic constraints that black 
migrants found themselves living under once they reached Chicago, it was little wonder that 
black property crime would represent a significant proportion of black arrests. However, the 
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number of black arrests for felony property crimes were so dramatically disproportionate 
compared to the proportion of black city residents, these numbers also suggested that police may 
have targeted this population for arrests or ignored similar property crimes that occurred among 
other population of the city. 
While police maintained discretion regarding whom to arrest for violent crimes or 
property crimes, other misdemeanor offenses were defined entirely by official discretion. It were 
those misdemeanors and quality of life offenses that black Chicagoans found themselves arrested 
for in the greatest numbers, particularly disorderly conduct. According to police data, there were 
a handful of racial and ethnic groups that found themselves particularly likely to be arrested for 
disorderly conduct, African Americans, Irish, Italians, Poles, and Russians among them.137 Black 
charges for disorderly conduct accounted for 11 percent of total charges for that offense in 1920 
when the black population of the city was only 4.05 percent of the total population.138 Evidently, 
it was the city’s largest immigrant and migrant communities that often found themselves 
vulnerable to discretionary police harassment and arrest even while many in those same 
communities critiqued police officers for failing to clean up vice or prevent violent crime in their 
same neighborhoods.  
Patterns of black overrepresentation among Chicago Police Department arrests and 
charges demonstrated how law enforcement practices themselves reflected and reinforced 
popular discourses of inherent black criminality that had circulated in Chicago and around the 
country since the early twentieth century. This evidence recalled Ida B. Wells’s critique of the 
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Chicago Police Department, which she claimed had played an active role in unfairly accusing 
black city residents of committing “all the crime in Chicago.”139 City officials noted those racial 
discrepancies of arrests and charges in the early twentieth century, but none indicated efforts to 
rectify racially discriminatory patterns of policing. Interviewed by investigators of the Chicago 
Commission on Race Relations in 1920, Municipal Court Judge Daniel P. Trude admitted that he 
had noticed “more disposition on the part of the officers to make arrests of colored offenders,” 
while Criminal Court Judge Charles M. Thomson related an incident that came before his bench 
in which a black man was repeatedly arrested, but in the judge’s estimation “A crime occurred in 
their district, and they pounced on this chap, I felt pretty sure he was not guilty.”140 Similarly, 
Criminal Court Judge Kickham Scanlan concluded that police arrested many black Chicagoans 
“on suspicion,” blaming that undue suspicion on racial prejudice and quipping “If you will tell 
me why race prejudice exists in this world, I will tell you why this is so.”141 Former Chicago 
Chief of Police Leroy T. Steward offered his own explanation for the overrepresentation of black 
arrests, concluding that this difference could be attributed to African American migration itself. 
He suggested that Chicago police officers were accustomed to seeing white workers in the city’s 
Stockyards but unfamiliar with most new black migrants who had found work there. According 
to Steward, this made new black migrants more likely to be arrested, since “There is concerning 
them naturally a greater suspicion than would attach to the white man who had lived for a greater 
length of time in the same district.”142 Steward’s response identified the active role of patrolmen 
themselves in driving up the number of black arrests and connected that role directly to the 
changes wrought by the massive migration of African Americans to Chicago.  
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Other official explanations for the high proportions of black arrests and charges laid 
blame on inherent black criminality itself. In the mid-1920s, Chicago Police Department 
Superintendent Morgan Collins spoke to an assembly of law enforcement officers and anti-crime 
activists at a conference organized the Chicago Crime Commission. Superintendent Collins’s 
remarks drew attention to black crime in the city, and he concluded “One cause of our increase in 
murders in Cook County is the greatly increased number of colored people who have recently 
made their homes in Chicago…I do not mean to cast any reflection on the colored population, 
but statistics show that they are in fact one source of the increase in our murder rate.”143 Indeed, 
the black homicide rate in Chicago had been higher than the white homicide rate since the late 
nineteenth century and continued to rise in the 1920s as the number of black Chicagoans charged 
with murder more than doubled between 1920 and 1924 and the number convicted of murder 
rose by a factor of more than eight.144 However, this singular reliance on statistics to understand 
the relationship between black Chicagoans and violent crime elided the structural factors that 
shaped the experiences of black city residents and magnified the violent crime rate among that 
population. Lack of policing in black neighborhoods along with the active role of police in 
directing vice establishments into the black South Side multiplied the number of potentially 
violent spaces in black neighborhoods with little if any state protection.145 Police also neglected 
to intervene when black Chicagoans faced violent threats from white city residents, as they had 
during the Teamster’s strike of 1905, the bombing campaign directed against black homes in the 
WWI years, and the 1919 Chicago Race Riot.146 Poverty and racial segregation further 
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exacerbated violent crime among black Chicago neighborhoods, as families struggling to make a 
living wage or access adequate housing often experienced higher rates of domestic violence.147  
 
WHITE RACIAL VIOLENCE AND POLICE DISCRETION 
By the end of the First World War, the intersection of white supremacy and police 
discretion had produced an urban geography and political landscape in which black Chicagoans 
were associated with criminality and disproportionately targeted by city police, and one in which 
white racial violence against African Americans went nearly unchecked by the state. It was this 
context that William B. Austin’s home was bombed on June 16, 1919, as well as the apartment 
he had rented to Gertrude Harrison just a few weeks earlier. The frequency of the white 
bombings of black homes increased by the close of the second decade of the twentieth century, 
especially along the border of the South Side Black Belt; between July 1917 and March 1921 
there were 58 home bombings in Chicago.148 As upwardly mobile black Chicagoans sought 
improved housing outside the Black Belt, some white neighborhoods formed protective 
associations to defend racial boundaries and property values, sometimes holding “indignation 
meetings” upon learning about potential new black neighbors.149 An account from the Baltimore 
Afro-American in March 1919 reported three black home bombings in the previous three weeks, 
and more than twelve in the previous six moths “All of them were traced…to a class of whites 
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who have become very much incensed because of the valuable properties colored people are 
getting in the exclusive sections of the South Side.”150  
Attacks on black homes began as early as 1906, when Hyde Park residents organized to 
intimidate black homebuyers. In 1910, a group of white homeowners on the West Side broke 
into a newly acquired black home, threatened the family inside with death, and proceeded to tear 
down the house and destroy everything inside.151 Police made little effort to apprehend the 
perpetrators of these attacks, effectively legalizing these white attacks on black property and 
safety and decriminalizing white violence in the service of the color line. The failure of police to 
investigate most of these attacks and their reluctance to make arrests in these cases represented a 
pinnacle of racialized police discretion. Police and other law enforcement officials played an 
active role in the association of blackness and criminality as they exercised their discretion to 
make disproportionate black arrests and direct criminal enterprises into black neighborhoods. 
Police failure to stop the operation of white-owned vice enterprises and the lack of arrests in 
cases of white racial violence—such as the ongoing home bombings—further decriminalized 
white racial violence in the same moment.  
White attacks on black property and black lives ranged from explosions at the homes of 
unassuming Southern migrants, to explosions at the houses of white landlords, to repeated 
attacks on elite black property owners. Reports of those attacks usually contained the same trope 
regarding police response—that police had investigated but found no evidence of the wrongdoers 
and made no arrests. This trope persisted in accounts of the bombing campaign despite widely 
held popular knowledge that white property owners’ associations had coordinated the attacks and 
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often circulated knowledge about their targets before the actual explosion.152 After an attack in 
July 1917, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported that the black residents of an apartment building 
on Maryland Avenue had been injured when a bomb exploded in the building. According to the 
report “There was a rumor that race resentments were responsible. No arrests were made.”153 The 
attack had thrown the sleeping residents from their beds and caused more than $10,000 in 
damage. S.T. Motley had acquired the building four years earlier, and “Rumors reached the 
police that white residents of the neighborhood resented the sale of the building to Motley, who 
is a negro.”154 In March 1920, white landlord Moses Fox received a call warning him that he 
would “suffer the consequences” of having sold a home to new African American owners.155 On 
the evening of March 10th, an automobile drove slowly past the Fox home and tossed a dynamite 
bomb inside, which exploded and damaged properties throughout the block. It was later 
discovered that the evening chosen for the attack was one in which the usual black patrolman 
who policed the block was off duty and that a white patrolman had taken his place. As was 








                                                
152 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago, 123. 
153 “Bomb in Negro Flat Laid to Race Trouble,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 2, 1917. 
154 Ibid. 























FIGURE 1.5: “HOMES BOMBED,” 1917-1921157 
Other attacks suggested that the goal of the violent campaign was not solely to confine 
black residential areas but also to stop black social and economic advancement. Over the course 
of a year beginning in November 1919, Jesse Binga, the owner of Chicago’s first African 
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American bank and the holder of more than $500,000 of property in the city, was bombed five 
times at his homes and businesses. A bomb left the Binga realty officers in shambles in 
November 1919, and once again “No clews [sic] to the bombers were found, and no arrests were 
made.”158 After an attack on Binga’s home a month later, police were detailed to guard the house 
on South Park Avenue, but attackers managed to plant another explosion. In a convenient 
“unguarded interval,” the driver of an automobile tossed a bomb towards the Binga home, which 
fortuitously extinguished in a puddle of water. Those with knowledge of the attempted bombing 
explained that the perpetrators had objected to Binga’s property ownership, particularly the real 
estate mogul’s “$30,000 home in a white neighborhood.”159 Two more bombings of Binga’s 
home followed over the course of the year; despite his offers of rewards for information leading 
to an arrest, “No one was arrested.”160 
Appeals to city leaders and police made little effect in changing the official response—or 
lack thereof—to the ongoing bombings, similarly to the inability of most black Chicagoans to 
persuade police to eliminate vice establishments from black neighborhoods in these years. 
Interracial committees and delegations sought audiences with the Mayor William Hale 
Thompson, Superintendent of Police John J. Garrity, and State’s Attorney Maclay Hoyne urging 
investigations of the attacks, to no avail. When Thompson referred the matter to the Police 
Department “The police were unable to discover the bombers or anyone directing them.”161 
Meanwhile, the attacks continued, as “The Negro population grew to trust less and less in the 
interest of the community and the public agencies of protection.”162 The recently reorganized 
Chicago branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People prioritized 
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the investigation of these violent attacks on black homes, listing among its top priorities 
“investigation of the destructive prohibitory methods used by some citizens to keep colored 
tenants out of certain neighborhoods.”163 Some drew attention to the fact that black votes had 
secured the mayor’s office for Thompson despite the fact that the city executive failed to take 
decisive action on the campaign of white racial violence. Julius Taylor, editor of the African 
American weekly Broad Ax, implored Chicago’s black leaders to continue to press Thompson on 
the issue, citing the fact that several black elites were integral members of Thompson’s urban 
machine and yet black Chicagoans failed to receive adequate police protection.164 
A week after the attack on the North Side Austin residence in June 1919, a seething 
editorial in the Chicago Defender demanded answers to the persistent problem of police 
decriminalization of this ongoing white racial violence. The writer posited that police “[winked] 
at these disgraceful occurrences because the victims are Colored people,” suggesting that police 
discretion to allow the ongoing violence hinged as much on the race of the victims as it did on 
the race of the perpetrators. The Defender contrasted this consistent police negligence with 
successful investigations of “labor sluggers when these gentry were carrying on their reign of 
terror against the building industry,” and noted that “the activity of the police was sufficient 
to…suppress the work of the I.W.W. and we can see no reason for the lack of similar activity in 
going after the bomb throwers.”165 Here the Defender identified the precise tension that had 
characterized the police response to the bombing of the Austin residence: police were apparently 
eager to respond to attacks on white capital but not to attacks on black homes and safety. The 
editorial asserted that black Chicagoans were entitled to equal police protection as taxpayers who 
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supported law enforcement institutions through their tax dollars and that in the absence of police 
protection “We must protect ourselves.”166 Here the writer indicated how the failure of the police 
to provide equal protection could result in the politicization of black Chicago or even violent self 
defense, processes that would continue in the years to come as black residents continued to face 
and critique racially discriminatory police discretion.  
In July 1919, only a month after the attacks on the Austin home, racial violence in 
Chicago transformed from targeted bombings to a wholesale riot. A confrontation on the 
Twenty-Ninth Street beach turned violent when a white crowd assaulted a young black swimmer 
and police failed to intervene. Investigators from the Chicago Commission on Race Relations 
and other black observers repeatedly referred to white rioters as “criminals,” a notable discursive 
reframing of the decriminalized white racial violence that had plagued black Chicagoans for 
years.167 Others expressed concern that a racially motivated home bombing could lead to another 
riot as the interwar decades progressed.168 In a frustrated note from February of 1920, Chicago 
Commission on Race Relations vice chairman Francis Shepardson identified the central role that 
police discretion continued to play in the ongoing racial conflict “Property is being destroyed and 
life endangered by bomb throwing. The facts are known to all. They are reported in the papers. 
But there seems to be no authority interested in the protection of Americans whose skins are 
black…unless something is done soon another riot is certain.”169 It was that failure to protect all 
Chicagoans that black city residents and members of other subjugated communities would 
continue to grapple with as the interwar decades progressed.  
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CRIME AND VICIOUS ENVIRONMENT: THE 1919 CHICAGO RACE RIOT  
AND BLACK CRIME POLITICS AFTER WWI 
 
It was a blistering hot Sunday afternoon on July 27, 1919, when Officer Daniel Callahan 
took a walk along the shore of Chicago’s Twenty-Ninth Street beach.1 Perhaps seeking a respite 
from the city’s scorching summer heat, Callahan wandered several blocks from his post at the 
Cottage Grove Avenue police station and strolled along the water’s edge.2 As he surveyed the 
lakeshore, the police officer saw a group of white bathers enjoying the relief of the cool water. 
For years, a tacit understanding had dictated that black swimmers would use the beach two 
blocks north near Twenty-Seventh Street, while white swimmers would enter the water at 
Twenty-Ninth Street.3 As Callahan watched over the segregated beach, he was surprised to see 
an unexpected figure bobbing in the water. Eugene Williams, an African American teenager, had 
drifted through the waves, crossing the invisible boundary that separated black beach from white. 
Callahan made no move to usher Williams northward toward the Twenty-Seventh Street beach. 
Neither did he stop a group of white swimmers as they gathered on the shore; the group ridiculed 
Williams and protested his entry into their supposedly protected waters. As the protestations 
grew more vehement, some of the white swimmers lobbed stones in Williams’s direction as 
Callahan looked on. 
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Disquieted by the commotion, a group of black bathers decamped from their spot at 
Twenty-Seventh Street to investigate the disturbance, eliciting the taunts of the white crowd. The 
shouts grew louder and the two groups began to launch stones at one another. Callahan watched 
the altercation, choosing not to intervene in the increasingly violent fracas. Eventually, a white 
man sent another stone flying into the water towards Williams, striking him and knocking him 
from his raft. Williams struggled in the water, unable to keep himself afloat due to his injuries. A 
group of experienced swimmers attempted to rush to the boy’s aid, but Callahan stopped them, 
ordering the group to stay on the beach as Williams drowned.  
As the crowd waited in vain for Williams to reemerge from beneath the surface of the 
water, several black witnesses turned their ire on George Stauber, a white man whom they 
claimed had thrown the fatal stone.4 They demanded that Callahan arrest Stauber, but the officer 
refused, failing to acknowledge Stauber’s supposed crime. Incensed, a group of black swimmers 
attacked the officer, pushing him to the ground and pummeling him until Callahan ran from the 
beach and into a nearby drugstore.5 There he made a call to the Cottage Grove Avenue police 
station, which dispatched two wagons loaded with officers. When the police arrived at the scene, 
Officer John O’Brien charged the crowd, attempting to quell the angry protestations. Hardly 
assuaged, the group of black onlookers attacked O’Brien, again calling for the arrest of 
Williams’s attacker and repeating their demands for fair law enforcement. Disregarding these 
calls for Stauber’s arrest, O’Brien fired his revolver into the crowd, striking three black men who 
fell to the ground.6 Quickly following this confrontation between police and the black crowd, 
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violence spread west from the beachfront along Twenty-Ninth Street and into the city’s south 
side Black Belt, setting off one of the largest racial clashes in Chicago’s history.7  
The Chicago Race Riot of 1919 joined a period of heightened racial violence that would 
come to be known as the Red Summer—the summer and early autumn of 1919 when massive 
racial violence reached across the country into booming metropolises and smaller rural outposts. 
The riot also represented a crucial example in the long trajectory of police involvement in urban 
racial violence. Indeed, discriminatory policing and police violence have played a causal role in 
nearly every major urban racial conflict in United States history. Among early-twentieth-century 
race riots, police brutality, negligence, or encouragement of violence played a role in the East St. 
Louis Riot of 1917, the Tulsa Riot of 1921, and the Harlem Riot of 1935, in addition to the eight-
day conflict in Chicago. In its investigation of twentieth-century race riots, the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders found that “Almost invariably the incident that ignites 
disorder arises from police action…police have come to symbolize white power, white racism, 
and white oppression.”8 Here the investigators found a deep historical pattern of police 
involvement in massive violence, along with a pattern of police defense the color line and 
protection of the privileges of whiteness, two patterns evident in Chicago in 1919 as well.  
Officer Callahan’s role in the incident on the Twenty-Ninth Street beach demonstrated 
the power of police discretion to define and defend racialized spaces and the potential for that 
discretion to spark vehement objection and massive urban violence. Callahan used his 
discretionary authority as an officer of the state to excuse Stauber for the murder of Eugene 
Williams with the full knowledge that a quick call to the Cottage Grove Avenue police station 
                                                
7 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago, 4; William M. Tuttle, Race Riot: Chicago in the 
Red Summer of 1919 (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 10. 
8 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders (New York: Dutton, 1968), 93. 
 
 92 
would provide him with the necessary institutional reinforcement to support that decision. The 
many witnesses on the beach that day may have formed their own varied interpretations of 
Callahan’s actions. Stauber and the other white swimmers may have interpreted Callahan as a 
righteous defender of the urban color line and may have seen his choice not to make an arrest as 
the state sanctioning of white racial exclusivity and violence. The black swimmers who had 
demanded Stauber’s arrest, however, likely saw Officer Callahan as a symbol of discriminatory 
state institutions, denying black Chicagoans equal protection of the law in the service of white 
supremacy. In his decision not to arrest Stauber but instead to call for more police officer to 
control black protestors, Callahan acted not as a rogue cop but as a representative of a state 
institution that provided for the discretionary power of police to decriminalize white violence at 
the site of racial conflict, allowing for the violent defense of the urban color line. 
This story of urban policing and the 1919 Chicago Race Riot ultimately indicated the 
pivotal role that local law enforcement institutions played in the construction and defense of the 
urban color line. The incident on the Twenty-Ninth Street beach dramatized several of the 
conflicts that had suffused race relations in Chicago since the early twentieth century, as white 
beachgoers violently defended urban racial boundaries with the endorsement of state officials. 
Officer Callahan’s failure to intervene in the violent conflict and his decision not to make any 
arrests following Williams’s death mirrored repeated police failure to intervene in or investigate 
the ongoing violent attacks on black homes that had continued through the summer leading up to 
the days of the riot itself. Policing in the years before the conflict enacted patterns of racialized 
police violence and police neglect of black security and safety. These processes reflected the 
particular urban landscape and social politics of Chicago, including the shifting racial geography 
of the city over the course of the Great Migration and the relationship between white ethnic 
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crime syndicates and the city’s police force. The riot, therefore, represented not a sudden 
explosion of urban racial violence, but rather the culmination of decades of the defense of 
racialized space and state complicity in the subjugation of blackness. 
Patterns of discretionary policing during the days of the riot itself similarly reflected 
decades of racialized police discrimination. Imbued with the authority of the state, police officers 
deployed their discretion to decide which laws to enforce and whom to arrest, reflecting and 
reinforcing discourses of black criminality to guide their actions on the streets of Chicago.9 In the 
years preceding the riot, police encouragement of illegal enterprises in South Side black 
neighborhoods, disproportionate black arrests, and inflated statistics of black crime all 
contributed to the growing association of blackness and criminality. Arrests during the days of 
the riot disproportionately targeted African Americans, despite the fact that injuries and fatalities 
were also disproportionately found among African Americans, indicating that police deployed 
their discretion to decriminalize many acts of white racial violence during the eight-day riot.10 
Accounts from riot witnesses also catalogued numerous instances in which police failed to 
intervene in violent white attacks on black city residents or participated in those attacks 
themselves, demonstrating how policing during the riot reinforced urban racial hierarchies and 
endorsed white racial violence. These patterns of racially disparate policing and prosecution did 
elicit objections from some state officials in the months and years following the riot itself. For 
instance, during the days of violence in late July and early August, the Cook County Grand Jury 
halted indictments after seeing only black defendants brought before them for riot violations.11 
These intra-state critiques and tensions demonstrated that despite years of racial discrimination 
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among police officers, law enforcement as an anti-black endeavor was not a consolidated state 
objective in the years following WWI.  
The riot also played a critical role in fomenting black critiques of local law enforcement 
and elicited broad investigation of the conditions of black life in Chicago during the years of the 
first Great Migration. Over the course of the riot, race leaders—elites and leaders of racial 
advocacy organizations—appealed to the mayor of Chicago, asking him to direct police to fairly 
enforce the law and intervene in the many instances of white racial violence. These appeals 
echoed the respectable black law and order politics that had permeated elite black calls for fair 
law enforcement since the early twentieth century, calls that were premised on black lawfulness. 
The most trenchant and widely read critiques of riot violence and the state response, however, 
would be found in the final report of the state-appointed Chicago Commission on Race Relations 
(CCRR), which conducted a years-long investigation of black life in Chicago and the conditions 
that led to the massive racial violence in 1919. The CCRR’s exhaustive report, The Negro in 
Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot, represented a comprehensive urban 
sociology of black life in Chicago, deploying the methodology of the newly established Chicago 
School of Sociology.12 The many recommendations that the CCRR made for improving race 
relations in the city drew attention to the ongoing problems of police discretion while also 
pointing to the broad range of social causes of inequality in Chicago. These broad-based 
critiques showcased the influence of Progressive reform on the methods and recommendations of 
the CCRR, as its investigators drew connections between racial conflict and the conditions of 
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urban life and drew attention to the strained relationship between black Chicagoans and the city’s 
overwhelmingly white ethnic police force.13  
The 1919 Chicago Race Riot represented the culmination of decades of racially 
discriminatory policing in Chicago, policing that had resulted in both the disproportionate 
criminalization of blackness and the decriminalization of white racial violence. Moreover, the 
riot itself, the patterns of discriminatory policing it showcased, and the critiques it elicited 
demonstrated the historical specificity of police discretion as a instrument of racial formation in 
early-twentieth-century Chicago. Police discretion did not work as an unmarked tool of racial 
hierarchy or anti-blackness, but rather functioned within the historically specific context of 
migration-era Chicago. The patterns of violence and discriminatory policing during the riot itself 
drew on years of state practices that criminalized blackness and reinforced the racial boundaries 
of urban space that many white neighborhood organizations had violently defended since the 
early twentieth century. The overwhelmingly white ethnic Police Department also drew on its 
many connections and financial relationships with ethnic gangs during the conflict, choosing not 
to arrests many affiliated with those groups despite their overt violence during the days of the 
riot. Informed by the racial, spatial, and political context of early-twentieth-century Chicago, 
police and other law enforcement officers patrolled the 1919 Chicago Race Riot as they had 
patrolled the city in the years leading up to the conflict, adhering to the discriminatory practices 
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RIOT POLICING IN 1919 
July of 1919 had already seen racial conflict across the country by the time tensions 
erupted in Chicago; in the first few weeks of that month, massive violence occurred in Virginia, 
Texas, Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC.14 Reflecting on this period years later, 
NAACP Executive Secretary James Weldon Johnson gave it its moniker “Eight months after the 
armistice…there broke the Red Summer of 1919, and the mingled emotions of the race were 
bitterness, despair, and anger.”15 In the context of the immediate post-WWI years and the First 
Red Scare, the label ambiguously encompassed widespread fears of Bolshevism and anarchy as 
well as the racial bloodshed that gripped the nation. Over time, the label came to be primarily 
associated with the numerous violent attacks on African American communities that summer. 
Estimates regarding the number of conflicts during the Red Summer ranged from 25 to nearly 40 
depending on the definition of racial conflict and the chronological scope used.16 Mob actions 
resulting in multiple deaths and injuries occurred in Washington, DC, Chicago, Knoxville, 
Longview, TX, Norfolk, VA, Philadelphia, Charleston, Millen, GA and Bisbee, AZ.17 Smaller-
scale conflicts resulting in one or fewer fatalities or injuries happened in nearly 30 cities and at 
least 77 lynchings of African Americans occurred throughout the calendar year.18 
The Red Summer erupted amidst a wide range of social disruptions, including post-war 
demobilization, temperance activism, the advent of federal Prohibition, intensified black 
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migration to the North and urban South, and labor conflict.19 The confluence of these myriad 
social changes helps explain the timing of the Red Summer and the rapid concentration of 
violence over the span of a few months. Each race riot, however, was rooted in local conflicts. 
For instance, the Washington, DC race riot that began on July 19th followed frequent news 
reports of a black “crime wave” in the city, and the city’s major dailies continued to trumpet 
warnings of black violence as the riot spread. Administrators of the district’s police department 
also reported that the violence had been encouraged by anti-Prohibitionists, who endeavored to 
demonstrate the negative impact of the federal ban on alcohol.20 The Chicago riot, however, 
followed the years of violence along the city’s color line, as white neighborhood associations 
coordinated at least 58 bombings of black-occupied homes outside the Black Belt beginning in 
1917.21 The violent confrontation along Chicago’s lakeside color line and the failure of police to 
address adequately the white racial violence at the Twenty-Ninth Street beach reflected that 
pattern of racial violence that had been sanctioned by police in Chicago since the beginning of 
the Great Migration.  
What began with a dispute at the Twenty-Ninth Street beach soon enveloped the city, as 
violence spread through Chicago in the days after July 27th. News reports described gangs of 
white and black rioters alike wandering the streets of the city. These reports depicted a city 
gripped in violence, city residents taking cover in their homes for fear of venturing out into the 
street only to fall victim to the roving gangs.22 While these reports drew repeated attention to the 
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supposed role of city gangs in the conflict, police were often at the center of the violence. Two 
days after the riot began, a car full of white passengers crashed into a police patrol car at Thirty-
Fifth Street and South State Street. The passengers had been roaming the Black Belt firing guns 
at black Chicagoans who unfortunately found themselves on the street that night. After the crash 
at Thirty-Fifth Street, a group of black bystanders rushed to the scene of the accident, enraged 
that police had done nothing to stop the attacks. Nearby police hurried to the scene as well, and 
soon the confrontation had nearly devolved into a brawl. Unable to subdue the black crowd, 
police opened fire, killing one black man and wounding 30 others.23 They had failed to stop the 
white violence that targeted black Chicagoans, and police turned to violence themselves in order 
to subdue black anger during the conflict. The next night, violence flared again at Fifty-Third 
and State Streets in the Black Belt, as 200 policemen clashed with black Chicagoans for close to 
two hours. The officers fired nearly 1,000 rounds into the crowd, finally arresting 45 people 
before the incident was over. Eventually, police used axes and sledgehammers to force their way 
into surrounding black homes, searching for suspected snipers.24 The incident at Fifty-Third 
Street demonstrated that police also acted as aggressors during the conflict, joining with white 
Chicagoans who sought black victims during the eight-day conflict and showing how the 
ongoing violence effectively authorized warrantless police searches of black private space and 
property. 
Many examples of discriminatory policing during the Chicago Race Riot demonstrated 
keen police neglect for black safety when African Americans found themselves the victims of 
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mob violence, echoing patterns of police neglect that black Chicagoans had critiqued in the years 
leading up to the riot. On July 28th, a group of white men beat Kin Lumpkin on the elevated train 
platform at Forty-Seventh Street. Instead of arresting his attackers, the patrolman who witnessed 
the incident arrested Lumpkin himself, charged him with inciting a riot, and held him in jail for 
five days.25 In this instance, the observing police officer not only decriminalized this act of white 
racial violence but also used the incident to criminalize Lumpkin, laying blame on the black man 
for this instance of racial conflict. A few days later, a group of white men beat John Slovall in 
plain sight of a white policeman. Subsequently “No arrests were made. The officer did not even 
call for aid.”26 Here again, police decriminalized the racial violence of the white assailants and 
demonstrated deep disregard for black safety. By neglecting to aid Slovall, the officer failed to 
fulfill one of the basic tenants of state police power, to protect the health and safety of all 
Chicago residents. 
While some of the worst reported violence occurred in the white ethnic West Side Back 
of the Yards neighborhood, police focused most of their attention and manpower on the South 
Side Black Belt. Police Superintendent John J. Garrity marshaled the full power of his 
department to patrol the Black Belt, even taking traffic patrolmen off their posts to further 
increase the police surveillance of black Chicago.27 Garrity indicated that police were 
overwhelmingly deployed to the Black Belt, primarily concentrated between Twenty-Second and 
Thirty-Ninth Streets and east of Wentworth Avenue.28 He estimated that approximately 2,800 
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police officers out of the department’s total 3,500 patrolmen policed an approximately two 
square mile section of the Black Belt during the conflict, meaning that “four-fifths of the total 
police force was concentrated there.”29 This concentration resulted after Garrity ordered 1,000 
additional police to patrol the predominantly black neighborhood, resulting in the densest 
concentration of police patrolmen in a given area of the city that Chicago had ever seen, leaving 
most of the rest of the city relatively unpatrolled.30 As a result, many other city neighborhoods 
were vulnerable to unchecked violence during the riot and the majority of injuries incurred by 
Chicagoans during the conflict were sustained outside the zone of intense police surveillance.31 
Additionally, the violence that occurred in the Black Belt itself may have been aggravated by the 
acute police presence, as the Chicago Commission on Race Relations later found that “Many of 
the deaths and injuries occurred during clashes between white policemen and Negro mobs,” 
suggesting that police exacerbated violence in black neighborhoods during the eight-day riot.32 
Despite the intense deployment of police patrolmen during the conflict, Police 
Department officials claimed that they lacked the manpower to quell the violence. Consequently, 
on July 30th, Governor Frank Lowden ordered 6,000 members of the state’s reserve militia and 
infantry into Chicago; they marched into the city “accoutered as for war.”33 Mayor William Hale 
Thompson and Police Superintendent Garrity had asked the governor for the assistance of the 
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state militia after they concluded that the city’s police officers could not control “the public 
disorder and danger” without further assistance.34 Militia members established a “barred zone” 
encompassing two square miles of the city’s black neighborhoods, roughly stretching north to 
south from Twenty-Second Street to Fifty-Fifth Street and east to west from Michigan Avenue to 
Wentworth Avenue.35 The borders of the barred zone formalized and hardened the racial 
boundaries of the city, as militia members refused to allow white Chicagoans to enter the black 
neighborhoods unescorted.36 The establishment of the barred zone may have delivered some 
relief to black Chicagoans who had feared the violence of roving white gangs over the preceding 
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FIGURE 2.1: “MAP OF RIOT AND FIRE ZONES,” 191938 
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But the establishment of the barred zone also stranded black Chicagoans in this corner of 
the city. The state militia’s order kept city workers from their jobs in the central business district 
and kept industrial workers from their jobs in the nearby Stockyards.39 On August 1st, a number 
of large packing companies in the Stockyards issued paychecks to 7,000 black employees at a 
YMCA headquarters in the Black Belt, as those workers had been restricted from retrieving their 
compensation for days.40 Militia members allowed shipments of food and milk to enter the 
barred zone that day as well, “for the use of the negroes, who have been virtually held prisoners 
in their homes since Sunday because of the race riots.”41 It was not until August 7th, four days 
after the riot had supposedly ended, that militia members allowed black workers to return to their 
jobs in meatpacking plants in the Union Stockyards district; even after the temporary ban on 
black workers entering the Stockyards was lifted, those workers faced rigorous surveillance from 
police and militiamen who feared that the intermingling of black and white workers might 
produce further violence.42 While some reports illustrated friendly relations between militiamen 
and Black Belt residents, troops also assumed the authority within the barred zone to search 
every person they met, ostensibly looking for concealed weapons. The temporarily constructed 
border of the barred zone provided these state actors with the authority to enact new tactics of 
surveillance upon any who chose to venture onto the city streets.43 
The highest concentration of riot violence actually occurred in the Back of the Yards 
neighborhood, an industrialized neighborhood to the west of the Black Belt that was 
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predominantly populated by European ethnic residents, particularly Irish, Poles, Lithuanians, 
Slovaks, and Czechs.44 Despite the fact that several deaths occurred in the Back of the Yards, 
“there [was] no record of an attempt by the police to increase the riot forces. In this district, gang 
raids by whites were practically beyond control.”45 The dearth of police in the Back of the 
Yards—in comparison to the intense concentration of police in the Black Belt—reflected Police 
Department strategy as well as the relationships many police officers had with local crime 
syndicates or European ethnic gangs, who relied on police discretion to protect their enterprises. 
The predominantly Irish Ragen’s Colts had a significant presence in the Back of the Yards 
neighborhood, and some reports suggested that police officers had tipped off gang members 
when state investigators ventured into the neighborhood to survey the conflict in that district.46 
While the decision to concentrate the vast majority of police officers in the Black Belt came from 
Police Department administrators, this discrepancy in police deployment also allowed street 
patrolmen with ties to the ethnic gangs in the Back of the Yards to protect residents of that 
neighborhood from state surveillance.  
The records of arrests and indictments during and following the eight-day conflict 
suggested that police had targeted black Chicagoans for criminalization during the riot despite 
abundant evidence of violence that reached across the color line. Among the 229 people arrested 
for criminal activity during the riot, 154 were black and only 75 were white. Of those arrested, 
the State’s Attorney returned indictments against 81 black defendants and 47 white defendants, 
indicating that blacks served as defendants in riot-related cases almost twice as often as their 
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white counterparts.47 The records of riot-related injuries, however, demonstrated an opposite 
trend; official records showed that 342 black city residents had been injured during the riot 
compared to 178 whites.48 Among the 38 men killed during the riot, 23 of them were black and 
15 were white.49 In addition to the racial bias in deaths, the fatal violence of the riot had been 
concentrated upon black migrants; 14 of the black men killed had been born in Southern states.50  
Considering that most of the riot violence occurred along the color line, arrest statistics 
should have suggested a reversed trend—if the number of arrested black rioters was double the 
number of white rioters, then the number of whites injured or killed would likely have been 
double the number of blacks injured or killed. An investigation into riot-related fatalities by the 
Cook County Coroner’s Jury three months after the conflict had concluded that the 
disproportionate number of black arrests had exacerbated racial conflict, as “The failure of the 
police to arrest, impartially, at the time of rioting, whether from insufficient effort or otherwise, 
was a mistake and had a tendency to further incite and aggravate the colored population.”51 
These racialized patterns of arrest during the riot mirrored patterns of disproportionate black 
arrests that had characterized policing in Chicago since the early twentieth century; black 
Chicagoans were regularly arrested at rates that were disproportionate to the proportion of blacks 
in the total population, even as the number of black city resident increased over the first two 
decades of the twentieth century.  
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Police targeting of black Chicagoans for arrest during the days of the riot was met with 
criticism from other institutions of criminal justice in the weeks following the conflict, indicating 
that the discretionary targeting of black city residents did not enjoy a full consensus among 
representatives of the state. On August 6th, as the Grand Jury heard evidence in riot cases from 
the Assistant State’s Attorney, one of the members of the jury stood up, exclaiming, “What the 
— is the matter with the state’s attorney? Hasn’t he got any white cases to present?”52 The juror 
objected to the fact that in the preceding days, the Grand Jury had indicted 17 black men and no 
white men, a fact that he attributed to discriminatory work of city police and the State’s Attorney. 
After the initial protestation in the jury room, other jurors voiced their objections as well, 
shouting, “Why are we getting cases against black men only? Why don’t you present some cases 
against white rioters, too?”53 The Assistant State’s Attorney sifted through his notes but failed to 
find even one case against a white rioter, even after making a call to his office. Following these 
protestations of early August, the Cook County Grand Jury refused to hear any more evidence in 
cases of black rioters until the State’s Attorney presented cases of white rioters as well. By the 
end of the month, the State’s Attorney did present the Grand Jury with cases of white rioters; the 
Grand Jury issued a total of 17 indictments of white men charged with deadly assault, arson, and 
conspiracy. However, indictments of black Chicagoans for riot-related offenses also continued, 
and by the end of the Jury’s term, 59 black indictments had been issued, significantly more than 
the total number of white rioters indicted.54 
This controversy regarding the overrepresentation of black rioters’ arrests and 
indictments demonstrated the range of state institutions with discretionary powers of 
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criminalization as well as the tensions that could manifest among those agencies in the process of 
law enforcement. After the group of protesting Grand Jurors bolted from the jury room on 
August 6th, State’s Attorney Maclay Hoyne privately insinuated that their protestations likely 
stemmed from “vicious black belt politics,” implying that Mayor William Hale Thompson had 
engineered this public attack on the State’s Attorney’s office in order to consolidate his support 
among black voters. Later, however, Hoyne joined the Grand Jury and the Coroner’s Jury in 
finding police themselves at fault for the racial imbalance in arrests, “There is no doubt that a 
great many police officers were grossly unfair in making arrests. They shut their eyes to offenses 
committed by white men while they were very vigorous in getting all the colored men they could 
get.”55 Perhaps eager to deflect criticism from his own office, Hoyne suggested that he had 
prosecuted twice as many black defendants as white defendants simply due to the fact that police 
delivered those arrestees to his office. This argument, however, obscured the prosecutorial 
discretion of the State’s Attorney’s office even as it highlighted the distinct racialization of 
arrests during the days of the riot. News accounts indicated that Hoyne had worked closely with 
police during the conflict itself, and had instructed them “That they should have in mind future 
criminal prosecution” when making arrests; Hoyne had objected to the release of arrested rioters 
with only a fine.56 These reports suggested that the State’s Attorney’s office had played a role in 
the official directives of the Police Department in controlling the riot and that Hoyne likely 
overstated the degree to which his office was beholden to the discretionary authority of police to 
make arrests. Furthermore, the State’s Attorney’s office was under no directive to indict all who 
were arrested during the riot; Hoyne’s criticism of racial biases in arrests ultimately served to 
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obscure attention from the role that prosecutorial discretion also played in the criminalization of 
blackness that the Grand Jury objected to.  
The protestations of the Grand Jury in August of 1919 elicited reports of confusion 
among law enforcement institutions in the waning days of the riot, as Chicago’s major news 
outlets reported that the group had “gone on strike,” framing the objections of the jurors as 
derelictions of their duties.57 The Grand Jury refuted this accusation in its end-of-month report, 
instead explaining that “its position was merely a suspension of hearing further cases of crime 
committed by blacks against whites until the State’s Attorney submitted evidence concerning the 
various crimes committed by whites against blacks.”58 According to the report “The reason for 
this attitude arose from a sense of justice on the part of this Jury.”59 Their choice of language 
offered a pointed critique of other law enforcement institutions including the Police Department 
and the State’s Attorney’s office, suggesting that the discretionary arrests and indictments 
leveled by those two agencies had compromised equal enforcement of the law. Ultimately, the 
Grand Jury concluded that black Chicagoans had “suffered more at the hands of the White 
Hoodlums, than the white people suffered at the hands of the Black Hoodlums, notwithstanding 
this fact, the cases presented to this Jury against the blacks far outnumber those against the 
white.”60 While the Jury conceded that a lack of coordination among law enforcement 
institutions might have produced the imbalance in cases presented, its members also concluded 
that official laxity and corruption likely caused the racial imbalance in arrests, arguing, “The 
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Police department is in need of a thorough house cleaning.”61 In so doing, the Grand Jury 
produced a multifaceted critique of the policing of the 1919 riot, drawing attention to the 
imbalance in arrests motivated by discretion as well as the way that police corruption and 
relationships with criminal syndicates had caused failure to make arrests in neighborhoods such 
as the Back of the Yards.62  
 
BLACK CRIME POLITICS AND BLACK RESPECTABILITY IN 1919 
Four days after the inciting conflict at the Twenty-Ninth Street beach, and amidst 
continuing riot violence throughout the city, a group of five black men paid Mayor William Hale 
Thompson a visit at the Chicago City Hall. Drawn from the ranks of black Chicago’s political, 
spiritual, and entrepreneurial leadership, the envoy included Major Robert R. Jackson, alderman 
of the Second Ward, Dr. Archibald J. Carey, AME clergyman, Reverend L. H. Williams, pastor 
at Olivet Baptist Church, Ferdinand L. Barnett, former Assistant’s State’s Attorney and editor of 
the racially progressive Chicago Conservator, and Colonel Franklin A. Denison, a former 
commander of the 8th Illinois Infantry and former Attorney General of Illinois.63 The men 
represented a cross section of Chicago’s black elites, drawing from those who led black 
congregations or businesses to those who held positions of political power; all of them had 
resided in Chicago before the beginning of the first Great Migration.  
The men called on City Hall that day to make a direct appeal to Mayor Thompson—they 
asked for his help in curbing the ongoing violence and destruction of property in Chicago’s 
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South Side black neighborhoods. Thompson had enjoyed significant popularity among Chicago’s 
black voters since his first primary victory in 1915; courting black votes in the city’s second and 
third wards proved critical to Thompson’s plurality victories in his four pursuits of the mayor’s 
office in the first three decades of the twentieth century.64 Some attributed Thompson’s success 
among black voters to his congenial oratory style and his self-fashioning as an anti-establishment 
candidate.65 Archibald Carey had long been a Thompson supporter since the mayor first ran for 
alderman’s office in 1900 and had helped the Republican candidate marshal support among the 
city’s African American congregations in his campaigns for mayor.66 It was perhaps this political 
relationship to the Thompson administration that prompted this group of black elites to appeal 
directly to the mayor in their pursuit of an end to the violence that had engulfed the city for days. 
The group delivered two documents to Thompson: “An Appeal to the Public by Negro 
Citizens,” and “The Causes and Cure for the Present Riot,” both written during a two-day 
community meeting of ministers, social workers, businessmen, and other professionals at Olivet 
Baptist Church, the city’s oldest and largest African American congregation.67 Although Olivet 
Baptist Church had played an active part in the recruitment and support of new black Southern 
migrants since 1915, the meeting largely drew those from Chicago’s black professional class.68 
But the meeting also revealed cleavages among black Chicagoans with regard to the causes of 
the violence; some black elites and Old Settlers turned their ire upon recent migrants to the city 
“who, they felt, had brought this catastrophe upon them.”69 Some attendees chafed at the remarks 
of one long time resident of Chicago, who reprimanded those who reprised white violence, 
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telling the crowd, “One of the chief causes of the trouble is that the colored men have been 
taught they must act on the policy of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.”70 Indeed, the 
meeting convened in the midst of the violence and the documents produced by the group 
reflected the stratified class politics of black Chicago as well as the strain of black crime politics 
rooted in respectability that had found voice in the Chicago Defender in the preceding years. 
The envoy to Mayor Thompson and the documents they presented framed black appeals 
to equal law enforcement in terms of respectability—that save for a select few, most black 
Chicagoans were upstanding and therefore entitled to equal protection under the law. For 
instance, the authors of the documents made careful distinctions between themselves and those 
who partook in the chaos of the riot. These distinctions largely fell along class lines, laying 
blame for the violence among the unemployed or uneducated. Describing those who had 
perpetuated the violence of the riot, the authors concluded “That irresponsible members of both 
races, persons with no property, families, no education, and sometimes no employment or 
anything else that would check their passions or move them to moderation are the ones making 
up largely, if not wholly, this riot…That, as a result of this outbreak, many innocent persons, 
persons who are taking no part, have had their homes burned, been assaulted, injured, 
murdered.”71 This description framed the participants of the riot as outside the boundaries of 
respectable Chicago, counter-posing criminality with law-abiding respectability. This critique 
echoed the politics of organizations such as the Chicago Urban League and the Chicago 
NAACP; indeed, some of the members of the envoy to Mayor Thompson and the attendees at the 
community meeting at Olivet Baptist Church had been involved in leading those same 
organizations. By framing their critique in opposition to those who had perpetuated the violence 
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of the riot, the authors of “The Causes and Cure of the Present Riot” bolstered their own 
authority to demand law enforcement. By framing themselves as committed to the project of 
urban order, the authors of the Olivet Baptist Church documents asserted that their critiques 
would not only protect black Chicagoans but would also improve law enforcement in the city 
more generally.  
While the authors of “The Causes and Cure of the Present Riot” made careful distinctions 
between themselves and those who participated in the riot, they also drew critical attention to the 
role that white racism, discriminatory policing, and years of violent racial conflict had played in 
the ongoing riot. According to the authors of the document, “racial antipathy” was the 
fundamental cause of the current conflict, which they defined as a deep-seated racial prejudice 
on the part of white Chicagoans toward their black neighbors. The authors used the concept of 
racial antipathy to draw linkages among several recent racially charged conflicts in the city, 
including “minor racial clashes, assaults, bomb throwing, efforts against colored people moving 
into certain districts, and finally in an assault made upon a colored boy last Sunday that resulted 
in his death.”72 In this formulation, the conflict at the Twenty-Ninth Street beach was just the 
most recent incident in a longer history of racially motivated violence and the violent defense of 
the color line, which had manifested as daily and spectacular violence perpetrated against black 
city residents since the beginning of the twentieth century.  
The authors of “The Causes and Cure of the Present Riot” directly implicated police in 
the conflict and the longer history of white racial violence in Chicago, asserting that the riot 
could have been prevented “had the police authorities present done their duty, or showed a 
disposition to do so.”73 Here the authors explicitly critiqued the nearly boundless power of police 
                                                




discretion that had allowed for the racial violence on the Twenty-Ninth Street beach and the 
death of Eugene Williams, as well as the violent defense of white urban space in the years before. 
This critique of police discretion extended to the days of the riot as well; the authors indicated 
the patterns of police laxity and disregard for black safety during the riot, “some members of the 
police department have been indifferent and inadequate in furnishing protection to our people.”74 
By connecting years of racialized violence with the unchecked power of police discretion, the 
authors of “The Causes and Cure of the Present Riot” suggested not just a parallel between these 
forms of discrimination but also a direct relationship, as state power and police discretion 
provided the foundation for ongoing expressions of white supremacy.  
The group of race leaders who visited Mayor Thompson in the midst of the 1919 Chicago 
Race Riot demonstrated the potential for urban violence and discriminatory law enforcement to 
politicize black elites, albeit a politics premised on black respectability. The authors of the 
documents composed at Olivet Baptist Church concluded their appeal to Thompson by invoking 
their equal rights to fair law enforcement, citing the emergent political consciousness of black 
Chicago. They asserted that African Americans in the city “[have] a distinct race consciousness, 
that has helped to fights its country’s every battle, and that will content itself with nothing less 
than the full enjoyment of the privileges and rights granted under the law.”75 Here, the authors of 
the documents pushed their critique of racially discriminatory policing beyond a simple an 
indictment of the police for their role in the 1919 riot itself. Instead, they insisted, unchecked 
police discretion posed a threat to democratic principles and violated the rights of respectable 
black citizens. Here they identified one of the fundamental problems with the operation of police 
discretion and the reliance of law enforcement institutions upon the decisions of their officers 
                                                




about when and where to enforce the law. The near absolute discretionary authority of police 
officers empowered those state agents to qualify the rule of law and circumscribe equal 
protection of Chicagoans based on their own determinations of whom was most deserving of 
equal law enforcement.  
The group presented Mayor Thompson with a fundamentally Progressive solution to the 
problem in Chicago; they urged the mayor to appoint a fifty-person committee to investigate the 
causes of the riot and make recommendations to prevent similar violence in the future.76 
Progressives in Chicago and around the country had long relied on investigatory commissions to 
solve social ills, assuming that the deep accumulation of knowledge provided the best foundation 
from which to craft social reform.77 Support for a Progressive investigation of race relations in 
the city gained support among the city’s professional and intellectual elites in the midst of the 
riot. On August 1st, a group of 81 individuals representing 48 social, civic, and professional 
organizations met at the city’s Union League Club to discuss the ongoing violence. Represented 
organizations included the Chicago Association of Commerce, the Chicago Medical Association, 
the Chicago Bar Association, the Federation of Churches, the Chicago Urban League, the 
Women’s City Club, and the Foreign Language Division.78 The range of organizations 
represented at the Union Club meeting demonstrated broad interest in restoring urban order 
among business boosters, women’s reform organizations, religious groups, and racial advocacy 
organizations.79 The attendees requested action from Illinois Governor Frank Lowden and sent 
the governor a letter asking that he appoint “an emergency state committee to study the 
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psychological, social and economic causes underlying the conditions resulting in the present race 
riot and to make such recommendations as will tend to prevent a recurrence of such conditions in 
the future.”80 
Following this public urging, Governor Frank Lowden appointed twelve men—six white 
and six black—to the Chicago Commission on Race Relations in late August 1919.81 Although 
Lowden claimed that he had sought “the most representative men of the two races,” all the 
members of the CCRR were drawn from the city’s economic, religious, and intellectual elites.82 
After the initial formation of the Commission, appointed members of the group turned their 
attention to fundraising in order to support the CCRR’s work; they delegated most of the duties 
of research and writing to the Commission staff.83 Since the Commission on Race Relations had 
been established after the regular session of the Illinois General Assembly, the state legislature 
made no additional appropriations when the governor formed the CCRR in August 1919, 
meaning that despite being a state institution, the Commission was “financed by the loyalty of 
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Chicago citizens.”84 Additionally, despite the fact that women had been present at both the Olivet 
Baptist Church Meeting and the Union Club meeting, Lowden failed to appoint any women as 
members of the Commission.85  
Lowden charged the Chicago Commission on Race Relations “to study and report upon 
the broad question of the relations between the two races,” describing the group as “a tribunal 
that has been constituted to get the facts and interpret them and to find a way out.”86 With this 
charge, the Commission set out with a mission of social research, drawing on the methodologies 
of urban surveys and neighborhoods investigations undertaken by Progressive reform 
organizations and urban sociologists. The research staff of the Chicago Commission on Race 
Relations drew from the leadership and staff of the country’s settlement movement and 
Progressive reform organizations as well as academic elites trained in techniques of urban 
sociology.  Graham Romeyn Taylor, the executive secretary of the CCRR, had worked at the 
Chicago Commons Social Settlement for twelve years while the group’s associate executive 
secretary, Charles S. Johnson, had previously worked as the Director of Research for the 
Chicago Urban League.87 Other staff members drew from a number of local and national reform 
and philanthropic organizations, including the Juvenile Protection League, the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the American Red Cross, the Chicago 
School of Civics and Philanthropy, Hull House, and the YMCA.88 Several research staff 
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members had also worked on social surveys in other American cities before joining the staff of 
the CCRR; for instance, Lucius McGee and Charles H. Thompson had both worked on a survey 
of black life and neighborhoods in Richmond, Virginia while Esther Fulks had completed a 
survey of social services available to black residents of East St. Louis.89 Twelve men represented 
the public face of the CCRR, but a significant degree of female labor contributed to the 
completion of its work and the group’s final report.90 Women comprised approximately half of 
the CCRR’s research staff with relative racial parity represented among both men and women 
staff members.91 
In September of 1922, after three years of investigation, the Chicago Commission on 
Race Relations published its findings and recommendations—The Negro in Chicago: A Study of 
Race Relations and a Race Riot. A nearly seven hundred page tome, The Negro in Chicago 
presented policy recommendations based on intensive sociological studies of urban life, 
including chapters on the riot itself, the migration of Southern African Americans to Chicago, 
housing conditions, crime and vice, industrial relations, and public opinion. The Commission 
concluded that it could offer no simple or rapid solution to racial tensions and violence in 
Chicago based on the complexity of its investigation. Ultimately, the investigators concluded, 
only “the disappearance of prejudice” could assuage racial tension, but barring this unlikely 
outcome, the authors offered a litany of recommendations for state and social agencies in the 
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city.92 Some of these recommendations spoke to ongoing problems with police discretion, as the 
CCRR called for police to “suppress the bombings of Negro and white homes,” and to “promptly 
rid the Negro residence areas of vice resorts.”93 Among the CCRR’s other recommendations 
were calls for stricter surveillance of city gangs, the provision of desegregated areas of recreation, 
the opening of schools in black neighborhoods, the expansion of social services to black 
communities, the improvement of black housing and the integration of certain neighborhoods, 
the desegregation of industrial employment and labor unions, and equal access to public 
accommodations.94 These multitudinous recommendations presented a broad program of racial 
equity for the city of Chicago, suggesting that the prevention of racial violence in the future 
would have to be rooted in equal protection of the laws and equal provision of social services. 
These final recommendations also reflected the Progressive politics of many of the Commission 
members and its staff, who located the solutions to Chicago’s racial tensions in social provisions 
that could be provided by state agencies and private institutions.  
The final report of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations also reflected early-
twentieth-century intellectual developments in the field of sociology, particularly the work of 
sociologists at the University of Chicago. Approximately one third of the CCRR staff members 
had completed or were in the process of completing a graduate degree at the University of 
Chicago, many of them in sociology. There, they studied under Ernest W. Burgess and Robert E. 
Park, two of the founding members of the Chicago School of Sociology and innovators of the 
concentric zone model of urban sociology.95 The concentric zone model conceptualized urban 
space as successive zones, including the central business district, transitional or industrial areas, 
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working-class residential zones, an improved residential area, and commuter or suburban 
zones.96 Burgess and Park argued that human behavior was strongly influenced by social 
structures and the physical environment, proposing that social relations in any given area of the 
city closely depended on its designated zone. This close attention to the role of the urban 
environment in social relations had a strong influence on the CCRR’s final report, as the research 
staff found that housing conditions, neighborhood environments, and social institutions played 
significant roles in shaping black life in Chicago.  
True to its name, The Negro in Chicago focused intently on life within the boundaries of 
the city, but contemporary readers saw broad applicability in its analysis and conclusions. Daily 
newspapers around the country reported on the publication of The Negro in Chicago, indicating 
the widespread national interest in the riot and in the Commission on Race Relations’ 
investigation. Editors of the New York Times characterized The Negro in Chicago as a model for 
repairing race relations throughout the country, suggesting that the report was “of national value, 
and not merely of local application,” and that although the Commission’s recommendations 
focused on the city of Chicago, they might be instructive “as to what the local governments, the 
principals and teachers in the schools, the social agencies, the labor unions, the employers of 
labor, the street car companies and, finally though not least of all, the press ought to do.”97 What 
may have begun as a confrontation on a local city beach had come to reflect the conditions of 
racial relations throughout the country, as national eyes trained on Chicago, abstracting an 
investigation that had been thoroughly rooted in local analysis to national significance.98 
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CRIME AND VICIOUS ENVIRONMENT  
The Negro in Chicago provided both a roadmap to the improvement of race relations in 
Chicago and a comprehensive record of black urban life in the midst of the Great Migration of 
African Americans to Chicago. Chapters concerning housing conditions, industrial relations, 
racial violence, and public opinion generated an archive of black urban life, revealing the 
intersecting structures and institutions that worked to exclude African Americans from adequate 
housing, jobs, and equal protection of the law. The seventh chapter of The Negro in Chicago, 
“Crime and Vicious Environment,” considered the state of crime among black Chicagoans and 
included detailed findings about the relationship among African Americans and law enforcement 
institutions as well as patterns of racial discrimination leading up to and during the riot itself. 
The CCRR’s account of the days of rioting—the first chapter of its report—described a range of 
police misconduct during the conflict, including inequities in arrests, police disregard for black 
safety, and police violence against black city residents. “Crime and Vicious Environment” 
expanded upon that critique of street policing that had first appeared in the Commission’s 
narrative of the riot, suggesting that discriminatory criminal justice in Chicago had actually been 
a causal factor in the conflict, not the result of it. The CCRR’s research on crime in black 
Chicago documented racial biases in law enforcement ranging from patrolmen discretion and 
conduct, to the creation of criminal justice statistics and data, to prosecution and sentencing. The 
Commission concluded that assumptions regarding inherent black criminality shaped interactions 
among black Chicagoans and law enforcement institutions at their every stage.  
In the introduction to “Crime and Vicious Environment,” the investigators of the Chicago 
Commission on Race Relations asserted that race was not the most critical factor in analyzing the 
state and causes of crime in Chicago. Rather, “The most important element is the general 
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lawlessness, crime, and vice in the whole population, irrespective of race.”99 The concept of 
lawlessness—the idea that disregard or disrespect for the rule of law lay at the heart of the crime 
problem—had imbued crime control campaigns in Chicago and throughout the nation since the 
end of World War I. Temperance organizations and municipal reformers often invoked the 
problem of lawlessness to legitimate their criminal justice campaigns, arguing that this 
widespread disregard for the law had produced urban disorder and moral laxity. The discourse of 
lawlessness also implied a critique of police discretion, as some criminal justice reformers 
suggested that selective policing itself had played a role in fostering this perceived disrespect for 
the rule of law. For instance, in its bulletins and other publications, the businessmen-led Chicago 
Crime Commission often lamented the state of lawlessness that had gripped the city, insisting 
that stricter and more vigilant mechanisms of law enforcement could repair this perceived 
disregard for the law.100 This privately funded and staffed organization had come to represent the 
best source of information about the state of criminal justice and law enforcement in the city in 
the few years since Chicago businessmen first began to investigate crime in 1917, especially in 
comparison to the incomplete and opaque records of the Chicago Police Department, and it 
served as a primary source of knowledge for the Commission on Race Relations’ investigation of 
crime in Chicago.101 
Much of the Commission on Race Relations’ findings included in “Crime and Vicious 
Environment” demonstrated the inadequacies of the state response to the citywide violence and 
manifestations of racial bias in police response to the conflict. The investigators of the Chicago 
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Commission on Race Relations suggested that police had faced two major obstacles in quelling 
the violence that gripped Chicago that summer—an inadequate police force and widespread 
black distrust of white police officers.102 The CCRR’s research team collected testimony from 
scores of state officials over the course of its investigation, and several individuals who offered 
testimony highlighted the lacking manpower of the Chicago Police Department. General 
Superintendent of Police John J. Garrity testified before the Commission that his department 
lacked adequate force to properly patrol the city “I haven’t had sufficient force now to properly 
police the city of Chicago by one-third.”103 Members of the Chicago Grand Jury similarly 
insisted that the Police Department would have to be enlarged in order to adequately protect the 
city in the future, suggesting, “at least one thousand officers should be added to the existing 
force.”104 Members of the Coroner’s Jury—which had reviewed the fatalities of the riot—
concurred with demands for a larger department but with the caveat that new patrolmen be paid 
increased wages and pensions, in order to draw talented men to the force.105 Five months before 
the actual publication of The Negro in Chicago, the Chicago City Council heeded calls for a 
larger police department, increasing the force by 1,000 patrolmen positions.106 While this 
increased police presence in the city seemed to address the first hurdle to urban order cited by the 
Chicago Commission on Race Relations, it failed to address the second—racially discriminatory 
policing and black mistrust of the city’s overwhelmingly white and European ethnic police force. 
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Critiques of police arrest practices made by the Chicago Commission on Race Relations 
drew an important connection between police discretion and the criminalization of blackness in 
Chicago. The investigators highlighted the fact that arrest and indictment statistics—and the 
racial imbalance of those statistics during and after the riot—could not be separated from police 
discrimination on the streets of Chicago. Indeed, rather than reflecting any innate racial tendency 
toward criminality, criminal statistics reflected the discretion of police patrolmen themselves to 
arrest or not arrest any one offender. Investigators concluded that the operation of police 
discretion had created a feedback loop with regard to black criminalization—patrolmen assumed 
black Chicagoans to be predisposed to criminality and therefore arrested them at higher rates. 
Interviews with police officials and municipal judges suggested the same: “Negroes are more 
easily identified and more likely to be arrested, and it is reasonably certain that smaller 
proportion of Negroes who commit crimes escape than whites.”107 This reasonable certainty was 
confirmed in a section of the report concerning the opinions of criminal justice authorities, as the 
Commission indicated, “testimony is practically unanimous that Negroes are much more liable to 
arrest than whites, since police officers share in the general public opinion that Negroes ‘are 
more criminal than whites.’”108 Here the investigation showed how popular discourses 
concerning black predispositions to criminality—which had circulated in Chicago since the 
beginning of the twentieth century—had become operationalized into law enforcement practice, 
as police drew on those discourses to inform their own decisions. While Chicago police officers 
may have shared the idea of inherent black criminality with the Chicago public more generally, 
they also had the power to act on this discourse and exercise the authority of the state to arrest 
suspected black criminals at higher rates than their white counterparts.  
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In one of its most remarkable arguments, The Negro in Chicago was the first published 
study in the United States to reject criminal statistics as objective measures of crime, suggesting 
instead that those statistics reflected racial bias and official discrimination.109 The CCRR drew 
particular attention to the problems with the creation of criminal statistics at their sites of 
production—urban police stations—highlighting the significant power of local police 
bureaucrats in forging the connection between blackness and criminality. Once a patrolman had 
arrested an individual, that person was taken to the district police station where the desk sergeant 
recorded the circumstances of the arrest, including demographic data that listed the arrested 
person’s race or nationality, gender, and age. According to the investigation of the CCRR, “The 
ability of these desk sergeants to correctly ascertain the prisoner’s race or nationality is open to 
question.”110 The Commission suggested that when white arrestees were taken before police desk 
sergeants, those sergeants might misinterpret that person’s nationality, recording Irish when the 
arrested man was Italian, for instance. But when black arrestees came before police desk 
sergeants, Commission investigators assumed that the race of the arrested person was never in 
doubt, and as a result “the Negro will be debited with all the crimes he commits, while figures 
for other groups will probably not indicate the full extent of their criminality.”111 In other words, 
the criminality of black Chicago had been inflated both through the discretionary arrests as well 
as through the process of creating criminal statistics themselves. Ultimately, Commission 
investigators concluded that racial biases in the creation of criminal statistics made it impossible 
for them to use those records to make any objective comparisons of criminality across racial or 
ethnic groups in Chicago.112 This refusal to use the Chicago Police Department’s statistics to 
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compare rates of criminality served as a pointed critique of the department’s policing and 
administrative practices, as the Commission suggested that these practices were so flawed as to 
preclude any useful analysis or conclusions about the relationship between criminality and race 
in Chicago. 
While the Chicago Commission on Race Relations remained highly critical of the 
patterns of racially discriminatory policing and law enforcement before and during the riot, it 
also acknowledged that crime control was a real problem in black Chicago and throughout the 
city. Despite the racial biases that permeated the criminal justice system, black Chicagoans did 
experience crime at significant rates in their communities, a reality that could not be erased by 
critiques of discriminatory policing and prosecution. Critically, however, the Commission on 
Race Relations rejected popular discourses regarding inherent black criminality to explain high 
rates of crime in black neighborhoods, instead offering a model of crime causation that relied on 
spatial, economic, and psychological factors to explain the presence of crime in the city’s 
predominantly black neighborhoods. This framework for understanding the prevalence of crime 
suggested that the structural conditions of white supremacy played principal roles in producing 
the conditions of urban crime, along with official discretion to relocate criminal enterprises and 
make decisions about where and when laws would be enforced.  
Among the spatial factors that contributed to the proliferation of crime, the Commission 
on Race Relations identified the decades of police discretion that had allowed illegal enterprises 
to flourish in black neighborhoods. It was police discretion that had directed the progression of 
vice districts in Chicago since the early twentieth century, eventually driving most vices 
establishments south into the Black Belt when earlier districts were dissolved in 1912. Critical of 
the laxity that law enforcement officers adopted within Chicago’s largest black neighborhood, 
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the CCRR insisted that black proximity to vice establishments did not indicated any racial 
affinity for illegality, refuting a common public perception that black Chicagoans were simply 
willing to tolerate vice in their neighborhoods. Instead, the CCRR argued that most of black 
Chicago lacked the political capital to draw adequate police protection, as most of the black 
residents of the city demonstrated “lack of sufficient influence and power to protest effectively 
against the encroachments of vice.”113 Here the Commission on Race Relations highlighted the 
fact that police had significantly more control over the proliferation of vice than the residents of 
the city’s many neighborhoods, as well as the relative lack of political power most black 
Chicagoans had to change the policing practices in their neighborhoods. For instance, when 
Mayor William Dunne proposed to codify the boundaries of the city’s vice districts in 1911, 
several wealthy Chicago property owners objected to the proposal on the grounds that the 
formalization of such districts would diminish their nearby property values.114 As many black 
elites discovered in those same years, they lacked the institutional resources or capital to draw 
similar boundaries around African American neighborhoods, despite claims of black 
respectability and moral upstanding.  
The politics of black respectability—the same politics that had imbued the Chicago 
Urban League and the Chicago Defender over the previous decade—provided the premise for 
the Commission on Race Relations’ explanation of the economic factors that had encouraged 
crime among black Chicagoans. Claims to respectability that circulated among black elites who 
published the Defender or led the CUL suggested that it was respectability itself that provided 
for black deservedness of equal law enforcement. When poverty and economic privation 
undermined black middle class respectability, the CCRR warned that crime could follow. For 
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instance, a lack of adequate housing and exorbitantly high rents in the Black Belt forced many 
families to take on boarders, a practice that CCRR investigators argued disrupted the integrity of 
the family and therefore encouraged illegal behavior among black Chicagoans.115 The CCRR 
failed to cite any specific testimony that confirmed the causal relationship between poor housing 
and criminality, but its analysis reflected a popular argument among early-twentieth-century 
criminologists and sociologists that a deviant or abnormal home environment could warp the 
mind and lead to criminal behavior.116 The CCRR’s investigation also drew a connection 
between low industrial wages and criminal behavior, suggesting that low wages encouraged 
property crimes among black Chicagoans and speculating that if all Chicagoans had adequate 
housing conditions, living wages, and equal access to education, the city would not face a crime 
problem.117 Here the Commission on Race Relations walked a delicate line, identifying the 
economic and racial inequality that shaped black life in Chicago while still maintaining the 
centrality of respectability in arguments about black deservedness of equal law enforcement.  
Finally, the Commission on Race Relations offered some hypotheses about psychological 
factors contributing to black crime but made a careful distinction between crime caused by race 
and crime caused by the structures of white supremacy. Investigators found that racial 
discrimination itself could incite some to illegal acts, finding that “The traditional ostracism, 
exploitation and petty daily insults to which they are continually exposed have doubtless 
provoked, even in normal-minded Negroes, a pathological attitude toward society which 
sometimes expresses itself defensively in act of violence and other lawlessness.”118 This 
proposition laid responsibility for black deviance on white officials who used their discretion to 
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discriminate against African Americans, suggesting that law enforcement officials themselves 
had actually fostered black criminality. The Commission suggested that black animosity and 
mistrust of police expressed by black Chicagoans during the 1919 Race Riot also represented a 
logical reaction to decades of police discrimination as “A desire for social revenge might well be 
expected to result from the facetious and insulting manner in which Negroes are often treated by 
officers of the law.”119 This analysis of the role of racism in fostering black criminality implied 
not that stricter law enforcement could rid Chicago of its crime problem, but that law 
enforcement officers also had to correct their patterns of racial discrimination. 
The investigation and conclusions of the Chicago Crime Commission on Race Relations 
represented the intersection of Progressive reform traditions and an urban sociological method of 
studying the city; together, they produced a social model of understanding crime in the city, 
which accounted for structural conditions and official discretion. The Commission’s attention to 
spatial, economic, and psychological causes of crime among black Chicago closely resembled 
the concept of sociological jurisprudence that had been popularized by judges and jurists of the 
city’s Municipal Court since the first decade of the twentieth century, but it also deployed the 
methodological tools of urban sociologists at the University of Chicago in order to base its 
conclusions in extensive empirical evidence.120 This framework and methodology contrasted 
sharply with other attempts to curtail crime in Chicago during the interwar decades, particularly 
among conservative anti-crime activists who foregrounded individual choice as the foremost 
causes of criminal behavior. Despite the assumptions of some that the waning of Progressive 
movements for reform had also defeated social interpretations of criminality, the work of the 
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Chicago Commission on Race Relations demonstrated how sociological methods could ground 
Progressive arguments in local evidence and conditions.121  
Social interpretations of crime causation had broad implications for urban crime control 
policy, as they suggested that punitive criminal justice could not address the many factors that 
led to crime in the city and certainly could not address the racialized differences in policing and 
prosecution. The CCRR’s critique of criminal justice in Chicago indicated that a socialized 
model of law enforcement would be necessary to combat crime, including policies that expunged 
racial discrimination and affirmatively addressed economic and racial inequality. Such a model 
of law enforcement would have required the city of Chicago and the state of Illinois to 
thoroughly reform the Chicago Police Department and commit financial and institutional 
resources to a crime prevention program that took into account social factors such as economic 
inequality and residential segregation. The city did make some limited steps toward such a 
comprehensive crime control policy in the interwar decades, such as expanding the number of 
policewomen engaged in crime prevention work with women and children.122  
Despite its many recommendations for reform, however, The Negro in Chicago did not 
bring about broad based change among Chicago state institutions and law enforcement agencies. 
In this regard, the comprehensive report joined other Progressive investigations, such as the Vice 
Commission of Chicago’s The Social Evil in Chicago, in its myriad unrealized recommendations 
for reform. It did, however, represent one of the most comprehensive and influential accounts of 
black urban life after the first Great Migration of African Americans to the urban North, an 
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account that had been compiled following a conflict sparked by an incident of racially 
discriminatory policing.123 Reviewers at the time noted the importance of the Commission’s 
findings; NAACP assistant secretary Walter White called the report “an epoch in race relations 
in the United States” that could be abstracted beyond the city limits of Chicago, as “It indicates 
vividly the problems of adjusting relations between the races in all parts of America.”124 Beyond 
these appraisals, CCRR critiques of criminal statistics permeated the work of influential 
intellectuals into the interwar years, as prominent criminologists associated with the University 
of Chicago adopted the Commission’s skepticism of criminal statistics and used that critique to 
undergird arguments about the association between urban geography and criminality, rather than 
suggesting that race or nationality served as the foremost determinant of lawfulness.125 This 
lasting intellectual impact—in both urban sociology and criminology—provided The Negro in 
Chicago with a robust afterlife, while the afterlife of the riot itself would be seen in the ongoing 
defense of Chicago’s urban color line, the continuation of white racial violence, and 
criminalization of blackness in the decades to come. 
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THE COST OF CRIME: BUSINESS, ANTI-CRIME ACTIVISM,  
AND POLICE STATE BUILDING IN INTERWAR CHICAGO 
 
On August 30, 1917, two hundred fifty police officers surrounded the home of Mrs. 
Francis Schnitzer on Thomas Street in Chicago’s Northwest Side Humbolt Park neighborhood.1 
On any other day, the street was a quiet one. Mrs. Schnitzer’s house sat among residential flats 
and apartment buildings, in sight of Lafayette Elementary School and only a few blocks away 
from Humbolt Park, one of the large boulevard parks that flanked the city’s downtown business 
district.2 The area had been home to immigrant communities since the mid-nineteenth century, as 
successive waves of immigrants including Danes, Norwegians, Italians, Bohemians, and Czechs 
populated the neighborhood.3 By the second decade of the twentieth century, Polish, Russian, 
and German immigrants predominated.4 A number of small businesses littered those few blocks 
near the Schnitzer house, but it was otherwise dominated by single and multi-family dwellings, 
homes to industrial workers and their families. Most of the gainfully employed residents of the 
neighborhood worked in manufacturing and mechanical trades, such as the clothing, steel, and 
lumber industries.5 The residential area made for a peaceful respite for those workers who 
returned home each day from the nearby Union Stockyards and central manufacturing districts. 
                                                
1 Walter Noble Burns, “Three Bandits Confess All: Wheed, Carrao, Admit Part in Double Murder,” Chicago Daily 
Tribune, September 1, 1917. 
2 Chicago Zoning Commission, “Chicago Zoning Survey Maps,” (Chicago: Chicago Zoning Commission, 1922). 
3 Cohen, Making a New Deal, 31. 
4 By 1920, first and second-generation European immigrants comprised over 90 percent of the census tract where 
Mrs. Schnitzer’s house was located. Poles and Russians were the two largest immigrant groups in the tract, with 
Germans, Czechs, and Hungarians also significantly represented. Ernest W. Burgess and Charles Newcomb, eds., 
Census Data of the City of Chicago, 1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 269. 
5 A significant portion of residents also worked in wholesale or retail trades. Ibid, 594. 
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At least, until a mass of police officers descended on one small block of Thomas Street in the 
early evening of August 30th.  
Two days earlier, a group of five men had stolen nearly $9,000 from a payroll delivery at 
the Winslow Brothers metal working plant on West Harrison Street, killing two Winslow 
employees in the process.6 It was the eleventh such robbery in the city since the beginning of 
1917, as Chicago industries regularly fell victim to brazen heists that netted thieves thousands of 
dollars.7 Days after the Winslow Brothers’ robbery, police at the West Side Maxwell Street 
station received an anonymous tip that a man named Edward Wheed had orchestrated and 
committed the crime. A group of Chicago Police detectives followed one of the man’s associates 
to Wheed’s mother’s home on Thomas Street—Mrs. Schintzer’s house on the Northwest Side. 
Officers stationed themselves on nearby rooftops as well adjacent street corners, all with rifles 
and revolvers trained on the little cottage, watching for any movement or sign of activity inside. 
When the officers approached the house, a barrage of bullets careened through the front door and 
windows as Wheed—barricaded inside—fended off his arrest with two automatic pistols.8 The 
police officers retreated and called for reinforcements, but not before three of their number fell to 
the ground, wounded by Wheed’s shots. 
Soon police swarmed the cottage, as a veritable army of law enforcement officers 
descended on the house in an attempt to apprehend the payroll robber. At both ends of the block, 
crowds gathered to watch the showdown; while some accounts reported that between 2,000 and 
3,000 people had gathered on Thomas Street, others claimed that nearly 5,000 had gathered to 
                                                
6 “Get Slayer in Two Hour Battle,” Chicago Daily Tribune, August 31, 1917; “Policewoman Started Round-Up That 
Netted 50 Chicago Arrests,” Washington Post, September 1, 1917. 
7 “Police Drive to Clean Chicago of Criminals,” Chicago Daily Tribune, August 31, 1917. 
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watch the confrontation.9 Once 250 police officer reinforcements had assembled on the street, 
Police Superintendent Herman Schuettler instructed his forces, “Riddle that house with bullets. If 
Wheed appears at the windows, shoot to kill.”10 The officers volleyed gunshots toward the house, 
but somehow Wheed managed to evade their fire. After a stand-off that lasted nearly two hours, 
police threatened Wheed with explosions of formaldehyde and dynamite, promising to throw 
bombs into the house if he would not surrender. The scene fell quiet and the officers approached 
the house once more. Suddenly, they heard shots fired from a neighboring rooftop; Wheed had 
managed to climb out of a window and escape the assailed house. One of the detectives in the 
crowd below demanded Wheed’s surrender once again, to which the man replied that he would 
indeed give himself up on the condition that the police guarantee that he would not be executed. 
Wheed asked if State’s Attorney Michael Sullivan was among the masses of police on the street, 
to which one of the detectives feigned, “Yes, I’m Assistant State’s Attorney Sullivan.”11 The 
impostor prosecutor promised Wheed that he would not be hanged, after which the man finally 
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FIGURE 3.1: “CROWDS ATTRACTED BY SHOOTING, HELD BACK BY POLICE,” 191712 
 
The theatrical battle between Wheed and the Chicago Police Department ended the string 
of payroll robberies that had plagued Chicago businesses in 1917. Contrary to the promises of 
police officers on Thomas Street that day, however, Wheed was convicted of murder and 
executed by hanging less than six months after his arrest. Wheed’s execution, simultaneous with 
that of Harry Lindrum for the murder of a city police officer, marked the first executions in 
Chicago in three years, a practice that law enforcement authorities hoped would “have a 
                                                




deterrent on the murder industry hereabouts.”13 The Winslow Brothers’ payroll robbery had also 
prompted sweeping arrests by the Chicago Police Department. After the robbery and killing of 
the two Winslow employees, Police Superintendent Schuettler sent instructions to every police 
station, ordering patrolmen “to search every saloon, poolroom, and hangout of tough character 
after midnight…several hundred police were engaged in this wholesale round-up of crooks in all 
parts of the city.”14 The police dragnet resulted in the arrest of at least 50 men in a matter of days, 
which Schuettler lauded as the harbinger in a new era of crime control in Chicago. Celebrating 
the arrests, which he assumed would contribute to the end of similar robberies, Schuettler 
predicted, “It has brought about a police drive against intrenched [sic] crime which I hope will 
not end until every professional criminal in Chicago is brought to book.”15 
The Winslow Brothers’ robbery, the sweeping arrests it prompted, and the dramatic 
pursuit of Wheed and his accomplices spurred the organization of private anti-crime activism in 
Chicago, particularly among many of the city’s businessmen who wished to see the protection of 
their property as well as the imposition of urban order. Following that string of payroll robberies 
in 1917, leaders of the Chicago Association of Commerce—an organization of middle-class 
merchants and manufacturers formed in 1904—commissioned a study of crime conditions in the 
city and subsequently recommended the establishment of a permanent organization to monitor 
law enforcement.16 On that recommendation, members of the Association formed the Chicago 
Crime Commission in 1919. Although it was a private organization, the Crime Commission 
blurred the division between public and private institutions, acting as a quasi-state law 
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15 Ibid. 
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enforcement agency in the years after its formation. The group drew on the logic of Progressive 
reformers, viewing an independent agency as the best avenue toward improved policy and order 
in the city.17 Also similarly to Progressives, they collaborated closely with state institutions, 
posting Crime Commission members as observers in the city’s police stations and courtrooms 
and organizing conferences among law enforcement officials in order to promote the 
coordination of multiple agencies.18 The Crime Commission also positioned itself as the 
foremost source of criminal justice knowledge in the city, compiling a comprehensive docket of 
all cases that reached the Criminal Court, from which “any person [could] obtain, in five minutes 
or less, exact information concerning any case at all.”19 In 1922, it was the Chicago Crime 
Commission and the evidence it provided that convinced the Chicago City Council to increase 
the city’s police department by more than 20 percent by hiring 1,000 new patrolmen, the same 
recommendation that the Chicago Commission on Race Relations made that same year.20 
The establishment of the Chicago Crime Commission marked the advent of the crime 
commission movement, as businessmen and members of the professional class across the 
country formed private organizations to improve the operation of urban law enforcement and 
protect the interests of business and capital. Although a number of cities had established civic 
committees to examine vice in the early years of the twentieth century, the crime commission 
movement distinguished itself from those Progressive-era reform efforts in its attention to violent 
                                                
17 Boyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in America; Flanagan, Seeing with Their Hearts; McGerr, A Fierce 
Discontent; Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1998). 
18 Chamberlin, “The Chicago Crime Commission,” 389; “Chicago Crime Commission: Some Excerpts from the 
Record of Sixteen Years,” Undated, Series I: General Files, Box 4, Folder 10: Chicago Crime Commission, 1932-
1939, Burgess Papers; Kenneth L. Roberts, “Watchdogs of Crime,” Saturday Evening Post, October 8, 1927. 
19 Kenneth L. Roberts, “Watchdogs of Crime,” Saturday Evening Post, October 8, 1927, p. 47. 
20 “Chicago Crime Commission: Some Excerpts from the Record of Sixteen Years,” Undated, Series I: General Files, 
Box 4, Folder 10: Chicago Crime Commission, 1932-1939, Burgess Papers. 
 
 137 
crime and property crime.21 The Chicago Crime Commission was the first such private anti-
crime organization in the country, and its structure and methods served as a model for a number 
of crime commissions in the interwar decades.22 Members of the Chicago group would often 
travel to other cities around the United States, offering guidance regarding the creation of a local 
crime commission.23 Over the course of the 1920s, businessmen and other anti-crime activists 
formed approximately 30 crime commissions across the country, including the National Crime 
Commission, formed in 1925 in New York City to coordinate the work of various municipal 
crime commissions and promote the growth of the crime commission movement. By the end of 
the 1920s, the federal government joined in the growing crime commission movement when 
President Herbert Hoover established the National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement to study the impact of Prohibition and the condition of law enforcement in the 
country. Members of local crime commissions populated the federal group, including Chicago 
Crime Commission vice president Frank J. Loesch.24  
The Chicago Crime Commission joined a crowded field of organizations interested in 
social reform and the improvement of municipal governance in post-WWI Chicago. Until 1919, 
                                                
21 Before WWI, most municipal investigations of law enforcement focused their attention on vice rather than on 
violent crime. By 1916, over thirty American cities and towns across the country had commissioned investigations 
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Regulation of Commercialized Vice, 52-53. 
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Chicago reform organizations were dominated by Progressive groups interested in the 
improvement of urban living and working conditions, such as Hull House, the Immigrants’ 
Protective League, the Juvenile Protection Association, and the Vice Commission of Chicago. 
Members of the Crime Commission distinguished themselves from those organizations, drawing 
gendered contrasts between their work to end crime and the work of Progressive reformers to 
improve social conditions of the city. Along with the organization’s self-fashioning as a 
masculinized crime control organization, the Crime Commission also marked a shift in the 
interpretation of crime causation among anti-crime activists and criminal justice reformers. The 
businessmen who controlled the Crime Commission largely interpreted crime as an individual 
choice to violate the law, divorcing it from social and economic circumstances that had been the 
focus of many Progressive reform organizations in the city.25 This interpretation of crime 
causation directly shaped the agenda of businessmen anti-crime activists, as they focused their 
attention on strengthening state coercive capacity in order to deter individuals from choosing to 
commit crimes. In its publications and in the public remarks of its members, the Crime 
Commission repeatedly argued that the city needed a larger police department in order to 
adequately detect crime but almost never elaborated its reasoning or described how a stronger 
state would therefore curtail law breaking. The underlying assumption seemed to be that a more 
powerful state would be better equipped to coerce its citizenry into lawfulness. The 1922 
Chicago Police Department patrolmen increase represented the institutional expression of this 
interpretation of criminality, popularized by the Chicago Crime Commission and shared by many 
like-minded anti-crime activists throughout the nation during the interwar decades.  
European ethnic crime—particularly organized crime—dominated the imagination of the 
Crime Commission as the most pressing crime problem facing Chicago leaders. Crime 
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Commission officers regularly referenced the problem of “professional criminals” that plagued 
the city, a coded term that brought to mind Italian and other European ethnic lawbreakers and 
members of criminal syndicates.26 Chicago newspapers had lamented the problem of syndicated 
crime among Italians or “alien murderers” since the late nineteenth century, and the Crime 
Commission’s attention to professional criminals invoked that discourse to mark crime as a 
problem that had arrived in Chicago among the foreign born.27 The organization was founded 
during the same year as the Chicago Race Riot and conducted its initial investigatory work 
simultaneously to that of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations. However, the Crime 
Commission’s critiques of policing in Chicago focused on the inefficiency, corruption, and laxity 
of the department, obscuring the entrenched patterns of anti-black discrimination demonstrated 
by Chicago police since the early twentieth century. The elite-led and white-dominated anti-
crime organization marginalized racial critiques of policing and law enforcement that had been 
rigorously documented by the members and research staff of the Chicago Commission on Race 
Relations, such as the disproportionate rates of black arrests, racially skewed crime statistics, and 
patterns of racially discriminatory police violence.28 Perhaps even more surprisingly, the Crime 
Commission did not foreground black crime as a paramount problem in interwar Chicago.  
The Chicago Crime Commission’s attention to criminal syndicalism, law enforcement 
inefficiency, police graft, and official laxity suggested a critique of police discretion, albeit one 
distinct from the critiques of discretion that had emerged among other criminal justice reformers 
and Chicago residents in the early twentieth century. The Crime Commission insisted that police 
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failure to evenly enforce the law across the city and patrolmen’s acceptance of payments in 
exchange for official laxity had resulted in a widespread disregard for the rule of law, which had 
encouraged further law breaking in Chicago.29 As a result of delays in the criminal justice system, 
potential lawbreakers might assume that they would never face consequences for violating the 
law and therefore be undeterred from doing so. This line of thinking aligned with the Crime 
Commission’s conception of crime causation as an individual choice, one that could be deterred 
through the elimination of police discretion. The Vice Commission of Chicago had made a 
similar critique of police discretion in its 1911 investigation, finding that police decisions not to 
enforce the law had provided for the flourishing of vice in certain neighborhoods of the city.30 
The Chicago Commission on Race Relations expanded on the Vice Commission’s analysis of the 
relationship between race and police discretion, showing how disproportionate arrests of black 
Chicagoans as well as police failure to stop crime in black neighborhoods had resulted in 
unequal access to fair law enforcement.31 The Crime Commission, however, excluded the spatial 
and racial analyses of these organizations from its critique of official discretion. Occasionally, 
Crime Commission Bulletins suggested that black migration played a role in the city’s crime 
problem, but their investigations of law enforcement never identified racial discrimination as a 
significant problem in policing.32  
The crime commission movement demonstrated the potential for local anti-crime activists 
and owners of capital to play an integral role in urban crime control policy and demonstrated 
how a deterrence-based program of crime control could translate into police state building and 
institutional development. Anti-crime activists’ focus on managerial reforms and the protection 
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of capital and business interests largely framed police discretion as a problem of official laxity 
and graft, obscuring the way that discretion also provided state endorsement for the arbitrary, 
discriminatory, and violent treatment of the city’s African American, immigrant, and working 
class communities. Although the post-WWI years seemed to mark an age of reform and 
modernization for urban policing and criminal justice, the role of business and capital in shaping 
the development of policing institutions in these years demonstrated how racial hierarchy and 
class politics shaped the reform process itself, protecting the power of law enforcement officers 
to mete out discriminatory treatment even in the midst of supposed reforms. The absence of 
racial and spatial analyses in the agenda of the Crime Commission led the group to focus on top-
down managerial reforms rather than giving attention to the conduct of patrolmen throughout the 
city. As a consequence, the unmarked whiteness of interwar anti-crime activism produced a 
reform discourse in which the problem of anti-black law enforcement was displaced by the 
relationship between European ethnic crime and official graft and framed as a problem that could 
be solved through administrative changes and state building alone. 
 
“CRIME WAVES” AND ANTI-CRIME ACTIVISM AFTER WWI 
The proliferation of the crime commission movement throughout the United States 
reflected widespread concern with the improvement of law enforcement in the years following 
WWI, especially as city officials and other observers across the country predicted a nationwide 
post-war crime wave. Civic leaders and newspaper headlines decried increases in crime that they 
anticipated would certainly accompany the end of the war and the return of soldiers to American 
cities. There is no clear scholarly consensus regarding the empirical basis of such fears of post-
war crime waves, and most early-twentieth-century criminologists asserted that predictions of a 
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general rise in lawlessness were unfounded.33 Examination of long-term crime trends with 
available data indicate that violent crime in the United States actually fell significantly from the 
mid-nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century, with occasional variations to that 
trend.34 Historical homicide rates showed some slight surges following war demobilization, 
although those trends were only based on data for homicide arrests and could not necessarily be 
abstracted to account for a more broadly defined “crime wave.”35 Homicide rates in Chicago as 
well as those throughout the nation did rise slightly in 1919 but proceeded to fall almost 
immediately over the course of the following two years.36  
Despite these questions about actual increases in crime, the perception or prediction of a 
coming post-war crime wave played a critical role in shaping crime control politics.37 Headlines 
from the Los Angeles Times to the New York Times announced, “Wave of Crime Follow War: 
Lawlessness is Increasing in Every Large City,” and warned of the coming “Worldwide Crime 
Wave.”38 Although these accounts of post-war crime conditions consistently linked a national 
crime wave to the end of the war, there was little consensus regarding the causal relationship 
between the two. Some accounts predicted that the psychological effects of war would encourage 
criminal activity among returning soldiers, or that the shock of returning to a quotidian civilian 
life would cause some former soldiers to seek thrills in the form of crime.39 Other reports implied 
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that war demobilization itself would not necessarily cause criminal behavior, but that the mass 
mobilization of soldiers may have drafted many likely criminals, and that the end of the war 
would see the return those men and their criminal tendencies to their home cities.40 Some 
criminal justice professionals scoffed at this linkage between military service and criminality; in 
1922, the president of New York’s Commission of Prisons conducted a survey of penal 
institutions in that state, finding that more than half of the former servicemen in the state 
reformatory had been under arrest before the war, suggesting that their service was not 
necessarily the cause of their criminal behavior.41 Other accounts made sweeping generalizations 
about Americans’ tendency towards crime in the interwar decades, some claiming that the 
national experience of war had encouraged widespread disregard for the rule of law, that the new 
federal ban on alcohol had done the same, or that the state sanctioned violence of war had carried 
over into American cities at its close.42 
In addition to these consistent linkages of war demobilization and crime, other observers 
connected rises in crime to economic downturn, unemployment, and labor radicalism. Civic 
reformers had linked unemployment and crime since the early twentieth century, often 
suggesting that joblessness or low wages drove many city-dwellers to seek work in the vice 
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trades.43 A census of Chicago police precincts in 1914 found nearly 30,000 unemployed men, 
and most police officers interviewed in the census agreed that unemployment had contributed to 
higher rates of crime in their districts.44 An investigation by the Chicago City Council 
Committee on Crime drew similar conclusions a year later, suggesting that the pressures of 
economic conditions “inevitably produce the crushed or distorted bodies and minds from which 
the army of crime is recruited.”45 As World War I came to a close, these links between 
unemployment and crime took on a newly urgent tone as the nation faced the homecoming of 
thousands of soldiers who might not be able to find work upon their return. At the 1919 
convention of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, William A. Pinkerton of the 
Pinkerton National Detective Agency warned that the wartime experiences of former soldiers 
made them particularly likely to turn to criminality if faced with unemployment, “[Their] 
Methods used are those of men accustomed to taking great risks, men who will brook no 
interference, they constitute a new class of criminals.”46 Pinkerton’s warning fused fears about 
the relationship between unemployment and crime with the idea that the war had produced a new 
culture of violence that would take hold of civil society. 
Other explanations of the supposed post-war crime wave played upon associations 
between labor radicalism and lawlessness, particularly the growing influence of the Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW), the radical labor union founded in Chicago in 1905. 
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Characterizations of the IWW as an organization of criminals littered news reports during the 
second decade of the twentieth century, many of them linking the union’s socialist politics to 
supposed anarchism and lawlessness.47 One description of an IWW convention in Ohio in 1915 
claimed that the organization flagrantly violated so-called “capitalistic laws” in defense of the 
working class, going on to define capitalistic law as “any law duly enacted by Congress, a State 
Legislature or a municipality which workingmen might take it into their heads to violate.”48 This 
report directly counter-posed labor radicalism and lawfulness, suggesting that IWW members 
purposefully violated the law in pursuit of their own interests. In January 1919, Los Angeles 
Chief of Police John L. Butler predicted that returning soldiers would seize jobs from “men of 
I.W.W. tendencies” who would then return to “their old occupations of doing no more work than 
necessary” and likely engage in criminal activities.49 In strained logic, Butler implied that the 
wartime labor shortage might have temporarily quelled labor radicalism, but that the temporary 
respite would end when returning soldiers reclaimed their jobs. Radical members of the 
Industrial Workers of the World might then find themselves unemployed and free to engage in 
criminal activity or violence. These foreboding warnings framed the supposed post-war crime 
wave as a threat to business and capital, predicting that unemployed criminals or labor radicals 
might direct violence or other lawless attacks on owners of business themselves.  
These numerous predictions of post-war lawlessness and a national crime wave sowed 
fear that urban disorder would pose threats to investments and flows of capital within and among 
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the country’s industrial urban centers. In that context, business interests and urban boosterism 
drove the expansion of the post-WWI anti-crime activist and crime commission movement 
throughout the country, as owners of capital sought to protect their property and firms and foster 
investment. Businessmen in a number of American cities established independent criminal 
justice improvement organizations in the years after World War I. For instance, following the 
Cleveland Crime Survey in 1922, which found that the city’s murder rate was 50 percent higher 
than that of 30 other large American cities, the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce established the 
Cleveland Association for Criminal Justice to monitor police work and help coordinate the work 
of the city’s criminal courts. The survey also found that the city’s burglary insurance rates were 
among the highest in the country, an issue of particular concern to urban businessmen who often 
found their firms subjected to payroll robberies like those that had plagued Chicago in 1917.50  
Within five years after the conclusion of the war, the business-led anti-crime movement 
had stretched across the country and into nearly every major industrial center. In 1922, the state 
of New York recommended the formation of a private crime commission modeled on the 
Cleveland Association for Criminal Justice and the Chicago Crime Commission.51 One year later, 
members of Los Angeles’ business and civic elite announced their plans to establish the Los 
Angeles Crime Commission in order to suppress existing crime and curtail seasonal crime waves 
produced by “the great annual influx of criminals from all parts of the country, driven from the 
North and East by cold weather.”52 Members of several business booster organizations 
established the Baltimore Criminal Justice Commission nearly simultaneously; the Baltimore 
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Association of Commerce, the Baltimore Stock Exchange, and the Maryland Bar Association 
were among the 25 business and civic organizations that contributed members to the new anti-
crime organization. Among anti-crime groups, the Baltimore Criminal Justice Commission 
represented a rare collaboration between business and labor; among the organizations 
represented in the commission were the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the American 
Federation of Labor. Notably, however, the more radical Industrial Workers of the World was 
not represented.53 
As businessmen and members of the professional class in cities around the country 
organized in response to predictions of a national crime wave, they appealed to the long 
relationship between capital and urban order. During the mid-nineteenth century, Chicago, along 
with nearly every other major Northern city, established a bureaucratized municipal police 
force.54 Industrial centers faced massive waves of immigration in this period and the attendant 
expansion of the urban industrial working class. Business elites, such as the leadership of the 
Illinois Central Railroad, pushed the Chicago City Council to modernize the police department in 
1855, expecting that a strengthened state coercive apparatus would help to quell labor strikes, 
attract Eastern investment capital, and discipline the city’s growing immigrant population.55 
These business elites deployed an ideology of order to legitimize the expanded coercive power of 
the state; order was a malleable concept that allowed for vast disciplinary state power over 
immigrant and working class communities.56 Post-WWI anti-crime activists reasserted this long-
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standing relationship between urban order and the interests of capital, although their anti-crime 
campaigns also marked subtle differences from their nineteenth-century predecessors. Post-WWI 
anti-crime businessmen in Chicago and throughout the nation interested themselves in police 
policy and criminal procedure itself, aspects of civic life that had been largely ignored by 
nineteenth-century advocates of expanded urban police capacity. No longer contented to see 
police simply put down labor unrest, post-war businessmen anti-crime activists argued that the 
reduction of crime and efficient law enforcement itself was crucial to foster the growth of 
capital.57 According to the rhetoric of these businessmen, urban order depended on legal order, a 
relationship that members of the Chicago Association of Commerce invoked in their response to 
Edward Wheed’s dramatic showdown with Chicago Police in 1917.  
It was in this context of national apprehension about an imminent crime wave—and 
spurred by Wheed’s robbery of the Winslow Brothers’ payroll delivery in 1917—that the 
Chicago Association of Commerce instructed ten of its members to investigate the condition of 
law enforcement in the city.58 The members of the organization’s Committee on the Prevalence 
and Prevention of Crime in the City of Chicago represented the city’s business boosters as well 
as its commercial and professional elites.59 Although two of its members had legal training, most 
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of the committee members had no formal background in law enforcement or criminal justice, 
their only apparent qualification for the task being their status as members of the business 
community. When the Committee on the Prevalence of Crime delivered its final report in June of 
1918, its findings and recommendations reflected the agenda of the post-WWI anti-crime 
movement, particularly in its focus on augmenting the coercive power of the state and improving 
the efficiency of criminal justice institutions. Upon the publication of the Committee’s report, 
chairman Edward E. Gore clarified that the group did not set out to study crime itself or to 
rehabilitate those who broke the law. Instead “Its purpose is solely to secure the punishment of 
the guilty and to make the punishment adequate to the crime.”60 According to the committee, the 
deficiencies of the criminal justice system were to blame for the state of crime in the city, 
including insufficient policing, poor criminal record keeping, and an inadequate state criminal 
code.  
The final report of the Committee on the Prevalence and Prevention of Crime was guided 
by the assumption that a robust coercive state was the most effective way to control urban crime. 
The report began by lamenting the inadequate numerical strength of the Chicago Police 
Department; according to its findings, Chicago had only one patrolman for every 712 city 
residents, while Philadelphia had one patrolman for every 468 residents, New York had a 
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patrolman for every 553 residents, and London had one patrolman for every 427 residents.61 In 
addition to the generally inadequate number of patrolmen in Chicago compared to similarly sized 
cities, the report added that police strength had been furthered diminished by political influence 
on the department, as commanding officers often deployed patrolmen to protect the property of 
their political allies, diminishing the number of police available to patrol the city.62 This critique 
of policing in Chicago implied one of discretion and corruption as well; the Committee noted 
that commanding officer discretion to deploy patrolmen according to political commitments had 
compromised urban safety. The report made little mention of the quality of policing or the 
conduct of individual officers, beyond recommending that police officers receive improved legal 
training in order that their investigations would better support the work of the State’s Attorney in 
prosecuting crimes.63 The authors of the report also failed to elaborate precisely how the 
numerical increase of patrolmen that they recommended would reduce or prevent crime beyond 
the implicit assumption that a larger police department would increase the state’s means of 
surveillance and therefore deter citizens from illegal activity. Although the report acknowledged 
that officers’ political connections could impede equal policing, it failed to explicitly mark the 
crimes committed by police themselves—such as police violence and graft—thereby obscuring 
how law enforcement itself could be a source of urban crime. 
The Committee’s advocacy of a robust law enforcement state extended beyond the Police 
Department itself, as it also advocated for the establishment of a new state agency that would 
aggregate and preserve criminal records throughout Illinois and make those records “available 
for the use of the State’s Attorney and for presentation to the court in order that the character of 
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the defendant, as indicated by his criminal history, might have proper consideration by the 
court.”64 The members of the Committee on the Prevalence of Crime suggested that such a 
bureau of criminal information would be especially useful in tracking and punishing repeat 
offenders, whom they assumed to be primarily responsible for the perceived epidemic of crime 
in the city. In particular, the Committee hoped that a bureau of criminal information with the 
capability to aggregate crime data across jurisdictional boundaries would help police and 
prosecutors apprehend so-called “seasoned criminals” who had committed crimes in multiple 
jurisdictions.65 Like the report’s recommendation to increase the size of the police department, 
the recommendation that the state of Illinois establish a centralized bureau of criminal records 
and statistics relied on the assumption that increased state capacity to monitor its citizenry would 
ultimately curtail crime.  
Despite these numerous recommendations regarding the expansion of the law 
enforcement state, the Committee on the Prevalence and Prevention of Crime recommended the 
establishment of a private commission to oversee the process of criminal justice reform in 
Chicago, demonstrating a tension within the report regarding whether or not private or public 
agencies represented the best path to lawfulness. The Committee recommended that the Chicago 
Association of Commerce assume ongoing responsibility for improving law enforcement in the 
city, suggesting that a permanent “Commission for the Suppression and Prevention of Crime” 
should undertake the task. Their recommendations regarding the funding and membership of this 
new commission indicated that urban business interests would continue to play an integral role in 
the administration and functioning of the group, just as businessmen had played a crucial role in 
initiating anti-crime activism in Chicago following the Winslow Brothers’ robbery. The 
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members of the Committee predicted that such a commission would require approximately 
$10,000 per month to support its work, but that “the fund required can be reasonably expected to 
be subscribed by the business interests of Chicago most concerned in the suppression of 
crime.”66 They expected the Chicago Association of Commerce to assume responsibility for the 
organization of this new commission and recommended that the CAC select “the members 
thereof to be representative of the important business interests of Chicago and of its best 
citizenship.”67 The Committee’s report reiterated several times that the “quality of the men” who 
might be assigned to the new anti-crime organization was paramount, emphasizing the gender 
and class boundaries of membership in the new organization. The recommendations failed to 
address whether or not the group would be an interracial one, but considering that the 
membership of the CAC itself was overwhelmingly white, it followed that the new Crime 
Commission would be as well.  
Following on these recommendations, the Chicago Association of Commerce formed the 
Chicago Crime Commission (CCC) in January 1919, appointing approximately 100 men to the 
commission from among its ranks.68 Members of the Crime Commission gathered for their first 
annual meeting on January 8, 1920, assembling at the Union League Club of Chicago, a civic 
organization similarly interested in the improvement of municipal governance.69 Edwin Sims, a 
Chicago lawyer and former United States District Attorney, served as the first president of the 
Chicago Crime Commission. Sims had also been the secretary of the Vice Commission of 
Chicago, the Progressive municipal reform organization that had conducted a thorough 
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investigation of urban vice conditions in 1911.70 Sims’ role in both the Vice Commission of 
Chicago and the Crime Commission indicated some degree of overlap between early-twentieth-
century Progressive reform organizations and the anti-crime activism of the post-WWI years, 
although the women reformers who had formed the core of Progressive social investigation in 
Chicago were wholly excluded from the Crime Commission. The Commission itself was never 
explicit about its racial boundaries, but by the mid-1920s, the CCC and like-minded 
organizations around the country had succeeded in creating an anti-crime movement that largely 
served the interests of white-controlled capital.  
Presiding over the Crime Commission’s first annual meeting in January 1920, Sims 
recalled that in its early months, the CCC had only the report of the Committee on the Prevalence 
and Prevention of Crime to guides its actions, but since then “we have organized into a 
directorate, and these by-laws have been framed, committees have been suggested, headquarters 
have been rented, an operating director secured, and a force organized.”71 Indeed, within the 
space of only a year, Chicago’s anti-crime movement had grown from an ad-hoc committee to an 
extensive organization made up of thirteen committees and 110 members.72 While the Operating 
Director and Executive Secretary drew a salary, all other members of the Crime Commission 
served without compensation, thereby limiting membership in the organization to those with the 
capital and resources to support many hours of law enforcement monitoring without pay.73 The 
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structure and membership of the new Chicago Crime Commission assured that the city’s local 
anti-crime movement and that of similar organizations around the country would remain the 
purview of the professional classes, excluding input from many of the city’s policed 
communities themselves, including working-class ethnic communities and the growing African 
American and Mexican American communities of the urban North. Prior membership in the 
Chicago Association of Commerce also served as a unofficial but largely regarded prerequisite 
for membership on the Crime Commission, practically guaranteeing that anti-crime activism 
remained in the hands of the city’s business elite. 
 
URBAN REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE IN INTERWAR CHICAGO 
 In May 1920, two imposing maps—each covered in thumbtacks—hung on the walls of 
the Chicago Crime Commission offices at 179 W. Washington Street, in the heart of the city’s 
downtown business district.74 The first map indicated the locations of violent crimes that had 
occurred in the city over the previous sixteen months, each tack corresponding to a numbered 
card in the Crime Commission’s files.75 The second map indicated the homes and meeting places 
of convicted and suspected criminals, including establishments like athletic clubs and poolrooms 
where crime was assumed to flourish.76 A visitor to the CCC offices could quickly gather 
information on any given crime indicated on the map, as the Commission’s numbered files 
included background on each crime. If relevant, they also catalogued information about the arrest 
and the actions of the Grand Jury and included a replica of the Criminal Court docket. The maps 
allowed the Crime Commission to visualize crime throughout the city and to track the relative 
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effectiveness of the Chicago Police Department’s precinct captains. Operating Director Henry 
Barrett Chamberlin explained that if a precinct had a relatively low number of crimes reported, it 
usually indicated either police corruption or failure to report complaints or an efficient law 
enforcement apparatus in that precinct.77 In this way, the maps made visible the CCC’s own 
surveillance of crime in the city as well as its evaluation of law enforcement institutions. By 
1927, the card catalogue in the Crime Commission offices comprised nearly 300,000 cards, 
including records on tens of thousands of lawbreakers and the major criminal trials of the 
previous decade. By all accounts, the Crime Commission had fashioned itself “into a 
combination of a detective agency, a newspaper morgue and an army intelligence department.”78 
These comprehensive maps of crime and criminal establishments visualized the Crime 
Commission’s critique of police discretion as well; by cataloguing the occurrence of every crime 
in Chicago, the Commission made a record of the law breaking that the Police Department had 
ignored over the previous year.  
The work and agenda of the Chicago Crime Commission reflected a strictly legalistic 
definition of crime and the idea that crime was caused almost exclusively by individual choice. 
This ideology of crime causation had direct implications for crime control policy and the reform 
of policing institutions and implied an assertive critique of police discretion—especially police 
failure to apprehend lawbreakers. According to members of the Crime Commission, police 
discretion had resulted in an inefficient and indulgent law enforcement state in which would-be 
criminals could violate the law without the expectation of being arrested or prosecuted. One 
description of the Crime Commission’s surveillance of the Chicago Police Department 
exemplified this critique “One Chicago police captain, for example, reported thirty-seven 
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complaints over a period of one month, whereas the investigation of the Crime Commission 
showed that there had been 141 complaints.”79 Other publications of the Crime Commission 
located problems with discretion not only among commanding officers but also among the rank 
and file of the department. An article concerning recent changes to Police Department officials in 
1920 suggested that sound leadership would be necessary in order to eliminate the misuse of 
discretion among patrolmen “The uniformed officer on the beat is the only representative of our 
government recognized by many thousands of our inhabitants. It is important, therefore, that he 
be a man of integrity, fairness and courage. The example of an inefficient or corrupt police 
official injuriously affects the whole moral fibre of the community.”80 
Businessmen and economic elites had played a limited role in the Progressive moral 
reform movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, often lending capital and 
other resources to reform organizations but leaving the labor of investigation and social work to 
women and religious groups. The influence of business did occasionally circumscribe the 
recommendations of Progressive reform organizations, particularly among movements to 
eliminate prostitution and saloon culture from the landscape of the city. Saloons and vice tourism 
played a sustaining role in the early-twentieth-century commercial life of cities like Chicago, as 
these establishments often abutted downtown business districts and served as spaces of leisure 
for urban business elites.81 Many landlords also made significant profits among establishments of 
prostitution, charging exorbitant rents to brothel owners who found themselves limited by police 
directives to keep urban vice in strict spatial boundaries.82  
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Business owners also chafed at some of the economic critiques of Progressive anti-vice 
investigations. For instance, the Vice Commission of Chicago’s exhaustive 1911 report on 
prostitution, The Social Evil in Chicago, cited low wages as one of the most significant factors 
that drove young women into the vice trades, imploring readers, “Is it any wonder that a tempted 
girl who receives only six dollars per week…sells her body for twenty-five dollars per week 
when she learns there is a demand for it and men are willing to pay the price[?]”83 But, despite 
insistence by Vice Commission investigators that low wages had caused the proliferation of 
prostitution in Chicago, proposals to establish a minimum living wage were nowhere among the 
group’s myriad recommendations.84 In all likelihood, the businessman members of the Vice 
Commission had managed to keep such recommendations out of the group’s final report; Julius 
Rosenwald, a member of the Vice Commission and eventually the Crime Commission, publicly 
maintained that low wages had no connection to the city’s vice problem.85 The idea of a 
minimum wage to guard against vice was later taken up by state and national anti-vice 
organizations; in 1913, Illinois Senator J. Hamilton Lewis introduced a bill establishing a 
national minimum wage to the United States Senate. Lewis’s bill followed on the 
recommendations of the Illinois Vice Commission, a group that formed after the investigation of 
the Vice Commission of Chicago, but his bill failed to garner the necessary support.86 
The rise of the crime commission movement in Chicago and around the country marked a 
new development in the politics of urban reform, in which business interests were not just 
represented but foregrounded in the leadership and agendas of these new organizations. The 
movement also represented a gendered shift away from the feminized social reform ethos of 
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many Progressive-era organizations and towards a masculinized legalistic approach to crime 
control, both in the institutional structure of crime commissions and in the rhetoric they used to 
describe criminality. The reformist landscape of Chicago was populated by a range of social 
reform organizations by the post-WWI years, many of them similarly concerned with crime and 
delinquency. A significant number of those organizations had also been founded or led by 
women. Local examples of female-led Progressive reform organizations included Hull House, 
co-founded in 1889 by Jane Addams and Ellen Gates Star, the Juvenile Protection Association, 
also founded by Jane Addams in 1901 and led by Jesse F. Binford until 1952, the Immigrants’ 
Protective League, founded in 1908 and directed by Grace Abbott, and the Negro Fellowship 
League, founded in 1908 by Ida B. Wells.87 Women social workers comprised the majority of 
staff for Hull House and the Juvenile Protection Association, as well as the majority of research 
staff of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations.88 In contrast, the Chicago Crime 
Commission was led and populated entirely by men.89 
Although the agenda of the Chicago Crime Commission seemed to be concerned with 
criminal justice reform, members of the group self-consciously rejected the label of “reformers,” 
a strategic rhetorical choice that drew gendered distinctions between their work and the work of 
women-led Progressive reform organizations. Describing the work of the Crime Commission in 
1920, operating director Henry Barrett Chamberlin insisted that the group was not a reform 
organization, but rather “An organization of bankers, business and professional men who are 
applying modern business methods to correct a system…It is interested solely in making 
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Chicago a place in which to live and work with a reasonable assurance that its citizens will not 
be the prey of gunman and thieves.”90 As operating director of the CCC, Chamberlin was 
responsible for coordinating the work of the organization’s various committees and made it clear 
to his members that the Crime Commission would focus its efforts on curtailing violent crime 
and property crime, turning attention away from the sexual vice, gambling, and juvenile 
delinquency that had drawn the attention of the Vice Commission of Chicago and the Juvenile 
Protection Association. The strict contrast that Chamberlin drew between the work of the Crime 
Commission and that of other reformers reflected the blurred boundary that the crime 
commissions straddled between private and public agencies. Chamberlin consigned “reform” to 
the private sphere, while the work of preventing crime among the members of the CCC “[grew] 
up in the departments of state and municipal government having to do with the prevention, 
apprehension, prosecution and punishment of crime and criminals.”91 It was this perceived 
access to the inner workings of the state and the ears of state officials that excluded the work of 
the CCC from the category of reform, in Chamberlin’s formulation.  
Occasionally, Crime Commission leaders’ contrast between their own work and that of 
Progressive organizations took on the form of disparagingly gendered language when anti-crime 
activists characterized the work of women reformers and social workers as emotional dabbling, 
in contrast to their own serious work to prevent crime in Chicago. At the conclusion of the 
organization’s first annual meeting in January 1920, CCC President Edwin Sims derided the 
work of the city’s social workers “This tender regard for the feelings of those in the clutches of 
the law, thus publicly displayed, conveyed to ten thousand criminals plying their vocation in 
Chicago the mistaken impression that the community was more interested in them than it was in 
                                                




their victims.”92 Sims belittled the city’s social workers as overly emotional and suggested that 
this attention to the social roots of criminality was misplaced “It would be more helpful if this 
sympathy was directed to a consideration of the feelings of the widows and children of police 
men who are murdered in the discharge of their duty or to the survivors of those who are 
victimized by the outlaws.”93 In an address to the Chicago Association of Commerce in 1921, 
Sims continued his disparagingly gendered characterization of the city’s social workers and vice 
reformers, lamenting, “Crime has been aided by maudlin sentimentalists who, forgetting the 
victim, stimulated the sympathy of the community for the criminal until we had reached the pass 
where the Crime Commission took hold, where few, if any criminals were actually being 
punished.”94 Here again Sims trivialized the work of Chicago’s predominantly female social 
workers, reducing their attention to the rehabilitative ethos to sentimentality. Reflecting on the 
history of the Crime Commission in 1960, CCC member and former criminal court clerk James 
Doherty speculated that this rejection of the “reformer” label won the organization more 
authority in the eyes of state institutions “Consequently [Chamberlin] got a warmer reception 
from mayors, chiefs of police, state’s attorneys and other law enforcement officials when seeking 
their cooperation in something that was strictly anti-crime.”95 Doherty’s speculation suggested 
that that the group’s gendered distinction from feminized Progressive reform organizations also 
gave the CCC a strategic advantage in its relationship to state law enforcement officials.  
While leaders of the Chicago Crime Commission drew stark contrasts between its 
approach to urban crime and that of Progressive social reform organizations, there was 
significant overlap between Progressives’ and anti-crime activists’ methods of producing urban 
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change. In particular, anti-crime activists in Chicago and around the country relied on the 
Progressive insistence that the accumulation of knowledge about social problems served an 
integral role in improving urban social ills. Settlement houses such as Hull House had conducted 
surveys of urban life in Chicago since the late nineteenth century, regularly publishing their 
findings about neighborhood development and working conditions in order to educate policy 
makers and reformers alike.96 The final report of the Vice Commission of Chicago served not 
only as an announcement of the group’s recommendations for eliminating prostitution from 
Chicago, but also as a comprehensive catalogue of the vice establishments that investigators had 
discovered over the course of their year of work, serving as a benchmark for the condition of 
vice in the city in 1911.97 Investigators for the Juvenile Protection Association continued this 
work in the decades following the publication of the Vice Commission report, conducting annual 
reviews of vice establishments in Chicago and forwarding their findings on to state authorities, 
including the Chicago Police Department.98 The Chicago Urban League also relied on methods 
of urban investigation as the basis for its reform work; a year after the founding of the CUL, its 
research department reported that it was “working out a system of records based upon 
investigations, clippings, reports, bulletins and other sources of information, which will enable 
the League to interpret Negro life and act as a bureau of information on all matters relating to the 
race.”99  
Much of the early work of the Chicago Crime Commission followed on this Progressive 
model of knowledge accumulation, as the group prioritized assembling records of law breaking 
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during its early years, a function that its membership lauded as “the only way you can get any 
good results.”100 Although it lacked state authority or sanction, the Crime Commission fashioned 
itself a clearinghouse for law enforcement knowledge and a coordinating agency among 
institutions such as the Chicago Police Department and the Criminal Court of Cook County. In 
fact, CCC Secretary W. Rufus Abbott claimed in February 1922 that the record keeping of the 
Commission was so comprehensive that law enforcement officials and city residents had come to 
see the CCC as the most authoritative source of information regarding urban crime “Where two 
agencies differ as to a figure or entry, it has become the established custom to accept the Chicago 
Crime Commission’s figure as accurate and indisputable.”101 Crime Commission members had 
also taken up the task of observing the workings of law enforcement agencies in the course of 
their criminal record gathering, and Abbott further claimed that this surveillance had improved 
the operation of law enforcement itself, as “the daily visits of Crime Commission operatives to 
the various departments for the purpose of obtaining records has resulted in a more careful and 
accurate keeping of official files.”102 Addressing the CCC membership in 1920, President Edwin 
Sims reasoned that complete crime records would provide the basis with which to authoritatively 
diagnose the state of crime in Chicago and apprehend repeat offenders.103 
The Crime Commission’s self-fashioned role as authoritative record keeper of crime in 
Chicago also resulted in the blurring of distinctions between public and private institutions in the 
interwar city. In fact, according to CCC President Edwin Sims, the group’s accumulation of 
knowledge on urban crime had come to be seen as the most reliable source of information for 
law enforcement officials themselves by the early 1920s, as “they are now frequently resorted to 
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by the police and other public officials as carrying the most comprehensive criminal data in the 
state.”104 By 1923, the work of the Crime Commission in the city’s criminal justice system had 
become so ubiquitous that its Committee on Publicity felt the need to clarify that the group was 
“an unofficial body of citizens; that it receives no support from public funds of any kind,” 
correcting what was apparently a common misconception.105 By assuming the role of 
authoritative criminal record keeper, the Crime Commission also implied a critique of state law 
enforcement institutions, suggesting that those agencies had failed in their responsibility to 
maintain records of urban law breaking. For instance, the CCC indicated that one of the most 
significant hurdles that the Chicago Police Department faced in curtailing crime was its lack of 
knowledge about past and current criminal activity in the city. In an attempt to remedy that gap 
in state knowledge, the CCC repeatedly recommended the establishment of a centralized 
criminal records bureau for the state of Illinois that could collect and coordinate knowledge 
about the citizenry and its criminal activity, a recommendation that anticipated the later work of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the nationally distributed Uniform Crime Reports.106 The 
presence of CCC members in spaces like the city’s courts and police precincts also represented a 
critique of law enforcement administration, implying that the state required this citizens’ 
surveillance in order to effectively enforce the law.107  
The Crime Commission’s agenda also followed from its legalistic interpretation of crime 
and its assumption that those who chose to break the law had forfeited their rights to social 
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services and sympathy from law-abiding citizens. From this perspective, organizations that 
attempted to aid law-breakers ultimately impeded the project of law enforcement. According to 
the members of the Crime Commission, urban order necessitated strict adherence to the law, and 
crime control could be best achieved by punitive state action in order to deter future law breaking. 
A Crime Commission bulletin from November 1920 began with a list of men who had been 
executed by the state over the previous six years, a list that the CCC lauded as the culmination of 
years of concerted efforts of urban crime control and a representation of “organized attempts of 
the public authorities, popular opinion and the Chicago Crime Commission to stamp out the 
flourishing business of murder in this city by the means provided for its eradication—
enforcement of the law as it is written upon statute books of Illinois.”108 These publications 
consistently suggested that the causes of crime lay in individual choice, implicitly rejecting the 
social interpretations of criminality that had been advocated by many of the city’s Progressive 
reform organizations and reform-minded jurists since the early twentieth-century.109 
Social interpretations of criminality—those that located the causes of crime in factors 
such as economic privation, neighborhood conditions, and urban maladjustment—had circulated 
among Chicago civic reformers and jurists since the early twentieth century and shaped the 
programs of the city’s settlement houses, mutual aid societies, and municipal courts. After the 
establishment of the Municipal Court of Chicago in 1905, many of the court’s leading jurists, 
including Chief Justice Harry M. Olson, adopted a social interpretation of crime that 
acknowledged the role that poverty, family structure, and urban environment played in law 
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breaking and criminalization.110 Occasionally, the conflicts between the Crime Commission’s 
legalistic interpretation of criminality and the social interpretations of other institutions came into 
relief. Leaders of the Juvenile Protection Association recognized that the gendered critiques 
leveled by Crime Commission members like Chamberlin and Sims derived in part from 
fundamental differences in their interpretations of crime causation. Jane Addams and a group of 
social workers had founded the Juvenile Protection Association in 1899 after the passage of the 
Illinois Juvenile Court Law to secure adequate funding for probation officers; later the group 
expanded its work to include functions such as neighborhood surveillance and supervised 
recreation in order to prevent juvenile delinquency.111 In 1923, University of Chicago economist 
and social worker Edith Abbott wrote to JPA director Jessie F. Binford, indicating a degree of 
hostility between the JPA and the Crime Commission despite their assumedly shared goals of 
preventing law breaking in Chicago. In her 1923 letter, Abbott recommended that Binford and 
her staff forego any attempt to collaborate with members of the CCC, but reluctantly admitted 
that the Crime Commission had seen some success in its efforts to improve urban law 
enforcement despite its frequent use of inflammatory rhetoric regarding crime in the city, “Of 
course I do think they get some results but very small ones and not to compare with the positive 
harm that it [sic] done by the kind of propaganda they carry on.”112 Abbott failed to elaborate on 
the “propaganda” to which she referred, although she could have been referencing some of the 
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Crime Commission’s publicity materials that regularly lamented the invasion of the city by 
habitual criminals.113  
By 1930, the Juvenile Protection Association starkly distinguished itself from the Crime 
Commission in its annual report, contesting claims that the JPA dispensed undue sympathy to 
those who violated the law. Instead, the report argued that attention to the individual lives of law-
breakers was not a sentimental impulse, but was the most effective way to understand crime 
causation and prevention “We think not only of the young men as they commit murders or 
robberies, but as boys traveling a long road of delinquency and crime…We are convinced that no 
solution will be found through legislation or change in the police or any other law enforcing 
department.”114 The report indicated that the JPA saw the solution to urban crime not in the strict 
rule of law advocated by the Crime Commission, but in crime preventative services that would 
address problems of education and unemployment among the city’s impoverished classes. That 
the JPA thought it necessary in 1930 to draw distinctions between its approach to crime and 
delinquency and that of the Crime Commission indicated that the tension between these two 
interpretations of crime causation continued into the interwar decades, beyond the initial 
concerns about post-war crimes waves and the mobilization of the anti-crime movement. 
 
POLICE STATE BUILDING AND CHICAGO’S 1922 POLICE PATROLMEN INCREASE 
On September 16, 1922, one thousand three hundred Chicago police officers descended 
on Grant Park, the picturesque green space on the edge of Lake Michigan, just blocks from the 
city’s downtown skyscrapers. Over the previous several years, Chicagoans had grown used to the 
sight of police swarming the city streets—the image of hundreds of police officers crowding 
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downtown boulevards recalled the dramatic showdown leading to Edward Wheed’s arrest in 
1917 or the chaotic days of the Chicago Race Riot in 1919. But on that September day, the mood 
was light. That morning police paraded through the downtown business district, performing drills 
and formations with precision timing. They had trained for three months in preparation for the 
day, practicing drill commands and honing their own individual strength and stamina during 
practices at the city’s various playgrounds and parks.115 These military imitations brought to 
mind a disciplined and professionalized urban police force, a stark contrast from the untrained 
and non-uniform force that had comprised the Chicago Police Department just decades earlier.116 
The procession through the city streets and the overwhelming presence of police in the 
park that day exhibited and celebrated the recently expanded Chicago Police Department, which 
had gained 1,000 new patrolmen positions four months earlier following the approval of the 
Chicago City Council.117 That weekend in September, the Policemen’s Benevolent Association 
hosted the first Police Department field days, featuring many of the new patrolmen recruits as 
they competed in track and field events as well as novelty games.118 The two days of competition 
put the department’s strength and discipline on display, demonstrating the improved manpower 
of the force and the masculine vigor of the officers themselves. As an account published by the 
Chicago Crime Commission described, “It was the first time that the general public had 
opportunity to view so large a number of the department in so varied a program of physical 
activity, in which muscle and brawn were directed by healthy minds capable of fast thinking and 
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quick judgement [sic].”119 Although the day proceeded with a tone of revelry, the field days 
showcased the coercive capacity of law enforcement in the city, signaling to onlookers that the 
officers competing that day could make an arrest just as quickly as they complete the fifty-yard 
dash. 
Twenty-five thousand Chicagoans gathered in the park on the first day of competition, 
cheering on members of their police districts and according one account “yell[ing] themselves 
hoarse, first for their favorite cops, then for the winners.”120 The first day of competition proved 
so popular that 40,000 people arrived the next morning to watch the second day of events; the 
crowd so exceeded the capacity of the park’s amphitheater that thousands of would-be spectators 
were forced to watch from the roof tops of nearby buildings along Michigan Avenue.121 In one of 
the most popular games of the day, teams of five officers competed in “motorcycle football,” in 
which the officers played a game similar to polo while riding department-issued motorcycles.122 
While it made for an entertaining spectacle, the game also displayed how the technological 
advancements of the department would augment its crime fighting capability, as one account 
acknowledged, “At times the eight machines seemed nothing by a mass of wreckage, but 
eventually the ball would emerge, propelled by the foot of a cop speeding as though after an auto 
bandit.”123 At the end of the day, officials distributed trophies and medals to the officers and 
teams who had won their respective events; most of the prizes had been donated by Chicago 
businessmen, many of them members of the Chicago Crime Commission.124 
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The inaugural Chicago Police field day allowed Chicago businessmen and members of 
the Crime Commission to survey and celebrate the recent triumph of their police state building 
advocacy. On May 23, 1922, a group of seven Chicago aldermen had called a special meeting of 
the Chicago City Council.125 There was only one item on the Council agenda that day—the 
consideration of Police Superintendent Charles Fitzmorris’s request to add 1,000 new patrolmen 
to the city’s police force. The Chicago Police Department had grown steadily but not 
dramatically over the previous ten years and Fitzmorris’s request represented the largest single 
police force increase in the city’s history to that point. In 1921, the department numbered just 
over 5,000 officers and patrolmen and the addition of 1,000 new police would represent a 20 
percent increase in its size.126 Fitzmorris had filed a similar petition to the City Council earlier 
that year, but the city aldermen denied his request, refusing to grant the appropriation necessary 
for the police increase.127 But in May, Fitzmorris returned to the City Council chambers, this 
time with the support of the Chicago Crime Commission. Members of the Crime Commission 
had resubmitted Fitzmorris’s request to Alderman John A. Richert, the chairman of the City 
Council Finance Committee, and had sent a delegation of “well-known and influential citizens” 
to meet with Richert and persuade him of the immediate need for 1,000 new patrolmen in 
Chicago.128 This advocacy for a dramatic increase in the size of the Chicago Police Department 
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aligned with the Crime Commission’s assumption that a strong coercive state was the best 
bulwark against crime.  
In the years preceding Fitzmorris’s and the Crime Commission’s appearance before the 
Chicago City Council, a number of reformers and observers had implored the city to improve 
and increase its police force, arguing that certain areas of Chicago were inadequately policed or 
wholly neglected by law enforcement officials. For instance, the Vice Commission of Chicago 
found in 1911 that police encouraged illegal activity in designated areas of the city, often driving 
prostitution and gambling into black neighborhoods on the city’s South Side. Those concentrated 
areas of vice were usually neglected by police, who allowed law breaking to flourish in those 
specified areas. Following the Chicago Race Riot of 1919, the Cook County Grand Jury, the 
Cook County Coroner’s Jury, and the Chicago Commission on Race Relations all critiqued the 
inadequate size of the Chicago Police Department, drawing particular attention to the failure of 
the Police Department to prevent racial conflict and violence. In fact, the Grand Jury came to 
precisely the same conclusion as Superintendent Fitzmorris would three years later, advocating 
in its August 1919 report “It is the opinion of this Jury that the police force is also inadequate in 
numbers, and at least one thousand officers should be added to the existing force.”129 The 
Commission on Race Relations further specified how such an augmented police force should be 
deployed “Distributed as adequately to protect both races in white and Negro neighborhoods and 
to avoid the gross inequalities of protection which, in the riot of 1919, permitted widespread 
depredations…against Negroes in white neighborhoods, and attacks in Negro neighborhoods by 
invading white hoodlums.”130 The inadequacy of the police force had been manifest in the 
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resolution of the riot itself, when Governor Frank Lowden ordered the state militia into Chicago 
to quell the violence. 
Despite these years of appeals for improved and augmented policing from criminal 
justice agencies and reformers, it was a series of bombings of Chicago factories in early 1922—
attacks on business attributed to so-called “union sluggers”—and the urging of the city’s anti-
crime businessmen that finally prompted this episode of dramatic municipal police state 
building.131 In the weeks before the Crime Commission lent its support to Fitzmorris’s request 
for 1,000 new patrolmen, a number of factories had been bombed and police turned their 
attention to Chicago labor leaders as the guilty parties behind the attacks. In the second week of 
May, two police patrolmen were killed as they guarded a factory that had previously been 
bombed, prompting raids on Chicago labor organizations in pursuit of the culprits.132 Police 
Superintendent Fitzmorris framed these attacks as part of the longer history of violent clashes 
between labor and police in Chicago, asserting that the union leaders were “just as guilty of the 
murders of the two policemen as were the anarchists of the Haymarket riots.”133 An editorial in 
the Chicago Defender pointed out the irony that it was these factory bombings that drove the 
city’s businessmen anti-crime activists to appeal to the City Council for improved policing, when 
they had stood silently years earlier when black homes were repeatedly bombed by white 
neighborhood associations.134 Anti-crime activists’ robust mobilization in response to attacks on 
capital in 1922 demonstrated the racial boundaries of their police state advocacy, which did not 
extend to the protection of black-owned or occupied property.  
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When he presented his request for an additional 1,000 patrolmen to the Chicago City 
Council on May 23rd, Police Superintendent Fitzmorris offered a letter of support from the 
Chicago Crime Commission. In the letter, CCC President Edwin Sims commended Fitzmorris on 
his leadership of the Police Department over the previous two years but lamented that the 
personnel of the department was simply insufficient to properly police the city. As Sims 
described to the city aldermen “In the opinion of the Chicago Crime Commission, the man-
power is totally inadequate. That degree of protection of life and property to which citizens of 
Chicago are entitled is not possible with the existing force, no matter how ably it may be directed 
or how wisely it may be distributed.”135 Here Sims walked a careful line, finding the deficiencies 
in the policing of Chicago to be due to a lack of capacity rather than poor police administration, 
training, or individual conduct. Sims’s critique stood in contrast to a number of other critiques of 
policing in Chicago offered in the preceding years. Following its investigation of the fatalities 
during the 1919 Race Riot, the Chicago Coroner’s Jury concluded that its interviews with more 
than 150 policemen revealed “quite a number possessing none of the attributes making good 
policemen.”136 The Coroner’s Jury recommended a new police-training program as well as 
significantly augmented police salaries in order to draw more qualified applicants to the 
department. Sims, however, avoided any direct critique of police training or conduct, instead 
finding fault for poor policing in the CPD’s patrolmen capacity. Sims’s remarks and his 
invocation of the “protection of life and property to which citizens of Chicago are entitled” 
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suggested that the growth of the Police Department represented more than just state development, 
but also the fulfillment of citizens’ rights to adequate and equal law enforcement.137 
The 1922 request to increase the size of the Chicago Police Department demonstrated one 
of the outcomes of the Crime Commission’s meticulous accumulation of criminal justice 
knowledge over the previous three years; the records compiled by the CCC confirmed that the 
current police force was simply inadequate. Sims’s letter to the City Council included three 
charts of data regarding Chicago’s law enforcement institutions. The first tracked the growth of 
the Chicago Police Department over the previous twelve years while the next two compared 
police personnel numbers and appropriations among major American cities. The first chart 
revealed that Chicago Police Department growth had been modest since 1910; the department 
had only grown by about 300 positions over the previous twelve years, while the population of 
the city had increased by over 500,000 people.138 This meant that while the Police Department 
had grown by about nine percent, the population of the city had growth by nearly 25 percent over 
the same period. Sims’s data also disaggregated the size of the Police Department according to 
rank, showing that the number of patrolmen—those responsible for guarding the city streets—
had actually fallen over the previous twelve years, from 3,785 street officers to 3,642.139 This 
tracking of police personnel among various positions within the department demonstrated that 
despite moderate increases since 1910, Police Department growth had been disproportionately 
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FIGURE 3.2: “COMPARATIVE POLICE STATISTICS,” 1922140 
Sims and the Crime Commission offered this data on the Chicago Police Department 
without any text in the way of explanation, perhaps assuming that the aldermen would agree that 
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a larger police force with an increased surveillance capacity would therefore decrease crime. 
According to this logic, potential lawbreakers would be most effectively deterred from crime if 
the state had a greater presence on the city streets. To bolster the Crime Commission’s support of 
Fitzmorris’s request further, Sims also included two additional charts comparing the Chicago 
Police Department to a number of departments in other major American cities, both suggesting 
that Chicago city leaders had failed to provide their citizens with appropriate law enforcement in 
comparison to their peers in other urban centers.141 The first chart compared monthly police 
appropriations, showing that Chicago only spent $3.97 per capita to control crime and protect its 
citizenry during the month of April, while Boston, New York, and Detroit had each spent over 
$5 per capita.142 The last chart compared the number of city residents per police officer in a 
number of large urban centers. While the Boston Police Department numbered 395 city residents 
per officer and Philadelphia 403 city residents per officer, the Crime Commission found that 
Chicago number 607 city residents per officer.143 The proposed increase of 1,000 patrolmen 
would decrease that ratio to just fewer than 500 city residents per officer, a proportion much 
closer to that of New York, San Francisco, and St. Louis. 
Despite what the Crime Commission and Police Superintendent Fitzmorris may have 
seen as overwhelming evidence supporting the growth of the Police Department, the patrolmen 
increase elicited significant debate among city aldermen, indicating that the logic of an increased 
coercive state to control crime did not enjoy a consensus among all city stakeholders. 
Fitzmorris’s request had been defeated before, and opposition to the police addition remained on 
the City Council by May of 1922. During a discussion at the special session, Alderman Guy 
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Guernsey argued that the cost of the new patrolmen was more than the city could afford, because 
“bridges needed painting, alleys needed cleaning,” and that “certain people are taking advantage 
of a psychological situation to put 1,000 more men on city payrolls.”144 The Crime 
Commission’s data on police appropriations was meant to serve as a rebuttal to arguments like 
this, suggesting that Chicago city leaders could well afford to fund a larger police department 
considering the fact that peer industrial urban centers had done so. Couched in Guernsey’s 
financial argument, however, was also a subtle critique of the supposed crime problem itself. 
Guernsey’s reference to the “psychological situation” that had overtaken the city implied that the 
news of a crime wave that littered the city’s headlines was not based on empirical evidence but 
rather represented unfounded assumptions about rising crime. In the months leading up to 
Fitzmorris’s request to the City Council, newspaper headlines in the city and around the country 
decried a perceived crime wave, echoing the anxious anticipation of a national crime wave that 
had followed the conclusion of WWI only a few years earlier. In February 1922, for instance, 
Chicago Daily Tribune report Arthur Evans labeled the city a “crime resort,” opining that the 
city’s supposed crime wave had simply become a matter of fact of city life.145 Discerningly, 
Guernsey predicted that the idea of a crime wave itself—rather than actual rises in the crime 
rate—was the key motivator of demands to grow the city’s law enforcement apparatus.  
What followed at the City Council’s special session on May 23rd represented a 
dramatized debate regarding the responsibility for and efficacy of urban law enforcement—who 
should pay for the patrolmen increase and would it work as a crime control measure? Most of 
Guernsey’s fellow aldermen seemed to ignore his arguments about the “psychological situation” 
and turned attention instead to rebutting his financial arguments against the new police 
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appropriation. Alderman Russ Woodhull agreed with Guernsey that while bridges and alleys 
certainly deserved their attention, “life and property are more important even than paint for the 
bridges and cleaner alleys.”146 Woodhull echoed the Crime Commission’s argument that 
Chicagoans were entitled to the protection provided by law enforcement officers and that such an 
entitlement should be a financial priority for the city. Other arguments against the patrolmen 
increase reflected the city’s long conflict between organized labor and police. Alderman Robert J. 
Mulcahy accused Fitzmorris of making the request for some “ulterior purpose,” suggesting that 
the Police Superintendent planned to use the new officers to attack organized labor. Mulcahy 
bluntly accused Fitzmorris of these political ends, telling the Council, “It’s simply another move 
in the battle to kick union labor out of Chicago and make it an open-shop town.”147 
Only a few aldermen objected to the idea that a larger police force would better control 
urban crime, the very premise of the Crime Commission’s support of Fiztmorris’s proposal. 
Alderman Albert suggested that increased numerical strength would have little effect on crime 
rates, telling the Council that four murders had occurred in his ward during the previous week, 
and that “More police will not get to the bottom of the situation. It is the hell holes, operating 
with the connivance of the police to whom graft is being paid that is at the bottom of the 
situation.”148 Albert’s comments echoed the critiques of police corruption leveled by the Vice 
Commission of Chicago in 1911, which had faulted police for tolerating and encourage vice 
enterprises in designated areas of the city. Police who accepted graft payments from criminal 
syndicates or vice proprietors benefited from their discretionary power to allow illegal 
enterprises to flourish and were thereby financially dis-incentivized from the strict enforcement 
of the law. The Vice Commission recommended better surveillance of police themselves and the 
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immediate dismissal of any patrolmen found to have failed to enforce prohibitions against the 
vice trades, rather than an increase in the size of the department.149 Albert’s comments to the 
City Council in May of 1922 highlighted how the police state building advocacy of the Crime 
Commission had obscured the question of officer corruption, one that had been forefront in the 
investigations of the Vice Commission and other anti-vice organizations as well as the Chicago 
Commission on Race Relations.  
The financial question seemed to press most urgently upon the city aldermen, as nearly a 
third of the City Council voted against the proposed patrolmen increase until a resolution was put 
forth to refer the question to the Council’s Committee on Finance for further review.150 At the 
regular meeting of the Council on May 24th, the Committee on Finance indicated that $675,000 
could be appropriated for the remaining calendar year to support the hiring of 1,000 new 
patrolmen, a sum that had apparently been found among the year’s “miscellaneous receipts.”151 
Although it failed to appear in the report of the Committee on Finance, the Crime Commission 
may have played an integral role in this recommendation, as the group sent “a delegation of well-
known and influential citizens” to discuss the police increase with the Committee’s chairman, 
Alderman John A. Richert, after Fitzmorris’s initial request for more patrolmen had been 
denied.152 Alderman Anton Cermak appended an additional resolution, promising that no 
additional taxes or levies would be imposed on the people of Chicago to pay for the new 
patrolmen, although it remained unclear how the city would continue to pay for the augmented 
department without increasing revenues.153 With these financial details in place, the aldermen 
                                                
149 Vice Commission of Chicago, The Social Evil in Chicago, 62. 
150 Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago (Chicago: May 23, 1922), 175. 
151 Ibid, 219. 
152 Chicago Crime Commission, Bulletin of the Chicago Crime Commission, February 8, 1923, p. 20, MRC. 
153 Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago (Chicago: May 24, 1922), 240. 
 
 179 
voted overwhelmingly to approve the new Chicago Police Department patrolmen, increasing the 
size of the department by nearly 20 percent in one fell swoop.154 
Members of the Chicago Crime Commission and their supporters celebrated the 
expansion of the Chicago Police Department as a triumph of their anti-crime activism and 
evidence of the potential for knowledge about crime to bring about necessary changes to 
American policing institutions. The conservative, anti-labor Chicago Daily Tribune proclaimed 
that the patrolmen increase amounted to “A Crushing Blow at Terrorism” and commended 
aldermen and taxpayers for appropriating the necessary funds “to provide adequate protection of 
life and property and to retrieve the good name of the city.”155 Reflecting on the reputation that 
Chicago had earned as a crime-ridden urban center, the Tribune continued, “It should make 
Chicago the terror of criminals in the future rather than the haven of criminals which it has been 
frequently in the past.”156 Six months after the City Council’s approval of the increase, the Crime 
Commission issued a bulletin lauding its own role in the growth of the Police Department and 
maintained that the recent decline in urban crime could be attributed to its advocacy of expanded 
police capacity. The Commission asserted, “Precinct commanders now have more men available 
for patrol duty than ever before in the history of the department, and have no valid excuse for 
failure to cut down preventable crime and maintain order.”157 Indeed, arrest totals rose in the 
years after the patrolman increase; total arrests by the CPD in 1923 were nearly 40 percent 
higher than they had been the previous year, and those totals continued to rise until 1927.158 
However, conclusions about the direct impact of the police patrolmen increase on the reduction 
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of crime in Chicago overlooked the role of political context in shifting those numbers as well, 
particularly the law and order crime control campaigns of the Prohibition years. 
TABLE 3.1: CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, 1913-1930159 
 




1913 4,443 107,257 
1914 4,420 111,461 
1915 5,331 114,625 
1916 5,277 104,535 
1917 5,199 129,270 
1918 4,706 105,632 
1919 5,120 91,457 
1920 5,152 87,197 
1921 5,140 117,719 
1922 6,184 132,290 
1923 5,965 181,980 
1924 6,010 242,602 
1925 5,862 264,494 
1926 6,080 211,317 
1927 6,078 161,234 
1928 6,098 150,885 
1929 6,712 194,999 
1930 6,719 183,434 
 
Furthermore, even some members of the Crime Commission itself admitted that these 
rises in arrests might not be evidence of better crime control but rather caused by the augmented 
capacity of the Police Department itself. At the CCC’s 1923 annual meeting, President Edwin 
Sims celebrated the new surveillance capacity of the Chicago Police Department, praising its 
efficiency and adding “No longer does the Department content itself with merely apprehending 
criminals after the offense; it now keeps tab on potential and prospective criminals before they 
get into action.”160 This surveillance of suspected or likely criminals may have been borrowed 
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from the Crime Commission’s own practices. In addition to its encyclopedic catalogue of crimes 
committed, the Commission kept “records of all criminals and all persons whose histories would 
be valuable to criminal investigators.”161 Sims lauded the Police Department for this so-called 
“crime prevention” measure, but his description of police work after 1922 demonstrated how a 
state with expanded surveillance capability might actually construct criminality itself and 
discover criminal activity where it had not and might not ever occur. At the same meeting, the 
CCC’s Committee on Police praised the work of Police Superintendent Fitzmorris and his 
discipline of CPD officers, even going to far as to suggest that “Citizens who fail to get full 
police service from the Chicago Department are now in a measure to blame themselves.”162  
 
THE RACIAL BOUNDARIES OF ANTI-CRIME ACTIVISM 
Just over a year after the Chicago City Council approved Police Superintendent 
Fitzmorris’s request to add 1,000 new patrolmen to the Chicago Police Department, Robert S. 
Abbott wrote a pointed letter to Mayor William E. Dever. The founder of the Chicago Defender 
and an established member of Chicago’s black economic elite, Abbott had also served as a 
member of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations after the Chicago Race Riot of 1919.163 
Echoing critiques of racial discrimination leveled by the Commission on Race Relations, 
Abbott’s letter of June 1923 drew attention to the racially discriminatory conduct of city police 
officers, particularly on Chicago’s predominantly black South Side. Abbott condemned police 
interference with interracial couples on the city streets, alerting the mayor: “Numerous 
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complaints have come to us with reference to the activities of the police in their attempt to 
regulate the relations of white and Colored citizens particularly.”164 Assuming the collective 
voice of black Chicago, Abbott carefully adhered to the boundaries of law abiding respectability 
in his critique of police conduct, “It is needless to say that all right thinking citizens are in 
sympathy with any lawful effort to suppress the activities of unlawful and criminal residents, not 
only in this section of the city, but throughout the entire city.”165 But he went on to clarify that 
interracial socializing violated no law, and in fact some of the city’s most “worthy” and 
respectable families included interracial couples. Here Abbott asserted that not only was 
interracial socializing legal and morally sound, but also that police harassment of interracial 
couples threatened and violated black respectability. 
These tensions between respectability and critiques of law enforcement recurred in 
debates regarding urban policing among black Chicagoans in the years follow World War I. 
Abbott’s repeated emphasis on the respectability of black city residents—and therefore their 
deservedness of equal law enforcement—echoed the exhortations of the men who had visited 
Mayor William Hale Thompson during the days of the 1919 Race Riot and asked the mayor to 
provide for adequate law enforcement in order to quell the violence that had flourished in black 
neighborhoods. In criticizing the policing of the city during the riot, those men had made careful 
distinctions between themselves and those who chose to break the law during the eight-day riot. 
Explaining the progression of the riot itself, they claimed “irresponsible members of both races, 
persons with no property, families, no education, and sometimes no employment or anything else 
that would check their passions or move them to moderation are the ones making up largely, if 
not wholly, this riot…many innocent persons, persons who are taking no part, have had their 
                                                
164 “Writes Mayor on Police Officers Who Are Inhuman: Robt. S. Abbott Sends Letter on Conditions That Will 




homes burned, been assaulted, injured, murdered.”166 The men had gone on to recommend that in 
order to stop the rioting, it would be necessary to “close up all vice hovels, which are the 
breeders of crime, the covert of the lawless and the retreat of an idle, irresponsible element.”167 
Likewise, in the months leading up to the riot, the Defender published a series of editorials 
regarding the bombing of black homes by white neighborhood associations, lamenting the 
respectable status of the victims of these crimes “The sufferers in this instance are taxpayers and 
respectable citizens…no charge of immorality or lawlessness can be laid at their door.”168 These 
many critiques of police discretion demonstrated the concern among black elites that racially 
discriminatory policing not only violated black equality but also black respectability.  
Abbott’s letter to the mayor further elucidated the state of policing in the city in the 
months since the Chicago Police Department patrolmen increase of May 1922. The letter 
provided a window into the daily interactions between Chicago police officers and city residents, 
as Abbott described the harassment and intimidation black Chicagoans frequently experienced at 
the hands of law enforcement officials. He lamented the embarrassment of black women, who 
suffered “humiliation on the part of police officers who, for reasons best known to themselves, 
have stopped and questioned [black women] on the street, in automobiles, and in restaurants.”169 
He went on to explain how law enforcement might be improved in black neighborhoods, telling 
the mayor, “what the South Side needs is not so much in the way of additional police officers as 
more TACTFUL AND SENSIBLE police officers, who are good officers, to administer the law 
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and not go beyond the law in preserving the peace of the community.”170 Abbott’s comments 
directly contradicted the repeated exhortations of the Chicago Crime Commission over the 
previous four years in its insistence that a larger police force would foster lawfulness in the city. 
Instead, Abbott drew attention to the illegal conduct of officers themselves, who stopped and 
arrested black Chicagoans for the apparent offense of appearing with a white companion in 
public. It was not more policing that would solve the problem of law breaking on the black South 
Side, but better policing that would do so. As the Defender editorialized when it republished 
Abbott’s letter on June 23, 1923, “[Police] are public servants and in Chicago, at least, must 
enforce the law and not make law by their own regulations for special groups.”171 Here the 
Defender suggested that the now augmented Police Department simply continued the same 
practices of discretion and corruption that the Vice Commission and other social reformers had 
identified for decades—they directed illegal enterprises to take root in black neighborhoods.  
In the years following the Chicago Police Department patrolmen increase, the department 
significantly increased its number of annual arrests especially following the election of the law-
and-order mayor William E. Dever in 1923 (see Table 3.1). The mayor pursued an aggressive 
campaign against alcohol in the city, following a series of violent confrontations among 
Chicago’s criminal syndicates. In concert with that campaign, however, the mayor also directed 
police to shut down the city’s vice establishments and officers targeted those that featured 
racially integrated clientele. That crime control campaign eventually extended to interracial 
couples as well, such as those highlighted in Abbott’s letter. These practices demonstrated the 
consequences of the limited law enforcement reform campaign of the crime commission 
movement following WWI, one concerned with police discretion but not the ways that discretion 
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created and reinforced racial and spatial boundaries in the city. In assuming that a more robust 
coercive state could more effectively curtail crime in Chicago, the Crime Commission played an 










BEER WARS AND BLACK AND TANS: POLICING THE COLOR LINE DURING PROHIBITION 
 
Just a few days before Christmas in 1926, Chicago’s black South Side endured an 
invasion. Hundreds of police officers flooded the neighborhoods of the densely populated Black 
Belt, armed with shotguns and tear gas bombs. They charged through the streets and stormed 
into nearly every cafe on the South Side as well as into many private homes, indiscriminately 
arresting over 500 black men beginning on the afternoon of December 22nd and stretching into 
the early morning hours the next day. Officers herded the arrestees into police wagons and 
deposited them at the Wabash Avenue police station, crowding holding cells with detained men. 
Police violently accosted black city residents over the course of the raid; at one recreation hall on 
South State Street, police threw a tear gas bomb through a window when those inside refused to 
open the door. Shocked, the occupants relented, as “Suffocation caused by the bomb caused the 
terror-stricken men to open the door. Twenty-eight were grabbed by the police here.”1 
This violent raid of the black South Side came in the wake of the killing of Patrolmen 
Julian Bonfield earlier that month, reportedly by two black men during the course of a burglary. 
Soon after the murder, police had conducted a similar dragnet raid another South Side black 
neighborhood; they invaded the second and third wards with shotguns and tear gas bombs and 
arrested 350 men.2 The burglary and murder of Patrolman Bonfield had been committed by only 
two men according to several eyewitness reports, but this hardly gave police pause as they made 
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hundreds of indiscriminate arrests that month. The only plausible connection between these 
sweeping arrests and the suspected killers was race, as officers deployed the racial identity of the 
suspects to legitimate their arbitrary and violent policing of the city’s black neighborhoods. 
Police paraded the hundreds arrested in front of witnesses to the Bonfield murder, but those 
witnesses identified none of the arrestees as suspects, and police “Reluctantly released most of 
the prisoners, holding some they claimed have “records.””3 Observers of the raids emphasized 
the extensive scope of the arrests that had landed so many black men in city jails, describing 
police who “herded the Negroes into police wagons, giving few of them opportunity to 
demonstrate they had no possible connection with the crime.”4 These observations made it clear 
that police had ignored the protocols of arrest, failing to investigate those detained or secure 
warrants for their arrest.  
A number of black journalists maintained that police had pursued the wide-scale raids in 
order to refute criticisms of their failure to apprehend the burglars quickly on the night of the 
murder, and thus conducted the raids as a spectacle to demonstrate their crime-fighting prowess.5 
Some also suggested that this “reign of terror” was an effort by police to disprove their own 
reputation for corruption and graft by “hounding—or rather “cleaning up”—the Negro 
neighborhoods.”6 Chicago’s Communist daily, the Daily Worker, contrasted the raids following 
the murder of Officer Bonfield with the events that had followed the murder of Assistant State’s 
Attorney William H. McSwiggin months earlier. Although it was widely believed that 
McSwiggin had been killed by the Capone criminal syndicate, the Daily Worker noted, “These 
brave Chicago police did not make any widespread raid or search during which homes were 
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broken into, nor were there ten arrests made, let alone 350.”7 The Daily Worker speculated that 
such a raid would not be visited upon any other area of the city, save for a “red” raid.  
The police raids of December 1926 identified one of the critical tensions in the city’s 
black crime politics during the interwar decades: while many black Chicagoans repeatedly called 
for equitable policing and crime control in their neighborhoods, their demands were often met 
with the violent and discriminatory policing that characterized the raids in late 1926. These raids 
elicited objection and critique among black Chicagoans who cited not only the violence that they 
had endured, but also egregious violations of civil liberties as police made sweeping invasions of 
private residences and businesses and made hundreds of warrantless arrests. The mayor and 
Police Superintendent received a deluge of phone calls from black leaders following the raids, 
protesting police conduct and brutality. The wholesale warrantless arrests drew particular ire, as 
the Pittsburgh Courier described: “The action of the police in arresting 500 persons in 
connection with a crime involving one person is branded as indefensible and outrageous by 
leaders of the race.”8 Black leaders assembled a meeting of community members the evening 
following the second raid, where attendees implored police to better control crime in the city but 
lamented the targeting of black neighborhoods for mass arrests. “It is stupid, cowardly, and 
asinine to try to create the impression that the majority of crimes here are done by Negroes,” 
commented one speaker, “Crime should be and must be suppressed in this city. But it cannot be 
done by the police in such a foolish and unconstitutional way as was done last Wednesday 
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night.”9 According to those assembled at the meeting, the raids represented the failure of law 
enforcement to protect black safety as well as the active violation of black rights.  
The raids on Chicago’s black South Side came after years of anti-crime drives and law 
and order campaigns in the city, processes set in motion by city officials and a range of criminal 
justice reformers. That decade saw the ascendance of new Democratic leadership to the mayor’s 
office, which endeavored to distance itself from the accusations of political corruption and 
lawlessness that had plagued city executives for decades before. Elected by a plurality in 1923, 
Democratic Mayor William E. Dever sought to clean his Police Department of graft and rid the 
city of illegal bootlegging, an ambitious agenda in a city notorious for rampant crime and an 
unchecked liquor trade. Dever’s law and order politics reflected his own history as a reform-
minded jurist as well as multiple strains of criminal justice reform that had manifested in the city 
over the previous decade, such as the work of the Vice Commission of Chicago, the Juvenile 
Protection Association, the Chicago Crime Commission, and the Immigrants’ Protective League. 
The crime politics of the new Democratic mayor represented the intersection of those multiple 
criminal justice reform traditions, as the mayor targeted so-called vice with a campaign against 
saloons soon after his election, but also deployed a strict legalistic understanding of crime as an 
individual choice. These policies melded the ideologies of Progressive reformers and the rhetoric 
and agenda of the city’s emergent crime commission movement. 
The crime control campaigns and policing strategies of 1920s Chicago transformed the 
rhetoric of criminal justice reformers into municipal policy, as the mayor and his administration 
deployed a localized law and order discourse that prioritized the rule of law, equalized law 
enforcement, and the rationalization of law enforcement institutions. In the first few months of 
                                                
9 “Chicago Police Covering Up Criminal Connections by Attacks on Negroes,” New York Amsterdam News, 
December 29, 1926. 
 
 190 
his administration, Dever directed police to shutter so-called black and tan saloons, which 
catered to integrated clientele. Although this campaign was consistent with decades of anti-vice 
activism in Chicago, it also exhibited a targeted racial component, as police only closed saloons 
where interracial socializing occurred. That campaign against black and tan saloons transformed 
as police arrested and harassed interracial couples and gatherings as the 1920s progressed. Later 
crime control campaigns expanded upon the law and order impulse that characterized the 
mayor’s campaign. Dever had entered office promising that he was no Prohibitionist, in order to 
secure votes among the city’s ethnic immigrant communities, but altered his policies after 
witnessing a rash of Prohibition-related violence in 1923. Instead of turning a blind eye to the 
sale of alcohol, the mayor directed the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department to crack 
down on the liquor trade, initiating what would come to be known as the city’s Beer Wars. 
Indeed, both the total number and rate of arrests by the CPD rose notably during the crime 
control campaigns of the 1920s; by 1925 the rate of arrest for all Chicagoans was more than 
three times what it had been just five years earlier.10 The Democratic Mayor Dever would only 
serve one term as city executive, as many of the constituencies who had swept him into office in 
1923 abandoned him four years later, an electoral fate often attributed to his insistence on 
Prohibition enforcement and the subsequent erosion of support among European ethnic voters 
when Dever lost to William Hale Thompson in 1927.  
The story of Chicago’s Prohibition-era law and order politics demonstrates how a narrow 
scholarly focus on the policing of European ethnics during this period obscures the full effect 
that interwar crime control campaigns had on the politics and geography of American cities—
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especially their effects on the policing and criminalization of African Americans. Historians of 
Prohibition have rightfully indicated that European ethnic communities were often targets of 
Prohibition enforcement and have shown how the federal ban on alcohol worked to discipline 
ethnic social spaces and culture in the context of post-WWI nativism and Progressive reform.11 
In Chicago, Italians and Poles represented two of the most frequently targeted populations for 
Prohibition arrests and comprised a significant portion of those arrests, charges, and convictions 
in the 1920s.12 However, the policing of blackness and the color line itself also became a priority 
among law enforcement officers in interwar Chicago, both among policy makers and police on 
the city streets. Black Chicagoans were overrepresented among general arrests and arrests for 
Prohibition violations, a pattern that reflected and reinforced the strict policing of interracial 
spaces and socialization.13 Scholars of whiteness have demonstrated the centrality of several 
intersecting structures that contributed to the process of incorporating various ethnic immigration 
communities into white racial categories, such as labor and unionism, welfare programs, 
community institutions, and cultural production and consumption.14 Law enforcement also 
represented a critical site where the racial boundaries could be expanded or contracted, as 
Chicago police chose carefully whom to arrest in the context of Prohibition-era crime control 
campaigns and whom to leave undisturbed by the criminal justice state.  
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The multiple crime control campaigns and patterns of racially discriminatory policing in 
interwar Chicago elicited a range of critiques among black Chicagoans, some critiques in tension 
with one another along the lines of class and status. Many black elites—such as economic elites, 
church leaders, and black clubwomen—celebrated the mayor’s campaign against black and tan 
saloons, viewing those establishments as blights on black neighborhoods. This support resonated 
with middle-class and elite calls for more stringent policing in black neighborhoods that had 
circulated since the early twentieth century, especially as black Chicagoans objected to police 
encouragement of vice in black areas. These claims drew on the strain of black law and order 
politics that was rooted in claims to black respectability and premised on the idea that since black 
Chicagoans were moral and law-abiding, they were therefore deserving of fair law enforcement. 
However, other black critics—some elite, others migrant or working class—drew attention to the 
racially discriminatory character of many anti-crime campaigns in interwar Chicago and the 
consistent patterns of racially discriminatory police conduct. These critiques drew attention to 
the failure of the criminal justice state to guarantee equal protection of the law as well as the 
frequent violations of black rights that occurred during interactions with the police.  
Chicago’s interwar anti-crime campaigns demonstrated how state campaigns against 
crime could transform into racial policing projects and official efforts to construct and defend the 
urban color line in the context of a rapidly diversifying city. Policing practices in 1920s 
Chicago—including the disproportionate scrutiny of racially integrated spaces of leisure, the 
harassment and arrest of interracial couples, and the disproportionate number of black arrests for 
Prohibition violations and other offenses—continued and expanded processes of racialized 
policing that had taken root in Chicago over the previous two decades. Ultimately, it was at this 
local scale that the criminal justice state most directly constructed and defended the color line in 
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the diversifying city. Through the intersection of local law and order discourse, racial conflict, 
and the politics of Prohibition enforcement, 1920s Chicago became a site where local law 
enforcement officials drew on the power of the state to enforce conceptions of racial hierarchy 
and inscribe that hierarchy onto the urban landscape.  
 
LAW AND ORDER FROM THE GROUND UP 
On January 26, 1923, Chicagoans awoke to a shocking headline. William Hale 
Thompson—“Big Bill” —would not seek reelection for mayor.15 Although he had previously 
expressed his desire to serve a third term, the boisterous city executive faced faltering public 
opinion in the wake of his response to the 1919 Race Riot and a conflict with the city’s school 
board.16 Thompson also confronted increasing opposition from municipal reform groups, 
including the City Club of Chicago and the newly formed Committee of One Hundred, a group 
of Republican businessmen who sought to nominate a reform-minded candidate for the city’s 
executive office.17 Thompson’s administration had also been plagued by accusations of 
corruption and graft, such as claims that Thompson kept “$1,000,000 real estate experts” on his 
payroll in order to dole out city resources to his political cronies.18 Thompson refuted those 
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claims even as he declined to run again, arguing that he had only drawn on city resources for the 
construction of new public works and city beautification projects.19  
News coverage among the city’s major dailies captured the range of political sentiments 
that Thompson had cultivated over his eight years in office. The Hearst-owned Chicago 
Examiner lamented his retirement, heralding the mayor as an unparalleled progressive, booster, 
and literal builder of the modern city, hastily dismissing his notorious cronyism as a “sense of 
loyalty to his friends” and an unfortunately slow recognition of “the shortcomings of those he 
had favored.”20 The Chicago Daily News, a frequent critic of Thompson along with the Chicago 
Daily Tribune, took a decidedly different view of the mayor’s retirement, lauding the 
announcement as the end of an “8-Year Regime of Ruin,” predicting that the city could look 
forward to “a future free from the shackles of a political ring which has been described as the 
worst since the days of Boss Tweed’s rule in New York.”21 Both of these depictions of 
Thompson’s time in the mayor’s office were grounded in some degree of truth—the Republican 
mayor did pursue many civic improvement projects and urban boosterism, but was also notorious 
for political scandals, graft, and connections to organized crime. These two caricatures of 
Thompson’s tenure each glossed over his cultivation of a form of urban populism, however, 
especially among the city’s growing black population. Thompson’s aggressive campaigning on 
the South Side had secured him 80 percent of Republican primary votes in the majority-black 
second ward in the four primary elections that he had entered since 1915, which proved to give 
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Thompson a crucial margin in the crowded Republican field.22 Some attributed Thompson’s 
consistent popularity among black voters to his political showmanship and his self-styling as a 
common man of the people. Thompson was also adept at navigating racial politics in the midst of 
the Great Migration, often citing the discriminatory records of his opponents and their supporters 
in his own campaign rhetoric and in his appeals to black voters.23 
Thompson’s announcement opened the field for that year’s mayoral contest, as new 
candidates emerged from both the Republican and Democratic camps. Real estate financier and 
recently appointed United States Postmaster Arthur Lueder won the Republication nomination, 
while the newly ascendant boss of the Democratic machine, George Brennan, tapped Superior 
Court Judge William E. Dever for his party’s nomination.24 Brennan sought a candidate who 
could draw votes from the city’s reform elements while also appealing to ethnic voters and found 
his ideal nominee in Dever.25 Dever had been a member of Chicago’s Democratic political 
landscape since the early twentieth century, when settlement reformer Graham Taylor supported 
Dever’s bid for City Council in 1902.26 As an alderman, Dever made a name for himself as an 
advocate of Progressive urbanism and reform, supporting continuing efforts for municipal transit 
ownership in the early decades of the twentieth century and advocating for more stringent 
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regulation of city saloons.27 Dever won a judgeship on the Superior Court of Cook County in 
1910, sitting on the bench until his nomination for mayor in 1923.28 
After winning the Democratic nomination in January 1923, Dever announced a platform 
based on civic improvement and reform, citing municipal transit, schools, and the elimination of 
vice as the centerpieces of his campaign.29 In a series of early campaign remarks, Dever 
emphasized the need to institute a new civic culture around city improvements and urban reform, 
in an attempt to distance himself from the graft that had characterized Thompson’s previous 
administrations. Describing his proposal to rid the city of vice establishments and criminal 
activity, Dever emphasized preventative measures as well as punitive approaches to crime 
control, suggesting that the city’s many houses of prostitution and other vice establishments be 
converted into schools to provide a wholesome environment for Chicago children. Dever drew 
particular attention to problems in the second ward, a predominantly African American district 
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where the Chicago Commission on Race Relations had found a particularly high concentration of 
vice resorts and police encouragement of the vice trades a few years earlier.30  
Since the early years of the Great Migration, the city’s Democratic and Republican 
parties had competed to win the votes of Chicago’s growing black electorate.31 Black precinct 
leaders in the first, second, and third wards worked to register black Southern migrants soon after 
they arrived in Chicago; migrant politics tended to remain closely attached to the Republican 
party following their experiences with the racial politics of the South.32 When the Republican 
William Hale Thompson was first elected mayor in 1915, he had faced a divided Republican 
party in the primary. Thompson actively cultivated black votes with promises of patronage and 
political protection in order to defeat the other Republican candidates in the city’s primary.33 
While his ostentatious political style may have been crucial to winning a number of those 
supporters, Thompson also made good on his promises to deliver black jobs in the form of 
political appointments, installing former county commissioner Edward Wright as assistant 
corporation counsel and Reverend Archibald Carey as an investigator in the city’s law 
department and a delegate to the Illinois Constitutional Convention in 1920.34 It was also during 
Thompson’s first terms as mayor that black precinct leaders took over the Republican machine in 
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the second and third wards, laying the groundwork for the election of black aldermen and 
judges.35 
Dever’s 1923 mayoral campaign specifically targeted this crucial segment of Thompson 
supporters by drawing attention to the role of police officials in directing vice establishments into 
the predominantly black districts and acknowledging the active role of the state in making the 
geography of vice synonymous with black urban space.36 He enticed black voters by promising 
to rid black neighborhoods of police-protected vice establishments that had moved to the second 
ward after the closing of Chicago’s downtown vice districts in the second decade of the twentieth 
century.37 “Houses of ill fame, dens of infamy and open prostitution flourish there in the faces of 
citizens of that district,” Dever lamented during a campaign appearance, “It is a terrible thing to 
contemplate—to realize that these obnoxious conditions represent the payments of great sums of 
protections and hush money.”38 In keeping with his vows of crime prevention, Dever promised 
that the establishment of schools in the second ward would be paired with the elimination of vice 
from the district, asserting that the city’s black population was equally entitled to quality schools 
and fair policing in their neighborhoods.39 This sort of political rhetoric played upon the 
discourse of respectability that suffused black political life in early-twentieth-century Chicago, as 
black elites often premised their demands for fair law enforcement upon respectable black 
lawfulness and morally upstanding behavior.  
Other efforts by Dever to win black votes in 1923 invoked the decades of racial 
discrimination that black Chicagoans had faced in the city, as he suggested that a Republican win 
                                                
35 Cayton and Drake, Black Metropolis, 350; Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 17-20. 
36 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago, 343-344. 
37 See chapter 1 for a discussion of the political and economic motivations for the closing of Chicago’s downtown 
vice districts in the second decade of the twentieth century and the subsequent redirection of vice establishment to 
South Side black neighborhoods. 
38 “Judge Dever Announces Mayoralty Platform,” Chicago Journal, January 26, 1923, Volume 10: Mayoralty 




might only worsen racial tensions. A Democratic pamphlet entitled, “Reasons Why Colored 
Citizens of Chicago Should Vote for Dever for Mayor” drew attention to the fact that the anti-
labor and anti-immigrant Chicago Tribune had endorsed the Republican candidate and suggested, 
“a vote for Lueder is a vote for the Negro-hating Tribune.”40 The pamphlet included even more 
sensational claims about the high stakes of black support for Dever, indicating, “It is not certain 
if Lueder is elected that he will not appoint some one of his K.K.K friends as chief of police.”41 
There were no other records indicating any connections between Lueder and the Ku Klux Klan, 
but the KKK had enjoyed a recent resurgence in other Northern industrial centers such as Detroit, 
making the threat of a mayor who was sympathetic to the Klan a credible threat to black and 
Catholic voters in Chicago.42 
Dever won the 1923 election by a margin of 105,319 votes over Lueder, winning a 
plurality victory over the Republican and Socialist candidates.43 A close examination of the 
election returns revealed that the Democratic Party’s delicate strategy of appealing to reform 
elements, European ethnics, and black voters had won the day. Dever managed to gain the 
endorsement of many of the city’s reformed-minded Progressives, including Graham Taylor, 
Mary McDowell, Charles E. Merriam, Harold Ickes, and Colonel A. A. Sprague.44 He also 
maintained strong support among several ethnic enclaves; while many recent immigrants usually 
voted Democratic in Chicago, Dever showed an especially high rate of return among Poles, 
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Italians, and Czechoslovakians in 1923, three of the largest immigrant populations in Chicago by 
1920.45 The most dramatic electoral shift occurred among black voters, who supported Dever at a 
rate of 53 percent, a dramatic increase from the 1919 election when black voters had supported 
the Democratic candidate at a rate of only 22 percent.46  
TABLE 4.1: DEMOCRATIC MAYORAL VOTE (PERCENTAGE OF ETHNIC VOTING BLOC 




POLISH LITHUANIAN ITALIAN GERMAN SWEDISH BLACK 
1919 73 55 76 61 51 35 22 
1923 76 76 82 80 45 42 53 
1927 59 54 57 42 37 38 7 
 
In light of the historical black loyalty to the Republican Party in Chicago and the close 
allegiance between Thompson and black voters, the mayoral election of 1923 represented a 
significant deviation from the political norm.48 The charismatic Thompson may have encouraged 
black voters to support Dever in an act of political retribution against his Republican rivals, but it 
was all the more likely that Dever’s promises of fair law enforcement and the end of 
discriminatory policing drew black votes to the Democratic candidate.49 Pollsters also discovered 
that the Democratic machine had done significant organizing among black women in the ward, 
employing many of them as precinct captains.50 Black women were especially vulnerable to 
threats to their respectability, as police regularly targeted women for solicitation arrests and 
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assumed that any black woman in public might be employed in the vice trades. The number of 
black voters shifted in Dever’s favor by Election Day, as he won 66.9 percent of the votes cast in 
the black second ward while the Democratic candidate in 1919 had won only 15.4 percent of the 
total votes cast in that ward.51 Dever’s victory in the second ward indicated a remarkable shift in 
municipal racial politics in 1923, as the ward contained almost 40 percent of the city’s black 
population in the early 1920s.52 Dever also won majorities in the first, third, fourteenth, twenty-
eighth, and thirty-second aldermanic wards, which each had a significant number of black voters, 
although none had proportions of black voters as high as the second ward.53 In terms of raw 
numbers, these votes did not comprise the whole of Dever’s electoral victory but did represent 
approximately 30,000 votes, about a third of his margin of victory.54 While the mayor may have 
been able to win without those votes, they represented an unusual shift in the city’s electoral 
politics, especially among black voters.55 
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CIVIC REFORM, VICE POLICING, AND THE COLOR LINE 
Upon assuming office, Dever began to make good on his promises to clean up the city, 
promises that he had made to a wide swath of voters including those on the black South Side. His 
election initiated a period of criminal justice reform that represented the intersection of two 
urban reform traditions—the legalistic agenda of the Chicago Crime Commission and the moral 
reform agenda of groups including the Juvenile Protection Association, the Vice Commission of 
Chicago, and the Committee of Fifteen. Entering its fifth year of anti-crime activism, the Crime 
Commission continued to advocate criminal justice rationalization, touting its role as “watchdog” 
of Chicago and claiming credit for having fostered a new spirit of lawfulness in the city by 
“trying through cooperation with the proper officials to remove hindrances to the advancement 
of criminal justice.”56 Leaders of the Crime Commission frequently critiqued the inefficiency of 
the criminal justice system, lamenting the lack of coordination among law enforcement 
institutions and delays in criminal investigations and prosecutions.57  
Drawing on this discourse of urban rationalization, the first change that Dever made to 
the governing of Chicago was to name a new chief of police. Captain Morgan A. Collins took up 
the office with a directive from the new mayor to root out patrolmen with connections to the 
city’s criminal syndicates.58 He issued an order to all Chicago Police Department captains in 
April of 1923, instructing them to dismiss any inferior officers with known connections to 
bootleggers and to resign from the department if they themselves had any connections to the 
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bootlegging industry.59  Considering the scope of bootlegging and the long history of police vice 
protection in Chicago, it seems unlikely that such a passive reform attempt would have been 
successful in ridding the department of its criminal connections, although news reports in the 
months following Collins’s announcement indicated that the city’s Civil Service Commission did 
dismiss a number of patrolmen from the force.60 These cases also generated good press for the 
newly appointed police chief and demonstrated to the city’s anti-crime activists that the new 
mayor sympathized with their cause. As Collins told a gathering of police captains and 
department heads, “I am fully cognizant of everything that has gone on…I know what rings have 
been formed, where the different wheels were turned, and where the roads traveled by these 
wheels lead to. The day of the bootlegger in the police department is over.”61   
In addition to the influence of the Chicago Crime Commission on the new mayor’s law 
enforcement reform agenda, he also assumed office in the midst of ongoing efforts by 
Progressive reform organizations to eradicate vice from the city, efforts that exemplified the 
social reform tradition in Chicago. These efforts were led by the Juvenile Protection Association 
(JPA), which had conducted its own investigation of vice in the city over the previous three years. 
In 1920, leaders of the JPA had solicited the help of the American Social Hygiene Association, a 
national organization of public health officials concerned with the control of venereal disease.62 
Investigators from the Social Hygiene Association spent several weeks in Chicago, observing 
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conditions there and ultimately concluding that several areas of the city were entirely lacking in 
law enforcement and had become overrun with houses of prostitution and saloons selling illegal 
liquor. Investigators found conditions to be particularly poor in African American neighborhoods, 
reporting that “The South Side is a hot bed of vice; houses of prostitution are operating, not 
exactly wide open, but practically so.”63 The investigator’s reference to the practically “wide 
open” nature of vice establishments on the South Side acknowledged the role of police in 
protecting those enterprises, as the idiom “wide open” denoted state protection of illicit 
enterprises. 
Investigatory records of the JPA further confirmed the active role of law enforcement 
officers in protecting vice establishments and revealed the role of police administrators and city 
officials in decriminalizing the vice trade in Chicago. In late 1922, one of the JPA’s officers 
spent several weeks interviewing proprietors of some of the city’s vice establishments, some of 
whom described the system of graft that allowed their illegal enterprises to stay in business. One 
of the proprietors of the second ward Columbia Hotel told a JPA investigator that establishments 
like his couldn’t exist without extensive police protection, and when asked to whom he made 
graft payments, he offered, “Everybody gets it in this town; the captain of the district gets the big 
slice. These schamisers (policemen on the beat) get a little now and then. Everybody’s got their 
hand out.”64 Other vice proprietors described the hierarchy of graft payments in more detail, as 
anyone from patrolmen to district captains received their share of payments to protect illegal 
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activities.65 Some of the vice proprietors even implicated individual city officials, as Tommy 
O’Connor told a JPA investigator, “Why the dough that they dish out goes all the way up. The 
Captain of the precinct, the alderman of the ward, and even people in the state’s attorney’s office 
gets a slice. There is a fellow by the name of Hoyne who takes care of all the syndicate’s 
business in the State’s Attorney’s office.”66 This report was particularly damning, as it explicitly 
implicated none other that State’s Attorney MacClay Hoyne in the system of graft, suggesting 
that corruption reached far beyond the level of street patrolmen.  
In light of law enforcement failures to respond to these investigations in the first years of 
the 1920s, JPA President Jessie Binford filed a petition to the Criminal Court of Cook County in 
March of 1923, describing the vice conditions that had been discovered by the organization, 
including the fact that many houses of prostitution enjoyed protection by officers of the law.67 
Binford described in detail the number of houses of prostitution that the JPA had discovered and 
the forms of soliciting that were openly practiced throughout the city. She concluded that these 
conditions demonstrated that Chicago had been “thoroughly disarmed of its only adequate means 
of eradicating such conditions and of halting such violations, namely, the performance of their 
duty by the officers of the law in enforcing the law.”68 Binford implored the court to direct the 
city’s Grand Jury to conduct its own investigation of vice conditions, appealing to judicial 
institutions of criminal justice since the city’s police force seemed determined to encourage 
prostitution within city limits. Chief Justice Michael L. McKinley acceded to Binford’s request, 
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directing the Grand Jury to conduct a special inquest into vice and prostitution in early 1923.69 
Observers waited anxiously for the results of the Grand Jury’s probe, which came just a few 
months later; the jury issued no indictments and concluded that “the charges of violation of law 
by officials whose duty it is to deal with these matters are not substantiated by the evidence.”70 
The rejection of Binford’s findings by the Grand Jury demonstrated how tensions among 
reformers in Chicago had become manifest in criminal justice institutions as well, and especially 
how the agenda of the crime commission movement had infiltrated the city’s criminal justice 
system. Members of the Crime Commission drew stark contrasts between their work and that of 
women-led organizations like the Juvenile Protection Association, often disparaging the work of 
JPA members for extending undue sympathy to lawbreakers. Likewise, the Grand Jury accused 
the reformers of the JPA of demoralizing the police rather than investigating the city’s vice 
proprietors themselves, admonishing Binford and her cohort “The constant heckling of police 
officers without actual evidence of wrong doing upon their part surely is not the constructive and 
proper way to encourage law enforcement.”71 Grand Jurors found that most vice establishments 
cited by the JPA had actually been raided at least once in the preceding months, concluding that 
police were in fact pursuing all avenues to vice eradication in the city. The failure of the Cook 
County Grand Jury to level any indictments with regards to police protection of vice in Chicago 
incensed urban reformers and jurists alike, who accused the jury of deliberately ignoring 
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evidence of official graft.72 Their conclusions had overlooked evidence gathered by the JPA that 
raids were occasionally visited upon vice establishments in order to deter suspicion while graft 
payments continued to exchange hands.73  
It was in the context of this increased scrutiny of urban vice and pointed criticism of the 
institutions of criminal justice that Dever initiated the first concerted crime control campaign of 
his administration—a sweep of the city’s cabarets and saloons.74 Although saloons spotted the 
city’s landscape, police focused their attention on establishments that served racially integrated 
clientele; in May of 1923, headlines proclaimed the closing of six of the city’s so-called “black 
and tan” cafes. These establishments were so named due to the fact that they solicited both black 
and white patrons, serving as integrated spaces of entertainment in a city that was already highly 
racially segregated and becoming increasingly so as the Great Migration continued. Dever 
marshaled the power of the regulatory state to insure that those cafes would not reopen again 
soon, revoking their retail beverage licenses after hearing from Police Superintendent Collins 
that the targeted establishments were “very rotten.”75 In addition to drawing on the work of anti-
vice reformers, Dever’s campaign also tapped into a strain of black law and order politics. In 
May 1923, in the midst of the black and tan drive, Dever appeared before an audience of 300,000 
congregation members and 70 clergy members at the Bethel A.M.E. Church, one of the oldest 
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African American churches in the city.76 Dever announced that the following day his police 
department would shutter Al Tearney’s, a notorious South Side cabaret that had often been the 
site of violence as well as voyeuristic white patronage over the previous several decades. He 
promised the congregants in attendance, “I have closed every black and tan place on the south 
side with the exception of one…that one is to be closed tomorrow.”77 His promise met with a 
roar of applause, signifying the intersection between the mayor’s law and order politics and the 
politics of respectability championed by many black elites and institutions such as black 
churches and racial improvement organizations. 
However, this anti-crime campaign did not serve solely as an appeasement to anti-vice 
reformers and black elites but also as a part of an ongoing racial policing project in service of 
constructing and defending the color line. Reports concerning the drive against black and tan 
cafes suggested that the primary offenses committed in these saloons were not violations of 
municipal regulations or federal Prohibition, especially considering the fact that the city was 
home to many liquor-selling establishments that operated with the full knowledge of the police. 
Instead, it was the interracial socialization and suggestions of interracial sexuality that drew the 
augmented scrutiny of police, as patrolmen reported to the chief “the dancing between negro and 
white men and women was so rotten that it could not have been called dancing.”78 Indeed, the 
specter of interracial sexuality and socialization also wove throughout the investigations of anti-
vice reformers, whose anti-vice campaigns had presaged that of the city. The JPA’s petition to 
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the Criminal Court of Chicago specifically named the “intermingling of races” as a problem in 
need of urgent state intervention.79 
The crime control campaign against Chicago black and tan cafes overlapped with the 
police targeting of black urban space; all of the cafes that were shut down in May 1923 were 
located in Chicago’s black second ward, most of them along east 35th Street in the entertainment 
district of Bronzeville.80 In the early 1920s, black and tan cafes had become increasingly popular 
among entertainment-seeking Chicagoans, particularly among elite and working class white 
patrons who ventured into the black second ward seeking illicit amusement.81 These cafes 
offered a range of attractions to those seeking Chicago’s nightlife, including interracial dancing 
and prostitution along with illegal liquor supplied by the city’s criminal syndicates. In this 
respect, black and tans were similar to the saloons and dance halls that had been protected by 
police for decades, but their promise of interracial socialization gave them a particular draw for 
so-called “slummers” seeking to experience the illicit thrill of interracial entertainment, 
socialization, and sexuality.82 
In a city that was rife with illegal bootlegging and prostitution, it was safe to assume that 
police would find such conduct in many establishments throughout Chicago, as the JPA had over 
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the course of its investigation in the early 1920s. What made black and tan cafes a particular 
concern for city leaders and reformers alike was the threat that they posed to the inchoate urban 
color line, especially the gendered violations of that racial divide as black men intermingled with 
white women at black and tan cafes. Descriptions of the objectionable conduct found in the 
shuttered cafes consistently drew attention to the crossing of the color line and the intermingling 
of black and white sexuality in those spaces. The mayor railed against the supposedly debauched 
behavior that was reported to occur in black and tans, citing reports from the police department’s 
vice squad, “Lewd dancing, drunken revels in which women became so intoxicated that they 
were unable to get off the floor to which they had fallen, and soul kisses between colored men 
and white women.”83 Although white men and black women often socialized in city brothels, this 
other variety of gendered crossings of the color line and the supposed violations of white 
womanhood that might occur at black and tan cafes made those establishments particular objects 
for Chicago’s white reformers and law enforcement officers.84 Police targeting of black and tan 
cafes continued throughout the summer of 1923, as officers made sweeping arrests at the South 
Side Vincennes Hotel and Labelle Hotel, leaving the premises with “a select company of 
attractive white girls and their colored companions and white libertines with their gay, senseless 
colored women.”85 Although the Vincennes and the LaBelle had been heralded as refined 
institutions upon their opening, their appeal to interracial couples made the two establishments 
targets for police during the campaign against black and tans.  
The mayor’s drive against black and tan cafes and reformers’ anti-vice campaigns of the 
1920s intersected with black crime control politics in complex ways, at times consistent with 
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demands of some elite and middle-class black Chicagoans that police clean up black 
neighborhoods but also in tension with critiques of racially discriminatory policing. The Vice 
Commission of Chicago and the Chicago Commission on Race Relations had demonstrated the 
active role of law enforcement officers in encouraging vice establishments to relocate to black 
neighborhoods as downtown red light districts closed in the early twentieth century.86 Indeed, 
many black leaders drew attention to the proliferation of vice establishments in the South Side 
Black Belt over the first few decades of the twentieth century, castigating those whom they saw 
as an invasive criminal element and demanding that police shut down vice establishments. A 
Chicago Defender editorial in 1923 insisted “Crime is crime and vice is vice,” condemning law 
enforcement officials who ignored illegal activity on the South Side and calling on city officials 
to enact equal enforcement of the law, as “It is the duty of the authorities to wage war upon vice 
in any form regardless of circumstances or conditions.”87 Here the Defender criticized the 
closure of black and tan cafes as actually too narrow a response to vice in black neighborhoods. 
Instead, it insisted that more thorough policing of the black South Side was necessary to protect 
black respectability and guarantee black safety.  
The mayor’s pursuit of the campaign against black and tans, however, demonstrated how 
both underpolicing and overpolicing could pose a threat to black respectability and equality in 
Chicago, as the undue focus on shuttering saloons in black neighborhoods also resulted in the 
disproportionate criminalization of black Chicagoans themselves. Some black journalists drew 
critical attention to the racial disparity of the campaign, framing this policing drive in the broader 
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context of racial discrimination in the city. A few years earlier, the racially militant Chicago 
Whip editorialized that scrutiny of black and tans amounted to no more than an assault on the 
city’s few racially integrated spaces, observing, “This continual tirade is made because these 
agencies object to SOCIAL EQUALITY even though it be in a cabaret. The attack is not made 
on CABARETS, but on BLACK AND TAN CABARETS.”88 Although it occasionally expressed 
support for the mayor’s campaign, the middle-class Chicago Defender also drew attention to the 
negative impact that the attention to interracial establishments had on racial equality in the city, 
suggesting that the JPA had “cloaked its real purpose under a clamor for the suppression of city-
wide vice.”89 This sort of critical wavering on behalf of the typically middle-class Defender 
demonstrated the dilemma that a crime control campaign such as this one posed for black 
respectability politics in Chicago. It was both underpolicing and overpolicing that could 
compromise black respectability, as undue scrutiny of black neighborhoods was also attributable 
and contributed to racial prejudice.  
A final tension within black law and order politics arose in the context of the black and 
tan campaign, as some black business owners insisted that the crime drive represented an assault 
on black-owned capital. In May 1923, William Bottoms, the proprietor of the Dreamland Cafe, 
wrote a letter to Mayor Dever protesting the closing of his establishment. The Dreamland was 
one of few black-owned cafes in the city, and Bottoms asserted that police had only shuttered his 
business because they assumed that he catered to integrated clientele, when in reality “hardly 
five percent whites comes to my place.”90 Although he operated a cafe that many who had 
attended the rally at the Bethel A.M.E. Church would have found objectionable, Bottoms 
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appealed to notions of moral upstanding in defending his establishment, telling the mayor that 
his intention had always been “to live within the law.”91 Beyond what Bottoms saw as the unfair 
closure of his establishment, he highlighted the economic harm that the police action inflicted on 
black Chicago, “I have been closed since Tuesday and everyday means a terrible loss not only to 
me but to some forty-five employees.”92 Most of the vice establishments on Chicago’s South 
Side were owned by white criminal syndicates or white proprietors; aside from the Dreamland, 
all the other cafes closed by police in May of that year were owned by whites. As one of the few 
black-owned cabarets in the city, the Dreamland represented one way for black Chicagoans to 
retain the capital generated in their own neighborhoods, and police closure of establishments 
with black owners thus served as an attempt to erect racial boundaries around capital 
accumulation. 
Most of the black and tans closed by police during the mayor’s first anti-crime drive 
eventually secured judicial injunctions that allowed them to reopen, but the targeting of 
integrated spaces of entertainment continued throughout the 1920s, as reports of police raids on 
black and tans appeared repeatedly among newspaper headlines.93 Despite the only temporary 
erasure of black and tan cafes from the urban landscape, the targeting of those establishments in 
ongoing anti-crime drives signified that interracial socialization and sexuality posed a particular 
threat to the city’s moral reformers and city leaders, making the policing of the color line a 
central site of contestation over law enforcement.  
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POLICING AND CONSTRUCTING THE COLOR LINE 
In June of 1923, the Chicago branch of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) received an alarming letter. The writer, Roy Turner, an African 
American Syracuse native who had recently visited Chicago, lamented, “Hardly a week goes by I 
do not read in your papers of some colored person in Chicago being beat by white officers 
simply because they think a Race person is with the white race.”94 Turner drew attention to a 
pattern of arrests and assaults that had captured the attention of the black press in Chicago and 
around the country—Chicago police repeatedly stopped interracial couples or those whom they 
assumed to be interracial and accosted them for what seemed to be no apparent reason. Turner 
observed that traversing the city with a member another race violated no law “And as long as 
they have a right to and are behaving them selves why can’t they be protected.”95 In his 
estimation, a respectable couple that observed the norms of proper decorum deserved no undue 
scrutiny from the Chicago police. 
Even in its brevity, Turner’s letter outlined an agenda for the Chicago branch of the 
NAACP and an agenda for racial justice in the sphere of law enforcement more broadly. He 
wrote confidently, “I trust there will be nothing left undone to show them they cannot take the 
law in their own hands. I know you will have the Chicago Branch take it up and with other good 
help see them punished.”96 Turner identified one of the critical problems with law enforcement 
in Chicago and in other urban centers around the country—despite city leaders’ appeals to 
criminal justice reform and the integrity of the rule of law, police officers continued to 
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discriminate against black city residents. Turner addressed his letter to the national offices of the 
NAACP, perhaps indicating the national significance that he assumed the issue deserved. 
NAACP assistant national secretary Walter White forwarded the letter on to Chicago branch 
executive secretary Morris Lewis, who assured White that the Chicago branch had a keen eye on 
the situation but lamented that the branch had little legal recourse against the department, as 
“There is no law or official sanction for such action on the part of the police.”97 Presumably 
Lewis meant that police rulebooks contained no specific prohibition against harassing interracial 
couples, since cases that escalated to violence did merit investigations. Lewis described one such 
inquiry in 1923, telling White that he had “attended inquest over one victim of this outrage, the 
defendant admitting that he might not have interfered had he known both parties were colored.”98 
Lewis’s letter contained few other details about this incident, although even this brief description 
of the inquest into a police officer’s encounter with a black couple indicated that race was indeed 
the crucial factor in the arrest, as the officer readily admitted that he would not have stopped the 
couple had he known that they both identified as black.99 
Police arrests of perceived interracial couples or police failure to intervene in the white 
harassment of interracial couples joined patterns of popular racial violence that had proliferated 
in Chicago over the course of the early twentieth century. Two years before Turner penned his 
letter to the NAACP, the Chicago Defender recounted two incidents in the city’s downtown 
district in which white men had attacked two different African American men whom they 
suspected to be socializing with white women. These attacks targeted the same gendered 
violation of the color line that would guide Dever’s campaign against black and tan cafes in 1923. 
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Although there was some debate regarding the women’s racial identity in these 1921 attacks, the 
Defender asserted, “There seems to be a concerted effort upon the part of a class of nondescript 
and law-breaking whites to forcibly and unlawfully prevent the appearance of men of the Race in 
public places with women who might pass.”100 Their white assailants had attacked the two 
couples, beaten them, and spat on them; following the incident “There was no recourse to 
law.”101 In these instances, police allowed the violent policing of the color line by white 
Chicagoans, decriminalizing violent assaults on interracial couples through their inaction. 
Writers at the Defender implored law enforcement officials to investigate this pattern of violent 
attacks, predicting another citywide race riot if similar assaults continued. But within a few years, 
as Turner’s letter indicated, law enforcement officers themselves also began to actively 
participate in the policing of interracial sociality.  
The harassment of interracial couples by police patrolmen transformed the department’s 
previous anti-crime campaign from a focus on integrated entertainment establishments into a 
focus on the conduct of individual Chicago citizens. Regardless of whether patrolmen had 
received official directives to arrest interracial couples, the Chicago Police Department 
sanctioned their conduct by failing to reprimand the offending officers. In May 1924, Mr. And 
Mrs. Thornton Parson were enjoying an afternoon at the lakeshore when a police officer 
approached the couple. Curious about Mrs. Parson’s fair complexion, the officer inquired if the 
couple was legally married and further harangued the couple with questions. The officer 
followed the couple as they walked home, drawing a crowd of both black and white onlookers; 
some claimed they heard threats muttered by members of the crowd.102 The officer left without 
arresting either member of the couple. When Mrs. Parsons called the Stanton Avenue police 
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station to report this harassment, the presiding sergeant apologized to her for the officer’s 
abusive conduct. But while the sergeant’s apology indicated that police leadership recognized the 
discriminatory nature of the officer’s conduct, there was no indication that this recognition was 
accompanied by any discipline for the offending officer.  
The extant records of the Chicago branch of the NAACP contain few other references to 
similar cases, despite indications that the problem was widespread and deserved urgent attention. 
This relative archival silence may be attributed to the fact that in the early 1920s, the Chicago 
branch of the NAACP was ill equipped to address the growing problem of racially 
discriminatory policing.103 The branch was languishing, despite being headquartered in a city 
with a rapidly growing black population that faced discriminatory treatment in housing, public 
accommodations, schools, and law enforcement.104 Ultimately, leaders of the Chicago branch 
attempted to address these instances of discriminatory policing through the model of interracial 
committee organizing, similar to the tactics undertaken by black leaders seeking fair policing 
during the 1919 Race Riot. Chicago NAACP executive secretary Morris Lewis referred the 
problem to the Committee on Race Relations of the Chicago Church Federation, an 
interdenominational association of Protestant congregations formed in 1907 with the goals of 
strengthening religious associational life, encouraging urban reform, and improving of race 
relations.105 In the midst of the 1919 Race Riot, Church Federation leaders had issued a set of 
resolutions that recognized the structural barriers to housing and employment equality that most 
Southern migrants faced upon their arrival in Chicago, indicating that the conflict that gripped 
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the city could be attributed to decades of structural racial discrimination.106 The Federation’s 
Committee on Race Relations consisted of leaders of the city’s settlement house movement as 
well as social improvement organizations, including settlement leader Mary McDowell and 
Chicago Urban League officers T. Arnold Hill and George C. Hall.107  
The Church Federation’s Committee on Race Relation brought the issue of interracial 
couple harassment before Mayor Dever and Police Superintendent Collins in 1923, informing the 
city executives about this pattern of unjust arrests and harassment. Unfortunately, neither the 
records of the Church Federation of Greater Chicago nor the records of William E. Dever contain 
any reference to this meeting or the presentation made by the Committee to the mayor. Existing 
references to the Committee’s work simply indicated that the meeting with Dever was indeed 
successful, as “The result after their presentation of this injustice of this police abuse [was] that 
these indiscriminating arrests were stopped.”108 Further news accounts, however, belied the 
conclusion that this meeting among the mayor, the police superintendent, and this set of middle-
class black leaders was sufficient to end the pattern of violent police harassment that interracial 
couples and black Chicagoans faced.  
Police harassment of interracial couples continued in the months and years following 
Turner’s letter to the NAACP and the appearance of the Church Federation’s Committee on Race 
Relations before Mayor Dever, revealing the diverse range of spaces where police exercised their 
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authority to defend the color line. In an incident from late 1923, police stopped William Gray in 
City Hall as he escorted Violette LaRue, a white woman, from the Morals Court. Gray was 
arrested and charged with disorderly conduct simply based on his association with this white 
woman in the public building.109 Gray informed his attorney that he had heard a number of 
officers of the Morals Court declare that they planned to see him arrested after he had the 
audacity to leave the courtroom with a white woman. When Gray’s case came before the 
Municipal Court, witnesses attested that they had seen Gray leave the courtroom with LaRue but 
failed to indicate any evidence of disorderly conduct. Witnesses did note the racial identity of the 
woman in question—a detail that the presiding judge disregarded as irrelevant.110 The judge 
dismissed the case, citing the fact that the city had failed to present evidence that Gray had 
engaged in any disorderly conduct. Gray’s ordeal demonstrated the broad investment of law 
enforcement officers in policing the color line, as he faced harassment from police patrolmen as 
well as other officers of the court who expressed their desire to see him arrested and charged 
simply for the offense of appearing in public with a white woman.  
Most accounts of police harassment focused attention on couples that appeared together 
in public, but some African Americans also faced undue scrutiny from police in private spaces, 
as law enforcement officers extended their defense of the color line into domestic spaces as well. 
A report from July of 1923 recounted an incident that occurred on the city’s South Side when 
police entered the home of John and Ethel Stokes without a warrant “and without any cause 
whatever save to humiliate Mrs. Stokes after discovering she was white and the lawful wife of a 
man who was not.”111 A group of four policemen had accosted Mrs. Stokes after seeing her bid 
farewell to a black acquaintance, demanding that she answer their questions about her own racial 
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identity. Angry, the officers took Mrs. Stokes to the 18th Street police station before escorting her 
home, where she produced her marriage license in an attempt to curtail the taunts of the officers. 
When John Stokes arrived home moments later, the officers arrested him without cause and 
forced him to post bond to secure his release.112 A report from October 1924 described an 
incident in which police arrested all the occupants in the home of a black worker on the city’s 
South Side after seeing that the family was entertaining two white friends.113 In a letter to the 
Defender after the original news item was published, John Ferguson wondered, “ Has it come to 
pass in Chicago that Negroes are liable to arrest solely on account of having white friends and 
visitors?”114 Echoing critiques of police conduct over the previous several years, Ferguson 
referred to the ubiquity of such arrests and harassment, “Chicago policemen have been carrying 
on a region of terror during the past year by molesting, insulting, assaulting and arresting Negro 
and white couples and Negro and fair complexioned Negro couples.”115 Ferguson also speculated 
that patrolmen had received directives to defend the color line from department administrators 
and powerful businessmen who had encouraged officers to harass interracial couples in order to 
foment racial animus. Such speculation, founded or not, underscored the role of police and law 
enforcement in the construction of racial hierarchy in the city, as they acted as the front line in 
the defense of white supremacy.  
Over the course of the 1920s, law enforcement discrimination transformed from an 
official campaign against racially integrated establishments, to the harassment of interracial 
couples, to the large-scale violent policing of the black South Side, as in the Christmas raids of 
1926. Dragnet raids of black neighborhoods represented both the escalation of discriminatory 
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policing as well as the intersection of racial conflict with the localized law and order politics that 
had developed in Chicago over the course of the 1920s. Analyses of arrest patterns in Chicago 
over this period showed an increase in violent crime and property crime arrests from 1919 to 
1927, a period roughly coterminous with Dever’s law and order administration and calls for 
stricter crime control.116 This upward trend in arrests was demonstrated both in the raw numbers 
of arrests as well as in the proportion of Chicagoans arrested, accounting for the city’s population 
increase over this period.117 According to arrest data, it appeared that police did indeed heed 
Dever’s warnings about strict law enforcement, responding by increasing the number of city 
residents arrested. 
These general trends in arrest totals and rates, however, failed to capture the impact that 
intensified policing practices had on city neighborhoods; accounts from the mid-1920s suggested 
that this increase in arrests was accompanied by violent and discriminatory policing in African 
American neighborhoods. Despite the mayor’s and Police Superintendent’s vows the clean up 
the police, graft still infested the department, and black residents found themselves the target of 
graft schemes between patrolmen and bondsmen. An account from 1924 described an 
arrangement between city bondsmen and police officers, in which bondsmen provided patrolmen 
commissions for making arrests. The Pittsburgh Courier described this scheme, refuting the idea 
that crime was any more rampant in black neighborhoods, as “The gangs centering around Dean 
O’Banion, Tommy O’Connor, Big Tim Murphy, Gener Gary, the Torrios, and O’Donnell made 
their habitants in other sections of the city.”118 Here the black daily pointed out the obvious irony 
of police raids and mass arrests in black neighborhoods—although it had been white ethnic gang 
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violence that had touched off Dever’s law and order campaign, black Chicagoans endured 
discriminatory policing and prolonged scrutiny as a result.  
Along with general targeting of black neighborhoods for graft payments, the Courier also 
described police penchant to target black women and arrest them for soliciting. It described the 
arrest of Irene Matthews, who was detained by two police officers after she refused the advances 
of a white man on the street; the officers had been waiting nearby to arrest Matthews after the 
man made lewd comments to her. According to the report, this strategy of arresting black women 
for soliciting was common in African American neighborhoods and may have contributed to the 
high rates of black women arrested for prostitution and soliciting. But it was also part of the 
tension between respectability and crime control, complicated by increased police surveillance of 
black neighborhoods following Dever’s directives to clean up urban crime. While many black 
women and particularly black women migrants did find work in the city’s brothels, the targeting 
of black women for soliciting arrests threatened to obscure distinctions between respectable 
black womanhood and criminality.119 
Threats to respectability came alongside threats to black safety, as some police raids of 
the black South Side turned violent. A Defender editorial in 1925 cited the frequent record of 
police brutality in the city and suggested that police violence was tied to assumptions about 
innate black criminality “These minions of the law who go a step farther and take on the airs of a 
bully and a thug should be made to realize that every individual who unfortunately comes in their 
path is not a criminal or a lawbreaker and is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing.”120 The 
Defender walked a fine line in its critique of police methods, conceding that guilty parties might 
be subjected to police violence “But what are we to think of the torture of the most fiendish kind 
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inflicted upon innocent—though suspected—persons behind prison doors in the hope of 
wringing a confession of guilt from the victim?”121 Here the boundaries of respectability came 
into clear tension with critiques of police violence, as the editorial staff of the Defender hedged 
its critique of police discrimination in order to distance itself from clear violators of the law.  
Some explanations of racially discriminatory police raids and violence suggested that law 
and order politics themselves had played a causal role in the targeting of black Chicagoans for 
arrest. A report from May 1925 described the hearing of a black man who appeared in the city’s 
Municipal Court for charges of robbery. The man struggled to stand before the judge during his 
hearing, as he had been “so severely maltreated by the police upon his arrest that he was still 
suffering from a broken jaw.”122 The presiding judge dismissed the case, chastising the police 
officers who had meted out such violent treatment to the accused man. Recounting the incident, 
the Defender reiterated the judge’s critique and added “For years Chicago law enforcers, from 
the highest office down, have conducted themselves as they chose in regard to certain of 
Chicago’s citizens. Whenever there is a “crime wave” someone gives orders to “clean up the 
city,” and every available policeman is rushed to the South Side.”123 It was this same connection 
between law and order politics and dragnet policing that some critics used to explain the police 
raids on the black South Side in December 1926, the raids that had netted hundreds of arrests 
following police failure to apprehend two suspected black murderers. These linkages between 
crime drives and discriminatory policing of black urban space proposed a causal connection 
between Dever’s law and order politics and police harassment, demonstrating that municipal 
crime control policy could become a racial project as police targeted black neighborhoods. 
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CHICAGO’S BEER WARS  
The police dispatcher at Chicago’s Thirteenth District station received a call late at night 
on September 7, 1923. There had been a shooting at a soft-drink parlor on South Lincoln Street 
in an establishment nestled among the industrial warehouses of the Back of the Yards 
neighborhood. When police arrived at the scene, they found bullet holes littering the walls of the 
shop along with a group of frightened patrons hiding behind the bar. Twenty minutes later, the 
station received another urgent call, this time from the offices of a Southwest Side doctor who 
had attempted to treat a gunshot victim who had been brought to his office earlier that 
evening.124 The dead man—Jerry O’Connor—was an associate of Walter O’Donnell, a member 
of a Back of the Yards family that was engaged in a violent struggle with Al Capone’s 
bootlegging syndicate for a piece of the city’s thriving market for illegal alcohol.125 The 
O’Donnell brothers had challenged the Capone syndicate for customers over the previous several 
months, sending representatives to Chicago saloons to inquire about their source of beer. If the 
proprietors sourced their alcohol from Capone or another syndicate, members of the O’Donnell 
group displayed the guns hanging from their belts or fired a few shots, and soon enough most of 
those saloons began to buy their liquor from the Back of the Yards gang.126 
Earlier in the evening on September 7th, Walter O’Donnell and a group of his associates 
had visited a saloon just a few miles north of the establishment on Lincoln Street. They had 
called on the proprietor, Jacob Geis, several times before, and each time Geis had assured them 
that he was happy receiving his alcohol from the Capone syndicate. But that night the O’Donnell 
gang decided to make their case more strongly, dragging Geis over the bar and beating him 
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senseless after he refused yet again to change his liquor supplier. Following the fracas at Geis’s 
saloon, the O’Donnell gang retreated to the establishment on Lincoln Street, but it was not long 
before Capone enforcers found them there. Just after 10:30 pm, three men burst into the saloon 
with shotguns and revolvers raised and began to fire at the patrons inside. Most of the surprised 
members of the O’Donnell gang managed to rush up the stairs or duck behind the bar when the 
shots started, but as their assailants retreated, O’Donnell associate Jerry O’Connor stormed after 
them. Those left inside the saloon heard a handful of shots fired outside. When they ventured 
into the street moments later, they found O’Connor prone on the ground, struck by a bullet to the 
torso.127 The men rushed O’Connor to a nearby doctor’s office but it was to no avail, as the 
physician quickly pronounced the man dead and brought him to a Southwest Side morgue.128 
The events of September 7th flew in the face of Dever’s promises to restore order to the 
notoriously corrupt and violence-ridden city. Police investigated the role of the O’Donnell 
brothers in Jerry O’Connor’s murder, but released Walter, Stephen, and Thomas O’Donnell after 
Jacob Geis failed to identify them as his assailants on the night of the incident.129 Dever had 
promised his supporters that he was no supporter of Prohibition, implying that he would allow 
the alcohol trade to continue after his election. But the violent confrontation between the 
O’Donnell and Capone syndicates demonstrated that the mayor’s promises of urban order could 
not be secured without more stringent policing of the federal ban on alcohol, which had fostered 
an extensive violent black market in the city. Dever revised his stance on Prohibition in the days 
following the O’Connor murder. At a press conference days after the shooting, Dever announced 
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that his administration would drive beer from the city—a policy directive that would come to be 
known as the Beer Wars.130  
Dever deployed a discourse of strict law and order as he warned bootleggers and police 
alike of the city’s new policy of suppressing the sale of all alcohol, promising, “We are going to 
uphold the law and permit no violations.”131 Police Superintendent Collins similarly promised to 
fire any officer who was found to have connections to beer running syndicates, echoing his 
promises months earlier to clean the department of its criminal connections.132 Collins promised 
that the police would proceed to root out the sale of beer at its source—the illegal breweries that 
spotted the city. Even as he vowed to crack down on the city’s illegal alcohol trade, however, 
Dever attempted to walk a fine line between endorsing a strict rule of law while also expressing 
no sympathy for the ideology of temperance, a delicate political balance that the mayor needed to 
maintain considering the coalition of reformers and ethnic voters who had sent him to city hall. 
He told his constituents “I would not have the people of Chicago believe that I am a 
prohibitionist…I should like indeed, if the law would permit, that the people might have the 
privilege of buying good wholesome beer at a moderate price, but that is impossible at this 
time.”133 Here Dever’s rhetoric echoed that of the Chicago Crime Commission in his insistence 
that strict crime control was the only way to protect the integrity of the rule of law in the city.  
The rise of Prohibition-related violence in Chicago drew out tensions between local and 
federal law enforcement regarding the responsibility and capacity for controlling crime and 
urban violence. Dever’s public statements after the O’Connor murder offered a critique of 
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federal law enforcement during a period that had seen the significant expansion of federal 
criminal law. Seemingly apologetic for his insistence on strict Prohibition enforcement, Dever 
conceded that shutting down the beer trade in Chicago would be difficult and cumbersome, but 
also that “Everybody knows that the proper and best method to stop this business is within the 
control of the federal government and courts…The failure to do so, however, is no reason why 
we should fail to do our duty.”134 Dever’s remarks reflected problems with Prohibition 
enforcement as it had been delegated to the federal Bureau of Prohibition; the agency was so 
woefully underfunded and corrupted that it often fell to local law enforcement agencies to 
enforce the national ban on alcohol.135 Dever implied that federal courts and law enforcement 
agencies could curtail bootlegging by increasing their own surveillance apparatus and by issuing 
injunctions to close establishments that dealt in illegal alcohol, but that they had failed to do so in 
any comprehensive way.  
Despite the gap in federal state capacity to enforce the ban on alcohol, the ratification of 
Prohibition resulted in the significant augmentation of law enforcement discretion, thereby 
further empowering local and federal policing agencies to surveil and detain those whom they 
suspected of violating the law. Just a month before the O’Connor murder, Chicago’s Corporation 
Counsel Francis Busch advised the mayor that as per Illinois legal precedent, police did not need 
a warrant to conduct a search or make an arrest for a suspected Prohibition violation. Dever had 
asked Busch to work with Police Superintendent Collins during the early months of his 
administration in order to improve the efficiency of prosecutions for those who violated state and 
federal Prohibition laws. In response, Busch advised that Chicago police could search an 
establishment or make an arrest without a warrant so long as they claimed to have smelled the 
                                                
134 “Statement by Mayor William E. Dever,” September 12, 1923, Box 4, Folder 30: Dever, William E. –Mayoralty 
Papers, Police Department (Internal Operations, etc.), 1923-1924, Dever Papers. 
135 Lerner, Dry Manhattan, 64-65; McGirr, The War on Alcohol, 208. 
 
 228 
scent of alcohol on the premises.136 While the Supreme Court of Illinois and the United States 
Supreme Court had previously ruled that evidence found in warrantless searches of private 
residences was inadmissible in court, federal courts had made an exception to that rule when 
alcohol was sold in a public place and suspected by law enforcement officials by sight or 
smell.137  
Busch’s directive expanded the legal foundation for Chicago Police Department arrests 
for Prohibition violations, demonstrating the role of the federal ban on alcohol in augmenting 
local police power to conduct searches and make arrests in this decade. Local news outlets made 
light of Busch’s opinion, jesting that the department’s new slogan could be “Your Nose Knows,” 
but adding on a more serious note that the opinion indicated that the department had gained more 
authority than ever before.138 Discussing the Corporation Counsel’s opinion, Police 
Superintendent Collins promised that “This gives us greater leeway and we intend to use it…the 
taxpayers are entitled to concerted action from all their servants and I want to call upon all law 
enforcement agencies to pull together to put the booze joints out of business.”139 Ultimately then, 
by September of 1923, both a legal and policy framework had been laid for increased police 
surveillance and expanded local state power to enforce the ban on alcohol and exert authority 
over Chicago citizens. 
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In the early years of Prohibition, Chicago had become nationally notorious for its 
obstinate saloon culture and violent criminal syndicates that kept the city wet; the Beer Wars 
flew in the face of the city’s long history as a wide open town. Within days of the mayor’s 
announcement, police seized truckloads of beer as they entered the city and arrested hundreds in 
connection with the bootlegging trade.140 Police Superintendent Collins issued a special order to 
commanding officers directing them to deploy two patrolmen to watch each suspected brewery 
in the city and to seize any beer manufactured there. Collins further directed that patrolmen be 
detailed to watch highways leading into the city in order to prevent any beer shipments from 
suburban breweries.141 The mayor also deployed the authority of the regulatory state to enforce 
the ban on alcohol, as he had done during the campaign against black and tan cafes earlier that 
year. Dever promised to revoke the licenses of any breweries found to be manufacturing “real 
beer” as opposed to the less alcoholic “near beer” permitted by the National Prohibition Act.142 
State law also provided authority for Dever’s anti-crime campaign. In 1919, the Illinois 
General Assembly had passed the Illinois Search and Seizure Act, which provided municipal 
police officers with the authority to enforce the National Prohibition Act and prescribed 
minimum fines and jail time for first and subsequent violations of the law.143 The number of 
arrests, charges, and convictions under the Search and Seizure Act increased gradually over the 
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first few years of the 1920s, but the number of arrests and charges under the act grew 
dramatically after the initiation of the Beer Wars. This anti-crime campaign resulted in hundreds 
of arrests over a period of a few months; total arrests for Prohibition violations in 1923 were 
more than two and a half times the total for the previous year.144 The number of charges for 
violations of Prohibition in Chicago Criminal and Municipal Courts more than tripled between 
1922 and 1925; that number fell after 1925, but continued to remain higher than it had been at 
the beginning of the decade.145 The Beer Wars also encouraged some of the city’s well-known 
criminal gangs, including the Capone syndicate, to relocate to nearby Cicero, outside the city 
limits. Although the Capone gang continued to manufacture illegal alcohol and exert influence 












FIGURE 4.1: ILLINOIS SEARCH AND SEIZURE ACT CHARGES AND CONVICTIONS, 1919-1930146 
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FIGURE 4.2: ILLINOIS SEARCH AND SEIZURE ACT CHARGES  
            BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 1920-1930147 
 
 
Ethnic immigrant communities and crime syndicates like Capone’s certainly represented 
a primary focus of Prohibition enforcement among many city leaders and reformers across the 
country who had supported the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919.148 The targeting 
of ethnic immigrants and the nativism that guided the passage and enforcement of Prohibition 
has led some to conclude that race played little to no role in the ban on alcohol in American 
cities. In his study of Prohibition-era New York City, for instance, Michael Lerner concludes that 
race did not significantly impact Prohibition enforcement, an argument that he bases on the 
relatively low number of Harlem saloons and speakeasies that were raided and closed during the 
federal ban on alcohol.149 A close examination of arrest and indictment patterns for violations of 
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the Illinois Search and Seizure Act over the course of the 1920s, however, reveals a different 
pattern and suggests that race did play a meaningful role in the enforcement of Prohibition in 














FIGURE 4.3: ILLINOIS SEARCH AND SEIZURE ACT CONVICTION RATES, 1920-1930150 
 
Among those with the discretionary power to make arrests and level indictments—city 
police officers and the Illinois State’s Attorney among them—black Chicagoans represented an 
increasingly significant target for Prohibition enforcement over the course of the 1920s. While 
whites and European immigrants served as the largest group of arrests and charges for 
Prohibition violations in Illinois in terms of sheer numbers, the number of black Chicagoans 
arrested for Search and Seizure Act violations increased by a factor of more than 30 between 
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1920 and 1923, and nearly doubled again by 1924.151 Similarly to patterns of black 
overrepresentation in the number of total arrests by the CPD, black city residents were also 
consistently overrepresented among Prohibition-related arrests.152 African Americans comprised 
four percent of the city’s population according to the 1920 census, but comprised 8.9 percent of 
those charged with Prohibition violations in 1923, and 16.9 percent of those charged under the 
Act in 1926. The conviction rate for black defendants charged with Prohibition violations was 
also consistently higher than it was that among other groups. While the conviction rate for white 
Chicagoans under the Search and Seizure Act during the 1920s hovered around 25 percent, the 
conviction rate for blacks vacillated between 28 percent and 36 percent.153 These figures suggest 
not only that race did play a role in the enforcement of Prohibition in Chicago, but also that 
blacks became increasingly targeted over time in comparison to other groups. Prohibition 
enforcement, therefore, represented another site at which local officers of the state could enact 
their conceptions of racial hierarchy through law enforcement, processes that would continue and 
draw critique in the years to come. 
 
POLICING POLITICS IN THE MAYORAL ELECTION OF 1927 
By 1927, what had become common and repeated police defenses of the color line took 
on political dimensions as the next mayoral election approached. Just as he had in 1923, William 
Hale Thompson gave Chicago’s voters a surprise that year. Although the former mayor had 
announced his retirement from public life a mere four years earlier, he declared his candidacy for 
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mayor again in January 1927, handedly winning the Republican primary in February of that 
year.154 As they had in the mayoral elections of 1915 and 1919, black voters demonstrated 
forceful support for Thompson in the primary.155 Soon after, aldermen of the predominantly 
black second and third wards protested police raids that they claimed had been visited upon their 
districts as retribution for black voters’ support of the candidate who would be Mayor Dever’s 
most significant opponent in the general election in April. Second ward Alderman Louis B. 
Anderson appeared before the City Council’s Police Committee in March, describing so-called 
“cossack methods” that had been deployed by police in black neighborhoods “in which colored 
citizens were being robbed of their constitutional liberties, picked up off the streets and out of 
their homes to be lodged and kept in jail without the opportunity of communicating with friends, 
counsel or bondsmen.”156 Just as they had done during raids of the black South Side over the 
preceding several years, “Police forcibly entered private homes and business places without 
warrants and in some cases assaulted inoffensive citizens,” in the weeks leading up to that 
spring’s mayoral election.157 
Recurring police raids of the black South Side over the course of the 1920s revealed a 
range of motivations for racially targeted policing, from municipal policy directives, to the 
surveillance of the color line, to politically-motivated raids like those that followed the 1927 
mayoral primary. The police raids that followed the primary election caused controversy in the 
Chicago City Council as well as in the Illinois General Assembly, as Senator A.H. Roberts and 
Representative George T. Kersey also lodged complaints in Springfield regarding the political 
motivations behind the raids and “Accused Mayor Dever of tearing down the constitutional 
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rights of liberty loving citizens, calling the actions of the police unjustifiable reprisals for the loss 
of political power to the Thompson forces.”158 The man who had courted black voters four years 
earlier with promises of equal protection of the law and vice eradication had become a symbol of 
the discriminatory punitive power of the state. Dever and Police Superintendent Collins defended 
the actions of patrolmen on the black South Side, claiming that crime and revelry had flourished 
in the second and third wards following Thompson’s primary victory and that the police 
crackdown was merely a necessary response to disorderly conduct. Dever further defended 
police actions by citing the fact that the second and third wards had long been a source of illegal 
activity in the city, a claim that glossed over decades of police encouragement of vice 
establishments to relocate to this area of the city. 
William Hale Thompson claimed victory on April 5, 1927, reclaiming the office that he 
had vacated four years earlier by a margin of over 80,000 votes in an election with one of the 
highest turnouts in the city’s history.159 Although black voters had voted in significant numbers 
for the Democratic Party candidate in the previous election, the vast majority returned their 
allegiance to Thompson in 1927. Polls in the week before the election suggested that over 80 
percent of black voters favored the Republican candidate, projecting nearly 50,000 black votes in 
his favor.160 Black votes made up a crucial portion of Thompson’s margin of victory. Even 
during his absence from office, Thompson had continued to enjoy significant support on the 
black South Side, and his victory in 1927 could be seen as an expression of the populist politics 
that he had cultivated during his first two terms in office.161 But Dever’s loss also represented the 
                                                
158 “Black Belt Raids are Storm Center,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 10, 1927. 
159 Nearly one million of the city’s 1,143,000 registered voters visited the polls in the 1927 mayoral election. The 
Chicago Daily News Almanac and Year-Book (Chicago: Chicago Daily News Company, 1928), 762; “Thompson 
Elected Mayor of Chicago by About 70,000,” Washington Post, April 6, 1927. 
160 “Big Bill Holds 81% of Negroes’ Ballots in Poll,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 23, 1927. 
161 Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 46. 
 
 236 
rejection of the Democratic mayor’s policies by several constituencies who had swept him into 
office in 1923—European ethnic voters and black voters. Aside from his loss of black support 
following years of violent and racially discriminatory policing, Dever also drew fewer votes in 
1927 compared to 1923 among Czechoslovakian, Polish, Lithuanian, Italian, and German 
voters.162 While the mayor had tried to walk a delicate line between law and order and 
Prohibitionism, he lost support among a wide range of voting constituencies who saw their 
neighborhoods targeted by the mayor’s crime drives over the previous four years.  
Although black voters repudiated the patterns of racist policing that they endured during 
Dever’s crime drives, the election of Thompson in 1927 hardly spelled an end to discriminatory 
policing in the city; the new mayor made no promises to reform the Police Department and 
accounts of violent police harassment continued into the later years of the 1920s. Appeals to 
respectability and negotiations with city leaders failed to institute any kind of wholesale change 
in patterns of policing in the city, as officers continued to enact violence in black neighborhoods 
and to reinforce the association between blackness and criminality. The continuing role of police 
in defending and constructing urban racial hierarchy ultimately demonstrated that new protest 
and reform strategies would be necessary in order to check police violence and assert black 
rights in the industrial city.  
                                                










CRIME AND THE FOREIGN BORN: DEPORTATION DRIVES IN THE DEPRESSION YEARS 
 
It was the evening of February 22, 1926, and Guiseppe Mangogna had just settled down 
to dinner with his wife and infant son in their home on the Near North side of Chicago.1 
Giuseppe had immigrated to Chicago from Italy in 1920 and found work as a carpenter; he was 
among the nearly 60,000 other Italian immigrants who had come to reside in Chicago over the 
previous several decades.2 Perhaps he anticipated a relaxing evening at home with his family and 
his visiting brother after a long day of work, or looked forward to recounting an incident that had 
occurred in the workshop that day. But those plans were disrupted suddenly when six police 
officers burst through the front door of the Mangogna home, guns drawn. They seized Giuseppe 
and his brother Joseph, taking both men to the Chicago Police Department detective bureau, 
where they held the two brothers for six days. While the officers did have an arrest warrant for 
Joseph Mangogna, they apprehended Giuseppe without a warrant.3 Unlike his brother, Joseph 
Mangogna was an American citizen and had served in the United States military. The arresting 
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officers alleged that Joseph’s physical description did not align with the description on his 
citizenship papers; how the officers would have known that and why it should have affected his 
detention was unclear.  
Although Chicago arrest bonds were typically set between $500 and $1,000, Giuseppe 
Mangogna faced a $5,000 bond to secure his release from the detective bureau holding cell. 
George Spatuzza, a lawyer with the Italian American lawyers’ Justinian Society of Chicago, 
agreed to represent the two brothers. Although he was able to reduce the bond by half, the family 
still struggled to raise the money required to secure the release of Giuseppe and Joseph. The 
family turned to friends in their Near North Side neighborhood to help pay the bond, drawing on 
the resources of their immigrant community in order to set free the detained brothers. Eventually, 
Spatuzza delivered a huge sack of five and ten dollar bills to the Police Department detective 
bureau, securing the release of the two brothers who had been held there with crowds of other 
arrested men for nearly a week, and where they had been reportedly treated as “a bunch of 
hogs.”4 Spatuzza described the abject conditions of the city jail where the men had been held, 
“At the police station and jail they were crammed together, had to stand terribly long hours, 
crowded, pressing, and pushing each other.”5  
Giuseppe and Joseph Mangogna were among the hundreds of Chicagoans arrested in 
February and March of 1926, in one of the city’s so-called deportation drives.6 During the drive, 
police descended on immigrant neighborhoods, indiscriminately arresting residents whom they 
suspected of being recent arrivals to the city. Police delivered the arrested to district stations, 
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where they interrogated the detained about their immigration status and criminal connections. 
Prosecutors sometimes charged those arrested with minor violations but usually released them 
after a few days in police custody. Although local police officers and federal officials claimed 
that the raids were necessary in order to root out immigrants who had entered the country 
illegally, only a minuscule number of those arrested in raids like those of February 1926 were 
deported after having been found to have violated federal immigration statutes.7 The small 
number of Chicagoans deported following mass arrests and raids of immigrant neighborhoods 
contradicted the idea that this policing practice was a necessary and effective mode of enforcing 
immigration law and restriction and suggested instead that these raids were a mode of targeting 
immigrant communities. In fact, the deportation drives represented the intersection of local and 
national crime control politics in the interwar decades; they occurred in the midst of nation-wide 
xenophobia and federal restrictionist immigration policies as well as local demands for stricter 
law enforcement in the context of Prohibition.  
During the last years of Prohibition and the early years of the Great Depression, 
Chicagoans experienced a series of periodic deportation drives characterized by mass arrests of 
first and second-generation immigrants, primarily in neighborhoods on the city’s West and 
Southwest sides. Although law enforcement officials usually rationalized these mass arrests as 
necessary to enforce the country’s immigration laws, police rarely investigated immigration 
violations before the raids, instead detaining hundreds of city residents on sight for other minor 
offenses, usually without obtaining any arrest warrants. Despite the relatively small number of 
immigration law violators found through these drives, Chicago police and their federal 
collaborators continued to pursue deportation drives into the 1930s. The deportation drives were 
                                                
7 Reports indicated that fewer than ten people were deported from Chicago in the spring of 1926, following at least 
700 arrests. “The Deportation Drive of the Winter and Spring of 1926,” 1926, Box 2, Folder 24: Deportation 
Drive—Interviews, December 1926-January 1927, IPL Records. 
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caused by an intersecting set of factors—motivated by local political culture and national policy 
developments. The first drives occurred in the context of national immigration restriction and the 
rise of nativist politics, as new federal regulations severely curtailed immigration on the mid-
1920s and federal agencies encouraged anti-immigration campaigns. In Chicago, those national 
policies built on local animus towards new immigrants, particularly Italians, Mexicans, and 
Greeks. As the drives continued into the early 1930s, Mexicans increasingly became the target of 
arrests, reflecting national efforts to repatriate Mexicans in the context of national economic 
crisis.8 
While the deportation drives occurred in the context of these national immigration policy 
developments, they were also motivated and shaped by local politics and political culture, 
especially as police attempted to demonstrate their own law enforcement authority in the face of 
continuing criticisms of police corruption and laxity during Prohibition. Mayor William Dever’s 
Beer Wars had drawn critical attention to the role of criminal syndicates in the city’s illegal 
alcohol trade, syndicates associated primarily with Chicago’s Italian immigrant community. As 
some critics of police observed at the time, the mass arrests associated with the deportation 
drives served to deflect attention from law enforcement’s own inability or unwillingness to 
control criminal syndicalism. Massive indiscriminate arrests obscured the Police Department’s 
corruption and connections with the very criminal syndicates that Dever’s Beer Wars had been 
designed to detect. By the early 1930s, the Chicago Crime Commission had also renewed its 
efforts to encourage strict law enforcement in Chicago, as it issued its first “public enemies” list 
in April of 1930.9 The list named 28 known lawbreakers in Chicago and served as a public 
rallying cry for stricter policing. Just months later, a deportation drive netted hundreds of 
                                                
8 Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez, Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 98-99; Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 135. 
9 “Lists 18 Gangsters as Public Enemies,” New York Times, April 24, 1930. 
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immigrant arrests. It also incited suspicions among some city executives and immigrant 
advocates that police had actually colluded with law breakers and received payments in 
exchange for releasing many of those who had been arrested, giving the appearance of strict law 
enforcement though the exploitation of police graft.  
These local and national political factors resulted in deportation drives that worked within 
the larger complex of racialized policing in Chicago and resulted in policing strategies similar to 
those undertaken in African American neighborhoods during those same years, as police often 
performed warrantless arrest drives in black neighborhoods as well. The similarities among raids 
in black neighborhoods and deportation drives in immigrant colonies emphasized how the 
strategy of mass arrests served to discipline multiple racial others, as police exercised the power 
of the state to detain black Chicagoans without any evidence of wrongdoing and did the same to 
certain immigrant groups. The shifting focus of deportation drives in interwar Chicago also 
demonstrated how indiscriminate arrests worked as a coercive state tool to surveil and control 
multiple urban immigrant communities and attested to the shifting racial boundaries of 
criminalization in these decades. While Italians represented a foremost urban crime problem in 
the minds of city executives and law enforcement officers in the early and mid-1920s, the 
perception of that problem had shifted to other immigrant communities of color by the first years 
of the 1930s, following the curtailment of European immigration, the end of federal Prohibition, 
and the national movement for Mexican repatriation. The earliest of the deportation drives in 
1926 targeted Italian neighborhoods but also included arrests among Mexicans and Greeks. 
Police continued to arrest Italians in raids through the 1920s, but shifted their focus to Mexicans 
and Chinese in the early years of the 1930s. These changes reflected national restrictionist 
immigration politics as well as local neighborhood relations, as police curtailed Italian arrests 
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due to their connections with Italian criminal syndicates and instead targeted Mexicans and 
Chinese who were subjected to interethnic neighborhood violence in those same decades. 
Ultimately then, police raids and mass arrests in multiple neighborhoods and communities in the 
interwar decades served to reinforce a racial hierarchy in which non-whiteness in multiple forms 
was associated with criminality and other violations of federal regulations.  
 
IMMIGRATION TO CHICAGO 
From the end of the nineteenth century through the first three decades of the twentieth 
century, Chicago saw an influx of immigration as the city’s foreign-born population climbed to 
over 800,000 city residents by 1930.10 In 1890, 41 percent of Chicagoans had been born outside 
the United States; by 1910 that proportion had fallen to 35.7 percent, and by 1920 it had fallen to 
29.8 percent, but still comprised nearly a third of city residents.11 These proportions understated 
the scope of immigrant communities in Chicago, however, as they failed to account for second-
generation immigrants, who also lived in immigrant neighborhoods in the city. The total number 
of foreign-born Chicagoans in 1910 was 781,217, but the number of Chicago residents with at 
least one first generation immigrant parent numbered an additional 912,701, making the total 
number of first and second-generation immigrants in Chicago more than three quarters of the 
total population of the city.12 By 1920, the total number of first and second-generation 
immigrants in Chicago had climbed to nearly two million, accounting for over 70 percent of city 
                                                
10 Chicago was home to over thirty different ethnic immigrant groups by the interwar decades; among the most 
populous groups by 1930 were Poles (149,622), Germans (111,366), Russians (78,462), Italians (73,960), and 
Swedes (65,735). U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1930), 642-644. 
11 U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1890), 454; U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1910), 512; U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1920), 261. 
12 U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1910), 504. 
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residents.13 This immigrant population joined the growing community of African American 
Southern migrants in Chicago, meaning that vast majorities of the city’s population in the years 
after WWI were newcomers looking for jobs in the city’s growing industrial sector and 



















                                                
13 U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of the United States, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 

























FIGURE 5.1: CHICAGO POPULATION DENSITY, 192014 
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FIGURE 5.2: CHICAGO POPULATION DENSITY, 193015 
                                                
15 Minnesota Population Center, National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 2.0 (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota, 2011). 
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Surges in immigration to Chicago since the late nineteenth century in conjunction with 
black Southern migration after World War I resulted in a metropolis that was rapidly 
transforming into a diverse multiracial city in the span of just a few decades. Before WWI, the 
groups that accounted for the largest proportions of first-generation immigrants to Chicago were 
central and eastern Europeans; Russians, Germans, and Austrians comprised more than 50 
percent of foreign-born city residents in 1910, while Hungarians, Irish, and Italians—the next 
three largest groups of first-generation immigrants—comprised nearly 18 percent.16 Among 
second-generation immigrants, Irish made up a much higher proportion, reflecting an older wave 
of Irish immigration to Chicago in the nineteenth century.17 By 1920, the largest groups of first-
generation immigrants had shifted slightly, as Poles joined Russians and Germans among the 
largest proportions of foreign-born Chicagoans, with Irish, Italians, and Swedes comprising the 
next three largest groups.18 Most of those first-generation immigrants, especially those who 
found work in the city’s mass production industry, lived in neighborhoods west of the downtown 
business district, on the Southwest and South sides, and on the far Southeast side.19 
Mexicans were absent among these census totals until 1930; the United States Census 
counted Mexicans as a separate category for the first time in 1930, although the 1920 census did 
provide an estimate of the number of Mexicans in Chicago. Census enumerators estimated that 
1,141 Mexicans lived Chicago in 1920; by 1930 that number had grown to nearly 20,000, 
increasing by a factor of seventeen in just a decade and comprising approximately one percent of 
                                                
16 U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of the United States, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1910), 482. 
17 Ibid, 482; Michael F. Function, “Irish Chicago: Church, Homeland, Politics and Class—The Shaping of an Ethnic 
Group, 1870-1900,” in Ethnic Chicago: A Multicultural Portrait, ed. Melvin G. Holli and Peter d’A. Jones (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 57-58. 
18 U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of the United States, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1920), 273-274. 
19 These neighborhoods were respectively close to Chicago’s garment industries, packinghouses, and steelworks. 
Cohen, Making a New Deal, 17-21. 
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the city’s population.20 These numbers likely underestimated the number of Mexicans in Chicago 
and in other areas of the United States, however, as census enumerators were instructed to 
classify as Mexican “all persons born in Mexico, or having parents born in Mexico, who are not 
definitely white, Negro, Indian, Chinese, or Japanese.”21 These instructions left significant 
discretion to census enumerators to categorize Mexican persons under a different racial category 
and excluded Mexicans beyond second-generation immigrants. However, since Mexican 
immigration to Chicago had a relatively recent history in the 1920s and 1930s, the estimates of 
the Mexican population there may have been more accurate than the estimates in the Southwest 
borderlands, where Mexican communities were much older.22 Like their African American 
counterparts who had migrated from the American South, early-twentieth-century Mexican 
immigrants came to Chicago along rail lines that stretched south, many taking jobs for railroad 
companies that eventually brought them to the Midwest. By the interwar decades, others came to 
Chicago after working seasonal agricultural jobs in surrounding states.23 
This influx of immigrants to Chicago over the course of just a few decades prompted the 
city’s Progressive social reformers to establish organizations to aid in immigrant settlement and 
adjustment to life in the city. Jane Addams opened Hull House in 1889, a settlement house 
located on the city’s Near West Side, a neighborhood that was home to a diverse range of newly 
                                                
20 U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of the United States, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1920), 261; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the Fifteenth Census of the United States (Washington, 
DC: US Government Printing Office, 1933), 98. 
21 U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1930), 263. 
22 Taylor, Mexican Labor in the United States, 26-27. 
23 In her study of Mexican Chicago before WWII, Gabriela Arredondo emphasizes the fact that many Mexicans 
found themselves in Chicago after taking a circuitous route from their country of origin as chain migration and 




arrived immigrants.24 Hull House provided educational opportunities and social gatherings for 
residents of the Near West Side neighborhood, as well as classes on literature, art, and domestic 
activities. The residents of Hull House—a group of predominantly white women reformers and 
social workers who volunteered to live at the house and provide services to its neighbors—also 
conducted extensive research in the surrounding area, providing analyses of urban problems and 
conditions including immigrant adjustment, child labor, welfare and charity work, and industrial 
unionism.25 Hull House served as a model for other settlement houses founded in the city in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including Graham Taylor’s Chicago Commons and 
the Northwestern University Settlement House, which provided educational and social services 
to newly arrived immigrants and working class city residents.26 Through the proliferation of 
settlement houses like these, aid to new immigrants and other working class Chicagoans became 
locally institutionalized by private philanthropic organizations. 
Settlement houses provided services and education to immigrants in their respective local 
neighborhoods, but by the first decade of the twentieth century, some Chicago reformers 
concluded that the work of immigrant adjustment would be more efficiently achieved by a 
centralized organization that could provide assistance in housing and employment to all who 
arrived in the city. Grace Abbott, a University-of-Chicago-trained social worker and resident of 
Hull House, left the settlement house in 1908 to help establish the League for the Protection of 
Immigrants, later called the Immigrants’ Protective League (IPL). Jane Addams praised the work 
of the new organization in its first annual report in 1910 and recommended that the centralized 
                                                
24 In 1895, the residents of Hull House produced a series of maps representing the racial and national composition of 
its Near West Side neighborhood. The maps catalogued a wide range of ethnic and racial groups living within a few 
blocks of one another—they included Irish, German, Dutch, Russian, Polish, Italian, Swiss, French, Bohemian, 
Chinese, and African American households. Hull-House Maps and Papers: A Presentation of Nationalities and 
Wages in a Congested District of Chicago (New York: T.Y. Crowell & Company, 1895). 
25 The 1895 Hull House publication Hull House Maps and Papers included essays on these topics written by 
residents including Florence Kelley, Ellen Gates Starr, and Jane Addams. Ibid. 
26 John P. Gavit, “A Story of Chicago Commons,” Chicago Commons (1899), 5-11. 
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bureau “is able not only to take care of the exceptional cases much more effectively than a 
settlement could do…but that new needs and possibilities are constantly discovered through this 
opportunity to treat as a whole the Chicago immigrant situation.”27 In its first few years of work, 
the IPL advocated for the reestablishment of a federal immigration bureau in the city and worked 
with local officials to prioritize the needs of new immigrant communities.28 Volunteers and 
employees of the League also visited the homes of newly arrived immigrant women and young 
men, collaborated with employment agencies to secure immigrant jobs, gathered information 
regarding immigrant exploitation by employers and other offices, and worked to prevent the 
entry of immigrant women into prostitution.29 This wide range of advocacy work meant that the 
League addressed the immediate needs of newly arrived immigrants to Chicago and attempted to 
affect institutional and policy changes to make adjustment an easier process.  
This attention to immigrant adjustment among Progressive reformers brought into relief 
the similarities and differences between the experiences of foreign-born Chicagoans and African 
Americans. The Immigrants’ Protective League provided similar services for immigrants as the 
Chicago Urban League did for the city’s growing African American population. In fact, there 
was overlap in leadership and funding support between the two organizations; both drew on a 
similar pool of Progressively minded elites for fundraising contributions and exhibited a reform 
ideology of socialized uplift services. In his introduction to the first annual report of the Chicago 
Urban League in 1917, CUL president Robert Park drew parallels between the work of the two 
organizations, beginning his remarks “The problem with the Negro in Chicago is, on the whole, 
one with the problem of the immigrant. Work and wages, health and housing, the difficulties of 
                                                
27 “League for the Protection of Immigrants, Annual Report,” 1909-1910, Box 4-SII, Folder 59a: Annual Reports 
I—1909-1916, IPL Records 




adjustment of an essentially rural population to the conditions of a city environment, and to 
modern life—these are the matters of most immediate concern to him and to us.”30 Park 
acknowledged that there were notable differences between the immigrant and African American 
experiences in Chicago, however; the latter enjoyed legal citizenship while many immigrants 
were still unnaturalized, and African Americans were generally not the targets of wartime 
xenophobia. He continued by contrasting the experiences of immigrants and African Americans 
in Chicago with respect to racial and ethnic hierarchy. Park lamented that black city residents 
suffered due to a racial prejudice from which their immigrant counterparts were exempted. He 
conceded, “A certain amount of prejudice against the “ignorant foreigner” no doubt exists. But it 
does not assume, as it tends to do in the case of the Negro, the fixed and permanent form of 
caste.”31 
This perceived difference between ethnicity and race reflected historical processes of 
immigrant adjustment in Chicago, where some immigrant communities had become upwardly 
mobile over time and eventually became integrated in municipal institutions of power. However, 
strict contrasts between these axes of difference glossed over historically contingent forms of 
social hierarchy faced by both immigrants and African Americans in Chicago, especially as they 
both encountered local power brokers such as police. As president of the Chicago Urban League, 
Park oversaw the work of placing thousands of newly arrived black Southern migrants in jobs 
and housing in Chicago, where many industrial employers refused to hire black workers and 
where housing options were so delimited as to restrict most black city residents to the narrow 
South Side Black Belt. He spoke from experience, then, in describing the structural barriers that 
black Southern migrants faced upon their arrival in the Northern city. But in contrasting the 
                                                
30 “First Annual Report of the Chicago League on Urban Conditions Among Negroes,” October 1917, p. 3, Series I: 




experiences of African Americans to those of immigrant Chicagoans, Park also assumed a fairly 
linear process of improvement and adjustment among newly arrived immigrants. In Park’s 
analysis, new immigrants may have faced discrimination or exclusion but would eventually 
progress into the ranks of unqualified whiteness with the passage of time and the accumulation 
of subsequent generations. The actual experiences of immigrant Chicagoans, however, especially 
across ethnic and spatial boundaries, belied the idea of a linear progression of wholesale 
immigrant incorporation and adjustment. Instead, certain immigrants to Chicago were regularly 
subjected to undue police scrutiny, indiscriminate arrests, and disproportionate criminalization 
just as many African Americans had been since the beginning of the first Great Migration. These 
incidents of police discrimination—such as the 1920s deportation drives—suggested that the 
decriminalization of immigrant Chicagoans was hardly the linear process that Park assumed, but 
was instead an uneven one that depended on the local politics of crime control. 
The patterns of police discrimination and warrantless arrest that many immigrants faced 
in Chicago reflected the intersection of local crime control politics with national xenophobia, 
restrictionist immigration policies, and anti-immigrant sentiments fostered by years of federal 
Prohibition.32 Post-WWI xenophobia and anti-radicalism had merged with a resurgence of 
scientific racialist thinking to produce a national political climate of hostility toward immigration 
that fostered restrictionist federal legislation that strictly limited the number of new arrivals to 
the country. Congress had first legislated immigration quotas in 1921, as nativist sympathizers 
such as the American Legion, the American Federation of Labor, and the American Protective 
Association warned that waves of impoverished people would soon flock to the United States as 
they fled from war-torn Europe.33 Advocates of racialism bolstered these political objections to 
                                                
32 McGirr, The War on Alcohol, 33-34. 
33 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 19-20. 
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immigration with tomes lamenting the influx of “new immigrants” to the shores of the United 
States, positing a hierarchy of immigrants that placed Nordic peoples at the top and 
Mediterranean and other Southern European people at the bottom. These academics and 
intellectuals suggested that new immigrants represented a degraded race, using supposedly 
scientific evidence regarding physical characteristics, social customs, and hereditary traits. In so 
doing, they provided a supposedly empirical foundation for restrictionist legislation that targeted 
Southern European immigrants for some of the most severe limitations.34 
While some nativists supported absolute bans on immigration, Congress eventually 
passed an emergency measure in 1921 that limited immigration to 355,000 people per year and 
set limits on European-origin immigration at three percent of the number of foreign-born United 
States residents counted in the 1910 Census.35 Congress revised this measure in 1924, when it 
passed the Johnson-Reed bill, which limited immigration to 155,000 people per year and 
mandated the establishment of national origins quotas based on the national origins of the entire 
United States population as measured by the 1920 census.36 Following the passage of the act, the 
Departments of Commerce, Labor, and State convened a Quota Board led by statistician Joseph 
A. Hill to determine the formulation of national origin quotas prescribed in the bill. His 
formulation for immigration quotas guaranteed that southern and eastern European immigration 
would be significantly restricted; the formula provided that only 16 percent of new immigrants 
would come from southern and eastern Europe, while 84 percent would come from northern and 
                                                
34 Among the most influential advocates of racialism and Nordic supremacy was zoologist Madison Grant, author of 
The Passing of the Great Race, in which he argued that race was the most important determinant of human history 
and that the purity of the white race must be preserved. Grant was joined in his racialist thinking by other academics 
including sociologist Henry Pratt Fairchild and paleontologist Henry Fairfield Osborn, among others. Guglielmo, 
White on Arrival, 60-61. 
35 An Act to Limit the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, Public Law 5, US Statutes at Large, 42 (1921), 5-
7. 
36 An Act to Limit the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, and For Other Purposes, Public Law 139, US 
Statutes at Large, 43 (1924), 153-169. 
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western Europe.37 While the bill used the language of “national origins” to determine 
immigration quotas, it excluded immigrants from the Western hemisphere, immigrants ineligible 
for citizenship, and descendants of slaves or Native Americans from the determination of quotas. 
The Quota Board mapped these provisions onto the racial categories of the 1920 census, using 
only those counted in the “white” racial category to determine the distribution of national origins 
quotas.38 This intersection of national origins categories with racial markers effectively limited 
the political and legal boundaries of the nation to white, European-origin peoples, with a 
preference for those from northern and western European climes.39 
 
CHICAGO’S DEPORTATION DRIVES 
By the middle of the 1920s, national anti-immigration politics and the passage of the 
Immigration Act of 1924 had produced a context in which local crime control politics in Chicago 
were ripe to turn attention to the problem of immigrant crime and particularly to target new 
immigrant populations for arrest. The city’s interwar deportation drives, however, were not 
singularly motivated by anti-immigrant politics, but came about due to locally contingent 
developments in crime control politics, particularly Mayor William Dever’s law and order 
administration and the city-wide Beer Wars, accusations of official corruption by criminal justice 
reformers, and ongoing bootlegging and violent crime associated with newly arrived 
immigrants.40 Mayor Dever had initiated the city’s Beer Wars just a year before the passage of 
the Immigration Act and that attempt to drive all alcohol from the city prompted accusations 
                                                
37 This formulation was introduced by Senator David Reed and restrictionist John Trevor and heavily influenced by 
the work of Madison Grant, the author of the 1924 tract The Passing of the Great Race. Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 
22. 
38 Ibid, 26. 
39 Ibid. 
40 See chapter 4 for a discussion of the political circumstances surrounding the 1923 Beer Wars. 
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among anti-crime reformers and some city executives that the source of bootlegging and 
associated violent crime was newly arrived immigrants. Others, however, turned attention to the 
police themselves suggesting that patrolmen and police leaders fostered the alcohol trade in order 
to reap financial rewards.41 Such criticisms prompted dramatic demonstrations of Chicago police 
capacity and encouraged massive raids in immigrant neighborhoods, much like those that 
occurred in African American neighborhoods in the same years. 
The immigrant incrimination associated with Chicago’s localized Beer Wars predicted 
and precipitated nation-wide efforts to deport immigrants who had entered the country illegally 
in the following years. In February of 1924, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported that the federal 
Secretary of Labor had completed preparations for a “drive to round up and deport the gangs of 
alien gunmen which are terrorizing Chicago.”42 It was the editor of the notoriously anti-
immigrant and anti-labor Tribune who had brought the situation in Chicago to the attention of 
federal officials, demonstrating how local political rivalries could inflect federal law enforcement 
efforts as the editors beckoned immigration officials to Chicago. Officials at the Department of 
Labor promised that they would root out those “aliens whose lawlessness has intimidated an 
entire community,” framing the targeting of immigrants for deportation as a law enforcement 
imperative to protect the safety of Chicago residents.43 Secretary of Labor Davis concluded that 
the only way to curtail this assumed wave of immigrant criminality would be to expand state 
surveillance, opining that “We never shall be able to put an end to the smuggling of criminals 
                                                
41 “Statement by Mayor William E. Dever,” September 12, 1923, Box 4, Folder 30: Dever, William E. –Mayoralty 
Papers, Police Department (Internal Operations, etc.), 1923-1924, Dever Papers. 
42 “OFFICIALS WADE INTO HUGE TASK OF DEPORTATION: Deluge of Cases and Drought of Funds,” 
Chicago Daily Tribune, February 17, 1926. 
43 Arthur Sears Henning, “Deport Chicago Gangs—US: Halt Sicilian Gunmen, Washington Demands,” Chicago 
Daily Tribune, February 12, 1926. 
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and other undesirable aliens into this country until the registration of aliens is required.”44 He 
assumed such a system would aid the Department of Labor in identifying those who might break 
criminal laws; his idea echoed earlier proposals from the Chicago Crime Commission, that all 
Chicagoans who had been found guilty of committing a crime be registered in a statewide 
database. Here the Department of Labor and Secretary Davis made the same assumption that 
anti-crime businessmen in Chicago had made for years—that the accumulation of knowledge 
about crime would ultimately lead to robust crime control. 
This federal attention to the crime conditions in Chicago came on the heels of sensational 
headlines that declared an age of “gun terrorism” in the city, announcements that were common 
in the context of the Beer Wars and the violent gang confrontations that had triggered that anti-
crime campaign. The Tribune claimed that some city residents had recently refused to sit on the 
juries of the murder trials of two Sicilian men for fear that they would be in danger if they voted 
to convict. Describing the supposed crisis of jury service, the Tribune claimed, “Almost 1,000 
murders in Chicago in the last twenty years are blamed by police on Sicilians,” using a passive 
construction that tellingly concealed whether police had reasonable suspicion that violent crimes 
were actually disproportionately committed by Italian-origin Chicagoans.45 Deputy Police Chief 
John Stege complained that his department had been trying to eliminate the supposedly criminal 
immigrant element from the city, but that many who had been arrested were able to post bond 
before the Chicago Police received a deportation warrant from the federal immigration office as 
it often took several weeks to receive action from federal officials.46 Stege’s lamentation about 
the bureaucratic lag between local and federal law enforcement implied that intra-state 
                                                
44 Chicago Crime Commission, Bulletin of the Chicago Crime Commission, February 8, 1923, p. 56, MRC; Arthur 
Sears Henning, “Deport Chicago Gangs—US: Halt Sicilian Gunmen, Washington Demands,” Chicago Daily 
Tribune, February 12, 1926. 




collaboration would be necessary in order to address the assumed problem of immigrant 
criminality. 
These claims about the outsized criminality of immigrants in Chicago served to obscure 
the role of local police officers themselves in the criminal syndicates that operated the city’s 
bootlegging market. Deputy Police Chief’s Stege comments about immigrant connections to 
crime absolved the many police who had relationships with city gangs and offered protection to 
houses of prostitution or saloons that trafficked in illegal alcohol. When Mayor Dever announced 
the initiation of the Beer Wars campaign in 1923, he also announced that he would direct police 
administrators to root out police corruption and graft, joining the problems of illegal alcohol and 
violence with the problem of police corruption.47 Stege’s comments about immigrant crime in 
the days before the initiation of the city’s first deportation drives in 1926, however, erased the 
problems of police corruption and graft from the anti-crime agenda of city executives, shifting 
the focus of anti-crime efforts entirely onto immigrant communities themselves. In the first days 
of mass arrests of immigrants in February 1926, local labor organizer Joseph Miller suggested as 
much, telling a group of Italian Chicagoans that the arrests were “fostered by race hatred,” rather 
than a sincere effort to eradicate crime. He further implicated city officials in local organized 
crime, claiming that the only reason gangs had proliferated in the city was because “certain 
politicians, judges, county and state officials demand that they vote 15 to 100 times for them for 
office…Then those men get a gun out and use it. When they get caught they demand that the 
politicians take care of them and square it, which is usually done.”48 According to Miller’s 
                                                
47 “Mayor, Collins Open War on Police Graft,” Chicago Journal, September 12, 1923, Volume 22: During office, 
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remarks, immigrant crime—particularly organized crime—that did exist in Chicago was not the 
product of any kind of innate proclivity to criminality, but had been fostered by local city leaders.  
The Tribune’s warnings about the dangers of immigrant criminals and the promises by 
Department of Labor officials that federal enforcement would turn its attention to Chicago 
ushered in weeks of mass arrests by Chicago police officers in February and March of 1926. The 
Tribune trumpeted these waves of arrests as a triumphant show of state strength; reporting on the 
first night of raids, it described a “concerted hunt for deportable aliens” that resulted in 121 
arrests in one evening.49 Two nights later, the Tribune reported that the “raiding squads” had 
again visited predominantly Italian West Side neighborhoods, netting an additional 90 arrests.50 
Deputy Police Chief Stege assumed responsibility for managing the raids and described the 
initial arrests as highly satisfactory to the department’s crime control efforts. He explained, “It’s 
not that we are getting so many of the real bad ones, but that we are finding out that there is a 
general exodus of Sicilian gunmen from Chicago. If our men can’t find them, it’s a good sign 
they have jumped town.”51 Although his statement was cloaked in optimism, Stege’s remarks 
indicated that the raids had actually failed to apprehend many associates of crime syndicates, 
whom police and federal officials had named as the targets of the anti-crime drive during the 
preceding weeks. Instead, they netted hundreds of immigrants with no ties to organized crime. 
Stege’s tone belied any irony, as he declared that the mass arrests of Chicagoans without 
connections to criminal syndicates actually indicated the success of the police in driving crime 
from the city.  
Those first nights of mass arrests targeted Italian neighborhoods on the city’s West side 
and particularly new Italian immigration from Sicily. Reports on the raids in the Chicago 
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Tribune repeatedly reminded readers that the police sought “Sicilian gunmen” who had 
supposedly been smuggled into the country by criminal syndicates. In his study of Italian 
immigration to Chicago, Thomas Guglielmo notes that this targeting of Sicilians marked 
recent—“new”—immigration from Italy as the greatest crime problem in the city and contributed 
to more generalized conclusions about the innate criminality of Italians.52 The police targeting of 
Italian neighborhoods also reflected the agenda of Dever’s Beer Wars; the violent confrontation 
between the Southwest side O’Bannion gang and Al Capone’s Italian syndicate in September of 
1923 had focused police attention on ethnic gangs and associated violent crime.53 In its report on 
the mass arrests of February and March of 1926, the Immigrants’ Protective League noted that 
police initiated the drive after “an upheaval in the criminal stratum” during which “A series of 
gang murders took place which shocked the community and apparently baffled the police.”54 
This escalation of gang violence brought to mind the events that had triggered the Beer Wars in 
1923, and the IPL’s description of the circumstances surrounding the first deportation drive 
indicated that similar concerns about ethnic gang violence circulated in public discourse at the 
time.  
Events of the ensuing weeks demonstrated that local law enforcement efforts were not 
singularly focused on Italians as a source of crime and supposed illegal immigration to Chicago, 
however. As federal pressure to crack down on immigration restrictions and criminal 
syndicalism continued, police expanded mass arrests to other neighborhoods on the Southwest 
side, in areas of the city that were home to Mexican immigrants. During the first week of March, 
police arrested 97 Mexicans, whom they had “rounded up in lodging houses, poolrooms, and 
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cafes in South Ashland Avenue.”55 According to one report, police took arrested Mexicans to the 
Chicago Police bureau of identification, examined their criminal records, and allowed federal 
immigration officials to question them about their residency status. These events indicated how 
the deportation drive resulted in the surveillance of Chicagoans by multiple state agencies and at 
multiple scales, as Italians and then Mexicans were subjected to scrutiny first by local law 
enforcement officers and then by federal officials.  
Dragnet arrests of Mexicans had been commonplace since the expansion of Mexican 
Chicago after the First World War. During the 1920s and 1930s, residents of Mexican 
neighborhoods cited numerous incidents of indiscriminate arrests following a report or suspicion 
that a Mexican immigrant had committed a crime, similarly to the indiscriminate arrests that 
occurred among African American neighborhoods in that same decade.56 Beyond patrolmen 
prejudices or assumptions that Mexicans were predisposed to crime, disproportionate arrests of 
Mexicans in the interwar decades also reflected the ethnic political landscape of Chicago’s 
Southwest side, where the growing Mexican community had repeatedly clashed with their Irish 
and Polish neighbors, many of whom were employed by the Police Department.57 Sociologists 
and settlement workers noted ongoing violent conflicts among these ethnic colonies in the 
interwar years, especially as Polish or Irish gangs targeted Mexican men in incidents of street 
violence.58 That interethnic tension and violence translated in criminalization throughout the 
1920s and especially in 1926 in the context of the first deportation drive. By the first week of 
March, many of the Italian Chicagoans who had been subject to arrest in the first weeks of the 
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drive had fled to surrounding suburbs in order to escape the jurisdiction of the Chicago Police 
Department.59 Under continuing pressure to demonstrate law enforcement proficiency and to 
enforce federal immigration restrictions, patrolmen directed their attention to Mexican 
neighborhoods instead, in order to continue the deportation drive.  
The expansion of the 1926 deportation drive demonstrated the role of local police in 
constructing and enforcing a racial hierarchy that marked non-whiteness as criminal and 
deserving of disproportionate state surveillance. The shift to Mexican neighborhoods and the 
significant number of Mexicans arrested during the drive demonstrated that this crime control 
campaign was not singularly an expression of anti-Italian sentiment or only an attempt to quash 
Italian criminal syndicates like the Capone outfit or the Genna brothers gang. While early reports 
on the drive did indicated that it began with a focus on Italian neighborhoods, the expansion of 
the drive demonstrated that it ultimately functioned as a more generalized targeting of new 
immigrants to Chicago. One federal agent suggested that it was the Chicago police themselves—
the local law enforcement state—that encouraged this change in the focus of the drive. As he told 
officers of the Immigrants’ Protective League “I was not ready for this work. I had my men out 
quietly matching different suspects and places, gathering evidence,” implying that the dragnet 
arrest tactics and indiscriminate policing was the result of collaboration with the Chicago Police 
Department.60 These raids and hundreds of arrests in a single night also mirrored the tactics that 
Chicago police had deployed in African American neighborhoods since the growth of black 
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Chicago during the Great Migration, as they periodically invaded black neighborhoods 
supposedly in search of one or two criminal offenders.  
Although police and federal officials had declared the raids a necessary crime control 
measure to root out those who had violated immigration regulations, annual data from the 
Chicago Police Department eventually showed that the drive had actually discovered only a 
small number of persons eligible for deportation. In its annual report for 1926, the department 
compiled data on the disposition of cases that it had submitted to federal officials, revealing that 
only ten cases investigated by the Chicago Police Department had resulted in deportation for 
violation of the Immigration Act, a minuscule number compared to the over 200 people who had 
been arrested over the course of the month of raids.61 Additionally, the total number of charges 
leveled against Italians according to Police Department data did not rise appreciably between 
1925 and 1926, implying that police lacked standing to charge most of the many Italians arrested 
during the deportation drive. Arrests that did not result in charges were not captured by this data, 
which obscured the excess arrests, most of which occurred without warrants.  
By mid-March 1926, the drive to arrest and deport immigrants from Chicago ended 
nearly as abruptly as it had begun, with few precise reasons given for the curtailment of the raids. 
Nearly a month after the drive had begun, Deputy Police Chief John Stege continued to lead 
bands of patrolmen into immigrant neighborhoods, but the arrests dwindled. Stege told reporters 
that only four men with criminal records were arrested during a sweep of nearly thirty locations 
on March 20, speculating “that most of the gangsters have left Chicago for Cicero.”62 Even 
though police apparently found few to arrest in these final nights of the drive, descriptions of the 
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raids attested to the violent policing they occasioned, as “raiders carried tear bombs and in two of 
the places the crowds were cowed by these.”63 
 
IMMIGRANT POLITICS AND CRITIQUE IN THE INTERWAR YEARS 
Although the number of immigrant arrests declined by the end of March 1926, the 
deportation drive drew increasing criticism from state officials as well as city residents. Despite 
the fact that Chicago Police had received the support of the federal Department of Labor, there 
was not a consensus among federal officials that the local drive to arrest immigrants was an 
effective means of crime control. In the waning weeks of arrests, Edwin A. Olson, the United 
States District Attorney for Illinois’s northern district, condemned the drive, declaring it “nothing 
but a smoke screen to shield those chargeable with the enforcement of the laws.”64 Notably, 
Olson did not argue that this anti-crime drive unfairly targeted immigrant Chicagoans for 
nativistic or xenophobic reasons, but simply that it was an ineffective crime control measure. 
Rather than being unjust or discriminatory, he opined that the drive was simply, “Hopelessly 
ineffective…born in excitement and designed to cover up shortcomings in local law 
enforcement.”65 Here Olson echoed critiques that had emerged among members of the Chicago 
Crime Commission, claiming that the biggest problem with local law enforcement was a lack of 
efficiency, calling instead for swift punishment in order to deter crime. While these critiques 
gestured to the inefficacy of mass arrests as a crime control measure, they elided the 
discriminatory dimensions of arrest drives that targeted immigrant neighborhoods, and the racial 
and social hierarchies that undergirded them.  
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Other critiques of the raids questioned the efficacy of the strategy as a crime control 
measure while also drawing attention to the discriminatory nature of the drive. During the first 
week of arrests, while police targeted Italian neighborhoods, the Forward, a local Jewish paper, 
heaped blame for the drive at the feet of the publishers of the Chicago Daily Tribune, which had 
earned a reputation as ardently anti-immigrant and anti-labor. The Forward accused the Tribune 
of being “a bitter enemy of all the foreign-born in America,” and further suggested that the paper 
had invoked the specter of crime and gangsterism in order to pursue its own agenda of 
“deport[ing] those coming from the southern part of Italy and from Sicily.”66 According to the 
Forward, those reports had resulted in “a dangerous and poisonous campaign of race 
discrimination against a nationality.”67 The Forward did not claim that the crime problem had 
been invented as a convenient excuse to round up suspected criminal immigrants, but rather that 
the focus on a few national groups was misplaced and contributed to the false association 
between foreignness and criminality. Like Olson, the Forward concluded that the drive was 
simply bad crime control policy, as “It is silly to try to convince anyone that by deporting a few 
hundred gangsters we shall eradicate the plague of gangsterism in America.”68 Here the Forward 
dramatically overstated the outcome of the drive even as it critiqued the strategy, as Police 
Department records showed that only a handful were deported, rather than the hundreds that the 
local paper predicted. 
Other coverage of the 1926 Chicago deportation drive explicitly connected the raids to 
the nativist politics that had animated calls for immigration restrictions and national origin 
quotas in the early 1920s. The Lithuanian communist newspaper Vilnis published a series of 
editorials in February and March of 1926, alerting its readership to the threat of anti-immigrant 
                                                





legislation in Congress. In addition to the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, the paper warned that other 
bills threatened to impose limitations on immigrants living in the United States “and keep them 
under constant surveillance as if they were criminals out of jail on parole.”69 Vilnis called for 
organization and protest to combat these kinds of measures, which it posited as the political 
motivation that underlay the mass arrests that had been visited upon Italian and Mexican 
neighborhoods. It also suggested that the drives were designed not only to attack immigrants but 
also to target working-class immigrants who comprised the bulk of the city’s industrial 
workforce. It warned that additional legislation that would facilitate the process of deportation 
would ultimately have the effect of weakening immigrant-populated labor unions, turning federal 
immigration regulation into a strikebreaking mechanism.70  
The deportation drive also drew the attention of the Immigrants’ Protective League, 
which conducted an investigation of the raids in the months after the mass arrests had stopped. 
Agents from the IPL interviewed residents of the targeted neighborhoods and spoke to lawyers 
who had helped those who had been arrested. In its final report, the IPL explained that the 
inquiry was necessary “to set forth the facts concerning an episode which achieved spectacular 
publicity, aroused a wave of unwholesome and dangerous anti-alien sentiment and resulted in the 
oppression of law-abiding foreign-born residents of this community, rather than in the detection 
of the serious crimes from which the community needed protection.”71 This conclusion echoed 
several of the critiques that had been lodged during the weeks of raids in February and March—
namely, that the drive was ineffective crime control policy and that it had the ancillary effect of 
fomenting anti-immigrant sentiments in Chicago. Reports that had appeared in the pages of the 
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Tribune and some of the other major dailies during the weeks of raids had highlighted the arrests 
of suspected or known associates of some of the city’s most notorious criminal syndicates, such 
as Al Capone’s outfit and the Genna brothers gang. Investigations of the raids by the Immigrants’ 
Protective League, however, indicated that the arrests were hardly so targeted, but rather 
indiscriminately meted out among the city’s Italian, Greek, and Mexican neighborhoods. Few 
news items during the raids themselves had noted the arrests of Greeks during the deportation 
drive, but the IPL discovered the targeting of Greeks through its interviews in immigrant 
neighborhoods. The disclosure that Greeks had also been a target for arrests and possible 
deportations further suggested that the raids had not simply been an anti-Italian effort, but rather 
represented a broader attempt to root out new immigrants. 
Investigators for the Immigrants’ Protective League sought to discover how many 
Chicagoans had been affected by the 1926 deportation drive but struggled to navigate the 
bureaucratic opacity that obscured the total number of persons arrested. Investigators noted that 
rumors had circulated “that the Chicago Police Department had ‘swept up’ seven hundred 
suspects,” although news reports had placed the total closer to 200.72 Initial estimates of the 
number of Mexicans arrested had been fewer than 20, but a survey of the Spanish-language 
weekly newspaper Mexico revealed that 97 Mexicans had actually been detained in the raids, 
second only to the number of Italians arrested.73 According to that paper, police had received an 
order to arrest “those men who seem to be out of work most of the time…with the idea of 
cleaning up the society from those kind of men who may be responsible for the frequent crimes 
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committed in this city.”74 Such a directive was unconfirmed by police sources, but the suggestion 
that police targeted working-class Mexicans demonstrated an assumed conflation among poverty, 
non-whiteness, and criminality, resulting in the arrest of nearly 100 Mexican city residents. 
Other evidence gathered over the course of the IPL investigation indicated that policing 
and police violence was an integral component to the construction of a racial hierarchy in 
Chicago that did not operate along a black/white binary, but one that criminalized non-whiteness 
more generally. When IPL investigators interviewed members of the Sociedad Mexicana 
Protectora del Cantiro, one man recounted a story about the type of mistreatment that Mexicans 
typically endured from Chicago police officers. He told the investigators the story of an elderly 
Mexican man who had been walking along Halstead Street when he was attacked by a group of 
young Italian men. The men beat him, leaving him prone in the street. The Mexican man 
struggled to his feet and searched for a police officer to whom he could report the attack. But 
when he found a patrolman “The police officer took the man to the nearest alley and once there, 
he clubbed his head and finished the job which the Italians had begun.”75 Not only was this 
Mexican man subjected to white racial violence, but also to state violence and police 
discrimination. Rather than arrest the group who attacked the unassuming man, the officer 
endorsed the violent attack through non-intervention and the subjected the man to further 
brutality. The anecdote also echoed stories that black Chicagoans had recounted for years, 
particularly during the days of the 1919 Race Riot, as police often stood idly by during incidents 
of white racial violence, refused to arrest white Chicagoans who had attacked black neighbors, or 
participated in racial violence themselves.  
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Ultimately, the Immigrants’ Protective League concluded that the most egregious 
consequences of the drive were the many Constitutional violations that it engendered and the 
reinforcement of the idea that all immigrants to Chicago were prone to criminality. According to 
the IPL, Chicago Police had obtained few if any warrants in pursuit of the drive; the hundreds of 
detainments over a few weeks were the results of massive warrantless arrests and “wholesale 
dragnet arrests do not wait upon the issue of legal warrants.”76 According to one arrested man, 
“Only those who had no political pull were kept in jail…those who paid $50.00 or more were not 
arrested.”77 Although reports on the drive in the Chicago Tribune had promised that the police 
sought those with connections to organized crime, this interview suggested that the close ties 
between many police and criminal syndicates meant that it was actually those without 
connections to organized crime who represented the primary targets for arrest. Investigators for 
the IPL argued that it was the arrest of those persons that represented the greatest problem, “The 
fact that defenseless persons not guilty of crime and not found illegally in this country were 
deprived of liberty for days or weeks—stands out as a very disquieting feature of this episode.”78 
These “defenseless persons” would have included people like Giuseppe Mangogna, the Italian 
man whom police had snatched from his own home on the evening of February 22nd. Without any 
connections to the criminal gangs that were supposedly the target of the raids, Mangogna had 
struggled to raise the steep bond levied against him, turning to his neighbors to raise the funds 
and demonstrating the potential of crime drives to sap resources from immigrant communities.  
By the time the Immigrants’ Protective League had compiled its report, a refrain had 
emerged among those who criticized the deportation drive—it was bad crime control policy. 
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Some, such as the United States Attorney Edward Olson, suggested that rather than the actual 
curtailment of crime, the object of the drive had been the public demonstration of law 
enforcement authority and capacity. Others, including the editors of some of the city’s foreign 
language newspapers and members of the Immigrants’ Protective League, pointed to the fact that 
most of the people arrested in the drive actually had no connections to crime at all, nor had they 
violated federal immigration regulations. These critics concluded that they drive simply resulted 
in marking Chicago’s foreign-born population as criminal without cause to do so and generally 
failed to root out members of criminal syndicates or gangs who had been involved in urban 
violence during the Prohibition years. Ultimately, then, a range of actors had produced similar 
critiques; those who prioritized state power and law enforcement efficiency and those who 
sympathized with Chicago’s immigrant communities concluded that the drives had failed to 
achieve the goal of crime control.  
 
DEPORTATION DRIVES IN THE DEPRESSION YEARS 
The 1926 deportation drive represented one of the most dramatic episodes of the 
discriminatory policing of immigrants in Chicago during the interwar decades, and the practice 
continued to occur periodically if less extensively over the coming years. In December of 1926, 
the Chicago Herald Examiner revealed that a new plan was underway “to weed out ‘undesirable’ 
aliens in the Chicago crime belt,” an effort recently announced by the chief investigator of the 
federal naturalization bureau.79 While the deportation drive of February had elicited news reports 
that celebrated the productive collaboration between federal and local law enforcement officials 
in rooting out supposedly criminal immigrants, reports in December instead indicated tensions 
among those same state actors. On December 15th, United States Commissioner of Immigration 
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Harry E. Hull announced that the Chicago office was seriously understaffed “because of the lack 
of a sufficient appropriation by Congress.”80 Another headline that same day put a finer point on 
the issue—declaring “Crime Aided by Penurious Uncle Sam,” and claiming that despite the 
hundreds of arrests just a few months earlier “Practically all the most dangerous gangsters 
escaped the government’s dragnet,” contradicting reports from February that the deportation 
drive had been a rousing success.81  
While the mass arrests of February 1926 had elicited critiques that the strategy was bad 
crime control policy, the idea that strict law and order and robust policing were the best 
deterrents to illegal activity still circulated in public discourse. Despite charges that the strategy 
of mass arrests had not succeeded in curtailing crime due to inadequate state resources, the 
strategy continued to muster support among city residents who espoused a strict law and order 
politics, such members of the Chicago Crime Commission and those who had supported Dever’s 
election in 1923. In a letter to the Los Angeles Times in June of 1927, one former resident of 
Chicago declared his decision to leave the city for good, as he doubted the state was strong 
enough “to overcome the defiance and law breaking of the politically controlled foreign 
element.”82 He asserted, “Deportation is the only cure,” arguing that only strict immigration 
control and punitive crime control measures could succeed in reducing crime in the city, echoing 
the claims that had appeared in the pages of the Chicago Daily Tribune the previous few year. 
Declarations of police and immigration officials’ plans to enforce immigration 
restrictions strictly continued to appear in the pages of Chicago’s major dailies in the late 1920s, 
particularly in the notoriously anti-immigrant Chicago Daily Tribune, demonstrating the 
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continuing salience of the nativist politics that had provided for the passage of restrictionist 
legislation in the early 1920s. A political cartoon—“Give ‘Em the Boot!”—that appeared in the 
pages of the Tribune in September 1928 indicated that the editors of the paper continued to view 
Sicilians and the foreign-born as the most significant crime problems in the city. The cartoon 
depicted a group of menacing figures toting guns, one labeled a “Sicilian gangster” and another 
an “Alien gangster,” who threatened the diminutive “US Citizen” at the center of the panel. The 
figure of the citizen wielded “US Deportation of Undesirable Aliens” in the form of the titular 
boot, poised to expel the immigrant “gangsters” who loomed behind him.83 A cartoon published 
by the Chicago Daily News a few days later relayed a similar sentiment; it depicted a formidable 
figured labeled “American Immigration Authorities” toting a group of “Undesirable Aliens” 
away from US shores while a jovial “US Citizen” looked on. The darkened faces of the deported 
looked distressed as they clutched guns and bombs while the figurative immigration official 
carted them away.84 Like the letter that had appeared in the pages of the Los Angeles Times a 
year earlier, these illustrations in the city’s popular press indicated the continuing salience of 
nativist sentiments that had encouraged the passage of restrictionist immigration legislation in 
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FIGURE 5.4: “A MUCH DESIRED KIDNAPING,” 192886 
Although the 1926 drive had resulted in only a limited number of actual deportations, 
state officials augmented their capacity to deport in the years to follow, as announcements of 
wholesale deportations populated Chicago headlines in the late 1920s. In October of 1929, 45 
immigrant Chicagoans joined a group of more than 200 immigrants from Western cities bound 
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for Eastern seaports where they were to be deported.87 According to the report, the group 
included not only those who had been arrested on the city streets, but also some found in the 
state’s prisons, “Among those who left from Chicago were a number of convicts who sentences 
had been commuted to permit the federal government to send them out of the country.”88 This 
detail indicated that by the end of the 1920s, state surveillance of immigrant Chicagoans had 
expanded in spatial and institutional scope, beyond the neighborhoods and homes where 
immigrants had been scooped up in 1926 and into state institutions that held immigrants who had 
already been charged or convicted of a criminal offense, compounding their punishment to 
include deportation. 
Deportation drives and mass arrests continued into the early years of the 1930s, as 
headlines continued to announce renewed police efforts to rid the city of criminal connections 
through the targeting of immigrants for deportation. These raids occurred in the waning years of 
Prohibition and after the law and order Mayor William Dever had left office. Pressure for strict 
crime control continued to populate contemporary news and popular discourse, however, as the 
Chicago Crime Commission issued its first list of “public enemies” in April of 1930, including 
“twenty-eight of Chicago’s most prominent, well-known, and notorious gangsters,” a list that 
was headed by Alphonse Capone and George Moran.89 Frank Loesch, President of the Chicago 
Crime Commission and a member of the federal National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement, claimed that the list was intended as both a mechanism to root out law breaking 
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and as a way to pressure law enforcement to maintain rigorous enforcement. Describing the 
purpose of the list, Loesch explained, “[The list is] to keep the light bulb of publicity on 
Chicago’s most prominent and notorious gangsters to the end that they may be under constant 
observation by law enforcing authorities.”90 He offered suggestions regarding how law 
enforcement officials could best eradicate those criminals from the city “Vigilant watchfulness 
and arrests; court action; deportation of criminal aliens…raids on gambling houses, night clubs, 
dog tracks, etc., in which they are interested or which they frequent.”91 Chicago Police 
Commissioner William Russell assured Loesch and the Crime Commission that the department 
would pursue the individuals on the list, even promising to create a “hoodlum squad” dedicated 
to finding and arresting those included.92 In addition to drawing widespread public attention to 
criminal syndicalism in Chicago, the “public enemies” list also revived the Crime Commission, 
which had suffered financial losses during the first years of the Depression, and served as a 
turning point in that organization’s agenda, as it moved from a private watchdog organization 
into a public-facing anti-crime advocacy organization.93 
Just two months after the Crime Commission had issued its “public enemies” list, 
eliciting renewed public pressure for strict law enforcement and the elimination of criminal 
syndicates in Chicago, police pursued another deportation drive. In June of 1930, Immigrants’ 
Protective League investigators interviewed a police sergeant who informed them that 400 
people had been arrested over the course of the previous few days, in order for immigration 
inspectors to question them. As they had in 1926, police continued to use warrantless dragnet 
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raids to target the city’s immigrant neighborhoods, repeating the wholesale Constitutional 
violations they had perpetrated during the first deportation drive. According to the sergeant, 
police had rounded up hundreds of people in the drive, and those who had a previous criminal 
record were charged for disorderly conduct. Among the 400 people who were arrested in the 
drive, only five were charged for carrying pistols, indicating that only a very small proportion of 
the people arrested were found to warrant more serious charges.94 
Anecdotal evidence from the 1930 raids echoed the stories that the Immigrants’ 
Protective League had gathered in 1926, indicating the continuing use of warrantless arrests and 
police invasion of the homes and private spaces of the city’s immigrant communities. Vincent 
Accardo had lived in Chicago for 17 years by 1930, although he had never completed his 
naturalization process due to a lack of money. His wife told IPL investigators that police had 
seized Accardo from the storefront that abutted the few small rooms that he and his family 
shared “just as if they were hawks and he was a little chicken,” an analogy that vividly evoked 
the power differential between police and the hundreds of city residents that they plucked from 
homes and street corners during the repeated raids of the interwar years.95 As it had in 1926, the 
Immigrants’ Protective League concluded that “The whole affair was but a smoke screen to 
make it seem that the police was [sic] on the job of suppressing the criminal gangs,” arguing that 
the raid represented an effort to mollify public demands for strict law enforcement, embodied by 
the Crime Commission’s “public enemies” list.96 Once again, federal officials deported very few 
immigrants as a result of the raids, indicating that claims that the arrests were necessary to root 
out illegal immigration to the city were unfounded or false. Additionally, IPL investigators 
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concluded that the raids actually had rounded up a number of “gangsters” and provided for their 
questioning by federal immigration authorities, but that “In light of later developments the police 
department one might suspect that it was pre-arranged with the gangsters themselves.”97 This 
finding suggested not only that Chicago police had engaged in the raids to shroud their own 
deficiencies in effective crime control, but also that the arrests were the result of collusion 
between law enforcement and criminal syndicates, designed to give the appearance of strict law 
enforcement through exploitation of police graft and corruption.  
After five years of the periodic mass arrests of immigrants, deportation drives by 
Chicago’s Police Department and collaborating federal officials dwindled in the early years of 
the 1930s; the city saw the last of its major deportation drives in the fall of 1931. The Immigrants’ 
Protective League noted that federal agents had arrived in Chicago in the fall of that year, 
ostensibly as part of a “nation-wide campaign to stop the smuggling of aliens,” which IPL 
officials suspected stemmed from “spectacular reports as to its prevalence, [which] greatly 
exaggerate the facts.”98 This deportation drive marked an important shift in this technique of law 
enforcement, however, and demonstrated how national political developments and policy 
changes could intersect with local policing to motivate changes in the racial boundaries of 
criminalization. Unlike the raids of the previous several years, police and federal officials shifted 
their focus away from the Italians who had for so long represented the center of nativist ire in 
Chicago. Instead, the majority of the arrests and surveillance in this last large-scale deportation 
drive occurred almost exclusively among the city’s Chinese and Mexican neighborhoods. 
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The 1931 deportation drive came just two years after the beginning of the national 
Mexican repatriation movement, a Depression-era campaign to expel Mexicans and Mexican 
Americans from the United States in order to alleviate problems of unemployment and welfare 
costs during the national economic downturn.99 Depression-era nativism fueled demands for the 
deportation of Mexicans, and public and private agencies cooperated with Mexican consulates to 
send both immigrants and American citizens south to Mexico, particularly between 1929 and 
1932.100 Estimates of the number of Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans repatriated 
during the early 1930s varied, especially due to the unreliability of Census data regarding 
Mexicans in that period, but examinations of Department of Labor records have shown that at 
least 400,000 Mexican and Mexican Americans were repatriated, deported, or voluntarily left the 
United States during the early 1930s, representing approximately one third of the Mexican 
population in the country at the time.101 A disproportionate number of those repatriated came 
from Midwestern states, reflecting pressure from organized labor and business owners to rid the 
region of assumedly indigent Mexicans.102 Chinese immigrants had faced hostility in Chicago 
since the late nineteenth century, and efforts to restrict Chinese neighborhoods in the interwar 
years resembled patterns of anti-Chinese discrimination in West Coast cities in those years as 
well.103 
As had been in the case in the deportation drives of the previous few years, hundreds 
found themselves swept off the streets in a matter of weeks. The first raid occurred in the city’s 
Chinatown, a small neighborhood at the intersection of Cermak Road and Wentworth Avenue 
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that abutted the South Side Black Belt.104 Reports that 1,000 Chinese people had been smuggled 
into the city circulated among the major daily newspapers during the weeks prior, and police 
seized nearly 500 city residents in the first raid. A few days later, on October 26th, police focused 
their efforts on the South Side Mexican neighborhood, rounded up more than 100 men “from the 
streets and the pool-rooms,” and brought them to the South Chicago police station where they 
were “for several hours, questioned by the Immigration officials.”105 Despite the fact that 
hundreds had been arrested over the course of just a few days, “only 3 were held overnight at the 
station, to be turned over to the Immigration Inspectors the next morning.”106 These initial raids 
were followed with arrests in Mexican neighborhoods near the Stockyards district as well as 
periodic stops near the downtown business district “where foreign-born have been believed to be 
employed in the kitchens.”107  
A week after the first waves of arrests, federal agents and Chicago Police continued their 
arrests in the city’s Chinatown. Reporting on the raids during the first week of November, the 
Chicago Daily Tribune depicted a scene of chaos, claiming, “Terror was spread in Chinatown 
yesterday,” as forty immigration officials and police officers “invaded the district around 22nd 
street and Wentworth Avenue.”108 The report indicated the fear incited by the raid; the law 
enforcement officers arrived in the neighborhood that afternoon, but “Before they were out of 
their cars Chinese were running as if their lives were at stake…They scrambled onto street cars, 
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into taxicabs, and up narrow stairways that led to secret exits in the rear.”109 An image of the 
raids depicted a group of local and federal officials ushering Chinese men into police wagons as 
a crowd looked on; among the group of onlookers were two young African American men, who 
turned away as police forced their Chinese neighbors into the patrol wagon. The image, 
published in the Tribune the day after the raid, served to illustrate the several state agencies that 
had arrived to police the neighborhood as well as the spectacular nature of the raids, as city 


























FIGURE 5.5: “FEDERAL IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS AND POLICE RAID CHINATOWN,” 1931111 
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Much of the contemporary news coverage of the raids suggested that the arrests were 
necessary to root out immigration violations and “alien smuggling” that had supposedly become 
rampant in the early years of the 1930s. Records of the Immigrants’ Protective League admitted 
that some who had entered the country illegally were questioned and eventually deported, but 
also noted that the raid had resulted in the unwarranted arrest of many who had not violated any 
immigration regulations. Consequently, the framing of the campaign as a deportation drive 
masked the significant number of people arrested who had entered the country under entirely 
legal circumstances, and worked to mark all Mexicans and Chinese living in Chicago as illicit or 
criminal. As it had done in 1926, the IPL made efforts in 1931 to discover the number of persons 
affected by the drive and to determine the outcome of their arrests. An internal document 
compiled in the weeks after the drive listed “People Arrested in the Deportation ‘Drive’” and 
included the names, addresses, and nationalities of men detained in the campaign.112 Reports on 
the drive indicated that hundreds had been arrested; this document only listed a tiny fraction of 
those detained, but its sample gave some sense of the people targeted for arrest. All the men 
listed were of Mexican origin and residents of the city’s Southwest Side. The list noted those 
who had made legal entry into the United States and the disposition of their cases. Most of those 
who had entered legally were listed as “released after questioning”; despite the fact that these 
men had adhered to immigration regulations, they still found themselves subjected to state 
scrutiny, solely due to the association of Mexicans with illegal immigration and criminality. 
As many critics had done in 1926, the Immigrants’ Protective League ended its 
assessment of the 1931 deportation drive with the conclusion that the campaign was bad crime 
control policy and a waste of state resources. Investigators for the IPL insisted, “Raids are a 
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costly use of public funds and a futile method of detection…They have been condemned in the 
Government’s own Report, by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Observance.”113 Here the IPL referred to investigations conducted by the National Commission 
on Law Observance and Enforcement (NCLOE), the federally sanctioned commission charged 
with investigating the state of lawfulness and law enforcement in the United States in 1929.114 
Among its many reports published in 1931, the NCLOE issued a volume entitled Crime and the 
Foreign Born. Dr. Edith Abbott, the sister of Immigrants’ Protective League founder Grace 
Abbott and a fellow University-of-Chicago-trained social worker, directed the NCLOE’s inquiry 
into the relationship between crime and immigration, indicating the link between local 
immigration advocacy in Chicago and this national investigation of crime and law 
enforcement.115 A study of criminal statistics from thirty-four cities conducted by Alida C. 
Bowler, a research associate from the University of Chicago, led Abbott to the conclusion “That 
in proportion to their respective numbers the foreign born commit considerably fewer crimes 
than the native born,” and “That in crimes for gain (including robbery, in which there is also 
personal violence or the threat of violence) the native white greatly exceeded the foreign 
born.”116 Bowler’s analysis drew on police data gathered from 34 cities with populations of more 
than 100,000, but the majority of the cities from which she gathered her data reported only 
charges and convictions, and failed to report all arrests and detainments by local police 
departments. In the end, the report of the NCLOE and Bowler’s analysis of criminal statistics 
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suggested that the foreign born were not predisposed to crime, but they failed to capture all the 
ways that many were still subjected to undue police scrutiny.  
The same year that saw the last of Chicago’s massive deportation drives and the 
publication of the NCLOE’s Crime and the Foreign Born also saw the election of the city’s first 
immigrant mayor. On April 6, 1931, Anton Cermak captured 58 percent of the popular vote to 
become mayor of Chicago, defeating the incumbent William Hale Thompson and beginning 
eight (ongoing) decades of Democratic control of the city executive’s office. Cermak, a Czech 
immigrant who had previously served as a member of the Illinois House of Representatives, a 
Chicago city alderman, and the president of the Cook County Board of Commissioners, managed 
to capture the Democratic nomination despite early challenges from Irish candidates who had 
previous controlled the local Democratic machine.117 In an election that was rife with 
xenophobic attacks hurled at Cermak from his Republican opponent, the former alderman found 
himself elected as the first foreign-born mayor of Chicago after rallying votes from several 
ethnic voting blocs.118 Compared to the 1927 election, Cermak saw increases in voting 
percentages among a number of ethnic groups—Czechoslovakians, Poles, Lithuanians, 
Yugoslavians, Germans, Swedes, and Jews.119 African American voters maintained significant 
support for Thompson, as they had during his previous elections in 1915, 1921, and 1927. In the 
weeks before the 1931 election, wards with black populations over 75 percent polled 83 percent 
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for Thompson, reflecting the decades of patronage politics Thompson had deployed to court 
black votes through jobs and political protection.120  
The multiple instances of dragnet policing and mass arrests that occurred in Chicago over 
the course of the 1920s demonstrated the role of local law enforcement in defending the color 
line and constructing racial hierarchy, even as the city’s racial and ethnic demographics shifted 
over the course of the interwar decades. It was during Cermak’s first year in office that the last of 
the deportation drives occurred in Chicago, when hundreds of Mexicans and Chinese were 
arrested en masse, detained, and questioned by immigration officials. The support Cermak had 
received from European ethnic voting blocs in April of 1931 may have encouraged the foreign-
born mayor and his administration to redirect the efforts of the Police Department away from the 
groups that had swept him into office. Mexicans, Chinese, and other immigrants from East Asia, 
however, were ineligible for citizenship and thus did not represent a potential source of political 
capital for the local political machines. These final deportation drives also served as a local 
expression of the national movement for Mexican repatriation. Like the multiple deportation 
drives that had occurred in Chicago since the mid-1920s, it was both motivated and shaped by 
national immigration politics as well as local political culture, demonstrating the consequences 
of the intersection of national and local crime control politics.  
                                                










LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT:  
POLICE VIOLENCE AND THE CHICAGO NAACP CAMPAIGN AGAINST BRUTALITY 
 
It was the middle of July 1933 and James Warren was seeking some relief from the 
punishing summer heat. A resident of Chicago’s West Side, Warren had walked to the South 
Water Street Market to purchase ice from a local vendor.1 As he approached the shops at the 
bustling market, a group of white men from a nearby immigrant neighborhood stopped him. 
They shouted at Warren, telling him that the ice was not intended for sale to black men, and 
proceeded to attack him. Warren attempted to fend off his adversaries, despite the fact that he 
faced a crowd of forty or more. As Warren deflected the blows, Officer C. A. Galler walked by, 
observing the vicious attack. Instead of stopping the melee, however, Officer Galler joined in, 
striking Warren with the butt of his pistol and breaking the man’s eardrum in the process.2 While 
Warren had perhaps hoped that the officer would halt the beating and arrest the men who had 
assailed him in the middle of the street, instead the officer subjected him to further violence. The 
patrolman’s actions stood as an egregious example of police brutality. His participation in the 
attack on Warren also functioned as an endorsement of white racial violence—violence that 
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African Americans had often suffered at the hands of white gangs in that corner of the city over 
the previous three decades.3  
Rather than report the incident to the police district station, Warren approached the 
Chicago branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, describing 
to branch officers the violence he had suffered as well as the failure of the police officer to come 
to his aid. Warren may have chosen to go to the branch rather than report the assault to police 
officials for a number of reasons. While the Chicago branch of the NAACP had struggled to 
retain key organizers and gain membership during its first two decades of operation, by the 
1930s the branch had expanded its institutional capacity and actively pursued sanctions against 
racial discrimination in Chicago.4 The branch had conducted a series of membership drives in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, and Warren was likely familiar with the work of the organization and 
may have seen it as a potential path to retribution for the brutality he had suffered at the hands of 
the officer. Warren also may have been reticent to report the incident to the Chicago Police 
Department, assuming that police administrators would ignore the report or fail to discipline the 
offending officer. 
The Chicago NAACP received a number of similar complaints in the years before the 
attack on Warren, and in light of the regularity of white racial violence and police brutality 
against African Americans, the branch announced that “The time had come for a wide 
investigation of some of the police methods used by police which rough tactics seemed to be 
reserved for colored citizens alone.”5 The Legal Redress Committee of the Chicago NAACP 
promised that a lawsuit would be pursued against the officer who had beaten Warren, whom they 
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hoped to try before the city’s Civil Service Commission. In addition to vowing to pursue action 
on James Warren’s behalf, branch leaders also announced that they would investigate the 
problem of police violence more broadly, to the end that “all who have been guilty of such 
behavior be driven from the police force.”6 Warren’s experience with the Chicago Police 
Department served as a catalyst to action by the Chicago branch of the NAACP, but the 
resolution of his case remains unclear, as few records of the complaint were preserved in the 
extant legal archive or the records of the NAACP. It is possible that the Civil Service 
Commission chose to discharge the offending officer along with the 82 other civil employees 
that dismissed that year, but it was more likely that Officer Galler remained on the force despite 
his record of brutality.7 
During the 1930s, the Chicago branch of the NAACP pursued a consistent if limited 
campaign against police violence, seeking financial damages for victims of police brutality and 
the dismissal of violent cops from the Chicago Police Department. Legal efforts to end police 
violence and remove brutal cops from the force proved to be a mobilizing and politicizing issue 
for the branch, which had struggled to gain membership and legitimacy among black Chicagoans 
during its first two decades of operation. In response to a series of violent encounters between 
black Chicagoans and police in the early 1930s, the branch established its Legal Redress 
Committee (LRC), a group of black and white lawyers who would represent and support cases 
brought against brutal police, as well as many of the branch’s other landmark anti-discrimination 
cases. Legal Redress Committee lawyers would go on to sponsor notable cases including 
Hansberry v. Lee in 1940, but it was agitation around consistent police brutality and violence 
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that prompted the institutionalization of the branch’s legalistic response to racial discrimination 
in Chicago. This campaign joined with several other organizational responses to police brutality 
in this decade, as the national officers of the American Civil Liberties Union also lobbied for 
investigations of state violence and drafted model statutes to institute protections for the 
arrested.8 
When NAACP officials insisted in 1931 that they would pursue action against police use 
of “rough tactics [that] seemed to be reserved for colored citizens alone,” they drew racial 
boundaries around their critique of state violence and their legal campaign to end police brutality. 
Branch leaders may have deployed this language as a rhetorical technique to gain support for the 
campaign, signaling to the national NAACP offices that police brutality in the urban North was a 
critical issue to which the organization should devote its resources during a period in which the 
national officers were almost exclusively focused on the violation of black civil rights in the 
South. They may have also used this racial critique to marshal support for the branch among 
Chicago’s African American population, acknowledging the frequent abuse that black city 
residents endured at the hands of police. But according to decades of news reports and 
investigations, branch leaders’ assumption that police brutality was “reserved for colored citizens 
alone” dramatically understated the extent of state violence in the city. Police violence and use of 
the third degree, a colloquial term for violence deployed in the course of arrest or interrogation, 
was so common among Chicago police officers in the early twentieth century that many 
acknowledged it as a matter of course. The Chicago branch’s decision to respond to cases of 
unnecessary police violence by forming a dedicated committee of lawyers and undertaking a 
legalistic critique worked to frame police brutality singularly as a racialized civil rights violation, 
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despite the fact that police violence in the city was so widespread as to be tantamount to 
department policy when police made arrests or interrogated suspects.  
The Chicago NAACP’s 1930s campaign against police violence was further limited in 
scope through its gendered and class boundaries, in addition to the racial boundaries of the 
branch’s critique. Almost all of the victims of police violence represented by the branch—and 
certainly all of those who gained significant publicity—were middle-class black men. This 
careful selection of plaintiffs adhered to the class and conduct standards of the politics of 
respectability, which had shaped middle-class black law and order politics since the early years 
of the Great Migration. This strain of law enforcement politics had found expression among race 
leaders in the early-twentieth-century, in venues such as African American churches and in the 
pages of the Chicago Defender. The underlying premise of black law and order politics 
maintained that since most middle-class and refined black Chicago residents were law abiding, 
they therefore deserved equal law enforcement. This political rhetoric therefore excluded those 
who broke the law but still experienced illegal state violence or the violation of their civil 
liberties.  
NAACP lawyers and their clients only very rarely succeeded in seeing an officer 
removed from the force, and any financial damages that they did secure were usually a small 
fraction of the amount originally sought. Illinois’ Civil Service law governed the employment 
and dismissal of municipal officers. As a result, complaints against offending police officers 
were heard before the Civil Service Commission, a bureaucratic body with close ties to the 
Chicago Police Department. The reticence of Chicago’s Civil Service Commission to dismiss 
police for brutality complaints or for the criminal courts to indict police for illegal violence also 
functioned to decriminalize white racial violence. All the cases supported by the NAACP during 
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the 1930s were against white police officers who had brutalized African Americans, and only a 
very few resulted in instances of police discipline. The failure of state oversight of illegal police 
violence worked to endorse that violence, paralleling the decriminalization of white racial 
violence that had occurred along the color line since the early twentieth century, especially 
during the Race Riot of 1919. In the context of the bombing of black homes in the years leading 
up to the riot and the violence of the riot itself, the failure of police to recognize illegal white 
racial violence or arrest perpetrators of racial attacks marked that violence as outside the 
boundaries of criminal sanctions. The unusually high burden of proof faced by those who lodged 
complaints against violent police mirrored those earlier instances. These repeated failures to 
discipline brutal police not only decriminalized individual violent cops, but also preserved the 
structural violence embedded in law enforcement in Chicago. 
Despite its structural and legal limitations, the Chicago NAACP’s 1930s campaign 
against police violence represented a concerted effort to reign in one of the worst excesses of 
police discretion—violence and brutality. The hurdles that the branch met with in its campaign 
signified just how entrenched the discretionary use of violence was in the practices of urban 
policing. The campaign also worked to institutionalize a legalistic response to racial 
discrimination and police violations of black civil rights, one that would be echoed by branches 
around the country and by the national offices of the organization in the decades to come.9 The 
causal role of police violence in the formation of the Legal Redress Committee indicated the 
gravity of the issue facing new Southern migrants as well as Old Settlers, and demonstrated the 
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critical role of state violence in the politicization of black Chicagoans across the political 
spectrum. The campaign also illuminated the many state-erected hurdles to police discipline and 
the structures that entrenched violence among law enforcement institutions. Ultimately then, the 
story of black critique of state violence in interwar Chicago is one of limited success but lasting 
impact in what it revealed about the relationship between state violence and black politicization, 
the foundations of civil rights lawyering, and the political and structural challenges to ending 
police brutality.  
 
STATE VIOLENCE AND PROTEST POLITICS IN INTERWAR CHICAGO 
Police brutality, violence, and official misconduct had deep histories in Chicago, and 
many of the city’s residents had regularly experienced and criticized state violence since the 
professionalization of the Chicago Police Department in the late nineteenth century.10 Although 
police brutality would eventually come to be one of the foci of the NAACP by the 1930s—and is 
nearly synonymous with racialized violence today—accounts from turn-of-the-century Chicago 
suggested that state violence and police misconduct were not singularly racialized problems, but 
were suffered by and contested by Chicagoans across racial, class, and ethnic divides. This wide 
scope of state violence indicated the active role that law enforcement officers played in 
reinforcing multiple intersecting social hierarchies along racial, class, and ethnic boundaries. 
Indeed, this was the city that had been home to the Haymarket affair in 1886, the bombing that 
killed seven policemen and four workers, following the police murders of several striking 
workers at the McCormick Machine Company the previous day.11 The incident was one 
prominent example of long-standing tensions between police and labor organizers in the city, as 
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police regularly threatened striking workers and aided business owners in dispersing organizing 
campaigns and gatherings of union members from the late nineteenth century through the 
interwar decades.12 
Early-twentieth-century historical actors used a range of terms to refer to violent 
mistreatment by police officers; among the terms that populated accounts of police abuse were 
lawlessness, cruelty, brutality, and the third degree. There was considerable slippage among 
these labels, as police critics and observers tended to use them interchangeably to refer to illegal 
or unnecessary roughness by police officers. One exception to that general vagueness was the 
term “third degree,” which referred to police deployment of illegal violence over the course of an 
interrogation in order to obtain information about a crime.13 The term had been used since the 
mid-nineteenth century to refer to illegal interrogation practices but became commonplace in the 
1920s, as public calls for crime control heightened during Prohibition and many police resorted 
to extreme violence to secure information about crime.14 Although the third degree had a 
relatively narrow technical definition, it was occasionally used to refer to police violence that 
occurred over the course of an arrest, not only violence during the process of interrogation.15 
“Police lawlessness” was sometimes used as an alternative to the third degree, and criminologists 
who studied police systems often used those terms interchangeably.16 “Police brutality” and 
“police cruelty” were used most often in popular news accounts of police violence, in African 
American, ethnic immigrant, and white-owned newspapers, with little to differentiate the terms 
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or specify the range of police actions to which they referred.17 It was not until after WWII that 
“police brutality” came to dominate the discourse of police violence and to refer predominantly 
to racialized police violence. 
These slippages among historical terminology produce challenges for clarifying the 
analytic language of police violence. This chapter draws on Marilynn Johnson’s historical 
examination of police violence in New York to differentiate analytic terminology. Police 
brutality is used to mean the illegal use of force by the police, while police violence is used more 
broadly to identify all police use of deadly force, which may or may not be justifiable under the 
law. Police misconduct is used to characterize a range of police malfeasance, such as warrantless 
searches, illegal arrests, corruption and graft, non-intervention, as well as brutality.18 Historical 
actors and sources did not always make these differentiations, but the analytical language used 
here will utilize those distinctions in order to clarify how and when officers of the state used 
violence, as well as the legal boundaries of that violence.  
Conflicts between labor and Chicago police in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries often took the form of dramatic mass action policing, as officers intervened in labor 
demonstrations, signaling their allegiance to business interests and owners of capital. Members 
of the city’s immigrant and working class communities—themselves the sources of most police 
patrolmen—were also regularly subjected to police violence, although this violence often 
                                                
17 Among popular reports of police violence, there was little distinction among the terms brutal police, police 
brutality, or police cruelty. For examples that described “brutal police,” see “Chicago N.A.A.C.P. Legal Group Files 
Charges Against Two Police: SAY COPS BRUTALLY BEAT MAN,” Pittsburgh Courier, January 16, 1932; 
“Brutal Chicago Cop Dropped from Force,” Chicago Defender, April 1, 1933; “Brutal Police,” Chicago Defender, 
July 23, 1938. For examples that referred to “police brutality,” see “Chicagoans Aroused to Action by S. Side Police 
Brutality: BEAT WOMEN AND GO INTO HOMES; NAACP TAKES A HAND IN CASE,” Chicago Defender, 
December 2, 1931; “To Curb Police Brutality,” Baltimore Afro-American, December 5, 1931; “Urge Mayor to Probe 
Alleged Cop Brutality,” Chicago Defender, October 12, 1935; “Sues 9 White Chicago Cops For Brutality,” Atlanta 
Daily World, August 25, 1936. For examples that refer to “police cruelty,” see “Charge Chicago Police With 
Cruelty,” Atlanta Daily World, July 22, 1935; “NINE WHITE CHICAGO COPS SUED FOR CRUELTY: 
N.A.A.C.P. PUSHES MOST SHOCKING CASE OF ABUSE' ... Alleged to Have Fractured Jaw of Already 
Wounded Man,” Pittsburgh Courier, August 22, 1936. 
18 Johnson, Street Justice, 10. 
 
293 
happened in private spaces and street encounters, rather than in mass actions. Occasionally, these 
cases elicited attention from the city’s newspapers and municipal leaders, although more often 
they were simply part of typical police practice. Chicagoans observed such a case in February 
1913, when second generation German Chicagoan and stockyards telegrapher Fred Haas was 
arrested by an officer from the Twenty-Second Street police station. Patrolman Peter R. Bronson 
mistook Haas for a murder suspect and brought him to the station for questioning. Upon his 
arrival, Bronson delivered Haas to a so-called “torture chamber” and subjected him to an 
extended, violent interrogation. According to witnesses, at least half a dozen officers in the 
station house must have heard Haas’ cries, but none intervened to stop the brutal treatment.19 
Haas was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, but upon the discovery that he was not the 
sought after murder suspect, he was released from police custody.  
Haas’s injuries were so severe that he could not return to his job for two days. The extent 
of his injuries also gave him pause in filing a complaint, likely fearing retribution from the 
offending officers. It was ultimately another arrested man—William Kirk, a real estate dealer 
who had been stopped for driving with malfunctioning taillights—who delivered a detailed 
report to Police Superintendent John McWeeny. Kirk described a disturbing scene, in which he 
had watched two officers take Haas into their lieutenant’s office and then had heard a series of 
screams emanate from the room for several minutes. After a few moments, a superior officer 
interrupted the commotion, but instead of reprimanding the brutal officers, he instructed them 
“Take that man to a cell if you want to do any beating.”20 The superior officer’s instructions 
indicated his endorsement of the violent treatment Haas had received and suggested that similar 
conduct occurred regularly in the Twenty-Second Street police station. Kirk’s detailed report 
                                                
19 “Alderman Fights Police Tortures,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 2, 1913. 
20 “Accuses Police of ‘Third Degree,’ Victim Innocent,” Chicago Daily Tribune, January 30, 1913. 
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came to the attention of Alderman Charles M. Thomson of the Twenty-Fifth Ward, a West Side 
ward populated predominantly by first and second-generation immigrants.21 Thomson promised 
to launch an investigation of police violence and discipline; he introduced a resolution to 
Chicago’s City Council on February 6th, directing the Civil Service Commission to conduct an 
investigation of the incident.22 Members of the Council refused to grant unanimous consent for 
the investigation, however, and the motion was referred to the Committee on Schools, Fire, 
Police and Civil Service; it did not appear in the records of the City Council again.23 Thomson’s 
promise to investigate Haas’s case disappeared into bureaucratic obscurity, an example of the 
periodic promises of municipal leaders to investigate police misconduct with few results.24  
Fred Haas’s experience and the brutal treatment he suffered at the hands of police were 
hardly exceptional for members of Chicago’s European ethnic and foreign-born communities. A 
survey of nearly 700 foreign-born men in Illinois state penitentiaries in 1930 indicated that police 
brutality was a common experience among that group of incarcerated men. According to their 
own accounts, some of these men had been arrested under curious circumstances “which 
seem[ed] to indicate that the police seem to be anxious to arrest upon the slightest suspicion.”25 
European ethnic men also commonly experienced violence in their daily encounters with the 
police; when language barriers prevented police from obtaining information they desired “They 
                                                
21 According to the 1910 census, first and second-generation immigrants composed nearly 66 percent of the 
population of the West Side twenty-fifth ward. U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1910), 514. 
22 “Haas Puts Police in Perilous Pose,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 3, 1913. 
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New York City. Johnson, Street Justice, 5. 
25 Jacob Horak, “Criminal Justice and the Foreign Born: Preliminary Report, Summary of the Study of Foreign Born 
Prisoners in the Illinois State Penitentiaries,” May 1, 1930, p. 14, Box 2, Folder 21: Deportation—Criminals, 1921-
October 1933, IPL Records. 
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as a rule use[d] the third degree and often beat the man into unconsciousness.”26 Some such 
beatings proved to be so vicious, that many incarcerated men “a long time after they have been 
committed to the penitentiary, will show marks on their body left from the beating.”27 These 
accounts were obtained from interviews with the incarcerated men themselves, rather than from 
police or prison records, and interviewers conceded that the stories could have been exaggerated 
or altered. But regardless of the verifiability of the claims, they revealed that the predominant 
impression of law enforcement officers among these foreign-born men was one of mistrust and 
anticipation of violence. 
Complaints of police violence and misconduct also proliferated among the city’s African 
American population, especially as black Chicago grew over the course of the Great Migration. 
A stream of letters to the Chicago Defender’s “Legal Helps” column in the early years of the 
Great Migration signaled the regularity with which new migrants and Old Settlers met with 
mistreatment at the hands of police. Letter writers often requested information regarding the 
boundaries of police conduct and the possibilities for restitution if one had been mistreated by 
police officers. These letters inquired about possibilities of restitution for illegal detention in 
police stations, police refusals to allow detained persons to consult their lawyers, warrantless 
arrests, and physical brutality.28 Defender journalists advised letter writers that they enjoyed 
equal rights of habeas corpus and counsel, and that violations of those rights may be actionable 
under the state’s Civil Rights Act of 1885. The regularity of questions regarding police 
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27 Ibid. 
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misconduct received by the Defender suggested, however, that despite legal assurances of 
African Americans’ equal rights, the city’s black residents routinely experienced mistreatment 
and violence at the hands of police.  
Regular disparate policing and state violence targeted at African Americans and working-
class city residents prompted varying responses among the city’s racial advocacy organizations. 
Chicago became a stronghold of protest politics during the 1920s, as organizations across the 
political spectrum advocated for social and economic equality. During that decades, the Chicago 
Urban League and the local branch of the NAACP were joined by new organizations on the 
political left that advocated for African American rights and equality. The Brotherhood of 
Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) and later the National Negro Congress (NNC) engaged in 
interracial labor organizing in order to advocate for both racial and economic justice in the city. 
Taking on the powerful Chicago-based Pullman Company, the BSCP recruited A. Philip 
Randolph to lead the organization in 1925 and built its membership and national influence 
through annual labor conferences hosted in Chicago.29 The BSCP met with resistance from a 
number of other contingents within black Chicago; there was friction between the nascent union 
and the Chicago Urban League, due to the close relationship between the CUL and the Pullman 
Company.30 Many of the city’s influential clergy also resisted BSCP organization; Reverend 
Archibald J. Carey of the AME Quinn Chapel criticized the confrontational organizing strategy 
of the BSCP, instead advocating a conciliatory relationship between black Chicago and the city’s 
white power brokers.31 By the mid-1930s, many of the city’s black liberal organizations 
including the NAACP and the Wabash Avenue YMCA had formed the Chicago Council of 
                                                
29 Letter from Webster to A. Philip Randolph, January 4, 1928, Correspondence, 1925-1969, Records of the 
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30 Bates, Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics, 43. 
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Negro Organizations, a coalition that did not include the BSCP or the NNC and did not include 
economic equality on its agenda.32 Along with this range of liberal and leftist black organizing, 
the Communist Party also attempted to make inroads in the city during the interwar decades. 
Building on the interest generated by its defense of the Scottsboro boys, the Communist Party 
established neighborhood Unemployed Councils in Chicago, leading demands for adequate 
economic relief in the early 1930s.  
Despite the tensions among this range of racial advocacy organizations, state violence 
and the discriminatory policing of African Americans in Chicago occasionally encouraged 
collaboration among those advocating for black rights and equality. In the early years of the 
Depression, many black Chicagoans suffered forced evictions for failure to pay rent as the city 
faced rates of unemployment nearing 30 percent.33 Groups organized by the Unemployed 
Councils resisted evictions by restoring furniture that had been removed by landlords and 
demonstrating as police removed tenants from their homes.34 In August 1931, one such incident 
turned violent when police confronted a crowd that had gathered to protest the eviction of a 
seventy-year-old black woman on South Dearborn Street.35 A crowd estimated at nearly 1,000 
people gathered and promised to restore the woman’s property to her residence.36 As the crowd 
voiced its protestations, a group of three patrolmen from the Wabash Avenue police station 
arrived at the scene. The patrolmen fired their revolvers toward the crowd, killing three black 
                                                
32 Bates, Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics, 125. 
33 Rates of unemployment among black Chicagoans were significantly higher than those among the general 
population; by the end of 1932, black unemployment vacillated between 40 and 50 percent. Mexican unemployment 
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men—Abe Gray, Thomas Paige, and John O’Neal—and injuring others.37 The officers later 
claimed that they had been overwhelmed and attacked by the crowd, although reports conflicted 
as to who had initiated the violence. 
The aftermath of the eviction incident revealed the tensions in protest strategies among 
the city’s several racial justice advocacy organizations in the interwar years. The Chicago branch 
of the NAACP collaborated with the Chicago Civil Liberties League to conduct a thorough 
investigation of the eviction before presenting evidence of their findings at a Coroner’s inquest 
hearing.38 The investigation contradicted many of the facts that had been reported in the popular 
press, finding little evidence that members of the crowd had been armed or had attacked the 
patrolmen unprovoked. Despite the recommendation of NAACP and Civil Liberties League 
officers that the responsible patrolmen be indicted, the Coroner’s Jury found no reliable 
witnesses able to identity the policemen who had fired the shots and ruled that Gray, Paige, and 
O’Neal had been killed by persons unknown.39 Although members of the Communist Party had 
been included in the process of investigation, local party leaders chose not to partake in the 
Coroner’s inquest, choosing instead to protest this incident of police violence through a mass 
demonstration. The bodies of Gray, Paige, and O’Neal were laid in repose at a fraternal club on 
the black South Side; a group of party members kept guard over the bodies while thousands of 
Chicagoans visited to pay their respects. A week later, the internment procession transformed 
from a funerary march into a protest demonstration, as thousands took to the streets to mourn and 
express their criticism of the police response to the eviction incident.40 Following the 
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demonstration, police bailiffs ordered a temporary suspension of South Side evictions and police 
involvement, but the three officers who had killed Gray, Paige, and O’Neal received no penalties. 
Illinois law and bureaucratic procedure provided some mechanism for addressing police 
brutality and misconduct, but the opacity of the process and the total state discretion over it 
erected significant barriers for citizens who wished to see police officers disciplined or dismissed 
from the force. According to Illinois’s 1885 Civil Service Act, the mayor of every city in the 
state was responsible for appointing a three-member commission to oversee civil employment.41 
The law charged local Civil Service Commissions with the administration of civil service exams, 
which tested applicants’ practical knowledge of the department to which they applied, including 
the Police Department. The Civil Service Commission had the authority to dismiss or remove 
civil officers for any disciplinary infractions after the offending officer had an opportunity to be 
heard in his own defense. Accordingly, in order for a police officer to be removed from the force 
for misconduct or illegal violence, protocol dictated that the complaint should be lodged with the 
Civil Service Commission, which would investigate the incident, hold a hearing, and issue a final 
decision. However, the law did not specify procedural rules for those hearings or indicate the 
appropriate burden of proof for the removal of a civil officer.42 The text of the law simply 
indicated that once written charges had been lodged against a civil officer “Such charges shall be 
investigated by or before said civil service commission, or by or before some officer or board 
appointed by said commission to conduct such investigation.”43 It provided each city’s Civil 
Service Commission with considerable discretion in investigating cases of misconduct; in 
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Chicago, a Trial Board heard evidence regarding charges of misconduct and then advised the 
Commission as to further action.44 
The near-absolute discretion that the state maintained over police discipline protected 
officers from much of the protest politics and critiques that had emerged among Chicago 
residents over the previous three decades. The structure of the Civil Service Act and the 
bureaucratic process that it provided for established a number of hurdles to civilian oversight 
over the police force and the removal of officers who had used undue force or other forms of 
discrimination. While brutal police officers could have been liable for civil damages or faced 
criminal charges, in order to remove an officer from the Chicago Police Department accusers 
needed to lodge their complaints to the Civil Service Commission. The law did not prevent 
police administrators from suspending officers for a time, but it limited that suspension to thirty 
days unless a complaint was lodged with the Civil Service Commission itself. The mayor, who 
also appointed the Superintendent of Police, appointed the three-member Commission; 
accordingly, members of the Civil Service Commission were closely tied to city administrators 
and the Police Department. Ultimately then, Illinois law constructed a bureaucratic system in 
which police oversight was closely tied to leadership of the Police Department and the city itself.  
Despite its close ties to the mayor’s office and police leadership, the Civil Service 
Commission was not unwilling to dismiss Chicago police officers on charges of misconduct, but 
police violence was not usually a priority for disciplinary actions. Rather, charges that drew 
frequent attention from the Commission were more typically intoxication, lewd conduct, or 
connections to gambling or graft. Sometimes these charges prompted wholesale investigations; 
in 1912, the Commission examined the department’s connections to gambling and criminal 
                                                




syndicates. The investigation uncovered police participation in and protection of gambling rings, 
and police complicity in prostitution and the illegal sale of liquor. However, the Civil Service 
Commission dismissed only one officer as a result.45 Attention to these issues of discipline, 
corruption, and efficiency mirrored the priorities of the Chicago Crime Commission, which had 
emphasized improving police efficiency and rooting out police corruption since its formation in 
1919. Outside of special investigations like that in 1912, the Commission did occasionally 
dismiss police officers, usually for charges of conduct unbecoming an officer or violations of 
department procedures.46 In September of 1933, the Civil Service Commission dismissed three 
police officers for conduct unbecoming an officer; all three had been intoxicated while on duty, 
and one had been found in a compromising position with a woman while he was meant to be on 
patrol.47 One of those men—Edward J. Wroblewski—had previously been dismissed for the 
same charges and later reinstated by a court order, demonstrating the significant hurdles to 
permanently ejecting an ineffective officer from the force.  
 
NATIONALIZING CRITIQUES OF POLICE VIOLENCE 
The bureaucratic opacity and limitations of civil service reviews prompted periodic 
efforts to augment civilian oversight of police and law enforcement in Chicago and throughout 
the country. Locally, the Chicago Crime Commission’s observation and recommendations for 
improving law enforcement operation prompted some administrative and organizational changes 
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among the Chicago Police Department.48 Elsewhere, criminal justice reformers suggested that 
civilian review boards could effectively monitor police misconduct; members of the Los Angeles 
Bar Association established a Committee on Constitutional Rights in 1928 in order to establish 
such review, but the group lacked any official power.49 Civilian review boards failed to gain 
much support or institutionalization until after World War II, but in the interwar decades, 
investigatory commissions that examined policing practices continued to proliferate.50 Such 
commissions resembled Progressive investigatory groups, which gathered data on urban 
problems and other social phenomena, acting largely as information gathering organizations. 
Those efforts to examine law enforcement practices came to national attention by the end of the 
1920s with the establishment of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement 
(NCLOE). 
President Herbert Hoover convened the NCLOE in May 1929; the eleven-member group 
was commonly known as the Wickersham Commission, so-named for its chairman, former 
attorney general George Wickersham.51 Hoover tasked the group with an investigation of the 
condition of law enforcement and the causes of crime in the United States, following growing 
criticisms of rampant lawlessness in the country and blatant disregard for the federal ban on 
alcohol.52 He populated the commission with many of the country’s top jurists as well as 
prominent social reformers; Wickersham chaired the group, which comprised former Secretary 
of War Newton D. Baker, federal judges William S. Kenyon, Paul J. McCormick, and William I. 
                                                
48 See chapter 3 for a discussion of the work of the Chicago Crime Commission and the influence of anti-crime 
activism on policing in Chicago. 
49 Samuel Walker, Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thompson 
Learning, 2001), 20. 
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Grubb, Washington state Chief Justice Kenneth Mackintosh, Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe 
Pound, Radcliffe President Ada Comstock, and criminal justice reformers Henry W. Anderson, 
Monte M. Lemann, Frank J. Loesch.53 Loesch’s appointment represented a connection between 
the national-looking Wickersham Commission and the localized crime commission movement 
that had begun in Chicago ten years earlier. Loesch was a Chicago lawyer and one of the 
founding members of the Chicago Crime Commission; he had been elected president of the 
organization in 1928.54 The Wickersham Commission and the Chicago Crime Commission 
demonstrated several key differences—one was a federally sanctioned organization tasked with 
making national crime policy recommendations, while the other was a private, local watchdog 
group that sought to improve the efficiency of urban law enforcement. But the federal 
institutionalization of the crime commission model with the establishment of the NCLOE 
indicated the legitimacy that the work of groups like the Chicago Crime Commission had gained 
over the course of the 1920s.  
After a year and a half of inquiry, the NCLOE issued a document entitled “Proposals to 
Improve Enforcement of Criminal Law in the United States,” and followed those proposals with 
a series of exhaustive reports detailing its various investigations, again following on the 
Progressive model of comprehensive social inquiry.55 Among the most damning publications 
issued by the NCLOE was its’ Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, a volume that 
examined police use of the third degree, which the NCLOE defined as “the employment of 
methods which inflict suffering, physical or mental, upon a person, in order to obtain from that 
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person information about a crime.”56 This definition limited the NCLOE’s examination of police 
violence to that which occurred in the process of interrogation or arrest, excluding violence that 
may have occurred in other police-civilian interactions or other forms of police misconduct that 
were not physically violent. This narrow investigation may have been due to the NCLOE’s 
reliance on legal evidence in its investigation. The authors of the Report on Lawlessness in Law 
Enforcement deemed published judicial decisions to be the most reliable sources of evidence 
regarding the existence of the third degree, a methodology that may have been due to the legal 
training of the most of the investigators and members of the NCLOE. Testimony or other 
evidence regarding the third degree usually appeared in legal decisions in relation to an 
interrogation or confession, as judges determined whether or not that confession or information 
could be included in the case.  
The investigation and conclusions of the National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement demonstrated that violence was deeply embedded in American law enforcement, 
tantamount to official police department policy in many cities, despite legal prohibitions against 
it. These findings confirmed the claims of many Chicagoans over the first few decades of the 
twentieth century, who had indicated the widespread and nearly ubiquitous use of force by the 
Chicago Police Department. The NCLOE concluded that the use of the third degree was 
common throughout the country both in urban and rural settings, carried out predominantly by 
police officers and detectives but also occasionally by prosecutors. The third degree could refer 
to a number of practices, including but not limited to protracted questioning, physical or verbal 
intimidation, physical brutality, illegal detention, and holding the accused incommunicado or 
unable to communicate with family, friends, or counsel.57 
                                                




Reflecting on their findings on police violence in Chicago, the authors of the Report on 
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement concluded “A consideration of the evidence and of the reported 
cases leaves no doubt that…the third degree is thoroughly at home in Chicago.”58 Indeed, the 
research materials and summaries written by NCLOE investigators depicted a city in which state 
violence was not only tolerated but also deployed as a primary method through which to exercise 
state power and maintain racial, ethnic, and economic hierarchy. NCLOE investigators 
conducted interviews in fifteen cities across the country, cities that the commission had identified 
as representative of national law enforcement practices.59 Chicago was among the sites chosen, 
where investigators interviewed attorneys, members of the press, and current and former police 
officials. Upon the conclusion of their inquiry, lead investigator Ernest Hopkins summarized his 
findings “The third degree is a prevailing practice in Chicago…it was the exception when a 
suspect was not third degreed.”60 Furthermore, he emphasized that the use of violence was not 
limited to a few officers but was “generally practiced.”61 Along with violent and illegal police 
conduct that occurred over the course of interrogation or investigation, members of the 
commission also concluded that “The arrests themselves are, to begin with, frequently without 
any legal basis, as in the case of a recent drive in which 2,000 men were arrested and later 
released.”62 The NCLOE’s criticism of these indiscriminate arrests echoed critiques that had 
been voiced by observers over the course of the 1920s, as police frequently conducted sweeps of 
black neighborhoods and immigrant communities, often arresting hundreds of people over the 
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course of one or two evenings, such as the raids that had occurred among black neighborhoods in 
the middle of that decade or the massive arrests of immigrants during deportation drives.63 
The NCLOE gathered detailed evidence about a range of violence visited upon arrested 
persons in Chicago; police frequently went far beyond roughing up suspects in the streets, 
deploying dangerous violent methods in police headquarters and elsewhere throughout the city. 
Former federal detective Alexander Jamie claimed to have inside knowledge of police practices 
and described violence he had witnessed during his time with the Bureau of Prohibition. Jamie 
had left the Bureau in 1930 to become lead investigator for Chicago’s Citizens’ Committee for 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crime, the so-called Secret Six businessmen who had 
organized that year to collect evidence regarding the existence of organized crime in Chicago.64 
Jamie’s work for the Bureau and the Secret Six provided him with opportunities to witness the 
inner workings of the Chicago Police Department over the course of the preceding decade, and 
as he told Hopkins, “It was the exceptional thing when a suspect was not subjected to physical 
violence” by arresting officers (emphasis original).65 Jamie described the brutality inflicted by 
Chicago police in detail, telling Hopkins that common practices included “the application of the 
rubber hose to the back or across the pit of the stomach; kicks in the shins, or beating with a club 
across the shins; and, very frequently, blows struck with the telephone book on the side of the 
victim’s head.”66 Jamie’s gruesome detail illuminated the forms of violence that many 
Chicagoans faced when arrested or brought to a district police station; Chicago police had 
innovated a range of technologies of violence that extended far beyond street roughing.  
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Other interviews conducted by NCLOE investigators corroborated Jamie’s account, and 
some offered even more extreme examples of the third degree. A newspaperman who chose to 
remain anonymous confirmed officers’ regular use of the rubber hose, police clubs, and the 
Chicago phonebook to brutalize suspects. He also described one incident “In which a young chap 
had been suspended out of a window, head downward, by handcuffs or manacles attached to his 
ankles.”67 While most evidence of the third degree gathered by the NCLOE described police 
violence as a relatively private, secretive practice, this account was particularly striking for the 
public display of police brutality it entailed, implying that the offending officers harbored little 
fear of discipline for their offense. The image of a man brutalized and suspended in the air might 
also have conjured reminders of a lynching, especially considering the ubiquity of lynching 
images in early-twentieth-century visual culture.68 Among the most extreme examples of police 
violence and misconduct uncovered by NCLOE investigators was the kidnapping and 
interrogation of Leo Brothers, an associate of Al Capone, after Brothers was arrested for the 
murder of Chicago Tribune reporter Alfred Lingle in 1930.69 Police arrested Brothers after 
Lingle was shot at the Illinois Central Train Depot, but instead of taking him to police 
headquarters, they brought Brothers to the downtown Congress Hotel. He was held there for four 
days without food, shackled in the bathroom of a hotel room while officers interrogated him. 
Police kept Brothers at the Congress Hotel for another week before taking him to a second hotel 
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where the brutal interrogation continued. Finally, police took Brothers to police headquarters, but 
only after he had been held incommunicado for twenty-one days.70 
The evidence gathered by the NCLOE suggested that police violence worked to maintain 
social and political hierarchy, operating within an economy of violence in which state brutality 
was indiscriminately meted out to the masses and in which only those with political or economic 
power could manage to evade such treatment. For instance, Detective Alexander Jamie told 
investigators that police subjected nearly every arrested person to the third degree, although 
exceptions included “Men who had political influence, connection with influential gangs, or who 
were either graft-sources or linked to graft-sources.”71 Connections to organized crime were 
among the only sure guarantees that a suspect would not be victim to police violence, as Jamie 
suggested that officers had become increasingly afraid of gang reprisals over the course of the 
1920s. He told investigators that he had heard several police speak about their fear of gang 
reprisals “There had been instances in which, after brutality had been used, the friends or “gang” 
of the victim had found out what policemen or detectives were responsible, and had watched for 
a good chance, then beaten the policemen up as an act of revenge.”72 Jamie concluded that this 
fear of reprisal was the only factor that had any significant impact on reducing the use of the 
third degree, indicating that officers rarely had to be concerned about official repercussions for 
the use of violence “The police were in no particular fear of discipline, for brutality, as charges 
were seldom brought and hardly ever made to ‘stick.’”73 Similarly, the anonymous 
newspaperman told investigators that he regretted “that the brutality was confined to the 
unimportant cases and that police hands were tied as to the gangsters and racketeers of influence,” 
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confirming that connections to the illicit economy in Chicago was one of the only ways to avoid 
police violence.74 
Other evidence collected by the NCLOE suggested that the prevalence of police violence 
in Chicago was also motivated by the law and order politics that had proliferated among city 
leaders since the passage of federal Prohibition at the start of the 1920s. The same anonymous 
newspaperman who had indicated the immunity of so-called gangsters from police violence told 
NCLOE investigator Ernest Hopkins that the third degree persisted in Chicago because “Nothing 
was done about it, because the whole emphasis in Chicago was upon more severe law 
enforcement rather than the reverse, and the police weren’t criticized for going too far, but rather 
for not going far enough.”75 The newspaperman’s comments reflected the anti-crime discourse of 
groups like the Chicago Crime Commission and the Secret Six, groups comprised of 
businessmen who advocated improved law enforcement efficiency but gave little attention to 
police violations of individual rights or use of violence. The newspaperman confirmed that anti-
crime businessmen’s attempts to reform the Chicago Police Department and other law 
enforcement agencies had focused on inefficiency and corruption, “He told of the various 
investigations made into the Chicago Police department, but thought that the investigators were 
trying to get graft evidence exclusively, paying little or no attention to police brutality, illegal 
arrest, illegal detention, or any other such enforcement practices (emphasis original).”76 This 
interview identified a tension that had permeated Chicago’s criminal justice reform efforts over 
the previous ten years: despite numerous attempts to rationalize the city’s law enforcement 
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apparatus, few influential reformers had given attention to the rampant violence and illegal 
arrests that many Chicagoans endured. 
While these interviews suggested that political power or criminal connections were 
among the few ways to avoid police violence in Chicago, most informants remained vague 
regarding the victims of police violence. Many interviewees asserted that the use of the third 
degree was so widespread that police subjected nearly every arrested person to some form of 
police brutality. Roger Baldwin, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, 
however, was one of few people who did provide more detail about the targets of police violence. 
He told lead investigator Ernest Hopkins “Government lawlessness is for the most part directed 
against certain minorities, who it is intended to keep subordinate.”77 He specified, “Negroes are 
by far the most common victims, aliens next and third radicals, political and economic.”78 
Baldwin’s comments tracked with NCLOE members’ analysis of the legal evidence they had 
gathered, which demonstrated that police use of the third degree crossed racial, ethnic, and class 
lines, although in some locales “these practices are particularly used against Negroes.”79 
Baldwin’s assertion that African Americans, immigrants, and political radicals were common 
targets for violence also resonated with decades of accounts of police brutality and 
discrimination in Chicago, as the city had seen police target labor organizing as well as black and 
immigrant neighborhoods for mass arrests and raids since the early twentieth century.  
Conspicuously missing from most of the evidence gathered by the NCLOE were 
explanations for the reasons that police violence and the third degree were so ubiquitous in 
Chicago and in other cities throughout the country, perhaps indicating the degree to which state 
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violence had simply become common sensical among urban policing. But Baldwin was among 
few interviewees who offered an explanation as to why police violence was so common—he 
suggested that police used violence to reinforce racial and socioeconomic hierarchy. He asserted 
that police often abandoned their duties in favor of protecting the powerful and wealthy 
“Policemen…go about armed, using force and weapons unrestrainedly, and busying themselves 
in political and economic matters…their attitude often expressly voiced is that their sole purpose 
is to protect property and not to protect individual rights.”80 Here Baldwin clarified his earlier 
comments regarding police efforts to keep certain groups subordinate to others, indicating that 
the hierarchy police sought to enforce was at least partially based on class and the power of 
capital, along with the boundaries of race and ethnicity. While Baldwin did not specifically cite 
evidence from Chicago, his comments were consistent with the Chicago Police Department’s 
frequent intervention into labor disputes and their repeated brutality of African Americans. 
Others confirmed Baldwin’s generalizations with regard to Chicago specifically; criminal 
attorney Joseph B. Lofton told Hopkins “The use of the third degree in Chicago was notorious, 
especially in cases where the suspect had no money or influence.”81  
 
POLICE VIOLENCE AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement published its findings in 
1931, issuing a series of reports authored by its many committees.82 The reports communicated a 
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series of conflicting conclusions; although the eleven members of the group agreed that reform 
and improvement of law enforcement were necessary, they failed to arrive at a unified set of 
recommendations for policy change.83 Despite their imposing length, the reports of the NCLOE 
were widely read and generated considerable public outcry, particularly the Report on 
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, which included a wealth of detail regarding the violent 
practices of American police. Undoubtedly, municipal officials, jurists, and social reformers in 
Chicago would have been familiar with the report and its conclusions and presumably found the 
report to resonate with their own experiences in the city. Officers of the Chicago branch of the 
NAACP likely would have read the report as well, perhaps remembering the extent of police 
violence uncovered by the NCLOE when James Warren arrived at the branch offices in July 
1933, seeking aid in his attempts to obtain restitution from the Chicago Police Department 
following the brutal beating he had received in the city streets just a few days before.  
Police brutality proved to be a mobilizing issue for the Chicago branch of the NAACP in 
the 1930s, which had struggled to maintain its member base and financial liquidity during its first 
two decades of existence. By the early 1930s, the branch had expanded its organizational 
capacity, forming its Legal Redress Committee in 1931 in response to a series of cases of police 
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violence and misconduct. Police had attacked a number of black women in late 1931, beating 
Eleanor Brimm so severely that the woman nearly lost her eyesight, and striking Mae Jones over 
the head after entering her home without a warrant.84 Along with these two brazen incidents of 
police brutality, a number of black drivers also found themselves subjected to warrantless car 
searches “the owners subjected to abusive language and in some cases to arrest.”85 Critics argued 
that these indiscriminate car searches unfairly subjected middle-class black Chicagoans to undue 
police scrutiny; in one instance, police seized prominent physician Dr. S.W. Smith from his 
vehicle and carted him to the nearest police district station, much to the doctor’s protestation. 
President of the Chicago NAACP Dr. Herbert A. Turner announced in December of 1931 that 
the Legal Redress Committee would aid the victims in these cases and encouraged other city 
residents to seek the aid of the NAACP in their own cases of police misconduct, announcing, 
“We urge all citizens who are thus victimized by the police to report their cases to our office and 
we will cooperate in every way with them to see that justice is done.”86 
The formation of the Legal Redress Committee in 1931 institutionalized a legalistic 
strategy of civil rights activism at the Chicago branch of the NAACP; the branch and the LRC 
pursued thousands of racial discrimination complaints over the course of the 1930s.87 In 
instances of discrimination judged to be minor by branch officers, the branch president would 
often personally contact the offending institution or individual, imploring them to reconsider 
their actions.88 In more egregious instances of discrimination or violence, the Legal Redress 
Committee pursued legal action under the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 1885.89 Introduced by John 
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W. E. Thomas, the state’s first African American legislator, the Civil Rights Act provided that all 
Illinois citizens were entitled to full and equal enjoyment of enumerated rights and specified that 
all persons would have full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations in the state.90 
Furthermore, it stipulated that persons found to have violated the provisions of the law would be 
subject to pay civil damages not less than $25 and not to exceed $500. The law also allowed for 
criminal penalties in the case of misdemeanors, prescribing a fine not to exceed $500, a year in 
jail, or both.91 A number of neighboring states had passed similar civil rights legislation in the 
decades following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, but Illinois’s Civil Rights Act 
prescribed some of the highest damages and penalties for violations of the law. 
Many of the notable cases supported by the Legal Redress Committee after its formation 
in the 1930s concerned the integration of public accommodations and residential housing.92 The 
integrated committee comprised sixteen lawyers—all men—drawn from the leadership of the 
state’s civic and legal institutions.93 Attorney Earl B. Dickerson led the group, which included 
former Illinois State Legislator William E. King, president of the Chicago Urban League 
Eldridge Pierce, and former Cook County Bar Association president Herman E. Moore.94 The 
members of the Legal Redress Committee received no financial compensation for their work, 
limiting potential membership to those with considerable personal wealth who could afford to 
work on behalf of the branch while drawing no salary. The administrative structure of the 
committee and its composition drew on the model of the interracial social reform committees 
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that had populated Chicago over the previous two decades, such as the Vice Commission of 
Chicago, the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, and the Chicago Urban League. 
Accordingly, interracial committees were a familiar organizing institution in the social landscape 
of early-twentieth-century Chicago, which the Chicago branch of the NAACP deployed to 
pursue its legal agenda in the 1930s.  
The Chicago branch’s legal campaigns were commensurate with the national NAACP’s 
pursuit of racial justice and social change through legal means, but the branch diverged from the 
national offices in its precise objectives and strategy. National officers had identified the courts 
as a critical site for advancing NAACP goals by the 1920s, and they sought to support cases that 
would help to establish a body of legal precedents to support racial equality and the protection of 
civil rights.95 The national organization’s litigation strategy was further refined by the early 
1930s, when the NAACP hired former US Attorney Nathan Margold to direct the funding it had 
received from the American Fund for Public Service. In the spring of 1930, Margold produced a 
report that outlined a legal agenda for the NAACP, recommending a program of litigation that 
would challenge segregation in transportation, housing, and—primarily—education.96 Charles 
Hamilton Houston assumed leadership of the NAACP’s legal offices in 1935, using the Margold 
report to guide the legal advocacy of the organization.  
Although the NAACP had established branches in many Northern and Western cities 
over the course of the Great Migration, the organizational focus of the national office was 
primarily Southern-looking during the interwar decades. James Weldon Johnson assumed the 
position of field secretary in 1916, with the goals of growing the organization’s black 
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membership and expanding the number of branch offices in the South; by 1919, the organization 
had established a branch in nearly every Southern state.97 After being appointed executive 
secretary of the organization in 1920, Johnson maintained NAACP attention on the South, 
especially with the organization’s sustained anti-lynching campaign and pursuit of federal anti-
lynching legislation, which Walter White continued to focus on after assuming the office of 
executive secretary in 1931. The organization had been hesitant to pursue federal judicial 
intervention in state criminal procedure, considering the historical reluctance of federal courts to 
violate the boundaries of federalism and intervene in state criminal trials.98 Criminal procedure 
cases that the national NAACP did support during the interwar years all concerned egregious 
cases of procedural violations and injustices, all in Southern states. NAACP lawyers provided 
legal counsel and financial support in Moore v. Dempsey (1923) and Brown v. Mississippi (1936), 
in which the Supreme Court respectively ruled that mob-dominated trials and confessions 
obtained through torture violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 White 
had also attempted to involve the NAACP in the defense of the Scottsboro boys in 1931, 
although the NAACP did not have a branch in Alabama in the early 1930s and the defendants 
instead chose the aid of the American Communist Party’s International Labor Defense.100 In the 
two Scottsboro cases that reached the Supreme Court, Powell v. Alabama (1932) and Norris v. 
Alabama (1935), the justices respectively reversed the convictions of the defendants due to the 
denial of counsel and racial discrimination in jury selection.101 In each of these cases, the justices 
created new law, locating new rights in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.102  
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Although the Supreme Court proved willing to intervene in criminal procedure in these 
cases during the 1920s and 1930s, the cases the court accepted and those that the national 
NAACP represented remained limited to Southern states. This choice may have reflected an 
inattention to the discrimination and violence faced by African Americans who had migrated to 
the North and West, as well as the assumptions of NAACP lawyers that the court would be most 
likely to accept and rule on particularly outrageous cases of injustice in which the facts of the 
case clearly contradicted state courts’ rulings. This incremental and measured legal strategy 
received criticism from some on the political left, who saw litigation as an insufficient method of 
achieving social change. Ralph Bunche and Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties 
Union suggested that direct action and interracial labor organizing would ultimately be more 
effective to protect African American rights.103 Houston himself acknowledged the limits of 
court decisions to enact wider social change, writing in a memo in 1934 that one of the goals of 
the NAACP’s litigation program should be “to arouse and strengthen the will of local 
communities to demand and fight for their rights.”104 In general, branch offices tended to be 
more aggressive in their agendas and legal advocacy, a trend that was no exception in Chicago. 
When A.C. MacNeal became president of the Chicago branch in 1933, he invigorated the 
branch’s legal arm and took on some of the paternalistic patrons of black Chicago, such as Julius 
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Rosenwald.105 MacNeal had come of age as one of the editors of the pro-labor Chicago Whip, 
and brought his experience with economic advocacy with him to the branch.106 
In contrast to the constitutional legal strategy of the national offices, the Chicago branch 
of the NAACP functioned more like a legal aid office, providing legal assistance to Chicagoans 
who brought complaints of racial discrimination and pursuing nearing 8,000 cases during 
MacNeal’s tenure as president during the 1930s. Unfortunately, the branch and the Legal 
Redress Committee preserved only scant records from their first three decades of work; the 
extant records provide the general contours of the activities of the branch and the committee, but 
lack much detail regarding their internal workings.107 The records that did survive, however, 
indicate that the Legal Redress Committee chose to employ a material strategy in combatting 
racial discrimination and state violence. Rather than pursue cases on legal principle in order to 
establish a body of legal precedent, LRC lawyers sought to maximize individual damages for 
their clients in order to increase the financial burden of racism and discourage future 
discrimination. This strategy was apparent in cases ranging from segregated public 
accommodations, to employment discrimination, to state violence. For instance, in the pursuit of 
sanctions against the Field Artillery Armory for excluding black patrons, two LRC lawyers 
promised to seek civil action against officers who had discriminated against black guests, 
promising that “The attitude of the Chicago Branch and its President is that every form of action 
under the law must be taken to make those who discriminate against colored people in Illinois 
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feel that it is both unwise and costly.”108 In cases regarding segregated train cars, restaurants, and 
theaters during that same year, the LRC sought individual damages on behalf of a number of 
clients and was successful in every case.109 This legal strategy occasioned criticism from some 
national NAACP officers, who suggested that LRC lawyers sought to maximize individual 
damages in civil rights cases in order to augment their own personal wealth. Midwest regional 
field secretary Daisy E. Lampkin denied any such accusations in 1939, telling officers of the 
national office that LRC lawyers were generous with their time and legal advice, answering legal 
questions that came into the branch office even if the matter did not concern civil rights or racial 
discrimination.110  
 
THE CHICAGO NAACP CAMPAIGN AGAINST POLICE VIOLENCE 
The Chicago NAACP Legal Redress Committee’s campaign against state violence was 
consistent with its broader legal strategy, as the group pursued individual restitution and 
maximum legal damages in cases of police brutality. The LRC faced considerable political and 
bureaucratic hurdles in its efforts to remove violent police, facing reticent witnesses as well as 
reluctance among city officials to dismiss police officers who had brutalized Chicago citizens. 
Ultimately, this campaign yielded a few circumscribed victories and helped the branch refine its 
legalistic response to racial discrimination. But the narrow critique of state violence leveled by 
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these individual cases failed to fully grapple with the broad scope of state violence and the 
deeply embedded violent culture fostered by the Chicago police, a culture that had been 
uncovered and duly documented by the work of the National Commission on Law Observance 
and Enforcement.  
The cases of police brutality pursued by the Legal Redress Committee adhered to the 
boundaries of black law and order politics, a strain of middle-class black respectability politics 
that had emerged among race leaders and other black elites over the course of the Great 
Migration. Black law and order politics found expression in the pages of the Chicago Defender 
as well as among black leaders who sought to reduce crime and violence among black 
neighborhoods in Chicago since the early twentieth century. In their formulations, black rights to 
fair and equal law enforcement were premised on black adherence to the law, a critical 
component of moral respectability. For instance, in critiques of police failure to stop white racial 
violence and the ongoing attacks on black homes in the early twentieth century, Defender editors 
frequently cited the law-abiding record of those victims of violence, suggesting that lawfulness 
should therefore translate to equal protection. This logic however, became especially strained 
with regard to state violence, as it was difficult to fathom how even those who violated the law 
were not deserving of protection from illegal violence.  
The LRC’s selection of cases demonstrated their adherence to respectable black law and 
order politics; nearly all of the cases of police brutality pursued by the branch were brought by 
middle-class black men, who had not committed a crime preceding their brutalization. Although 
it had been police attacks on a series of black women that precipitated NAACP attention to the 
issue of state violence in the early 1930s, all of the cases that the branch publicly championed 
were those of men, indicating that respectable black law and order politics entailed a gendered 
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boundary as well as those of class and status. Despite the differences between LRC legal strategy 
and that of the national offices of the NAACP, the careful selection of respectable plaintiffs 
whose records and characters could not be assailed represented a point of continuity between 
those two scales of the racial justice organization.  
Just weeks after the formation of the Legal Redress Committee in December 1931, the 
branch received news of the brutal beating of South Side merchant Ernest T. Draine. Draine 
owned a bakery and delicatessen in the Bronzeville neighborhood of the city’s South Side, the 
center of the influx of African American migration to Chicago. Draine had protested when a 
patron tried to remove the outdoor awning of a neighboring shop on the afternoon of December 
15th. An hour later, the man returned, along with the company of two policemen. Still protesting 
the removal of the awning, Draine turned to walk into his own store. At that moment, Office 
John Rasmussen struck Draine over the head with the butt of his pistol, leaving a deep cut on his 
forehead. Reportedly, Rasmussen turned to his partner and quipped, “Shoot him, we’ll show 
these damn ‘niggers’ on the South side something trying to be so smart, we’ll kill half a dozen of 
them.”111 Officer Herbert Barrick followed Draine into the building and kicked him, leaving the 
injured man prone on the floor. After Draine’s wife and employees tended to his wounds, the 
officers escorted him to a nearby police station, where he was charged with two counts of 
disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and using obscene language on a public street.112  
A week later, Draine appeared before Judge Francis Borelli at the Forty-Eighth Street 
station police court, where the judge dismissed all four charges. During his hearing, Draine stood 
before the judge with the gash on his head clearly visible, indicating the injuries he had received 
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at the hands of the two officers who looked on from across the courtroom.113 The judge noted the 
contradictory witness statements and lack of evidence, but rather than dismiss the case quickly, 
he offered an extended commentary on the actions of the police officers and the violence they 
had inflicted. He berated the officers for their assumedly false testimony that Draine had been 
intoxicated when they encountered him at his shop, reprimanding the officers for providing 
accounts “[So] inconsistent with what we know.”114 He went on, “This assault by the officers 
with a revolver was entirely unwarranted and unnecessary,” and invoked previous statements of 
the city’s mayor “Hon. A.J. Cermak has on a number of occasions given utterances in which he 
has denounced and objected to the unnecessary use of weapons by the police. And this is one 
case, in my judgement [sic], where it was entirely unnecessary to use a gun on this man.”115 
Emphasizing his own disapproval of police misconduct and referring to previous statements of 
the mayor, Judge Borelli indicated conflicts among state offices and agencies over the issue of 
police violence, suggesting that the prevalence of police brutality in the city posed a political 
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FIGURE 6.1: “POLICE VICTIM EXPLAINS ATTACK,” 1931116 
 
Draine had been accompanied to the Forty-Eight Street station by a bevy of lawyers—he 
was represented by Legal Redress Committee member Wendell E. Greene, who was assisted by 
LRC chairman Earl B. Dickerson and six additional attorneys.117 While this legal team may have 
been outsized for a routine misdemeanor hearing, the Legal Redress Committee also pursued 
charges against the offending police officers. Just a few weeks later, LRC lawyers filed charges 
against the two officers with the Chicago Civil Service Commission in accordance with the 
provisions of the Illinois Civil Service Act.118 The Chicago Civil Service Commission heard the 
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complaints against Rasmussen and Barrick a few months later. Despite numerous eyewitness 
accounts of the unnecessary violence meted out by the two patrolmen, the Commission failed to 
eject the men from the police force and they remained on active duty. Draine’s case had 
marshaled considerable support among black Chicagoans and generated a spectacle when Draine 
appeared with his NAACP-sponsored legal team at his own hearing, but the municipal 
bureaucracy responsible for overseeing police conduct and discipline failed to accede to the 
charges that had been leveled by one of the city’s most prominent racial justice organizations.  
Nearly a year and a half after the initial attack, one of the offending officers in the Draine 
case was finally dismissed from the Chicago Police Department. Despite the evidence of 
brutality that had been leveled against Herbert Barrick in 1932, it was his operation of an illegal 
dance hall that merited his ejection from the force a year later.119 The Chicago Defender heralded 
Barrick’s dismissal from the CPD as a triumph of justice, speculating that the former patrolman 
“may yet have occasion to think back over his attitude and to regret his record of brutality.”120 
While the Defender was correct that the Civil Service Commission had eliminated one brutal cop, 
the other offending officer in the Draine case remained on active duty, having not been found 
guilty of having connections to the illicit economy. The Defender’s celebration that justice had 
been served in the Draine case came with a considerable degree of irony, since it failed to 
acknowledge that the case demonstrated the way to remove a brutal cop was to find some other 
objectionable offense he had committed. 
The Legal Redress Committee continued to pursue cases against brutal police in the years 
following the Draine case, often encountering the insular and self-protecting culture of police in 
their attempt to secure restitution for victims of violence. In 1934, the branch announced its 
                                                




support of David Campbell, an employee of the Binga State Bank, in his case against Office 
Charles Pickert of the Hyde Park police station. Campbell had been riding the Stony Island street 
car when Pickert approached him; the officer shouted insults at Campbell and attempted to 
assault the unsuspecting passenger. According to witnesses, Pickert was intoxicated, despite the 
fact that he was on active patrol duty. Campbell managed to disarm Pickert and brought the 
officer to the Hyde Park Police Station, where he turned Pickert over to the presiding sergeant. 
Campbell reported the incident to the Chicago branch of the NAACP and asked the Legal 
Redress Committee to aid him in bringing Pickert to trial before the Civil Service Commission. 
LRC lawyers agreed, with the promise from Campbell that he would appear at the hearing and 
“vigorously prosecute his charges against Pickert.”121 
Before the hearing was set to begin, Pickert’s fellow officers sought out Campbell and 
attempted to quash the charges in order to protect one of their own. A number of patrolmen 
contacted Campbell, telling him to “lay off” the case. Pickert himself approached Campbell and 
attempted to bribe him with $50 if he would abandon the charges. Pickert also contacted NAACP 
branch president A.C. MacNeal, admitted that he had been intoxicated and had tried to assault 
Campbell, but asked MacNeal to drop the case considering that Pickert had a wife and three 
children to support. The officer also marshaled support from Campbell’s employers at the Binga 
State Bank, who appealed to MacNeal as well. But the branch president refused to drop the case, 
citing it as a critical step in the branch’s ongoing campaign to end police lawlessness targeted 
against the city’s black residents.122 
The Civil Service Commission held a hearing on the charges against Officer Pickert on 
July 11, 1934. But when the witnesses assembled, only NAACP President MacNeal was there to 
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make the case against the offending officer. Campbell failed to arrive, despite the fact that he had 
asked the NAACP to pursue the case in the first place; perhaps the threats and bribes had 
persuaded the man to abandon the charges. MacNeal related the details of the incident that 
Campbell had told him, as well as the confession that Pickert had offered him and other 
witnesses in the NAACP offices. The Civil Service Commission heard testimony from another 
witnesses as well; Captain Hogan of the Hyde Park police station testified that Pickert had 
indeed been intoxicated while on patrol and was unfit for duty. This charge prompted the Civil 
Service Commission to suspend Pickert and ultimately to dismiss him from the Chicago Police 
Department.123 On its face, the case was a victory for the NAACP; Pickert was expelled from the 
Police Department and the branch won the dismissal of a brutal cop. But the case remained 
consistent with previous Civil Service Commission refusals to dismiss officers on charges of 
brutality alone. Indeed, the cases like those of David Campbell, Ernest Draine, and James 
Warren confirmed the findings of NCLOE investigators, who had discovered that police violence 
and the third degree essentially amounted to department policy and that officials concerned 
themselves primarily with department efficiency rather than illegal violence.  
Despite the limitations of these early cases, the Legal Redress Committee continued to 
pursue its campaign against police lawlessness throughout the 1930s. During the same month 
that David Campbell was accosted on the Stony Island street car, nineteen-year-old James 
Troutman was arrested by a cadre of police officers from the Wabash Avenue police station, who 
accused of him of involvement in the murder of Patrolman John Officer. Troutman was not tried 
for the murder but was charged with robbery and sentenced to one year to life in the Joliet State 
Prison.124 Troutman died six days after he was sent to Joliet; the prison physician indicated that 
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the man suffered from a dislocated vertebra when he arrived. Troutman had been held at the 
Cook County Jail before being transferred to Joliet, where the jail physician had also examined 
him. His report noted that Troutman suffered from kidney problems and a dislocated cervical 
vertebra, which the jail physician concluded were likely the “result of unmerciful beating by the 
police officers, all white.”125 The prison physician concluded that Troutman died due to 
hypostatic pneumonia and nephritis caused by his kidney damage and back injuries.126 These 
reports suggested that Troutman was a fatality of the third degree—his death the result of a brutal 
beating meted out in an attempt to extract information from the arrested man. Although he had 
clearly required medical attention, police instead sent Troutman to the state prison where he 
succumbed to his injuries.  
Nearly a year after James Troutman’s death, his wife Willa Mae Troutman filed a suit 
against the officers who had brutalized her husband, seeking $10,000 in damages. Troutman’s 
case represented one of the only examples in which the LRC supported a case against brutal 
police on behalf of a victim’s estate, indicating that even though such a strategy was limited, it 
could also offer a path to restitution after a police murder. The suit named nine officers from the 
Wabash Avenue police station, accusing the men of “willful assault” resulting in Troutman’s 
death.127 NAACP officers had aided Mrs. Troutman in her investigation of her husband’s death, 
uncovering the physicians’ documents that revealed Troutman’s dire condition upon arriving at 
Joliet. The jail and prison physicians cooperated with the investigation by the NAACP, and their 
records showed conclusively that Troutman had received his fatal injuries before being brought 
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to the Cook County Jail. The police records at the Wabash Avenue station contained no evidence 
of Troutman’s interrogation, but a witness confirmed that he had seen the patrolmen begin to 
beat Troutman on the street during his arrest and again at the Wabash Avenue station, leading the 
NAACP and Willa Mae Troutman to conclude that the group of arresting officers was indeed 
responsible for his death.128 Traces of Mrs. Troutman’s case disappeared from the legal and 
NAACP archive after their initial filings, suggesting that the plaintiff likely failed in her efforts 
to secure damages from the offending officers.  
By the mid-1930s, the Chicago NAACP’s campaign to end police violence had seen only 
limited success and little evidence that the Legal Redress Committee’s strategy of eliminating 
brutal cops through individual legal challenges could surmount the bureaucratic hurdles to 
ending state violence or penetrate the insular culture of the department that had fostered the 
widespread use of the third degree. James Troutman had encountered state violence in his every 
interaction with the criminal justice state—on the city streets, while he was held at the district 
station, and as he waited in Cook County Jail. Witnesses attested to the extent of brutality 
inflicted on him and physicians’ reports documented his injuries. The failure of the lawsuit filed 
on behalf of his estate indicated both the unusually high burden of proof faced by critics of 
Chicago police as well as the limitations of this individualized legal strategy, which failed to 
fully grappled with the broad scope of state violence and the deeply embedded violent 
department culture fostered by the Chicago police. Despite the limitations of this legalistic 
strategy, NAACP lawyers likely continued to pursue these cases because they were consonant 
with the broader legal strategy of the branch and because some cases demonstrated that success 
was possible, albeit limited and protracted. The last few years of the 1930s saw such an instance, 
when the Legal Redress Committee agreed to support the case of Orrie Branch. 
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In March of 1936, Branch was strolling down Wabash Avenue near Forty-Fourth Street 
when two unfamiliar men approached him. They demanded that Branch surrender his wallet and 
any other valuables on his person. Just then, in the midst of the robbery, two officers from the 
Wabash Avenue police station drove past. Officers John Dawe and Michael O’Connor halted 
their vehicle and attempted to stop the robbery in process. As the officers exited their patrol car, 
the two assailants aimed their revolvers at the police and fired; in the ensuing gunfight, Officer 
Dawe was shot in the abdomen and Branch was struck in the leg.129 Branch managed to reach the 
48th Street police station once the conflict had subsided and reported the incident to the officers 
there before being escorted to Provident Hospital for treatment.130 
Soon after, however, a group of police officers arrived at Branch’s hospital room and 
arrested the injured man. They escorted him to Bridewell Hospital where Dawe was being 
treated and brought Branch to the injured officer’s bedside. The arresting officers asked Dawe if 
Branch was one of the men who had shot him earlier that day. Dawe affirmed that he was, 
despite the fact that Branch had actually been the victim of the robbery in which Dawe and his 
partner had attempted to intervene. Upon hearing this false information, the group of officers 
attacked Branch, breaking his jaw in two places before escorting him to the Wabash Avenue 
police station where he was charged with breach of the peace.131 It may have been this blatant 
attack in a hospital room—outside the cover of police station interrogation rooms—that caused 
NAACP branch president A.C. MacNeal to call Branch’s case “one of the most shocking 
exhibits of police brutality ever brought to the attention of the [NAACP].”132 
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With the support of NAACP Legal Redress Committee, Branch brought a lawsuit against 
nine of the officers who had brutalized him or had been complicit in the attack. Branch sued the 
officers, all white, for a total of $25,000 in damages.133 Nearly two years passed before Branch’s 
case was decided in the Superior Court of Cook County, due to court delays and police 
investigations into the incident. But in June of 1938, the jury found one of the nine officers liable 
for damages and ordered Officer James Woulfe to pay $1,200 or face six months in prison.134 
Although the award was only a small fraction of the damages that Branch had sought when filing 
the lawsuit, the Chicago Defender celebrated the decision as a victory, especially considering 
that Branch’s NAACP-funded counsel had “succeeded in upsetting an organized defense by a 
batter of lawyers from the Corporation Counsel’s office and sympathizing testimonies of 8 
policemen.”135 
Details of the Branch case mirrored the challenges that had faced LRC lawyers and their 
clients in police brutality cases over the previous several years, indicating that it was not only 
bureaucratic reticence but also active police deception and prosecutorial disinterest that had 
made it so difficult for plaintiffs to secure damages and see brutal police dismissed from the 
force. Defender reporters lauded the work of attorneys Sidney A. Jones and William H. Temple, 
noting that their victory “registered against numerous police subterfuges utilized in such 
cases.”136 Here the reporters may have been remembering the case of David Campbell, who had 
been bribed and intimidated to prevent him from offering testimony in his own case against a 
Chicago police officer. But even though Branch’s lawyers had successfully surmounted the 
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numerous testimonies in support of the offending officer, Branch had to wait nearly another year 
to receive his damages while Woulfe appealed the decision. In May of 1939, the Appellate Court 
of Illinois affirmed the decision of the Superior Court, finding that Branch had indeed shown that 
a preponderance of evidence indicated that he had been mistreated by Woulfe.137 Only then—
more than three years after the brutal police beating that he had endured—did Branch receive 
$1,200 in damages. The decision published by the Appellate Court included no indication 
regarding Woulfe’s employment with the Chicago Police Department; it is possible that the Civil 
Service Commission found the judgment against him to be reason enough for dismissal, but also 
fully possible that he and the other eight officers against whom Branch had pressed charges had 












FIGURE 6.2: “A TOUGH CASE BUT THEY PUT IT OVER,” 1939138 
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The Chicago NAACP campaign against police brutality revealed both the limited legal 
vision of early organizational responses to police violence as well as the structural and political 
hurdles that the local branch faced. Efforts to secure financial damages from brutal cops in 
Illinois Superior Court were occasionally successful, but this legal strategy ultimately limited 
critiques to the actions of individual officers and failed to address the problem of ubiquitous and 
structurally embedded police violence faced by many Chicagoans. By the end of the 1930s, even 
a successful case in the Chicago NAACP’s campaign was a relatively circumscribed one. 
Although Branch had indeed secured financial damages from one of the officers who brutalized 
him in 1936, it took the courts over three years to resolve the case and they ultimately awarded 
Branch only a fraction of the damages he had originally sought. Most plaintiffs that sought 
NAACP support in cases of police brutality or misconduct were stymied by the bureaucracy of 
the Civil Service Commission or failed to secure damages in Illinois Superior Court. Others were 
intimidated into silence or obstructed by lying or obfuscating police officers. Even in the face of 
these limitations, the Chicago branch and other local branches continued to pursue this strategy 
of individual legal challenges to police violence, drawing on the legal resources and institutions 
that the branch had established earlier that decade.139  
The narrowing of the branch’s legal critique of police brutality as a racialized civil rights 
issue also limited the possibility of intersectional critiques of state violence that reached across 
the boundaries of race, gender, and class. For instance, in 1933, the same year that James Warren 
pursued his case against brutal police and just a year after Ernest Draine had suffered his attack, 
police clashed with black women in the streets of Chicago on a massive scale. In June of 1933, 
over 1,500 women walked out of six B. Sopkin & Sons apron factories on Chicago’s South Side, 
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protesting “inhuman working conditions and starvation wages.”140 The crowds of black and 
white women picketed the factories peacefully, but after less than an hour of demonstrations, Mr. 
Sopkin made a call to the police. A dozen or more police arrived at the scene of one of the 
pickets and “mauled and slugged and cracked the heads of the women.”141 The pickets continued, 
despite myriad injuries among the striking women and warrantless arrests among the protestors. 
In early July, A.L. Foster of the Chicago Urban League called a conference among employers 
and striking workers, in the hopes of reaching a settlement.142 After two weeks of protests and 
ongoing negotiations, the women reached an agreement with the firm, which limited weekly 
hours, provided for wage increases, and prohibited discrimination for political or racial 
motivations.143 Although this dramatic incident of police violence occurred simultaneously to the 
branch’s campaign against brutality, it failed to adhere to the legal strategy or the political 
boundaries of the campaign, as it represented an attack on working class women who had 
mounted a labor protest. While some of Chicago’s middle-class uplift organizations including 
the Urban League participated in the resolution of the strike, the boundaries of the NAACP anti-
brutality campaign failed to accommodate the incident. 
The boundaries of the NAACP legal campaign against state violence continued to 
exclude examples of massive police brutality, particularly against labor, as the 1930s concluded. 
In one of the most spectacular displays of police violence during that decade, a group of Chicago 
police officers fired into a crowd of striking steel workers on May 30, 1937, killing ten protestors 
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and injuring nearly ninety others.144 Workers had attempted to establish a picket line at Republic 
Steel on the city’s Southwest Side, after the manufacturer refused to sign the union contract that 
had been agreed to by US Steel. The Steel Workers Organizing Committee called for a strike in 
response, and at the end of May a group of hundreds marched toward Republic Steel, halted by a 
group of Chicago police. A Congressional inquiry into the incident later found that police 
accounts of mob violence had been manufactured and that the police aggression had been 
entirely unwarranted. Despite these findings, the Chicago coroner’s jury concluded that the 
officers had acted in self-defense, ruling the killings of the strikers justifiable homicides.145  
As had the Sopkin factory strike, the police massacre at Republic Steel fell outside the 
boundaries of the Chicago NAACP’s legal strategy against police violence—it was an attack 
directed at organized labor, rather than at individual black Chicagoans who had made up the 
whole of NAACP supported plaintiffs in the 1930s. Almost all of the plaintiffs represented by 
the NAACP had also been middle-class respectable men who owned businesses on the South 
Side Black Belt or who worked in professional positions rather than industrial jobs. But the 
findings of the Coroner’s Jury and its failure to indict the officers who were guilty of killing ten 
people during the strike demonstrated the same bureaucratic hurdles and state opacity that had 
stymied NAACP efforts to discipline brutal police since the beginning of the 1930s. It also 
indicated the ongoing role of law enforcement institutions in reifying social hierarchies of class 
as well as those of race. While the campaign of the Chicago NAACP had worked to frame the 
problem of police brutality as a racialized problem that violated black civil rights and had 
instituted a legalistic critique of state violence, there was little evidence by the end of the decade 
that this campaign or the protest strategies of other groups across the political spectrum had 
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made many inroads at all into curtailing the violent institutional culture of urban law 










WAR, MIGRATION, AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT LANDSCAPE OF MID-CENTURY CHICAGO 
 
On the afternoon of May 15, 1943, a group of young African American boys gathered at 
the intersection of 113th Street and the Pennsylvania railroad tracks on Chicago’s South Side to 
enjoy the spring day. The group watched as passenger trains sped by and passed the time by 
tossing stones in the direction of the advancing rail cars. What might have seemed like a 
harmless youthful dalliance to some apparently appeared more sinister to other neighbors in the 
area, as a number reported the boys to the Morgan Park Police Station. Those who reported the 
boys may have been further motivated by circulating predictions of a wartime wave of juvenile 
delinquency, prompted by disruptions to family life and gaps in social services.1 When 
Policeman Patrick Rynne arrived at the scene, the boys became irritated and hurled stones in his 
direction, likely disgruntled at the patrolman’s surveillance of what had started as a jovial 
afternoon prank. After a few stones struck him in the head, Officer Rynne became angry, trained 
his service revolver on the boys, and fired. A bullet struck sixteen-year-old Elmo Vassar, killing 
him.2 
The incident echoed myriad cases of police violence that had occurred throughout the 
interwar decades—police officers subjected African Americans and Chicagoans writ large to 
violence even in the most quotidian of interactions. The NAACP’s interwar campaign against 
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police brutality had done little to curtail the regular police violence that black Chicagoans 
endured, even if the campaign had fomented a growing political consciousness and new methods 
of critique. It may have been that anti-police brutality campaign or the mere shock that a teenage 
boy had been killed by an officer for the minor offense of throwing a few errant stones that 
transformed Elmo Vassar’s murder into a rallying point for black Chicago during the war years. 
More than one hundred fifty black observers attended the initial coroner’s inquest into the 
incident, eager to see the city official find the officer at fault for the killing. Vassar’s father 
testified at the inquest that he had no knowledge of any events preceding his son’s death that 
should have precipitated his killing by a Chicago police officer, challenging any suggestions that 
Elmo Vassar’s delinquency or past violations had elicited the murder.3 In contrast, Rynne’s 
supervisor at the Morgan Park station claimed that the officer was “perfectly justified” in his use 
of violence.4 
Hundreds of black Chicagoans continued to attend the coroner’s inquest hearings into late 
May; three hundred African Americans observed the next inquest hearing on May 25th, where 
Louis McCamey, an African American sailor, testified that he had witnessed the shooting from 
the window of his nearby home and saw Rynne fire two shots at Vassar as the teenager ran away 
from the scene. McCamey asserted that it was only then that Vassar had hurled a rock in the 
officer’s direction.5 The lawyer for the Vassar family, William Temple, demanded that Officer 
Rynne be arrested, but Deputy Chief Coroner James Whalen insisted that there was no evidence 
to warrant the arrest, despite McCamey’s direct testimony. The Chicago Police Department 
suspended Rynne and his partner, pending further investigation in the following months.6 Two 
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months later, in August of 1943, Officer Rynne and his partner Officer Charles J. Schwertfeger 
were dismissed from the Chicago Police Department by the Chicago Civil Service Commission, 
having been found guilty of conduct unbecoming of police officers. Notably, the Commission 
did not find the officers guilty of “unlawful use of a police weapon,” nor were criminal charges 
ever filed against the two men. Rather, it was their poor conduct and the negative impression that 
it provided of the Chicago Police Department that justified the dismissals. Only one member of 
the Civil Service Commission refused to confirm the majority opinion; African American 
member James B. Cashin announced that he planned to file a dissenting opinion, protesting the 
failure of the Commission to find the officers guilty of the greater charges.  
Some may have seen the dismissal of Rynne and Schwertfeger as a measure of 
improvement in the discipline of Chicago police officers during the war years. Rather than being 
hamstrung by bureaucratic procedure, the Chicago Civil Service Commission adjudicated this 
case in a matter of months, and the officers were indeed dismissed from the force. But the 
incident itself demonstrated the persistence of police violence directed against African 
Americans—in this case, African American youths—and the ongoing decriminalization of police 
violence, as the officers faced no criminal sanctions for the killing of Elmo Vassar. Furthermore, 
the Irish and German heritage of the offending officers was likely not lost on the hundreds of 
black observers who came to watch the coroner’s inquest that summer as they saw two members 
of the city’s immigrant communities excused for the murder of a young black man. Here the 
state endorsed white violence against black bodies, which African Americans on the city’s South 
and West Sides had experienced in their clashes with white neighborhood associations, ethnic 
gangs, and police officers over the previous three decades.7 Vassar’s murder, then, exemplified 
the ability of certain immigrant communities to become integrated into state institutions, the 
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persistent role of the state in endorsing white racial violence, and the pathologizing of the city’s 
growing African American population in the war years and beyond.  
As had become commonplace in the first four decades of the twentieth century, Chicago 
saw similar patterns of racially discriminatory policing and white racial violence in the war years 
and beyond. Police brutality, warrantless arrests, and police raids continued, despite organized 
protests by organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People and the Chicago Civil Liberties Committee.8 As the black population of the city increased 
during the years of the second Great Migration, white Chicagoans and neighborhood associations 
once again targeted black homeowners and renters who sought to move outside the narrow 
confines of the black South Side, much as white homeowners’ associations had violently targeted 
black homes in the years of the first Great Migration. And again, those violent attacks saw little 
if any police intervention or criminalization, as the violent enforcement of the urban color line 
proceeded with the implicit approval of the state.9 This state endorsement of white racial 
violence was joined by ongoing police brutality, as African Americans and political radicals 
continued to contest that form of state violence.  
The history of urban development and racial change in post-World Was II Chicago is by 
now a familiar one. Massive black migration dramatically altered the racial composition of the 
city. White city leaders, realtors, and city residents met this racial change with an array of 
technologies of white supremacy and racial exclusion, including restrictive covenants, racially 
discriminatory lending and home finance, segregated schools and workplaces, and white racial 
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violence.10 Similarly to the years following the First World War, city leaders anticipated a post-
war crime wave, particularly among the city’s growing African American population. In 
particular, city executives and social reformers bemoaned increases of juvenile delinquency and 
designed policing strategies and other intervention programs to prevent delinquency. Immigrant 
populations also shifted in the post-war years, as nearly two decades of restrictionist legislation 
significantly curtailed European immigration, while the Mexican population of Chicago 
continued to grow. This reduction of European immigration along with the repeal of federal 
Prohibition resulted in an urban crime control landscape in which city leaders emphasized black 
crime and delinquency as foremost crime problems, as opposed to the problem of immigrant 
criminal syndicalism. Law enforcement institutions themselves became increasingly opaque in 
the post-WWII years as well, despite decades of attempted reform by criminal justice advocates 
and anti-crime activists.  
Placing these changes in the context of early-twentieth-century crime control politics and 
racialized law enforcement practices demonstrates that the post-WWII years did not represent a 
radical break in urban development but rather the further entrenchment of policing practices and 
forms of racial violence that had taken hold in Chicago since the turn of the twentieth century. 
Foregrounding the politics of crime control in the story of post-war Chicago demonstrates the 
central role that law enforcement and attempts to impose lawfulness played in the imposition of 
urban order and defense of the color line, as the city became increasingly racially diverse through 
the middle of the twentieth century. Law enforcement and police discretion provided the state 
                                                
10 For representative literature on the history of racial exclusion in post-WWII Chicago see Diamond, Mean Streets;  
Cayton and Drake, Black Metropolis; Fernández, Brown in the Windy City; Helgeson, Crucibles of Black 
Empowerment; Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto; D. Bradford Hunt, Blueprint for Disaster: The Unraveling of 
Chicago Public Housing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); McGreevy, Parish Boundaries; Satter, 
Family Properties; Amanda Seligman, Block by Block: Neighborhoods and Public Policy on Chicago’s West Side 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
 
341 
with a critical set of tools to enforce social hierarchy and reify the post-war urban color line. 
Policing therefore served as a critical state technology of racial formation as well as one of the 
primary sites at which reformers continued to attempt to control the problems of discretion, 
including state violence, racial discrimination, and inequitable policing throughout the city.  
 
CHICAGO AT MID-CENTURY  
Changing labor needs, wartime mobilization and demobilization, and federal policy 
changes all altered the racial composition of Chicago, as African American migration increased 
dramatically during the war years, the number of Mexican and Puerto Rican immigrants rose, 
and European immigration significantly decreased. The result was a city that became 
increasingly racially diverse as well as racially segregated, as early-twentieth-century racial 
boundaries became further entrenched through housing policy, exclusionary real estate practices, 
and urban violence. Chicago’s African American population had continued to grow over the 
course of the interwar decades, but that rate of growth increased rapidly with the start of WWII 
and the beginning of the massive wave of black migration that would come to be known as the 
second Great Migration. By 1940, the city’s black population had grown to 277,731 and 
comprised 8.2 percent of the total population, amounting to more than double the black 
population of the city in 1920 and six times Chicago’s black population in 1910.11 The number 
of black Chicagoans and particularly black Southern migrants continued to grow apace over the 
course of the 1940s; by 1950, the black population of the city had grown to 586,655 and 
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comprised 10.7 percent of the total population.12 During their comprehensive study of black 
Chicago in 1945, sociologists Horace Cayton and St. Clair Drake found that eighty percent of 
black Chicago residents had been born in Southern states, meaning that the vast majority of the 
city’s black population was new to the landscape and politics of Chicago.13 This massive 
proportion of Southern-born African Americans reflected national patterns of black urban 
migration in the post-war years; by the 1940s, two out of every three black Southern migrants 
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FIGURE 7.1: CHICAGO BLACK POPULATION DENSITY, 194015 
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Despite the rapid growth of the city’s black population, most African American 
Chicagoans remained confined to the narrow South Side Black Belt, despite serious problems of 
overcrowding and housing shortages for black residents.16 As a result of that racialized real 
estate market, along with white hostility, federal urban development policy, and public housing 
programs, the city’s African American population became concentrated and isolated during the 
middle decades of the twentieth century.17 At the beginning of the twentieth century, two thirds 
of the city’s black population lived in neighborhoods that were less than 50 percent African 
American. By the early 1920s, however, that number had shifted significantly, as 87 percent of 
black Chicagoans came to live in predominantly African American neighborhoods, a proportion 
that grew to over 90 percent a decade later.18 Although the boundaries of the South Side Black 
Belt grew in those years to accommodate massive waves of black migrants—especially as some 
white Chicagoans left the city for the surrounding suburbs—these post war-processes of 
residential segregation and housing restriction reified urban racial boundaries that had been first 
established during the early decades of the twentieth century.19 
While African American migration produced one of the most visible changes to the racial 
landscape of mid-century Chicago, new immigration patterns and policies also produced changes 
to the ethnic immigrant composition of the city. By 1940, decades of nativist politics and 
immigration restriction resulted in the decline of the foreign-born population of Chicago, as that 
demographic numbered below 700,000 and fell below 20 percent of the total city population.20 
The proportion of foreign-born Chicago residents had dropped steeply since the beginning of the 
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twentieth century, when foreign-born whites represented nearly 35 percent of the city 
population.21 That proportion had remained relatively high through the interwar decades; in 1930, 
first-generation immigrants still represented 25 percent of Chicago’s population.22 But by 1950, 
the proportion of first-generation immigrants in Chicago would drop even further; although the 
total number of foreign-born whites remained close to 700,000 people, that group only 
represented 12.8 percent of the city’s population by mid-century.23 In the span of just a few 
decades, the decline of the proportion and gross total of first-generation European immigrants 
represented a dramatic shift in the demographic composition of the city, and it was even more 
striking in comparison to the growth of the city’s African American population over the course 
of the interwar decades and the years after World War II. 
Several factors helped account for the precipitous decline in the number of first-
generation immigrants in Chicago over the first half of the twentieth century. Federal 
immigration restrictions and national origins quotas had severely limited immigration from 
European nations since the passage of the Johnson-Reed Act in 1924 and the 1940 census totals 
reflected the consequences of that federal ban on new immigration from European countries. 
Among the European immigrant groups with the largest representations in Chicago, the total 
number of first-generation Germans, Poles, and Russians had each declined by between 20,000 
and 30,000 people over the previous 20 years.24 Notably, however, changes to census categories 
by the 1940s had also artificially lowered the number of foreign-born residents of Chicago. In 
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1930, the Department of Commerce counted Mexican residents of the United States in their own 
separate census category rather than count those persons in the categories of white or foreign-
born white. The decline in the number of foreign-born whites in Chicago predicted an ongoing 
decline in the number of white residents of the city more broadly over the coming decades, as 
many white Chicagoans left the city limits for the suburbs, encouraged by racially structured 
federal home finance. Between 1940 and 1960, the white population of Chicago declined by 
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FIGURE 7.2: CHICAGO POPULATION DENSITY, 194026 
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The most significant increase in the population of Chicago in the second half of the 
twentieth century came through the continuing growth of its African American population, 
which grew by more than 200,000 between 1940 and 1950 and eventually increased to nearly 1.2 
million by 1980.27 The massive growth of the city’s African American population, however, did 
not totally account for the corresponding loss of white residents of the city, as the Chicago’s total 
population only declined slightly in the interwar decades and post-war years. This seeming 
contradiction in population change could be accounted for, as historian Lilia Fernandez has 
explained, by Mexicans, Mexican Americans, and Puerto Ricans who were “buried within 
census data.”28 Until 1980, the federal census did not classify Latino/as as a separate category 
and most were counted in the category of “white” or “foreign-born white.” The 1980 census 
added a category that allowed individuals to indicate if they were of “Spanish origin,” a term that 
is more commonly referred to as “Hispanic” or “Latino/a.”29 As a result, the 1980 census showed 
that Chicago had over 400,000 Latino/a residents, comprising 14 percent of the city’s 
population.30 
Although the federal census did not officially count people of “Spanish origin” until 1980, 
some data collected for Chicago in the interwar decades already indicated a significant number 
of people of Mexican origin. Census takers provided estimates of the number of Mexican people 
in Chicago in 1920, counting just 1,141 people of Mexican origin.31 A decade later, that estimate 
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had grown significantly, numbering close to 20,000 people of Mexican origin.32 These early 
statistics provide challenges to interpretation, as census takers failed to indicate whether those 
they counted had been born in the United States or had been born in Mexico, therefore confusing 
the categories of first and second-generation Mexican immigrants.33 And although the 1930 
estimate had shown an increase in the Mexican population of Chicago by a factor of seventeen, 
some interwar contemporaries speculated that the figure was likely too low, as many Mexican 
immigrants might have been reticent to answer to the questions of census takers for fear of 
deportation or arrest. By the end of the 1930s, however, census records indicated that even that 
artificially low number had fallen to less than half of the total number of Mexicans residents of 
Chicago compared to the total at the beginning of the decade.34 Economic crisis, repatriations, 
and deportations drove that decrease in the Mexican population of Chicago by the 1940s, after 
which census inconsistencies obscured the number of Mexicans in the city until changes to the 
federal census questions in 1980.35  
All of this conflicting and opaque census data makes it difficult to fully quantify the 
number of Mexicans or Latino/as in Chicago by mid-century, but archival sources from the 
records of the Illinois Division of the American Civil Liberties Union suggest that this was 
indeed a population that had grown through the war years and continued to be a target of police 
discrimination, as Mexicans and other immigrant groups had been during the deportation drives 
of the 1930s. In 1951, the Chicago Division of the American Civil Liberties Union began to 
distribute a new pamphlet to visitors who arrived at their local offices. The title of the pamphlet 
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was simply stated—“Your Rights When Arrested”—and excerpted sections from a report written 
by the Illinois State Bar Association’s Committee on Civil Rights, a professional organization of 
lawyers and jurists with an interest in civil liberties. The ACLU national office in New York City 
distributed a similar pamphlet in these years entitled “If You Are Arrested.”36  
The circulation of these pamphlets by both the national organization and this local office 
of the ACLU indicated the emergence of the rights of the arrested as a critical issue among the 
nation’s foremost civil liberties protection organization by the middle of the twentieth century. 
Scrawled on the front of a copy of the pamphlet from the Chicago office was a hasty note—
“Translation to Spanish”—a reminder to Illinois ACLU staff that the office required a new 
version of the pamphlet that could be read by the city’s growing Spanish-speaking population. 
The brief memo served as an indication of the changing demographics of the city as well as 
shifts in the populations and communities served by organizations like the American Civil 
Liberties Union. An organization that originated to protect the rights of political radicals and 
dissidents, officers of the Illinois ACLU recognized that their future work would also depend on 
their ability to protect the rights of the city’s growing Latino/a population. Furthermore, the note 
that “Your Rights When Arrested” should be translated into Spanish also suggested that Latino/a 
Chicagoans suffered police discrimination and violence at least as frequently as English-
speaking Chicagoans and would benefit from the aid of the civil liberties advocacy organization 
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BLACK CHICAGO IN THE WAR YEARS 
Mid-century changes to the racial composition of Chicago resulted to corresponding 
changes to black life and politics. The spatial concentration of black Chicago over the course of 
the first four decades of the twentieth century obscured to some degree black class stratification 
and political differences across the boundaries of class and status that had taken hold in the years 
of the first Great Migration. The economic crises of the interwar years and the exclusion of many 
black Chicagoans from jobs that provided a living wage hampered widespread economic 
mobility and capital accumulation among the black South Side.37 Some black elites, however, 
did achieve a measure of economic mobility through financial institutions or by catering to the 
captive African American market on the black South Side through businesses such as retail, 
undertaking, and personal grooming.38 Other black Chicago residents achieved upward mobility 
and middle-class status through occupations such as civil service positions, other municipal 
employment, or industrial labor and service work.39 Even so, Drake and Cayton noted in Black 
Metropolis that only a few were able to amass significant generational capital, and the vast 
majority of businesses in the Black Belt remained in control of white business owners.40 
According to their analysis, the economic strictures imposed on black Chicago by white 
industrialists, union officials, and property owners produced conditions in which the only reliable 
way to accumulate black capital was through the illicit economy of numbers running and policy 
games.41 Rumors had circulated in the Prohibition years that criminal syndicates tempted black 
Chicagoans away from the liquor trades by giving them control of policy—a game of chance 
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akin to lottery.42 The game proved so profitable that several policy game owners were able to 
convey their earnings into legitimate businesses; some alleged that Binga State Bank owner Jesse 
Binga had made his initial fortunes through just that avenue.43 
The war years saw the broader expansion of employment opportunities for black Chicago, 
however, as war industries and federally funded projects expanded the city’s work opportunities 
in the years after 1940. By 1945, the proportion of black workers in Chicago had exceeded the 
proportion of black city residents, as increasing numbers of African Americans moved into the 
workforce and especially into the industrial sector.44 Black workers tended to remain in the 
lowest paid jobs, though, and after the conclusion of the war, black unemployment rose and was 
accompanied by reduced job quality for most black industrial workers.45 While post-war black 
unemployment did not reach its interwar numbers, the effects of urban segregation continued to 
shape black Chicago life, as most of the city’s African American residents continued to occupy 
dilapidated and crowded housing on the black South Side. It was among these neighborhoods 
that sociologists not only found rampant unemployment but also high rates of delinquency.46 
South Side black neighborhoods also maintained their reputations as the primary locations of 
Chicago’s vice trades, which elicited objections particularly among black women who 
sometimes found themselves confused with vice workers and solicited in the city streets.47 
The conditions of wartime and post-WWII black neighborhoods resurrected critiques of 
police discretion among black intellectuals and race leaders, who drew attention to the fact that 
police routinely failed to equally enforce the law on the black South Side. This pattern of 
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neglectful policing brought to mind the processes that had resulted in the concentration of vice 
and other illicit enterprises in black neighborhoods during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. In 1940, Chicago Defender editors warned about a “wave of lawlessness” that had 
infiltrated the black South Side and demanded, “increased police measures to restrain young 
hoodlums.”48 They went on to acknowledge that high rates of delinquency and crime had their 
roots in economic deprivation, as unemployment and low wages encouraged law breaking and 
immoral activity among the city’s black youth. The solution, according to the Defender, lay in a 
law enforcement collaboration with social services: “Any movement to eradicate crime which is 
not coupled with a movement to eradicate such things as unemployment because of racial 
discrimination…is like trying to dam up a river with sticks.”49 Later that same year, Defender 
journalist David Ward Howe observed the same problems with police discretion among black 
neighborhoods, vividly describing “an increase in armed robbery and bands of young hoodlums 
roam[ing] the streets insulting and attacking women with little fear of arrest.”50 Howe also drew 
connections between the South Side crime rate and unemployment, compounded by housing 
shortages and real estate exploitation, and noted the work of the Chicago Urban League to 
ameliorate the conditions of delinquency, as it sought “the cooperation of law enforcing officials 
in eliminating the abuses conducive to delinquency.”51 
The appeals for fair law enforcement that appeared in the pages of the Chicago Defender 
and the programs of the Chicago Urban League represented a law enforcement critique that was 
distinctly different from the black law and order politics that had circulated among respectable 
race leaders in the early twentieth century. Instead of insisting that black lawfulness earned black 
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equal rights, these leaders acknowledged black law breaking and delinquency but contextualized 
it within the economic shifts of post-war Chicago. These appeals to fair policing were made on 
the premise that the state had a responsibility to address the wide range of social ills that afflicted 
black Chicago. And as the Defender noted in 1940, that state responsibility would have to be 
holistic, since “We do not feel that any social condition will be permanently corrected by 
building bigger and better jails.”52  
The rapid growth of the city’s African American population in the years following WWII 
had precipitated a corresponding growth and expansion of racial advocacy organizations such as 
the Chicago Urban League and the Chicago chapter of the NAACP. The CUL’s annual report at 
the close of 1942 noted that more than 24,000 black city residents had registered with the 
organization that year, seeking aid in finding employment and housing, an increase of more than 
15,000 more people seeking aid from the CUL since 1939.53 In January 1944, Chicago Urban 
League president A. L. Foster announced that the organization had recently enjoyed “its greatest 
growth and expansion, and rendered its most effective service since it was organized in 1916.”54 
That year’s annual report lamented that the previous year had proven to be a challenging one for 
African Americans around the country. Urban unrest in cities including Detroit and New York, 
continuing exclusion of African Americans from labor unions, attacks on black men in military 
uniform, the expansion of residential segregation, the failure of federal anti-lynching 
legislation—all “combined to form an ugly national picture.”55 Officers of the CUL admitted that 
their city had its own share of racial conflict and discrimination, noting the continuing housing 
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shortage and use of restrictive covenants, inadequate schools in black neighborhoods, and the 
fact that “police have not used consistent good judgement [sic] in handling explosive 
situations.”56 Despite this litany of problems facing black Chicagoans in the early 1940s, the 
CUL concluded that it had made major strides in improving the working and living conditions of 
the city’s growing black population, and that “the spirit of racial goodwill has seemed to improve 
and to conquer to some extent the fascist forces.”57  
The desegregation of employment had been one of the foremost priorities of the CUL 
since its founding in 1916, and the majority of cases addressed by the CUL in the early 1940s 
concerned black migrants seeking industrial employment. But by that decade the CUL also had a 
new agenda—the amelioration of juvenile delinquency. This campaign was consonant with the 
politics of respectability that had dominated the organization’s first two decades of work. The 
CUL’s focus on delinquency resonated with the idea that individual comportment reflected on 
the condition of the race as a whole and as a result had to be improved and refined to meet 
middle-class standards of behavior. However, the CUL’s acknowledgment of the economic and 
social roots of delinquency and other law breaking did distinguish its post-war rhetoric from 
early-twentieth-century calls for fair law enforcement that were premised on black respectability. 
By the post-war years, this political commitment had translated into programs such as 
neighborhood improvement meetings and collaborations with the city Health Department and the 
Chicago Police Department.58 These programmatic attempts to curtail delinquency were paired 
with efforts to shift the public perception of black Chicagoans through a vigorous public 
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relations campaign that sought to counter ideas of black inferiority that had woven through the 
city’s public discourse since the early twentieth century. 
The war years saw upheavals in a number of urban centers across the country; in June of 
1943, reports reached Chicago that nearby Detroit had erupted into a three-day racial conflict, 
eventually quelled by the arrival of federal officers. The Detroit riot had been touched off by 
fights among black and white youths in the city’s Belle Isle recreation area and compounded by 
rumors regarding supposed violence perpetrated against white and black women in the days 
leading up to the conflict on Belle Isle.59 Over the course of three days, 34 people were killed, 25 
of whom where African Americans and 17 of whom were killed by police.60 More than 75 
percent of the 600 people injured were black, and 85 percent of those arrested over the course of 
the conflict were black, suggesting both the targeting of black Detroiters by their white neighbors 
as well as a focus on black Detroiters as the perpetrators of violence and other illegal activity by 
law enforcement officers.61  
Reports of the riot in Detroit appeared in newspapers around the country, eliciting 
concern among some Chicago community leaders that mere discussions of the problems in this 
other Midwestern urban center would provoke rioting in their own city.62 Indeed, the patterns of 
violence in Detroit in 1943 echoed the violence that had spread through Chicago in August of 
1919. The conflict began in a recreational park and involved black and white youths vying for 
resources in one of the city’s premier leisure spaces. The propagation of the violence also relied 
on the dissemination of rumors, was met with a profoundly racialized response from law 
enforcement, and eventually prompted a military response from the state or federal government 
                                                
59 Dominic J. Capeci and Martha Wilkerson, “The Detroit Rioters of 1943: A Reinterpretation,” Michigan Historical 
Review (Vol. 16, No. 1), 52-53. 
60 Harvard Sitkoff, “The Detroit Race Riot of 1943,” Michigan History, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Fall 1969), 194-195. 
61 Ibid, 202-203. 
62 Diamond, Mean Streets, 124-125. 
 
357 
in order to put down the ongoing violence. The Chicago Race Riot of 1919 had occurred just a 
generation earlier, and those who remembered the conflict likely feared that similar episodes 
around the country would incite rioting in Chicago again. 
It was perhaps simply coincidence or luck that Chicago did not see a similar large-scale 
racial conflict during the war years as it had at the end of WWI. In the years and months before 
the eruption of violence in Detroit, local news outlets repeatedly reported instances of police 
brutality, recalling the entrenched patterns of police violence that had prompted protest among 
the Chicago NAACP and the Chicago Civil Liberties Committee in the interwar decades and had 
been extensively documented by the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement. 
A Chicago Defender report in March of 1942 indicated how very routinized police violence had 
become, as nearly all instances of African American public conduct seemed to elicit a brutal 
police response. That month Anthony Williams suffered a brutal beating by Officer Earl Wilson 
after he refused the advances of a woman at a South Side tavern. Officer Wilson immediately 
approached Williams after he’d dismissed the woman who’d approached him; when Williams 
informed the officer that no altercation had occurred, Wilson struck Williams and threw him to 
the ground. When other patrons exclaimed, Wilson threatened them with his service revolver and 
continued to brutalize Williams, striking his eye and severely damaging his sight. Following the 
beating, Wilson arrested Williams and brought him to the 48th Street station, where he was 
charged with disorderly conduct.63 Anthony Williams’s brutal treatment demonstrated the kinds 
of daily violent encounters that black Chicagoans continued to endure into the 1940s. Others 
garnered far more notoriety and elicited protest among the city’s growing black neighborhoods—
such as the killing of Elmo Vassar in 1943—making it all the more surprising that the city did 
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not see massive racial conflict or rioting on the scale of other cities such as Detroit or Los 
Angeles. 
 
RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE WAR YEARS 
On August 23, 1946, South Side Chicagoans bore witness to a horrific sight. A black 
man’s lifeless body swung in the air, suspended from the tracks of the elevated train. Neighbors 
and witnesses rushed to notify news outlets and the Chicago Police Department of the gruesome 
incident—there had been a lynching in Chicago. Days later, a report in the Chicago Defender 
noted—with relief—that the investigation of the death revealed that the man had actually taken 
his own life after a domestic dispute in which he had beaten and killed his wife. Enoc P. Waters, 
writing for the Defender, observed that beyond the obvious tragedy of the case, it also served as 
an important indicator of the state of race relations and the threat of white racial violence in 
wartime Chicago. Waters noted that the multiple reports of lynching that South Siders had made 
to the Police indicated that the idea of a black man being lynched in Chicago was hardly out of 
the realm of possibility. He continued, “It is obvious that their thinking was conditioned by the 
contagion of anti-Negro violence that has been raging through the nation since V-J day,” 
referencing patterns of violence against African American soldiers that had occurred in cities 
across the country in the preceding months.64 Although the true circumstances of the man’s death 
brought some reassurance that it had not resulted from a lynching, the assumptions of many 
South Siders that decades of white racial violence had culminated in this violent expression of 
white supremacy indicated the tenor of race relations in Chicago during the war years.  
Coverage of this incident in the Chicago Defender placed decades of white racial 
violence in Chicago into the same framework as Southern lynching and other forms of anti-black 
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violence throughout the nation, offering a critique of spectacular racial violence as a purely 
Southern phenomenon. Writing about the Southside black man’s death in 1946, Waters argued 
that recent waves of racial violence could be attributed to “a new assertiveness among Negroes” 
that was not regionally delimited; rather “These disgraceful exhibitions are Southern growing 
pains, and to the extent that they occur elsewhere, the growing pains of the nation.”65 He went on 
to cite examples of racial violence in Chicago as well as in other urban centers around the 
country as indications of the nation-wide resurgence of white supremacy in response to black 
gains during the war years “The Chicago house bombings, the Gary, New York and Philadelphia 
high school strikes, the Freeport killings, the disgraceful California home burning and double 
murder are all phases of resistance to the gradual but persistent forward surge of Negroes toward 
a status long denied them.”66 According to this analysis, the sight of a man’s possibly lynched 
body made tragic sense to black Chicagoans who had endured decades of white racial violence. 
Waters’s reference to “the Chicago house bombings” called to mind a form of spectacular 
racial violence that had occurred repeatedly during the war years—another series of home 
bombings targeting black residents, which echoed the bombings of the 1910s that had directly 
preceded the 1919 Chicago Race Riot.67 In the years before and after the 1919 riot, black 
homeowners and renters who moved outside the narrow confines of the South Side Black Belt 
endured attacks on their homes at the hands of white neighbors and neighborhood associations, 
who used violence to enforce the residential color line as the city’s black population grew during 
the years of the first Great Migration. These violent attacks elicited little if any response from 
police and law enforcement; black Chicagoans and white property owners who rented to them 
reported nearly 60 bombing attacks in the 1910s, but only two perpetrators were arrested in those 
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cases and none convicted. The second Great Migration during and after the Second World War 
prompted a similar pattern of white racial violence, especially as soldiers returned from war and 
black Chicagoans moved into West Side neighborhoods. In October 1944, recently returned 
soldier John Titus found a stink bomb in the hallway of his newly purchased home on the 
Southwest Side, along with smears of orange paint on his porch and tar on his front steps. The 
Defender reported that the vandalism to Titus’s home “climaxed a series of attacks by white 
hoodlums in an attempt to intimidate Negro tenants.”68 Not only had the Titus home been 
defaced, but the broker who sold the family their new home had received a threatening letter 
“composed of headlines clipped from newspaper stories of the recent bombing of School 
Superintendent Johnson’s home.”69  
Reports of bombings—but few reports of arrests—littered Chicago’s daily news in the 
coming years. An image of blasted windows accompanied the July 1945 headline “Home Blasted 
by Hoodlums,” showing the destroyed house of Henry L. Vandetta on the far South Side.70 Just 
six months later, assailants flung two Molotov cocktails into an apartment building on the West 
Side, after a white man warned African American tenants Sherman Hemphill and Anna Johnson 
“Colored people are not wanted in this neighborhood.”71 The two families accosted in that 
firebombing of February 1946 had received threats from an anonymous group of white neighbors 
the week prior, who warned the new tenants “not to call the cops, ‘or it’ll be twice as hard for 
you.’”72 Disregarding the threat, Johnson had alerted the Blue Island Avenue police station to the 
threats she had received; officers there stationed a patrolman outside the apartment building. 
However, this police presence did nothing to stop the bombing attack; the patrolman was indeed 
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on duty when the bombs were thrown. This peculiar detail could have indicated that the police 
response to Mrs. Johnson’s report of violent threats was simply inadequate—that one patrolman 
was an insufficient surveillance to stop a crowd of bombers—or that the police were indeed 
complicit in the bombing itself, standing by idly as the white crowd hurled flaming bombs into 
the building.  
Police ignorance of the ongoing problem of white racial violence against black homes in 
the war years was difficult if not impossible to believe, considering the public threats made by 
some white Chicagoans who anticipated new black neighbors during the war years. Just a week 
after the bombing of Hemphill’s and Johnson’s apartment building, the Chicago Defender 
published an exposé of the white neighborhood organization that had coordinated the attack. A 
group of white landlords had formed the White Independent Citizens’ Committee in the 
preceding months and collaborated with the Oakland-Kenwood Property Owners’ Association, 
which had previously been found to have played a role in home bombings. Alton D. Baird, a 
leader of the Citizens’ Committee, decried his Jewish neighbors for choosing to sell or rent 
property to African Americans and criticized the administration of Mayor Edward J. Kelly for 
his positions on racial equality and civil rights. Baird explicitly endorsed white racial violence 
and lamented continuing violations of the city’s color line “We—er—they bombed and burned 
the niggers on Michigan Boulevard and they bombed ‘em and burned ‘em on Grand and now the 
niggers are there anyway.”73 The thought of Kelly being reelected nearly brought tears to Baird’s 
eyes as he acknowledged, “He’ll probably get in again. The machine, you know.”74 Baird’s 
candidness and his willingness to be publicly associated with these threats of violence stood in 
contrast to the racial bombing campaign of the second decade of the twentieth century, in which 
                                                




perpetrators remained largely anonymous. It also showcased the lack of fear that Baird and his 
cohort harbored about law enforcement reprisals for their ongoing violent campaign.  
By July of 1946, local news outlets had reported at least 27 home bombings over the 
previous years, but a failure of Chicago police to apprehend any suspects in the violent attacks.75 
That month, a delegation of representatives from ten civic and labor organizations paid a visit to 
Police Commissioner John C. Prendergast to protest the lack of police response to the ongoing 
bombing of black homes and to object to recent rumors of a law enforcement plot to conceal the 
circumstances surrounding the bombing of the home of Mrs. Grace Hardy on the South Side.76 
The delegation included representatives from a wide range of labor unions, community groups, 
and racial improvement organizations, demonstrating broad investment in the improvement of 
equal policing and the curtailment of white racial violence. Weeks earlier, the Chicago branch of 
the NAACP had hosted a meeting of those representatives at the Chicago City Club to discuss 
the ongoing attacks on black homes. Michael Mann, secretary of the CIO Chicago Industrial 
Council, promised the support of labor to black city residents who suffered racial attacks, telling 
the group “This matter has been brought to the police, and if no action is taken by the police to 
protect citizens, the CIO will raise plenty of hell.”77 Chicago NAACP President Henry W. 
McGee reiterated the urgency of Mann’s remarks, insisting that this “reign of terror” had to come 
to an immediate end.78 
Predictably, Prendergast denied the allegations of a police cover-up and informed the 
delegation “every effort would be made to apprehend and punish the criminals responsible for 
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the arson bombing.”79 Members of the delegation urged preventative action as well, suggesting 
that the Commissioner report incidents of racial conflict or violence to the Mayor’s Commission 
on Human Relations, the municipal body that had been formed three years earlier to examine and 
address racial tension in the city.80 They further reminded the Commissioner that in seven recent 
incidents of home bombings “None of the criminals [had] been apprehended or punished.”81 In 
some instances of violent threats during the war years, the Chicago Police Department had 
deployed officers to guard black homes, as they had done when John Titus received a threatening 
letter at his home in 1944 and when Anna Johnson’s apartment building was threatened in 1946. 
The delegation that visited Prendergast in July of 1946, however, indicated to the Commissioner 
that in many cases the officers assign to protect black Chicagoans actually sympathized with the 
attackers and allowed white violence to occur uninterrupted. Henry Vandetta, whose bombed 
home had appeared in the pages of the Defender a year earlier, told the black daily that officers 
assigned to protect his home had advised him simply to sell the house and leave the 
predominantly white neighborhood into which he had moved. Failing to do so, Vandetta’s home 
was bombed. In this instance, not only had the police failed to protect the safety and property of 
Vandetta and his family, but they had also deployed their authority as officers of the state to 
endorse the violent defense of the color line, as they actively encouraged him to abandon his new 
home and return to the predominantly black neighborhoods of the South Side.  
By the end of the year, the total number of violent bombings or arson attacks on black 
homes had risen to 35, in addition to 19 assaults of African Americans by white assailants in the 
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city streets.82 The Mayor’s Commission on Human Relations monitored those incidents 
throughout the year and encouraged Police Department officials to detail additional patrolmen to 
transitional neighborhoods on the South Side. Despite dedicated police details in neighborhoods 
that had seen bombings over the previous several years, however, neither arrests nor 
apprehensions were made.83 Similarly to the spectacle of law enforcement authority that police 
had demonstrated in the Beer War raids and the deportation drives of the 1920s, these patrols and 
details served as a performance of police surveillance but failed to actually improve black safety 
or guarantee equal law enforcement. Much like the patrolmen occasionally stationed outside 
black homes in hopes of preventing violence—usually ineffectively—these patrols served to 
insulate racially discriminatory police discretion from critique, especially as the interracial 
Mayor’s Commission on Human Relations endorsed the patrols as an adequate measure to 
address ongoing wartime violence.84 
 
POLICING WARTIME CHICAGO 
The failure of the Chicago Police Department to address the ongoing problem of white 
racial violence targeted against black homes in the WWII years and beyond stood in direct 
contrast with the department’s aggressive policing of so-called “hoodlums and vagrants” at the 
urging of the anti-crime activists of the Chicago Crime Commission. In late June of 1946, Crime 
Commission Operating Director Virgil W. Peterson issued the group’s annual crime report and 
“made a rather blanket indictment against the police department for its laxity against law 
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violators in the South side area.”85 The report claimed that at least 25 percent of Chicago’s 
violent crimes occurred among the black South Side, which was home to just 10 percent of the 
total city population.86 Peterson particularly faulted police work in the Wabash Avenue district, 
where he found that significant proportions of the city’s violent crimes had occurred during the 
previous calendar year and criticized “the prevalence of policy, the influence of politicians and 
the leniency of Municipal Court judges at Wabash in treating serious offenses rather lightly,” and 
“described police work as “totally unsatisfactory.””87 The police captain of the Wabash Avenue 
district station refuted the CCC’s findings, and claimed that his officers had indeed performed 
exemplary police work in that district, having investigated and solved all of the homicides and 
nearly all of the attacks on women in that area of the city in the six months preceding the 
publication of the CCC report. Despite the captain’s protestations against Peterson’s conclusions, 
Police Commissioner Prendergast responded to the report by sending twelve of his own specially 
trained detectives to the South Side district “with strict orders to “clean up the district.””88 As a 
result “three squads of four men each had jailed 50 hoodlums” within a matter of days after the 
publication of the report.89 
The political pressure exerted by the Chicago Crime Commission evidently elicited a 
much more urgent response on behalf of local law enforcement. While the delegation of civic 
and labor organizations that had paid a visit to Commissioner Prendergast that same month had 
received assurances that the campaign of racial violence would be addressed, little actual police 
response occurred. Political pressure from the Chicago Crime Commission was a familiar theme 
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to the Chicago Police Department by the mid-twentieth century, as the anti-crime advocacy 
group had leveled similar critiques of law enforcement efficiency and manpower in the post-
WWI years, resulting in the significant growth of law enforcement capacity in the 1920s. The 
wave of arrests in July 1946 also echoed the response of the Police Department to the 
Prohibition-era law and order campaign of Democratic Mayor William A. Dever, as officers 
made raids in immigrant and African American neighborhoods following calls for strict law 
enforcement in the context of the federal ban on alcohol. The CCC’s annual report of 1946 was 
in keeping with these earlier anti-crime campaigns, in its demands for immediate arrests and 
strict law enforcement, and consistent with the Commission’s strategy since the early 1930s of 
exerting public pressure on the Police Department in pursuit of law and order.90  
Peterson’s report reflected decades of discretionary policing that had directed vice 
establishments and criminal syndicates into South Side black neighborhoods, the same 
discretionary processes that the Vice Commission of Chicago and the Chicago Commission on 
Race Relations had identified in their investigations of urban conditions in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century. The Crime Commission, however, described the problem of South Side 
crime as one caused by “hoodlums and vagrants,” rather than identifying the active role that 
police discretion itself had played in shaping the geography of crime in post-war Chicago. 
Contemporary observers identified this oversight, drawing particular attention to the inattention 
that Peterson and his fellow Crime Commissioners had paid to the role of racial segregation in 
the encouragement of crime in the city. Writing to the Chicago Defender in the weeks after the 
publication of the Crime Commission annual report, Chicago resident J. Hamilton Johnson drew 
attention to what he called the “iron ring” that restricted most of black Chicago residents to the 
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South Side Black Belt.91 Hamilton faulted discriminatory laws and real estate practices for 
Chicago’s profound racial segregation, particularly the use of restrictive covenants. Nevertheless, 
while acknowledging the role of racial segregation in fostering law breaking among black 
neighborhoods, Hamilton invoked the claims of black law and order politics that had been 
commonplace in the years of the first Great Migration. Referring to himself and his neighbors, 
Hamilton wrote, “We who live in this iron ring know that for some time we have been making 
some progress in eliminating such evils…we should give our wholehearted support to the 
captains in this section.”92  
Other appraisals of the state of crime among black Chicago in the post-war years echoed 
popular assumptions of black criminality and particularly Southern migrant criminality that had 
circulated among city leaders and the popular press in the years following the first Great 
Migration. Assessing the conditions of black Chicago in light of the Crime Commission report, 
black Chicago lawyer and former editor of the militant Chicago Whip Joseph Bibb noted the 
lackluster response among black Chicagoans to the report of rampant crime. Bibb registered no 
protests or condemnations of the South Side conditions, and lamented, “Some have even had the 
nerve and audacity to deny the charges…no vigilantes have assembled, no marches in, no plans 
have been put into action.”93 Bibb acknowledged the role of racial segregation in the conditions 
of the black South side, while also drawing attention to the role of Southern black migration in 
fostering law breaking “Undoubtedly overcrowding has stifled culture. It is admitted that 
newcomers from the badlands of the South have intensified viciousness.”94 Ultimately these 
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condemnations of the crime conditions on the city’s South Side resulted in calls for renewed 
leadership among black Chicago and reform efforts that could adequately address the 
concentration of illicit activity in black neighborhoods.  
The reformist landscape of Chicago in the post-war years continued to be populated by 
organizations with historical roots in Progressivism, including the Chicago Crime Commission 
and the Juvenile Protection Association. Through the interwar decades and into the WWII years, 
the Chicago Crime Commission continued to perform its law enforcement watchdog role, 
maintaining its comprehensive database of records on criminal activity and the disposition of 
criminal cases in Chicago, carrying this Progressive reliance on knowledge accumulation into the 
post-war years.95 The national reach of the crime commission movement significantly 
diminished during the 1930s, as most municipal crime commissions disbanded or ceased to 
function during that decade, and only four new groups formed between the 1920s and the Second 
World War.96 According to the University of Chicago sociologist Ernest Burgess, two interwar 
shifts accounted for the diminishing number of crime commissions throughout the United 
States—the financial crisis of the Great Depression and the repeal of Prohibition.97 Most crime 
commissions comprised businessmen and other owners of capital, who both staffed and funded 
the organizations; many of those businessmen anti-crime activists found themselves with less 
expendable capital during the Depression and the war years, and crime commission funding 
diminished as a result. Just as importantly, Burgess noted, was the repeal of Prohibition and the 
reduced sense that organized crime and bootlegging represented the criminal threat that they had 
in the years following the First World War. While the legalization of alcohol hardly eliminated 
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organized crime, it did result in a diminished sense of urgency surrounding the question of 
bootlegging and criminal gang activity, which had often served as the impetus for the formation 
and work of municipal crime commissions around the country.98 
The Chicago Crime Commission survived the interwar decades along with only three 
other municipal crime commissions—the Cleveland Crime Commission, the Baltimore Crime 
Commission, and the Criminal Justice Association of Washington, DC.99 Since its founding in 
1919, the Crime Commission had maintained its attention to the improvement of criminal justice 
agencies, particularly with regard to the efficiency of criminal trials and other judicial procedures. 
The Prohibition-era agenda of the Chicago Crime Commission had largely focused on the 
problem of criminal syndicalism and law enforcement involvement with organized crime in 
Chicago, a problem often racially coded as white ethnic due to the associations between 
immigrant communities and organized crime. The CCC had retreated slightly from its militant 
anti-crime position during the 1930s, in contrast to the advocacy of strict crime deterrence that 
had characterized the organization’s early years. Attorney Frank J. Loesch assumed leadership of 
the organization in 1928, during which the CCC abandoned some of its earlier insistence on the 
necessity of criminal punishment but maintained strict advocacy of the improvement of criminal 
justice.100  
The wartime and post-war activity of the CCC shifted yet again, as the organization 
refashioned itself as an information clearinghouse, seeking to conduct scientific studies of crime 
in order to aid public officials in the reduction of crime, and redefining its role as “a non-partisan 
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scientific agency of citizens inquiries for the promotion of the efficiency and activity of all 
officers and departments of the State of Illinois, County of Cook, City of Chicago, charged with 
the duties of suppressing, preventing, and punishing crime.”101 In the post-war years, the Crime 
Commission variously turned its attention to the problems of police corruption, the improvement 
of police administration systems, and police technology.102 The organization also demonstrated 
the growing influence of University-of-Chicago-training criminologists and sociologists, as it 
conducted repeated surveys of crime in the city, publishing volumes including Gambling, Should 
it be Legalized? and Why Honest People Steal.103 These changes in the work of the Crime 
Commission, particularly its internal focus on the improvement of police systems, resulted in the 
gradual retreat of the CCC from the problem of organized crime that had been primarily 
associated with ethnic immigrant communities since the early twentieth century.  
The Juvenile Protection Association, often contrasted with the Crime Commission during 
the interwar decades due to the organizations’ differing interpretations of crime causation, also 
survived into the post-war years, continuing to advocate for improvements to the juvenile justice 
system. The post-war JPA joined the Chicago Urban League in its goal of reducing juvenile 
delinquency in Chicago, participating in a citywide conference in 1943 on the prevention of 
juvenile delinquency and focusing its programmatic attention on preventative services to ensure 
that Chicago youths would not fall under law enforcement supervision.104 The JPA had begun as 
an advocate of juvenile justice and its post-war focus on juvenile delinquency remained 
consistent with that organizational priority. However, the post-war attention juvenile delinquency, 
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along with the preventative programs of the Chicago Urban League, served to reduce the 
visibility of vice and prostitution from the agenda of these urban reformers. Vice had been 
among the foremost problems that animated programs of urban reform in the early twentieth 
century, as multiple municipal commissions and agencies focused their work on eliminating vice 
establishments.105 After the publication of the Vice Commission of Chicago’s report, The Social 
Evil in Chicago, the private Committee of Fifteen had assumed primary responsibility for 
cataloguing and reporting vice establishments in Chicago.106 That organization had ceased its 
work by the post-war years, however, as the reformist landscape became increasingly dominated 
by the Juvenile Protection Association’s focus on juvenile delinquency and the Crime 
Commission’s attention to police systems.  
Despite decades of scrutiny from anti-crime advocates and police reformers, the Chicago 
Police Department had seen some administrative improvements, but few changes to the oversight 
of police discretion by middle of the twentieth century. In fact, the Chicago Police Department 
became increasingly opaque with the establishment of the so-called Red Squad or the Subversive 
Unit in the early 1930s, a classified surveillance unit that gathered information on suspected 
radicals, Communists, and civil rights activists.107 The Red Squad grew out of Police Department 
surveillance of organized labor in the years following the Haymarket bombing in 1886; over the 
following 70 years the Squad assembled records on over 100,000 Chicagoans and over 14,000 
organizations.108 The economic crisis of the Great Depression had ignited labor organizing and 
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radicalism throughout the United States, and by the middle of the 1930s red squads throughout 
the country had turned their attention to suspected communists.109 The earliest extant Chicago 
Police Department Red Squad records tracked the activities of suspected communists, many of 
them associated with local labor unions. In the post-WWII years, the Chicago Red Squad turned 
its attention to civil rights organizations and movements for racial equality. Even during its early 
years, however, members of the squad had taken note of some Chicagoans who had “protest[ed] 
indiscriminate stopping of Negroes for questioning by police,” and others who had signed a 
petition “protesting ill treatment of Negroes by CTA and CPD.”110 In some ways, the Red Squad 
represented the culmination of demands for more stringent law enforcement and surveillance in 
Chicago, but it did so through an entirely opaque and furtive policing institution. 
The institutionalization of the Chicago Police Department Red Squad occurred nearly 
simultaneously to ongoing efforts to improve police systems and efficiency, urged by the 
Chicago Crime Commission as well as criminologists interested in the study of municipal law 
enforcement and management. In January 1929, Police Commissioner William F. Russell had 
addressed an urgent letter to a number of prominent criminologists and local anti-crime activists. 
In it, he described the state of the department and implored scholars and businessmen—including 
Chicago Crime Commission President Frank J. Loesch—to turn their critical eyes to the 
operation of law enforcement in Chicago. Russell’s letter echoed the appeals of Chicago anti-
crime activists who had deplored the inefficiency of the Department since the early twentieth 
century. He wrote, “Several serious problems confront the Chicago Police Department,” and 
went on to cite problems with the staffing and personnel of the department, its system of 
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recording keeping, and housing for Chicago’s police officers.111 Russell’s letter emphasized the 
need of the Department to expand—similarly to the arguments that had circulated among the 
Chicago Crime Commission and the Chicago City Council a decade earlier. He noted that a 
“scientific study” of the Department and its needs would best provide for “its proper 
expansion.”112 He ended his letter by appealing to the duties of law enforcement “The 
department is keenly aware of the great responsibility which by law rests upon it to protect from 
harm the lives, liberty and property…of three million citizens in their homes and their 
livelihoods. To meet successfully this formidable responsibility the department must have 
adequate support and resources.”113 These appeals for adequate resources echoed the arguments 
that the Chicago Crime Commission had made less than ten years earlier in support of the Police 
Department patrolmen increase, recommending that in order to adequately control crime, the 
department needed adequate resources. 
Russell’s appeals resulted in the formation of the Chicago Citizens’ Police Committee, an 
advisory organization dedicated to improving police systems and administration in the city. It 
was staffed by criminologists from the University of Chicago and Northwestern University, as 
well as some of the same anti-crime activists who populated the Chicago Crime Commission. 
The Committee, a temporary commission in the same model of Progressive organizations such as 
the Vice Commission of Chicago, conducted a review of the Chicago Police Department starting 
in 1929. The Committee contracted criminologist Bruce Smith to conduct the review, an expert 
in American policing from the National Institute of Public Administration.114 After a year of 
study, the Committee published its findings as Chicago Police Problems, a volume that reviewed 
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Chicago Police Department structure, management, record keeping, and personnel, with 
corresponding recommendations for improvement. Notably, despite decades of critique from 
anti-crime activists and other urban reformers, the Committee did not investigate the issue of 
police corruption, instead suggesting that its investigation into the problems with police 
administration and investigation tactics provided sufficient explanation of the department’s 
shortcomings without a study of corruption.115 Chicago Police Problems demonstrated how 
police reform remained narrowly focused on questions of Department structure, man-power, and 
efficiency in the interwar decades and leading into the post-war years, despite decades of 
evidence regarding the Chicago Police Department’s systematic use of violence and 
discrimination.  
Calls for administrative reform and increased surveillance capacity over the course of the 
twentieth century had also had little effect on the social composition of the Chicago Police 
Department by the post-war years, as it remained an almost entirely white organization. In early 
1946, the Chicago City Council authorized the hiring of an additional 1,000 temporary patrolmen, 
raising the total number of police employed by the department to nearly 7,000. The temporary 
addition of these patrolmen accounted for the depleted ranks of the Police Department due to 
World War II. Of that nearly 7,000 officers, however, only 226 were African American, 
accounting for just three percent of the total Chicago Police force.116 By the beginning of that 
decade, the African American population of Chicago had comprised 8.2 percent of the total 
population of the city, meaning that the proportion of black police officers fell far below the 
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proportion of black residents of Chicago.117 In addition to the underrepresentation of black 
officers on the police force, those who were employed by the Department were deployed almost 
exclusively in black neighborhoods and not allowed to supervise white officers.118 Despite slight 
increases in the number of African American police officers in post-war Chicago, the 
consistently low proportion of black patrolmen compared to the total proportion of black 
Chicago residents meant that the diversifying city continued to be policed by a predominantly 
white law enforcement agency, which defended and reinforced the structures of racial 
segregation that had taken root in Chicago over the previous four decades. 
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In January of 2017, the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and the 
United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois issued their joint 
investigation of the Chicago Police Department.1 Initiated after the police murder of Laquan 
McDonald on October 20, 2014—and in the midst of the ongoing national movement for black 
lives—the investigation probed the CPD’s use of force, record of officer misconduct, imposition 
of discipline, and racial, ethnic, and other disparities in accountability.2 At the center of the 
investigation were questions of community-police trust, particularly among the city’s West and 
South Sides, which had borne the brunt of the surges of gun violence over the previous several 
years. The Department of Justice’s investigation of the Chicago Police Department joined similar 
recent investigations of municipal police departments across the country, such as the DOJ’s 
investigation of the Ferguson Police Department following the murder of Michael Brown.3 
In the months following the McDonald murder, the City of Chicago had pursued of 
number of measures to curtail police violence and increase officer supervision, including the 
establishment of the mayor’s Police Accountability Task Force and a pilot program for officer 
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body cameras.4 Despite these attempts at reform, the Department of Justice found “that CPD 
officers engage in a pattern or practice of using force, including deadly force, that is 
unreasonable,” and a pattern of force that was in violation of the United States Constitution.5 The 
problems discovered by the Department of Justice echoed some that early-twentieth-century 
reformers and city executives had faced—inadequate mechanisms of police discipline and 
oversight, undue surveillance of certain neighborhoods and lack of surveillance in others, poor 
and incomplete police record keeping, connections to criminal gangs, and uncontrollable police 
violence. In addition to this litany of problems, the investigation found racial discrimination to be 
endemic in the department, as “[The] CPD’s pattern or practice of unreasonable force and 
systemic deficiencies fall heaviest on the predominantly black and Latino neighborhoods on the 
South and West Sides of Chicago, which are also experiencing higher crime.”6 This tension —
between police discrimination and failures of crime control measures—was precisely one that 
early-twentieth-century African Americans and Latino/as had faced in Chicago as they 
simultaneously demanded equal law enforcement and critiqued the illegal state violence that 
pervaded their neighborhoods.  
The Department of Justice made a long list of recommendations for the improvement of 
policing in Chicago, echoing the many recommendations for reform offered by organizations 
like the Vice Commission of Chicago, the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, and the 
Citizen’s Police Committee. These recommendations treated the many problems identified in the 
investigation, as the DOJ suggested that the Chicago Police Department implement policies for 
the de-escalation of force and reduction of violent citizen-police encounters, establish an 
                                                
4 United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney’s Office Northern District of 
Illinois, “Investigation of the Chicago Police Department,” 3. 
5 Ibid, 5. 
6 Ibid, 15. 
 
378 
impartial police oversight body, retrain officer and provide better guidance on the legal 
parameters of policing, create of transparent data collection services, revise the police promotion 
systems to ensure that qualified officers assumed leadership positions, and the reinvigorate 
community policing.7 These recommendations focused entirely on improvements the Department 
itself, leaving aside questions about urban inequality, racial segregation, and urban violence that 
many of the city’s early-twentieth-century reformers had foregrounded. 
“The Politics of Crime Control” provides deep historical context for the findings of the 
Department of Justice and yields explanatory value for the intransigent problems of police 
violence, police accountability, and community mistrust that the investigation discovered in 
Chicago. The broad investment in the politics of crime control among a variety of historical 
actors in the early twentieth century demonstrated that the primary goal of law enforcement was 
the imposition of urban order and defense of the urban color line, often at the expense of the rule 
of law, equality, or safety. The findings of the Department of Justice also indicated the historical 
continuity of several elements of the early-twentieth-century coercive state, particularly the 
coercive state’s toleration of certain types of urban disorder—state violence and law breaking in 
certain neighborhoods—and its attempts to discipline some communities through illegal often 
violent means. The city has undergone many massive changes in the decades that separated those 
two historical moments, however, as decades of deindustrialization, capital flight, and new 
waves of immigration have transformed in the urban landscape of Chicago in the second half of 
the twentieth century. The enduring problems of policing, however, indicate how deeply issues 
of police discretion and state power are embedded in the very governance of the city itself, 
shaped by immediate political circumstances but ultimately entwined in the organization and 
                                                
7 United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney’s Office Northern District of 
Illinois, “Investigation of the Chicago Police Department,” 150-161. 
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structures of urban life. The parallels and similarities between the problems of the early-
twentieth-century city and that of today indicate that in order to implement meaningful change to 
urban policing, reformers must grapple with the long history of discretionary, violent, and 
discriminatory policing and particularly the structures and processes that have insulated those 
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